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THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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SAMUEL ALEXANDER

PROFESSOR J H MUIRHEAD

IN Samuel Alexander, who died on September 13th, we have lost the thinker who, since the death of F H Bradley in 1924, has been the leading figure in British philosophy, and whom all schools, whatever their differences, have delighted to honour as their chief. Closely united with Bradley as one of "those from whom he learned most," and as himself for eleven years Fellow of a neighbouring College in Oxford, he developed a philosophy which in its starting point, method, and apparent results was poles asunder from that of his teacher. Yet it would be strange if two men who both inherited the same great European tradition, and pursued what they conceived of as its inner significance with the same absolute sincerity of purpose and the same talent, amounting to genius, for speculation should have been so wide apart from each other as the letter of their teaching seemed to indicate. Alexander might not perhaps have been willing to ask, as Whitehead does, whether "the type of thought involved (in his own metaphysics) be not a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism on to a realistic basis,"¹ but I believe it could be shown to be true that by a kind of "meeting of extremes in contemporary philosophy," different from that which Bosanquet had in mind in his book with that title, these two philosophers stand for different perspectives of the same world: the one starting from the axiom that "if you would see a thing as it truly is you must watch it in its beginnings," the other from the opposite "if you would see the reality of a thing you must see it in the light of what it aims at becoming," the one meaning by reality that which is actual, the other that which is ideal, the one

¹ Preface to *Process and Reality*, p. vii

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emphasizing existence, the other value, as the clue to the truth of the universe. If this or anything like it be true, what these two leading thinkers have left to the coming generation is not so much a choice between two diverse philosophies as a call to the task of uniting what is true in each in a more truly "synthetic philosophy" than Herbert Spencer was able in his time to achieve. It is hoped that the present article may be followed by others in the same journal in which in the different departments of philosophy something of this kind may be attempted. It has seemed, however, to the editor that any such articles should be preceded by a more general one on Alexander's life and work as a whole, and he has asked me to undertake it. If old acquaintance, dating from 1878, when, coming from Australia, he won his Scholarship in Bahol for a like excellence in Classics and Mathematics, and admiration for a life as lovely in its entire unselfishness and unworldliness as in its devotion to truth, as he saw it were sufficient qualifications for the task, I might have more confidence in my ability to perform it. It is another thing to hope that, in the bare outline which alone is possible in a single article, anything like justice can be done to the immense scope and statuesque completeness of the work he has left behind him, and to the debt which not only our own generation but others after us will always owe to it, and I am full of diffidence of my power to do what is required of me.

Alexander has himself indicated two different ways of approaching a great philosopher:—one, "the study of his precise teaching, setting it in relation with his age" the other, that of inquiring what he "can teach us in our present problems." But there is a third which, while not without reference to the former of these at the beginning and to the latter at the end, should occupy itself in the main with the steps by which he arrived at the great generalizations that he sought in his chief work to expound. It is this, as more suited to my own turn of mind, that I propose to adopt. If I venture, with still greater diffidence, to add a reference to certain difficulties, which one approaching these problems from a different point of view still feels about the letter of his work, it will be with the view of justifying what I have just said of it as a perspective which requires to be supplemented rather than superseded. In itself it may still be possible to say of it, *stat mole sua*.

Though, by his own work and that of others, the terms "realist" and "idealist" have largely ceased to form any clearly dividing line between different schools, there remained in the formative period of Alexander's thought a fairly definite distinction between those who approached philosophy from the point of view of a human

experience everywhere interlaced and, in its higher forms, dominated by ideas in a way that separated its method from that of the empirical, and particularly the physical, sciences, and those who approached it from the side of the latter, and conceived of philosophy as consisting in only a wider application of the same method, differing chiefly from the special sciences by the inclusion of the elementary "categorical" forms that run like a warp beneath the woof of experience in every field. It had been the unfortunate legacy of the Kantian philosophy to treat these forms, of which substance, causality, universality are the chief along with extension in time and space as contributions of the mind and so to make every object into which they enter mind-dependent. Idealism was burdened with this tradition, and formed a challenge to a realism that was prepared to treat these along with everything else that could be made the object of contemplation, as empirically given. Whether Alexander ever accepted the Kantian form of idealism I do not know, but his whole bent of mind was against it, and the historian of the time¹ is within his right in classing him with the writers who in the book with that title represented the New Realism. 'The temper of Realism,' Alexander himself wrote in 1914 "is to de anthropize, to order man and mind to their proper place among the world of finite things on the one hand to divest physical things of the colouring they have received from the vanity or arrogance of man and on the other to assign them, along with minds, their due measure of self-existence"² He was careful, however, to add in the spirit of that 'natural piety'³ which he held to be the mark of the true investigator "Realism strips mind of its pretences, but not of its value." It was this, along with a profounder acquaintance with the history of philosophy, that distinguished him from some of the writers just mentioned and made him reject with growing decisiveness the extremist view which was prepared to treat consciousness as merely "a cross-section of the external world, and so to lapse into "behaviourism." While in its appeal to non-empirical elements, such as he conceived Green's "eternal self" and Bradley's "Absolute" to be, idealism required a wholesome lowering, the new realism called for an equally wholesome raising of its temperature.

This attitude is already clearly manifest in his first book, *Moral Order and Progress*, published in 1889. It was based on the essay for which he obtained the Green Moral Philosophy Prize in 1887 upon the subject, "In what direction does Moral Philosophy at the

¹ E.g. Rudolf Metz in his *Hundred Years of British Philosophy*

² 'The Basis of Realism' *Proceedings of the British Academy*

³ *Space, Time and Deity* II p. 47. Elsewhere he speaks of it in another mood as that "deliberate innocence," that "strenuous naïveté" which was the chief qualification of the philosopher.

present time seem to you to admit or require advance?" By this time Spencer's *Data of Ethics* was already in its fifth edition, and Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics* had followed on the same general evolutionary lines. From his study of these writers Alexander "had come to the ideas borrowed from biology and the theory of evolution, which are prevalent in modern ethics." But he had come to them also "with a training derived from Aristotle and Hegel," and claimed that what he had found was "not antagonism but, on the whole, fulfilment." It was this training that enabled him to go beyond at once Spencer's mechanical treatment of society as an aggregate of individuals and Stephen's idea of the "social tissue," while remaining true to the realistic spirit of both these writers.

The first part, on Moral Order, is a modern version of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, interpreted in terms of an "equilibrium" established, on the one hand, between the individual and the society with which he is organically connected and, on the other, between his own instincts, desires, and interests. The second and more original part, on Moral Progress, is an application of the doctrine of evolution in a field where the struggle for survival is no longer between individuals and groups, terminating in the physical extinction of one or other of them, but between ideals, with all that this implies in the gradual and peaceful victory of those which are more in harmony with the needs of a truly social life.

On re-reading the book to-day one is struck by the anticipation we find in it of all that the writer taught us to look for in his work: the learning so lightly borne, the power of expression and of finely chosen, often humorous, illustration; the scrupulous fairness to opponents, finally the sense of the limitations within which his own conclusions held. Whatever we may think of the adequacy of the formula of "equilibrium" and of "social," or what Bergson calls "closed," morality to cover the full scope of moral goodness, the book stands along with Green's *Prolegomena* and Bradley's *Ethical Studies* as the high water mark of nineteenth-century Oxford thought in this field.

While he had become convinced from the side of ethics, as Bradley in those same years had come to be from the side of logic, that neither of these studies could be pursued with success apart from a sound basis in metaphysics, Alexander was aware that problems still awaited him in psychology and the theory of knowledge the solution of which must supply further data for such an advance. For some twenty-five years accordingly we find him occupied with a series of papers on these subjects, in every one of which he may be said to have broken new ground by his insistence on

a thoroughgoing empiricism. It would be tiresome to enumerate them, but one or two are of particular interest as anticipations of his later metaphysical doctrines.

He was one of the first to see the importance that was coming to be attached to the idea of Value, and his article upon it in *Mind* of January 1892 formed a transition from his empirical treatment of moral values to a similar treatment of value in general. He is still occupied mainly with the moral ideals interpreted as "nothing but the formulations of desires" and "but forms of healthy social life," but he recognizes that there are other kinds of value, namely, aesthetic and scientific, which admit of being treated on the same basis in reply alike to hedonist, intuitionist, and rationalist theories. However closely related to metaphysics the corresponding sciences are as furnishing further data for it, his method removes them from its domain and classes them as "the last or psychical class of the natural sciences." He was to return to all three with new clues to their nature in the light of his own metaphysics. Meantime his interest centred in psychology and epistemology in preparation for a higher flight.

It was, so far as I know, in his contribution to the Symposium in the Aristotelian Society on "The Nature of Mental Activity" in 1908 that he first announced the view that mind or consciousness consisted essentially in activity or conation, and that what were commonly treated as the objects or 'contents' of consciousness, whether sensations, perceptions, images, or conceptions, are in fact physical objects, part of the real world, entirely independent of mind. The conation differs according to the nature of the object, colour, figure, etc., but "consciousness is one and the same thing working only in different directions." When we try to make our idea of it more definite and explicit, "it is always referred to brain." In other words, "consciousness or mental activity can never be a presentation." "I cannot attend to my attention as I attend to what I write." He had not yet arrived at the distinction between the object as something "contemplated," the activity as something "lived through" or "enjoyed," still less at an answer to all the questions which are thus left over to be settled by metaphysics, but it is easy to see that we have here the foundation of everything that was to come.

The article in the same journal of the next year contains a further explanation of what is meant by "direction" ("consciousness exists in space just as greenness is spread over a leaf"), together with an application of the doctrine to willing and the problem of universals. With regard to the will, his comment upon Bradley's view of it as "the self-realization of an idea" is that in an act like that of lifting the arm "in nine cases out of ten there is no image of the arm

being lifted, but only a felt direction, as yet disconnected with the system of mental movements which is the consciousness of present reality " "The fiat of the will, which some writers love to regard as mysterious, is nothing but the snapping together of the temporarily imperfect and disconnected system with the general trend of the mind's activity ' With regard to ideas or universals, again starting from Bradley's doctrine of them as inseparable from reality but as having a psychical existence, Alexander appeals to a greater authority than his "Unless Plato has lived and written in vain, why should not ideas be realities? ' What is true of the universal in things is true (again *pace* Bradley) of the universal we call the 'self' There is no continuity between myself and the part of it we isolate as an object to it (e.g. an idea which it has) "in the sense in which there is continuity between my different mental actions " Throwing down the gauntlet to the whole idealist epistemology, he declares that it is only "because subject and object are supposed to constitute an experience, to make that unity within duality which alone is real, that we are disposed to accept the proposition that a part of the self may become a not self and be turned into an object to the self from which it is cut off ' "

The challenge was not long in being taken up In a paper at a following meeting of the Aristotelian Society, G. F. Stout, whom Bosanquet in those days called "our one psychologist," on the subject "Are Presentations Mental or Physical?" sought to show the deep line of division between presentations such as we have in sense perception, in memory, or in dream images, and the physical objects which they represent Stout did not deny that conation and feeling were underlying elements in all mental existence, but he contended that there were 'certain existents so connected with conation and feeling as to form with these part of the simple system which we call an individual mind ' "

In his reply in the following number of the same journal, in a paper on "Sensations and Images," Alexander admitted that he had gone beyond his record "in calling all objects of cognition physical " "The vital question is whether they are independent of mind " But he was still prepared to insist that *sensa* and images (as distinguished from seeing or imagining) are physical in the sense of having the characteristics of physical objects, and to drive the doctrine home by what seemed a greater paradox still, namely, that "perceiving a thing means that mind and the thing are together in the same sense as the table and the floor are together " That is not to say that there is not a personal element in experience, as is shown in illusion and error But this means merely that "inappropriateness in the action of the mind distorts its vision of things

The man who is in error is wry-necked " He is "thrown" like Janet in Stevenson's story, and the object of Science and Philosophy, as Plato said long ago, is to twist him round so that he can see The illusion is a partial appearance which, though not "true," is nevertheless "real "

In these articles the lists were set for a tournament which has lasted to the present day Meantime opposition and criticism only stimulated Alexander to the further development of his own thesis What strikes one in looking through these and the succeeding articles is the sureness and rapidity with which he advanced along his chosen road In that on "Self as Subject and as Person" he rejects all doctrines that appeal to a "pure ' or "timeless self ' The self is "thoroughly empirical and yet, though it is so, it is rightly called 'I,' because it is not an 'object' experienced but an 'experiencing' experienced "It is enjoyed or suffered but it is not revealed to itself it is not contemplated " If we try to contemplate it, we find that it is not the mental self we are contemplating, but the complex of neural activities, of which mind is the ' effluence ' He has, however so far advanced on his former view as to recognize other features in the activity besides direction, namely, duration and succession, degrees of intensity, a variable toning of pleasure and pain, and emotional excitement He admitted the difficulty of treating these last as objective "If anyone chooses to maintain that they are the varying qualities of consciousness, I have as yet no answer to give ' So far as I know, it was not till he came to write the section on Feeling in *Space, Time and Deity* that he renounced the view hitherto shared with Stout that pleasure and pain are modalities of conation, and boldly announced that they are objective experiences of the order of organic sensations "

The paper in the *British Journal of Psychology* of the same date as the last mentioned, on "Foundations and Sketch-Plan of a Conational Psychology," is chiefly interesting as showing what he might have done had he chosen psychology instead of metaphysics as his subject in the coming years How strongly his mind was by this time bent, and how far it had already proceeded in the latter direction, we can see from the article which has the leading place in *Mind* of 1912, on "The Method of Metaphysics and the Categories " After repeating what he had already said of mind, he uses it to exclude two principles of method first, the principle that other things depend on it (in other words, idealism), and secondly, the principle that mind is co-extensive with physical things (in other words, pan-psychism) From this he goes on to define metaphysics in distinction from the particular sciences as "the attempt to describe the ultimate nature of existence and the pervading charac-

¹ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1910-1911*

² Vol II, p 132

ters of things," a definition which he holds is "sufficiently near to that of Aristotle to be regarded as identical with his." But, though thus distinguished from Science in the extent of the matter with which it deals, its method is the same "through and through empirical." It takes existence and its pervading characters as given entirely independently of mind, either as a contributor or as a constituent. So far from being either, mind is only one among other things so given—albeit "endowed with the highest quality we are aware of," and thus "the most gifted individual in a democracy of things," the summit of a hierarchy of levels each of greater complexity of structure than that which goes before it but founded upon it. To this apparent commonplace of observation his distinction between the contemplated and the enjoyed enables him to add that, while each higher can enjoy its own form of existence it can only contemplate itself in terms of the level below it: the living in terms of physical and chemical matter, the mental in terms of the living organism. If there are higher beings than human minds (as we may well believe there are, or are coming to be), minds will be there for them to contemplate "spread out in space and occurring in time, just as we see vital processes in a plant occurring in space and time," while they will enjoy a form of being of their own the nature of which we can only vaguely anticipate. Again it is easy to see that in all this we have the first sketch of the argument of his great book the subject of which is further anticipated at the end, when he puts to himself the "old question of the nature of being itself. Is time for instance, the real tissue of things? Or space? Or both?"

What the enumeration of the categories is? Finally, as there is no identical quality which belongs to all things in the same sense as they are all in the infinite foundations of space and time, "it would be the business of a profounder study than this to explain the secret of the breaking up of the whole continuum into these 'finite centres' of existence."

It was these questions that were to occupy Alexander during the immediately succeeding period. Whether he would have been stirred to carry out this formidable programme in anything more than isolated studies like those just mentioned is a question. At times he would complain of his own laziness and inertia, perhaps not unconnected with the feats of physical energy he displayed in those days on his bicycle. Certainly the social and political disturbances of the time might have formed sufficient excuse for the indulgence of such a weakness. Fortunately, the invitation in the middle of the War to deliver the Gifford Lectures at Glasgow came as the strongest incentive to adopt a wider plan, in which the various strands of his thought as hitherto developed should be woven

together into a single pattern. The result was given to the world in 1920 in his great book on *Space, Time and Deity*, to take its place beside Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* and one or two others as a landmark in the history of latter-day metaphysical philosophy in England. Much of it was already familiar to those who had followed the previous development of his thought. But even in this there was no mere repetition of what he had already written. Everything was recast to fit into the new mould, and came with a freshness derived from the new context. The features that were distinctively new were the doctrine of the unity of Space and Time as comparable to that of body and mind,¹ which occupies so large a portion of the first volume, and the doctrine of Deity as a quality of the universe which has still to "emerge," which occupies the latter part of the second.

It would lead me too far to attempt to condense the difficult arguments by which Alexander sought to establish these doctrines, still more to attempt any criticism of them. It will be sufficient to recall the respects in which they came as a challenge to both the current idealism and the current realism. The first challenged the criticism of idealists by its apparent attempt to find the secret of the universe in the earliest, most abstract, and empty form of unity, that of space and time, instead of in the latest, the most concrete and the fullest, as we have it, in the *mind-discovered* worlds of science, history, art, morality, and religion. The second challenged the criticism of realists by the flight it seemed to take from the solid ground of space-time existence into the azure of an unexperienced and to us inexperiencable quality called Deity. It was while his book was being assailed by this cross fire of criticism that Alexander once ruefully complained to the present writer of his failure to have found any important following. But this was to forget that a philosopher, more than anyone else, casts his bread upon the waters in the hope of finding it after many days, and that, in any case, his success is to be measured not by the number of his disciples, but by the sincerity and consistency with which he has sought to apply some single great principle to throw light on the world of experience. As the Scottish philosopher Ferrier long ago said, "It is more important that a philosophy should be reasoned than that it should be true." If any was ever reasoned from the foundations, it was Alexander's.

With regard to the truth of it I will venture only on one remark, and that in the form of a question following on what I said at the beginning. Bradley, in his last years, is said to have been visited by misgiving as to his own entire consistency. This is a wholesome

¹ Time in Alexander taking the place of thought or idea in Spinoza as the other known "attribute" of Substance.

visitation, even when it may be too late to remedy the fault I do not know whether Alexander, with all his modesty, ever seriously confessed to one of the same kind. Yet if he had done so, might there not have been some ground for it, in view of the at least seeming inconsistency of seeking the matrix of everything that is in the empirically, or, as he preferred to say, intuitively, given fact of existing Space-Time, and yet endowing this with a *nisus* to ever higher forms of being, each of which takes up and gives meaning to that which went before—in a certain sense (to use a phrase of his own in speaking of human imperfections) "redeems" it? It may be a misnomer to speak of this *nisus* as the purpose of a creator embodied in the world, but does it not bear a strong family resemblance to the transformation which things undergo, according to Bradley, in the Absolute, and may it not be legitimately read as another example of bow in the great dialectic movement of thought which we call philosophy 'the incensed points of mighty opposites' may bear in themselves the promise of their reconciliation?

After the main harvest of his long sowing had been reaped in 1920, Alexander lived long enough to glean a still rich aftermath in the indulgence of the interest he shared with so many of the younger generation in the theory of art. No one can read even the most technical of his writings without being struck with the fineness of their literary expression. His own outlook on life may be said to have been that of the artist. He had the poet's love of "all things both great and small" in nature and human life. His heart went out to birds and dogs, to children, and to the subtler, more humorous and lovable traits of men and women. Deprived by his life long deafness of the full enjoyment of the freedom of human intercourse and of music, he found his chief resource in literature. In his frequently solitary walks it was his habit to carry a book of poetry with him, and to employ himself in committing favourite passages to memory. It was, therefore, no surprise when in his later life he became engrossed with the problem of the nature of Beauty.

¹ *Space, Time and Destiny* II, p. 421

² There is doubtless a record in Manchester University of the words in which as 'public orator' he introduced the recipients of honorary degrees. Nothing that he has written would more vividly illustrate this charming feature of the man.

³ Among his lesser writings are "Mobyère and Life" 'The Art of Jane Austen' 'Pascal the Writer' to be found in the *John Rylands Library Bulletin* 1926 and following.

⁴ One of my own liveliest reminiscences of him was once in Edgbaston in the twilight before the lamps were lit when it was suggested that he should recite some poetry to us, and he unhesitatingly responded with long passages from Shelley in the rich tones of his beautiful voice.

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He had already, in *Space, Time and Destiny*, dealt with it in conjunction with those of truth and goodness under the head of "Tertiary Qualities," where, to the surprise of some of his readers, he had seemed to abandon his realistic basis by treating it as a character which "the external thing receives from its connection with mind"¹ The explanation was that the development of his "conational" psychology had given him a new point of view from which value in general could be treated as issuing from the demand to satisfy fundamental impulses when these reach a certain degree of consciousness, and the objects towards which they are directed are sought for their own sakes Each of the so-called values has a nature of its own according as the impulse is to be satisfied in the case of truth, by the exclusion of personal elements and submission to the teaching of things in the case of practice, by the adaptation of things to human needs in the case of beauty, by the infusion of new meaning into things as objects of impassioned contemplation In all cases these qualities appear in contrast to the primary and secondary, as a joint product of mind and object It was this doctrine that had been applied in his book, but there was much left over to say about them, and particularly about beauty True, natural beauty seemed to offer a difficulty, and in discussing it Alexander is apt to use words reminiscent of ordinary realism, as when he distinguishes it from artistic beauty and claims for it that it 'is presented to us ready made for inspection, or rather for discovery our hands or voices have had no part in fashioning it'² But in *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*,³ published in 1933, he leaves no doubt as to his view, namely, that "the beautiful, whether in art or nature is of course a reality It is not mere physical (or human) reality because it mixes the mind with the physical or, it may be, human topic which suggests it But being an amalgam of two real things, the one physical and the other mind, the product is also real and has its own autonomous reality" Why, he elsewhere asks, should that which is the product of two things that are real be itself less real on that account? To which our reply would be, "Why indeed?" but further to ask whether on this principle we might not here again find a ground of reconciliation between heated opposites in the long, by this time somewhat wearisome, discussion of the objective reality of empirical qualities, including space and time themselves, by taking them as Meredith in the *Ode to Colour*, which Alexander delighted to quote, took them, if not mind created, yet as much spiritual as physical

¹ Vol II p 293

² *Art and Instinct* (Herbert Spencer Lecture 1927)

³ P. 143 Cp "Artistic Creation and Cosmic Creation," p 12 Herz Lecture, *John Rylands Library Bulletin* 1927

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As a member of the great Jewish community, Alexander would have been false to that profound interest in religion and the destiny of man, of which it is the historical representative, if he had not had the bearing of his philosophy on these subjects constantly before him. In his first book he mentions them at the end, only to postpone the fuller treatment of them as belonging to metaphysics. He returns to them in the last two chapters of his second book. On the problem of human destiny, his view of the organic connection between mind and body forbade him to entertain any idea of immortality in the sense of individual survival. But his doctrine of the universe as groaning and travailing for the revelation of a Deity, which is "on the side of goodness,"¹ brought him very near to the conception of the fatherhood of God. "On the one hand, we finites reach out to God, who is the goal of our desires: on the other hand, God, who is sustained by us, meets us with support and 'the solution of our uneasiness,' " in what theologians have called "grace and redemption or forgiveness of sins."²

In the course of his life Alexander was loaded with honours. Besides receiving honorary degrees from six universities, he was a Fellow of the British Academy, an Honorary Fellow both of Bahlol and Lincoln College, and in 1930 he received from the King the Order of Merit. In the obituary notice in *The Times* it was reported of him that he once remarked "I may be wrong in the way I see the fact, but if they inscribe on my cinerary urn *Errat il cum Spinoza* I am well content." If we would not inscribe that upon it, we might well inscribe instead *Ut alter Spinoza philosophatus*.

¹ *Space Time and Destiny* ii p. 413.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 398-9.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF POLITICS

W G S ADAMS CH, MA, DCL

I VENTURE to take as the subject for our consideration the philosophical study of politics. However imperfect the treatment of such a subject, it seems to me opportune that attention should at this point of time be directed to the question. The study of politics is of increasing importance in the curricula of our universities and in general adult education. There is also the plain fact that we live in times when a deep unrest of spirit and a great variety of experiment challenge ideas and institutions which have received wide acceptance. There has been, in short, a return to politics. It is well that we should consider afresh the value of the study and the methods by which it is studied.

Forty years ago there was very little place in our universities for the study of politics. Looking back on my undergraduate days, I recall that in the University of Glasgow there was no study of politics as an academic subject. Much the same could be said of all the universities of this country, with the exception of Oxford and Cambridge. Economics had already established its claim. But apart from the general consideration which might be given under the subject of ethics, politics was not in the curriculum of the faculties of arts. At Oxford more than at any other academic centre in this country, there had been a tradition of political philosophy in the school of *Literae Humaniores*, and later in the school of Modern History—a classical and a historical tradition of great value which was enriched and stimulated by the lectures of T. H. Green on *The Principles of Political Obligation*. But very little attention was given to the study of modern institutions and forms of government. In Oxford it was not until 1910 that a university readership in political theory and institutions was established, and two years later the Gladstone Chair was founded. In Cambridge there was even less recognition given to the subject of politics, though Professor Sidgwick had in his *Elements of Politics* prepared the way for the more systematic study of government, analytical and comparative. But it was not until after the war that a chair of political science was established at Cambridge. On the other hand, the establishment of the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1895 was a notable step in the recognition of the impor-

* Wright Memorial Lecture delivered on Tuesday, June 28th, at University College, Gower Street, London WC 1

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tance not only of economics but of politics as a subject of academic study and research. It was of particular significance, as marking an advance in the study of the institutions of modern government, ranging from the constitutional forms and functions of the State to the machinery and methods of administration. Since 1920 there has been a considerable growth in political studies, inside and outside of our universities. But it is still noteworthy that, apart from the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and London, the provision for this subject in the universities of this country remains very restricted, and in only one of the Scottish universities is there a chair of Political Science. When we reflect on the importance and scope of the subject matter, it is, I hope, opportune to direct attention to the position of the study of politics in our universities and colleges. The contrast with the practice in the United States of America is marked. In that country, both at the older and at the younger universities, Politics and Government have been firmly established in the curriculum of studies, and while criticism can fairly be directed to the methods of study as developed in many of the American universities, the place given to the subject is assured.

The traditional study of politics in England has been philosophical. This developed with historical study, formed the background of our academic political education. But politics deeply affected by scientific method, has turned to the examination of the data of politics, to the study of institutions and of administration, and to the use of comparative methods of inquiry. This inductive procedure has greatly enriched the study of politics. But it has also had its dangers. Classification and comparison of constitutions may easily deteriorate into a formal and arid study. The data are so vast and so complex that there is a danger of a mass of information with very inadequate illumination and evaluation. The teaching of politics in not a few institutions, and not least in the United States of America, has suffered from the weakness of the more theoretical study of the subject. An emphasis therefore, of the philosophical side of political studies is the more important because of the great advance in the study of the forms and methods of government.

But there is also another aspect which has come into greater evidence—the psychological approach to politics. Graham Wallas more than anyone in this country opened the way, and it is to be regretted that others have not followed up his work to a greater extent. But even the psychological method has its dangers unless it is accompanied by a well-thought out philosophical background, and by a proper sense of values.

We have, then, to remark the wide and growing appeal of political studies. Man is a political animal, and there is especially in our

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Anglo-Saxon peoples a natural aptitude and interest in the subject of politics, in practice and in theory. Like religion, politics has a wide human appeal, and political education, adapted to meet the requirements of widely varying conditions, can be a great instrument of international understanding.

We have, therefore, to bear in mind the unique opportunity which the instrument of political education offers, and to see that such education is thought out in a way which can be assimilated most easily and be most truly beneficial to the great mass of people. For it is in the advance of political education that one great hope of continued progress lies. It is, then, all the more important that in the academic field we keep a true sense of proportion. In this approach to politics from so many sides—the historical, the comparative, the psychological—the philosophical approach is now more valuable than ever so that synthesis and perspective may be maintained. Not only is this important for the study of politics in itself, but also for the relations between politics and other subjects. For politics is the architectonic science in human relations. It has to weave together the different elements in a whole as seen in the pattern of the good community and the good man in that community. It is the sequel and complement of ethics, and they both must rest on a sound theory of knowledge. For this reason there was great wisdom in the older academic curricula in which there was a related and balanced order of studies. The increasing range of subjects claiming academic recognition, and the methods of free choice and the equality of studies, have led to a less unified and less systematic mental training than the older order with all its limitations secured. One can see this tendency writ large in the American universities. The right way of meeting the danger is in the recognition of the place of philosophy at the centre of all our academic studies. But this also affects the content and the concept of philosophy itself. It is the science of values and of relations which helps to set out that which is fundamental and to see the order in which things stand one to another. The content is greatly enriched by the range of modern studies but we need a development true to line with that which was laid down by the great masters. Therefore we must see to it that in our academic curricula, while we provide the opportunity for all the branches of knowledge, we secure that there is this essential common study which should be claimed to be of the province of philosophy. If this is done in the great study centres of the universities, the influence of this method of treatment will pass over their walls into the fields of the wider community and influence the whole character and value of adult education. And it will be welcomed. For the plain man—if we may use such a term—in virtue of his social nature and experience has

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a strong sense of values. He wishes to get what can help him to a way of life which he feels to be worthy of a man and a citizen. It is because it appeals to this sense that politics, like religion, has been, or can be, so universal an agent in the progress of mankind. To-day, in the complexities and distractions of modern life, it is therefore more than ever important to consider the main lines of constructive social thought, from a philosophical standpoint.

Let me then try to state some of the essentials which belong to such a philosophical view. First, there is not simply the recognition that man is a political animal, but that he is a creative being, in whom not only social sense, but imagination and, above all, will are the directing powers. The will to create is the deepest urge in man. It is true not simply of the individual, but also of the society or community in which men realize their social nature. History has been rich in illustrations of the power both of the individual and of what we may call the social will—the will of orders and groups, of States and communities. Surely to-day one of the most striking things in the modern world has been the will-power and the creative energy which have brought into so great a place the new forms of government which have emerged since the war. Whatever we may think of their qualities and their objects, they offer signal evidence of the power of will of the leaders to create a new order of State—Soviet, Fascist, or Nazi—to take the most familiar examples. These forms—because of their very will-power—challenge our own Anglo-Saxon society, whether in the old or in the new world, to give proof of a will and energy no less vital and no less able to re-create and to provide a way of life as good or better than the new forms of government have achieved or can achieve. It is then of first importance to recognize that while nature in its manifold and complex influences shapes our way of life, the will to the good life is the unique and the most essential quality of man, and that he is the conscious architect of the society in which he is to live. It is the challenge to the policy of drift. It is the policy of planned effort. The will of the organized community is something which can overcome mountains of difficulties. The power of the organized community is something of which we only yet dimly know the possibilities. There is no inevitability in poverty and unemployment and slumdom. The will of the society can conquer all of them. It is fundamental that we should have as strongly as others this sense of the creative will in politics. For it is on this that the whole structure of our thought and action is based.

Second, we must be clear as to the purpose and end of political society—that it is to make possible the good life in which all its members may share. "Treat every man as an end and not a means

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only" is a condition of the good society This is one of the tests by which we try the merits of any political society

A third principle is, that to see the nature of the parts we must see the whole However far from its realization, we must keep in view a world order which completes the life of the individual States which are only parts of the wider political society The very difficulties and failures which have marked the efforts to advance towards a world order do not remove the need for it, but only help to show by what means it has to be sought and with how great patience The discontents and dangers of the times in which we live make it clearer than ever that there is no peace, and no safe prosperity and well being, until the principles of world order have been secured

Further, we must frame for ourselves the idea of the good community, so that we can see the different elements which enter into it and their significance This is the sequel to and consummation of the foregoing points For we sum it all up in our idea of the good community Here it is that we bring theory into practice It is the philosopher in all of us translating into terms of government and of community organization the theory which we approve We have our principles by which we assay the goodness of the constitution If a constitution fails to provide what we know is essential to the good life, then we cannot accept that type of constitution We see to-day more clearly than ever the need of such tests The philosophical question is 'What is the good community?' The student of politics has to be asking himself time and time again this question, and the concept of the good community, step by step becomes more defined and complete There is no single pattern but in various forms we may find the variety of expression of the idea of the good community We have to face the evidence that different types of State, and different organization of functions in similar types of State, can be the expression which suits best the history, the conditions of life, and the mental characteristics of different peoples In fact, it is only through the experience of varieties of types, and through the cross fertilization, if I may say so, of these types, that we are able to discover how the social end can be best expressed For it is by experience that we discover ways and means of achieving the expression of the good life The forms and functions of government are continually changing There is constant growth and adaptation And we cannot at any point of time be certain how a particular type of State may develop We thought the way of progress and of the expression of the political nature of man was so much simpler than it is Lord Bryce, in what we may regard as his political testament, puts forward the view that we have reached the stage in which it is not so much in the form and constitutional

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framework of States that interest and experiment lie, as in the functions of the State. But even in the seventeen years since that was written we have seen great new experiments in the form of national States, and we see in the international sphere one great constitutional experiment which has still left unsolved the problem of the form of international government. Progress comes largely by experiment, by trial and error. But throughout it is necessary to have the philosophical critique of value, seeking to assay the breadth and depth of each stage in our experiments. It is the critical Socratic spirit which is necessary to progress, and never more so than in the complexity of modern experience. But this variety of experience does yield conclusions. We have the comparison of the working of different types, and gradually by trial and error certain forms tend to predominate. If forms are found unequal to meet the fundamental aspirations of man as a social being, they adapt themselves—or give place to other forms. For more and more the importance of good government is being realized. In the modern world the powers of government have so greatly increased—and the powers not only of government but of combinations whether of capital or labour—that control and direction are of vital consequence in the pursuit of the good life of the community. Government can do great damage to the whole social and economic well being of the community. There is a new realization of the importance of good government, and men are asking again the question—What is good government?

There is always a danger of forgetting things that are simple, perhaps even obvious. Politics is not something abstruse. The very term—the good life—which it is so difficult to analyse completely, yet expresses the *fundamental simplicity of politics*. There has been a tendency in the present generation to belittle the creeds of the preceding generation. The "rights of man" may not express the sum of political endeavour, but they give an answer of permanent value. That all men are equal contains a great truth as well as something that is contrary to experience. The rights of freedom of speech, of freedom of association, and of freedom of movement are great elements in the good life. The claim to life, liberty, and property expresses much that is vital to every man. All such rights are conditioned—and especially is this true of the right to property. But the study of the nature of rights and of sovereignty is still of the essence of political education. There is a danger that we pay too little attention to thinking and rethinking the various conditions and qualifications of rights and of sovereignty. No study of constitutions and of administrative method can have the fruitful character which it should have unless it is accompanied by this constant reconsideration of the nature of rights and sovereignty.

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We are apt to find the history of political thought, or the comparison of constitutions, an easier and more concrete study, and politics is enriched thereby, but it is necessary to have the philosophical evaluation of each phase of thought and of each form of constitution. And for this purpose we must have our principles and standards of value clear. I find, therefore, that in the study of politics we must not dispense with or give second place to the more abstract study of the nature of the State of rights and sovereignty, but that we must carry on this method of political examination enlarged and enriched by the great variety of experience which illustrates the nature and conditions attaching to rights and sovereignty. Power politics tend to discourage and even to deny the value of such speculation. It is in the pursuit of liberty and in the free association of men for their political and spiritual development that such speculation has its great value. The rights of man are the essentials of a good constitution. If by reason of their abuse or because of the dangers which temporarily threaten the safety and existence of the community, these rights are limited or even suspended, this is an abnormal condition. The end in view of any good State must be the establishment of those fundamental rights the denial or the restriction even of which limits the capacity of the members of the society to attain the good life. The study, therefore, of these fundamental conditions is a way in which societies can emerge from the dominion of power politics. It is also in this way that functions and forms of government tend to approach nearer to one another. For is it not a reflection which has arisen in our minds from time to time, that while there is in some States the denial of the rights of free speech, of association, and of other such fundamental rights, yet there is at the same time a growth of social functions and a realization in other respects of much that contributes to the good life? We disagree deeply with many things that we see in the Fascist or Communist forms of government of the day, but we must recognize also how large has been their positive contribution. We must try to find the specific good as well as the evil, and to see how that, under conditions in which fear and ambition are less dominant forces, these fundamental rights, which are so large a part of liberty, may be re-established.

Let us try, then, to express what is our idea of the good community. That idea comes out of a long political experience through which our Anglo-Saxon peoples have been passing. We believe that representative responsible government is the best way of releasing the political energies of man, that Cabinet government is the best of the forms of representative and responsible government, that the nation forms the unit in a system of international government and order, that by means of representative government we can advance,

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on the one hand, towards the best form of organized world government, and that, similarly, by representative institutions in local government we are in the process of building up a differentiated yet integrated political life, which reaches down to the smallest unit of the parish and stretches up to the institutions of international government, that the citizen thereby enters into and shares in the life both of his local community, of his State, and of the larger federations or unions which have their final consummation in the field of world government, that the distribution of powers is by experience being continually adjusted between the different planes of government, and that the flexibility of the constitutional framework is an essential quality if the system of government is to respond to the changing conditions of a progressive community

But there is another aspect no less important. Great as has been the gift of representative government, we have also learned, especially in this twentieth century, that the community is an organization greater than the State, greater than the machinery of representative government and its statutory authorities, and that the power of free association expressing itself through voluntary bodies of a wide variety of functions in co-operation with the statutory authorities is a type of community far more capable of realizing the good life than is possible under a simple representative, and still more a mainly bureaucratic, type of government

Now in this new development of the community idea there is deep significance—in line with the evolution of democracy, as we understand that term. The idea of democracy is that as far as possible the members should be associated with the work of government and that there should be full and free opportunity for groups of members and for individuals sharing in and contributing to the life of the community. The form in which this has been expressing itself with increasing activity in recent years has been not only in the growth of the functions of the State and the devolution of power to local authorities of a representative character, but also in the part which voluntary organizations have to play in co-operation with statutory authorities. Thus co-operative commonwealth of statutory and voluntary bodies, central and local, is developing before our eyes and in none of the great industrial States of the world has it been carried so far as in this country. It is still far from its full expression but the associative principle, springing from the free exercise of initiative, is enabling a great variety and richness of community effort to advance the standard of well being is bringing about a breaking down of class divisions and the growth of good neighbourliness and what is also very important is increasing the power and usefulness of public opinion. Democracy is governed by enlightened public opinion. This experi-

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ment in community life is in its nature as significant as the growth of representative government. For while there have been in other generations strong elements of community life, especially local, here and now is a much wider community consciousness, developed largely through the social services in which voluntary associated effort has so often pioneered the way for State action. This new community sense which calls out the initiative of the individual and which seeks to provide increased opportunities for self-expression in the service of the community has a significance which is being appreciated in countries with very widely differing conditions of life. Forms of voluntary social effort may succeed in stimulating community life even where representative government at least in its responsible forms, may not be suited to the conditions of a community. In some countries the introduction of representative government has not worked easily, because there is not a sufficient development of the social and associative qualities of the individual in ways which enable him to take a responsible share in even local government. In such cases we must get down to the education of simple voluntary activities in communal life. Thus in its sense of values and in seeing the whole range of social development, from the primitive to the more advanced forms, the philosophical study of politics should help to interpret the past, to see the relations of things one to another in the present, and to re-state for each generation the complex nature of that end which is our goal—the Good Community.

SCIENCE AND MORALITY

PROFESSOR A. E. TAYLOR

'I do not think that moral philosophy can be of the use of which it should be, unless it struggles at least, to cope with the greatness and complexity of the problem which there is before it and to face the difficulty of the variable-ness and vastness of the nature of man'—*J. Grote*

CAN there be such a thing as moral science, or a science of morality? And if so, what sense has the word *science* in such a connection? In the middle of the last century such a question would probably have seemed superfluous. Utilitarians, Comtists, and not a few "evolutionists" would all have claimed to be moralists, with this advantage over the metaphysical or theological moralists of an earlier day that their own moral doctrines were "scientific" (which meant apparently that they formed an integral part of a wider view of things for which the principles of the natural sciences provided the foundations). Mill, Spencer, Stephen, to name no others, would presumably all, if challenged, have claimed to be scientific moralists in this sense as distinguished from the "unscientific" moralists who filled University Chairs of Moral Philosophy or occupied pulpits on Sundays. The intellectual climate of to-day is very different. In view of the current tendency to exalt the "irrational elements" in life it is now not only possible but pertinent to raise the question whether the very phrase "moral science" is not an attempted conjunction of incompatibles—a *contradictio in adiecto*.

Plainly our answer to the question will depend very much on the precise significance we give to the word *science*, and it is to some extent arbitrary how we are to use that word. But it would, at least, be generally admitted that before any body of assertions can be called a science it must satisfy two conditions: the assertions which compose it must be true, and they must be systematically interconnected by logical interrelations. The most coherent body of false assertions is not a science,¹ and again a number of assertions, however true each of them may be, does not constitute a science if one can detect no systematic logical connections between its members. Consider, for example, the entries in a chronicle, or the items in a list of historical dates. Every item or entry may be a record

¹ Thus the consistency with itself of an astrological system would not entitle astrology to be considered a science. Yet it is quite conceivable that the astrologer's initial postulates should be mutually compatible and that his inferences should be drawn from them with logical correctness.

of truth, but the construction of such a chronicle or list of dates is not the writing of "scientific" history (if there is, indeed, such a thing). At best, the chronicler, or the compiler of the list, is providing materials for 'scientific' history (if there is such a thing), not making a contribution to it. The very possibility of moral science, then, depends on our ability to make assertions about right and wrong, moral good and evil, which are (a) true, and (b) systematically interconnected. It follows that "moral science" must at once be confessed to be an impossibility unless we can dispose of a doctrine which is beginning to be expressly formulated by some of the more thoroughgoing of our 'logical analysts'. According to this doctrine sentences which contain an ethical predicate such as *right*, *wrong*, *obligatory*, *undutiful*, cannot properly be said to be either true or false, or, in fact, to have a meaning at all. They *state* nothing, and so, I suppose, should not properly even be called propositions but are merely "emotive" utterances, whatever that phrase may mean. What it does actually mean to those who employ it is more than I can tell, but I should like to ask what it *should* mean if it is to justify the radical distinction between such "emotive" use of language and the meaningful use of it.

To say that certain sounds are an 'emotive' expression, or are expressive of emotion is to say something highly ambiguous. We need therefore to be very careful to fix the precise sense of such a phrase before we allow ourselves to assume that language which is "emotive," or "expresses emotion" cannot also be language which has a value or disvalue as true or false. If all that is meant in calling an utterance "emotive" is that the speaker or writer is *moved* to make it by some emotion, and would not have made it if he had not felt the emotion, almost any form of words we employ in normal waking life may be said to be 'emotive'. A sane man in the waking state does not commonly make any statement, however true it may be, unless it is relevant to a situation which *interests* him, and interest has always its emotional side though it may not always be very prominent in consciousness. No one but a "freak" like "Mr F's aunt" in Dickens makes remarks like "there's milestones on the Dover Road" apropos of nothing in which an interest is felt. Hence a normal sane utterance is regularly "emotive" in this minimal sense, though its primary purpose is not to call attention to the speaker's emotion. If I say to you, "that girl dances well," or "that tree will be the next to fall in the autumn gales," my remark is certainly prompted by admiration of the dancing, or by some kind of emotional concern in the fate of the tree, though it is not the fact that I am feeling admiration or concern (a fact about myself), but the fact that the dancing is graceful or the state of the tree precarious (a fact about the dancer, or the tree), to which I want to direct your

attention. And these statements are certainly capable of being true or false. It is thus no proof that sentences containing an ethical predicate cannot properly be called true (or false) to say that the utterance of them is prompted by emotion, the same thing might be said of all normal utterance.

Again, it would not be true to say that at any rate utterances which are *passionately* emotional, intensely charged with emotion, need be in any way removed by the intensity of the emotion which inspires them from the class of meaningful utterances with a "truth-value." The bare statement of fact may itself be charged with the deepest emotion, as when Macduff says of Malcolm, "He has no children," or Lady Macbeth in the sleep-walking scene, "the thane of Fife had a wife," or Lear that the 'little dogs' bark at him. So in everyday life, "He'll go over the edge," is a statement which will very soon be shown to be true or false by the event, and "What a liar you are," does not cease to be a true assertion about a man because it may have been prompted either by intense disgust or by keen admiration. Even if it were true, then, that utterances containing an ethical predicate are always expressive of emotion in an exceptionally high degree—and I think this not true, since it seems to me that I often pronounce some act right or wrong without feeling any remarkable degree of emotion—it would still not be proved that these statements are not also true or false, as the case may be.

Even if we took what seems to me the certainly false view that the purpose of enunciating a statement with an 'ethical predicate' is simply to proclaim the fact that the utterer is, at the moment of speaking, feeling a certain emotion, this would be no reason for denying that such statements are true (or false, as the case may be), in the proper sense of the words. For if such phrases are "emotive" in that sense of the word, then the sentence "this is good (or evil)" states an alleged fact, the fact that the speaker is now feeling 'moved' to approval or disgust, and since he may sometimes lie about his emotions and sometimes be honestly mistaken about them, it is as pertinent to ask about a moral judgment as to ask about any other judgment, whether it does or does not represent the facts as they really are. It would not help an opponent to suggest that a relevant difference is made by the impossibility that *B* should 'verify' *A*'s statements about *A*'s emotions. It is true that this is strictly impossible. Since I can never actually inspect the feelings of anyone else it is always conceivable that the assertions the other man make about his feelings are untrue. But to be untrue is one thing, to be unmeaning in the sense of being incapable of a "truth-value" is another. If the privacy to myself of the emotions which, on the proposed interpretation, my moral judgments assert me to be experiencing were a good reason for holding that such judgments

—or rather such "sentences indicative"—lie outside the field of the true and the false, it would equally follow that such a statement as "my tooth aches badly" can be neither true nor false, since, though you can "verify" by inspection the fact that there is a cavity in my tooth, you can never "inspect" my pains.

There is, as it seems to me, only one interpretation of the language which the rest of us regard as expressing moral judgments left open to the "analyst" who wishes consistently to deny that such language can be true (or false). His meaning in what he says about "emotive" utterance must be not that these deliverances *communicate* information about the emotional mood of the speaker, but that they are intended purely, like political propaganda, to *excite* or induce certain emotional moods in the hearer. When I say, "that is an act of heroic courage," or "that is a despicable meanness," I must be taken merely to be making a noise which will stimulate the hearer in the first case to shout "Bravo" and in the second to yell "Boo" or "Yah," and it is as irrelevant to my use of this language whether or not I, the speaker, feel the emotion I am trying to arouse in my audience as it is irrelevant to the platform politician whether he shares the emotions he is trying to produce in *his* audience. For, on this interpretation, when I call one act heroically right and a second damnably wrong, I am not even trying to inform you that I feel admiration for the one and horror at the other, I am only

I know that the "analysts" seem commonly to hold that "verification" may be effected in two different ways: (1) By observation of *sensa* and (2) by introspection. But the admission of introspection as a method of verification—though indispensable in fact—seems to me a fatal weak point in the theory since if there is one way of ascertaining the truth of a statement other than the inspection of *sensa* and radically different from it there seems to be no antecedent reason why there may not be a plurality of such ways in which case it will be possible to "verify" statements which cannot be shown to be true either by examination of *sensa* or by introspection. I suspect indeed that the "analyst" only consents to recognize introspection because he is not alive to the radical difference between it and all examination of *sensa* imagining both to be ways of inspecting objects presented to our notice. If so I am sure that he is mistaken about the whole nature of what is called introspection. My awareness of pain or anger while I am feeling them is emphatically *not* observation of what lies in the field of objects attended to, it is awareness of an attitude on the part of the subject who is attending to them. James Ward long ago used to complain of the mischief wrought in psychology by extreme "presentativism," but his warnings seem to me never to have borne all the fruit they should.

(It is not strictly relevant perhaps to add that in my own opinion it is a complete mistake to describe even the process by which we verify a statement about the world outside as inspection of our own *sensa* in the sense in which that word is employed by those who make prominent use of it. I mean that what we try to inspect, and succeed in inspecting whenever we really "verify" such statements, is never "private" to ourselves, but always a "public" fact.)

trying, for some unknown purpose, to make you feel these emotions, and it may well be that I shall often be most successful if I am a consummate actor, like Antony in his oration over the body of Caesar, undisturbed by the emotional tempest I am awakening in the breast of others

If it were really possible to interpret "ethical" language in this fashion, it would, of course, follow that it is senseless to ask whether such language can be *true*. It would be like asking whether "Hurrah!" "*à bas*!" "go it!" "damn!" are true or false. Or I may take a closer analogy from an incident which dwells in my memory after the lapse of over forty years. I recollect being present with one or two friends at a Liberal political meeting where the speakers were careful to begin as many sentences as they could with such grammatical subjects as "The Tones," "Lord Salisbury," "Mr Chamberlain," and to make a long pause after the enunciation of these names, obviously in the hope that the audience would be excited by the sound of them to hisses and similar "emotive" reactions (I am glad to remember that my friends and myself, being securely encased in a gallery from which we could not be dislodged, were able to spoil the effect by sedulously filling up the pauses with loud cheers and applause which, I am afraid, was far from being sincere). Now here was a genuine employment of language for the *mere* purpose of evoking 'emotive' reactions, it would be senseless to ask whether "the Tones," or "Mr Chamberlain," is a true or a false enunciation; the intention was only that the sound of the syllables should provoke a manifestation of hostile feeling (and it was our resentment of this abuse of language which prompted my friends and myself to do what lay in us, to disconcert the proceedings).

Now it is, of course, open to the bright young logical analyst, if he pleases to profess that when he uses the language of moral approval or condemnation, he intends only to employ it in this fashion. If he likes to say that when he utters the words *good, bad, right, wrong*, he is merely employing them as "expletives" which he finds successful in producing an entirely unintelligent reaction from his auditors, no one can prove that he is lying or deluding himself (though one may have one's suspicion on the point). But if he pretends that this is how the rest of us use these "ethical predicates," then I think, he is simply stating the thing that is not. Our intention—or at any rate our hope—is that our language will awake an emotional response, favourable or unfavourable, but also, and primarily, to call attention to a character present in the act we call good or evil, right or wrong, which *justifies* this response. Our analyst

* Such a profession reminds me for one of Morris Finsbury's explanation that when he referred to Dent Pitman he was only using an 'expletive,' a statement which was naturally not credited by the interlocutor

may assert (very rashly, I think) that *he* detects no such ethical characters in the acts in question and that our language consequently has no meaning intelligible to him, but that gives him no right to say that it has not a meaning which is perfectly intelligible to us. He may be like a colour-blind person who should say that other men's statements about the colours of the rose and the turf can be neither true nor false on the ground that if they are taken to have a "truth-value," they presuppose qualitative differences which *he* is unable to "verify." It may be barely conceivable that all mankind, with the exception of a few "sophisticated" young men of the present generation, have deluded themselves into imagining they discern purely non-existent contrasted moral characters of human actions, though, as Butler long ago said, the supposition is extravagantly improbable. "It cannot be imagined that all these authors, throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimerical." But, at any rate if we who are less 'sophisticated' are convinced that we do discern moral distinctions between acts and can make a whole body of coherent statements about these distinctions, our conviction is not proved to be "chimerical" by the "analyst's" declaration, however sincere it may be, that the distinctions are imperceptible to *him*. He may be "colour-blind" or 'tone deaf' in these matters.

This suggests a reply to the suggestion, if any one should think of making it, that there are notorious cases of purely "chimerical" beliefs which have imposed on mankind generally for ages. The most obvious example is perhaps that of the once universal belief in witchcraft. If there is a whole literature of ethics so it may be said, there is a whole elaborate literature dealing with witches, their crimes, and the methods by which they can be detected and frus-

' To take a particular illustration, I happen just to have re read John Grote's *Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*. I have found myself often agreeing with the 'ethical' propositions of the writer, sometimes dissenting from them, but only rarely perplexed by a sentence which appeared to make no assertion true or false. And in these rare cases I seemed always to have reason to believe that my perplexity was due merely to some failure in the author to put his thought into unambiguous language. It is possible of course both that I may have mistakenly thought some of his assertions true when they were actually false (or vice versa) and that I may have thought his meaning ambiguous where it is not really so: but is it credible that through a work of 350 pages I should have been deluded into the fancy that there was meaning true or false, when in fact there was none at all? If it is credible then it is equally credible that the writings of the logical analysts themselves may equally have imposed on me in the same way: and that I am deluding myself into the notion that I disagree with them when there is really no asserted meaning to be agreed or disagreed with. They also perhaps are only making noises which evoke certain emotive dispositions in me?'

trated Yet, it will be argued, the existence of the *Malleus Maleficarum* and its likes are no proof that there are or ever have been witches; why then does the existence of treatises on ethics prove that our moral distinctions have a meaning which is not "chimerical"? But here we need to make a *distinguo*. The literature of witchcraft does really prove the real existence of something, it proves that there really have been multitudes of persons who have claimed the extraordinary powers attributed to witches and have used their position as the supposed repositories of these powers for criminal purposes. It is no 'chimera,' but an historical fact, for example, that "covens" of such persons were common and active in Scotland in the seventeenth century. On any sane theory, what was "chimerical" in the beliefs of the writers on witchcraft was their *explanation* of facts which were themselves genuine enough. And the objection to the explanation as it seems to me, is not that it is meaningless, but that it is most probably false. In the same way, it is perfectly possible to put forward *explanations* of "moral fact," which are "chimerical," but the emptiness of the explanations is no proof that the facts themselves are not genuine facts. And Butler seems to me justified in treating the preoccupation with the moral characteristics of human acts to which the serious literature of all ages is witness as a sufficient presumption that our acts have the characters indicated by the great pairs of contrasted moral predicates. *Φήμη δ' οὐτις πόμπαν ἀπόλλυται ἤντινα λαοί*

In a word, I agree altogether with Dr. A. C. Ewing that the whole case for the 'meaninglessness' of sentences with ethical predicates falls to the ground unless we can make the initial assumption that all meaningful statements can be "verified" and that this assumption—which seems to me plainly false—being itself unverifiable, ought in consistency, to be regarded by the 'analyst' as meaningless and therefore *a fortiori* not true. And I would add the remark that if a discourse of moral exhortation or rebuke proves effective in arousing the "emotive" reactions desired by the speaker, it succeeds only because the listeners assume the ethical predicates employed to have a meaning and to be truly applicable to the conduct to which they are being applied. Your audience will not be got to 'boo' at a man by describing his conduct as wicked if they either attach no meaning to the word *wicked*, or give it a meaning which is not true of the conduct you are describing. I shall not be wrought to a frenzy against a Nero by denunciation of his cruelty unless I already believe that *cruel* is a word with a meaning, and that cruel deeds have the character, whatever it is, meant by the word *cruel*. If I thought it simply unmeaning to call any conduct evil, or false to call cruelty in particular evil, your eloquence would leave me unmoved. Purely meaningless language, recognized as such, will

have no "emotional" effect on the hearer, except possibly to bore him¹

(It is, no doubt, true that a crowd might conceivably be wound up to a high pitch of excitement by a vehement appeal in a wholly foreign language, but the thing is only possible because the general bearing and demeanour of the foreigner speaks for him—it suggests, rightly or wrongly, to his hearers that he is struggling to convey a meaning, and one which they believe themselves, in part, to grasp. Dr. Johnson—if it was he—is said to have stirred an old market-woman to fury by calling her a 'noun substantive,' but the reason of her wrath was, of course, that she took the unfamiliar vocables to be equivalents of others whose meaning was only too familiar.)

There is thus no objection in *limine* to the description of the moral life as the subject matter of a science, when the word *science* is understood to mean any body of true propositions (or judgments, if you prefer the name) systematically interconnected through discoverable principles. Even on a naturalistic theory like Hume's "moral science" remains *scientific* in this sense, though there may be nothing distinctively *moral* about it. It does not simply present us with a string of records of isolated social approvals and disapprovals—but connects them systematically by a principle, the approvals are all of "acts or qualities" either "agreeable" or 'useful,' and the disapprovals are all of the useless or disagreeable. To live by it would be not merely to conform to a set of rules, but to have a *principle* of "choice and avoidance."

This otherwise superfluous remark is introduced here simply to lead up to the important point that to recognize morality in conduct as the subject matter of a possible science commits us to no view whatever on the question of the methods appropriate to that science. In saying that we are entitled to presuppose the existence of principles of consistent moral approbation and disapprobation, and to expect them to disclose themselves when sought for by the proper method, we are making no assumption that any particular method for their discovery will prove to be the right one. What methods will succeed in conducting us to the discovery of principles in any field of inquiry must naturally depend on the character of the field.

¹ Cf. John Grote's comment on the suggestion that by calling action conducive to happiness *right* or *good*, philosophers have intended merely to convey praise and incite their readers to the performance of such action.

I am disposed to think that Mr. Mill would agree with me that such is not the way in which the human race could act—that language could not be made by contrivance to give the notion that action was valuable for one reason while the men who made the language had in their minds all the time the notion that it was really valuable for another reason—could not in fact be employed to conceal or disguise the thoughts of the whole human race (*op. cit.*, 272).

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In particular the question whether the methods which have proved fruitful in the natural sciences will prove equally fruitful, or fruitful at all, in moral science can only be answered by first answering the question whether a moral fact and a natural, or physical, fact are facts of the same kind. Natural, or physical, fact, we may perhaps be content, for our purposes at the moment, to describe as the occurrence of a specific event in a determinate region of space and time (Whether there are or are not irreducible differences in kind between some of these natural facts and others—whether, for example, biological facts can or cannot be regarded as peculiar and highly complex chemical facts—is an issue which need not concern us.) By a moral fact, or fact of the moral life, I mean here any action which can be truly said to be either good or right, or deserving of approbation or evil, wrong, deserving of condemnation. Now it may be that there is a radical distinction between an *action* and an *event* as I propose in due order to contend that there is. At any rate, we are not entitled to take it for granted without discussion that there is no such distinction. Until we have satisfied ourselves that there is not, we have no right to presuppose that the methods which disclose principles when applied to natural facts will be equally applicable to moral facts, or even applicable to them at all. It is pure *petitio principii* to take it for granted that if morality is the subject-matter for a science, the methods of that science must be those of the experimental sciences, or that the ethics of a philosopher like Kant who rejects this assumption must be less "scientific" than those of a philosopher like Herbert Spencer.

The extent to which either deserves to be called a scientific moralist is to be measured by the thoroughness with which he has envisaged the field of facts with which he is professing to deal in their full concreteness, and compelled the facts themselves to disclose the principles they presuppose and we are not at liberty to assume in advance that the advantage in this respect must lie with the more 'naturalistic' and less "transcendental" thinker. His naturalism may prove to mean that he has ignored the specific character of moral fact, and is therefore, in his ethics, the more "unscientific" of the two.

Now if we take an initial broadly comprehensive view of the whole field covered by the natural sciences, we can see at once that they are all concerned in finding the answer to a question of definite character and that the nature of this question determines for us the type of answer which will satisfy it, and so decides what shall be, for our purposes, relevant fact. Our question has always the form *quid eveniet si* . . . ? If events of a certain kind occur, then what? If particles with such and such masses are set moving in such and such directions, what will follow? What will happen if such and such

chemicals are mixed in such and such proportions and at such and such a temperature? If such and such a plant is placed in such and such conditions in respect of sunshine, moisture, nutriment, and the like, how will it be affected? The question is always what will happen if some process is allowed to run its course without our interference, and the assumption made in putting it is that there is a definite way in which that course will be run. It may be that the situations of which we wish to know the outcome are presented for us without any action of our own to prepare them, as when astronomy as a science began with the attempt to answer the question in what orbits we may expect to see the planets moving. It may be that we have experimentally to produce the initial situation of which we wish to study the outcome by elaborate arrangements of our own. But the important point is that in either case a certain situation once secured, we "leave things to take their course" and watch to see what it will be. Even when, as in a prolonged series of experiments, we introduce one modification of the conditions after another, it is always with the purpose of then noting what will "happen of itself" after each new modification introduced into the situation. The distinction popularly drawn between observation and experiment is a secondary one as it is largely arbitrary where the line of demarcation is to be drawn between them. The one point of importance is that we should know precisely the character of the situation we are interested in studying. It is a great practical convenience, for this purpose, to be able to produce the precise situation we want for ourselves, but in principle it makes no difference to the type of method available in our study whether we have done this or nature has provided us with our situation unsought. In either case, the question before us is, as I said simply, "this being the situation, what next?" And it is no objection against such a description of the problem of natural science to say, truly enough, that some natural sciences, such as astronomy and geology, are largely concerned not with answering the question "what next?" but with telling us what was the condition of the earth's crust, the sun, or the Galaxy millions of years ago. For the answers to these questions of natural history are provided on the strength of previous answers to other questions of the "what next" type. Before astronomers could raise any problems about the past history of the solar system, for example, they had already to be in possession of a generally correct account of the way in which the members of the system do move, i.e. an answer to the question given their present positions, masses, velocities, and accelerations, where may we expect to see them go?

What I may call the typical problem of natural science is thus of the form *quid eveniet* si . . . ? By using the word *eveniet* I mean

that the problem is always how a certain situation will be continued if left uninterfered with, I add the *si*, of course, to indicate the hypothetical character of all "scientific laws." They do not assert that the situations of which they describe the continuations ever actually occur exactly as they are described. In many cases we can be quite sure that they do not, but are simplified "ideal pure cases," and in no case can we be theoretically certain that our description has not omitted some relevant, or included some irrelevant circumstance. The probability that we have committed one of these errors may be so little as to be negligible for practical purposes, but it is never zero.

The orientation of "reason in its practical use" is entirely different. Here the question to be answered is never *quid eruiet*, but always *quid mihi faciendum, quod vitae sectabor iter?* The moral problem, which even the most resolute logical positivist can never ignore in the management of his daily life, however stoutly he may deny its existence in his speculative theory, is never what will happen "of itself" if a given situation is allowed to develop itself, but always what kind of change I am to introduce into it. It is, of course, possible to ask the other type of question with reference to situations in which the constituents are ourselves and other personal agents. An "introvert" with a marked interest in psychology can, at times and for a time, by an effort attain an attitude of detachment in which he *seems* to be watching the spontaneous development of the "mental events" of his own life without intending to deflect their direction. We can, and sometimes do, say and do various things, merely to see as the phrase is, how other persons will "take them." But this sort of interest in ourselves and in other persons is not the attitude of morality. No precept or maxim of any conceivable moral code is a mere answer to the question what will come of it if certain persons are placed in a situation of a certain type, the question which even the most "naturalistic" of moral theories sets itself to answer is the very different one in what situations I am to place myself and others, what direction I am to give to any initiative. I want to know for example, not what will come of it if I revenge affronts and what if I pardon them, but *whether* I am to pardon them or to revenge them. I cannot, of course, answer this second question without knowing *something* about the answer to the first, but it is still a wholly different question and remains to be dealt with when the first has been disposed of. Even the logical analyst who theoretically professes to regard "ethical" statements as meaningless cannot escape the daily and hourly necessity of having to make decisions. Like the rest of us, he has to decide whether he will or will not take a certain journey, accept a certain post, or make a certain offer of marriage or a certain business proposal. Whenever he is faced with

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the need to come to a decision, he is treating his life not as a course of events to be watched and described but as a thing to be made, and a thing which may either be made as it should be or made otherwise, according to the use he makes of his initiative. Thus whereas in making a scientific experiment the problem how we are to intervene by our own initiative is secondary and can be at once answered in principle by saying that we are to do so to realize the situation in the development of which we are interested and then to let things take their own course, in practice it is the question how we are to intervene, what we are to make of our lives, which is paramount and the further question what will come of it which is subsidiary.

It is a consequence of this that the moral problems, properly stated, is not *quid mihi faciendum sit* . . . but *quid mihi faciendum* without any further qualification. When I have to take a decision, I may already be satisfied that if I decide in this sense, I shall increase my income, or add to my reputation or gratify a cherished longing, or improve my expectation of living to advanced age, if I decide in that I shall diminish my income, shall risk my reputation, shall disappoint my hopes, shall impair my 'expectation of life,' yet I have still to decide whether I will take this course or that. It is not a sufficient answer, for example, to the question whether I am to close with a certain proposal or not to say that if I do so I have every expectation of affluence; if I do not, I am pretty certain to remain poor. An adviser who regarded such considerations as decisive would be tacitly implying the doctrine of Jim Pinkerton that 'it is every man's duty to die rich if he can,' and no intelligent recipient of the advice could well avoid retorting on him, like Lothian Dodd, with the awkward question "Why?" It would not be much more satisfying to say, "Decide for this alternative against that because this line of action will probably in the end give you whatever it is that you want most, and the other will not." For though I may *perhaps* know what it is that at this moment I want most, I can never be sure that I shall continue to want that thing most, one of the results of any important decision will be that the making of it will affect my whole "scale of values" in all sorts of subtle ways, and so that by taking my decision I am determining what I shall want. What I shall want out of life will depend on the sort of man I come to be, and I make myself that sort of man by the decisions which I take throughout my life.

None of us are born into the world ready-made devotees of "women, wine, and song," of wealth, fame, power, virtue, or anything else. At most it can only be said that some of these things have a stronger attraction for one man, others for another. It is each of us who decides for himself in the main by the way he directs his

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choices which of them he shall care for most. The moral shaping of our lives is no simple matter of selecting means to some end which is prescribed for us once for all from the outset and which we might, by taking sufficient time for reflection, envisage in advance, we have to decide for ourselves what our ends, as well as the means by which we compass them, shall be. Indetermination of this kind is a fundamental characteristic of the life of practice which we are bound to recognize as a fact, independently of any speculative theory libertarian or anti libertarian, by which we may try to co ordinate the facts of human life with the rest of our knowledge. Any rule for the practical direction of life must therefore be based on the presupposition of a *faciendum* which is *faciendum simpliciter*, not *faciendum* if some particular consequence is to be achieved. There we have the unassailable kernel of truth in the Kantian doctrine that the precepts of the moral law are *categorical imperatives*.

To make my precise point clearer, let me take a simple illustration of it from my own personal history. As a young man I received and declined the offer of a post which would have meant passing years of my active life, and perhaps the whole of it, in India. When I look back upon that decision and ask myself whether it was justified or not, it would not be enough to say that it is justified because the life I have in fact led has been productive of certain results which I now find satisfactory, but should not have achieved if I had accepted the post offered to me, that I have got what I wanted out of life, and should not have got it if my decision had been different. For it is reasonably clear that if I had closed with the offer and had spent my life between twenty-five and forty or forty five in India, my interests would have been in many ways different from what they actually are. I should not have had the life which I now pronounce satisfactory, but I should have had one which would very possibly have been at least equally satisfactory in retrospect to the man I should now be if I had then chosen differently. It follows then that in deciding at the time whether to accept or decline I could not have reached any issue by merely asking myself which course would provide me with the life on which I might expect to look back with the greater satisfaction in my later age. If I could have been shown in advance in some magic mirror the life I have actually led and the life I should have led if I had migrated to India and then asked "which picture will give you the more content when you come to review it at the end?" I could not have answered in either sense, since the answer must depend to an

* I g. it would not be enough to say "If you had gone to India, you would never have written books about Plato" since if I had gone there and wanted to write books still, I should probably have wanted to write them about something different.

unknown degree on the very choice which I should be illogically trying to make dependent on it. If the choice was to be made not on blind impulse but on grounds which could justify it to the intelligence, those grounds must be looked for in some conception of a life to be lived, an activity to be pursued, independently of any hypothesis about what met my wishes at the time of deciding or might be imagined likely to meet my wishes in later age, simply because it is "the thing to be done" τὸ πρέπον, τὸ καθήκον.

If we are to have any rules we can trust for the direction of life, there must be a discoverable standard of "appropriateness" wholly independent of the particular tastes and antipathies of any of us or all of us. And it must measure the "appropriateness," or "fitness" not merely of different ways of acting as conducive or not conducive to some presupposed "end," but of alternative 'ends' themselves. It must indicate to us a standing orientation of the will which will be ideally fitting in all the contingencies of any possible human life. And this clearly means that our knowledge of this standard must be strictly *a priori*, it cannot be derived from any information furnished by experience about the ends which men actually set themselves to attain, since it is itself the standard by which we adjudicate on the "fittingness" of all of them. It must, from the very nature of the case, have—and here I am glad to find myself in full accord with Professor Guzzo—precisely the character of a 'separate and "transcendent" εἶδος which Plato ascribes in the *Republic* to the "good" and in the *Symposium* to the καλόν.

Further, it follows from the 'transcendence' which must belong to such a standard precisely because it is the standard which it is that any knowledge we can have of it must be "abstract" in the sense in which "abstractness" is commonly, but in my opinion quite wrongly, said to be a fault of the ethics of Kant. One thoughtless writer after another has made it a reproach to Kant that his supreme moral principle will not of itself tell them unambiguously just what it is my duty to do here and now. I should rather say for my own part that the only ground for justifiable criticism of Kant in this particular respect is that he apparently (though, I think, only apparently) allows himself to speak in one or two well known passages as though information of this kind could be extracted from his principle. As it seems to me this is not the case and ought not to be.

I am thinking particularly of the unguarded language sometimes used in the *Fundamental Principles* about the ease with which the plain man can satisfy himself of the path of duty by merely applying the test of universalizing his maxim. Kant over-simplifies there by considering only cases where there is already a known 'middle axiom' provided by the current moral code and the problem is whether I am free to disregard that axiom in the present case. Unconsciously he presupposes his person in doubt to know already that generally speaking it is wrong to violate the current precept,

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the case if Kant's principle is really *the* ultimate moral principle. What is the one thing "fitting and proper" in one practical situation may be the very thing which is least fitting and proper in another, and the very same principle may therefore demand sharply contracted courses of action

Two men, for example, may have exactly the same conception of the obligations imposed by marriage and the same respect for them, yet the one may be led to regard it as his bounden duty to marry and leave children behind him, the other, on the same principles, to hold it his duty to live in life-long celibacy, and both may be right. A king, for instance, who knew that his death without a son would probably lead to a war of disputed succession would be doing wrong not to marry, even though all his strongest personal preferences were for the life of virginity, a soldier, an explorer, a Christian missionary, whose work could be ruined by the cares and distractions of domestic life, would be equally doing wrong in marrying, however difficult he found the practice of continence. Since the principle of dutifulness (or whatever other name we may give to our ultimate moral principle) is equally illustrated by the marriage of the one and the celibacy of the other, the principle, taken by itself, cannot prescribe either. A principle implied in all rules of right action cannot itself be identical with any of the rules. And therefore anyone who comes to the study of moral *principles* expecting to learn from it just what "good thing" he in particular is to do in life is bound to find that study distressingly "abstract." It is as though a poet or musician were to go to a work on æsthetics for rules which could tell him just how to shape the tragedy or the symphony on which he is engaged. Just how Shakespeare was to make a great tragedy out of the crude materials of the story of Hamlet or Lear is something which no philosophy of æsthetics could have told him. At most he could have been given some general warnings against faults like the brutal blinding of Gloucester on the stage in *Lear*, but the most punctilious attention to these warnings would not have sufficed to produce the great play. And the warnings themselves

and it therefore becomes easy to show that to violate it would be to put inclination in the place of principle and must therefore be immoral. It is easy enough to convict a man who already grants that it is a duty to make no lying promises of want of principle if he proposes to make such a promise in order to suit his convenience. It would be quite another matter to deduce from the general principle of duty that there is a duty to make promises. It is inconsistent to maintain that promises ought to be kept but that I am dispensed from keeping them when it is inconvenient to me to do so. But it is not obviously unprincipled to lay it down as a rule for every one's conduct that a verbal undertaking not substantiated by a guarantee of performance is not binding. The language of the *Critique of Practical Reason* about the use of the Kantian principle as an acid test of purity of motive is more guarded

have to be taken with the caution that they are sometimes more honoured in the breach than in the observance "Elizabethan" drama would be improved by being more faithful to the precept *ne pueros coram populo*, yet it is clear to my mind that the dead bodies of Agamemnon and Cassandra were exhibited on the Athenian stage itself, and that the effect Aeschylus is aiming at would be impaired without them *

We may seem to have strayed far from the issue which this essay is professedly discussing, but I believe we shall find on consideration that we have been strictly faithful to it. It follows from what we have said that a supreme principle for the direction of conduct is not related to the particulars of the conduct inspired by it as the "laws" of the natural sciences are related to their instances. The scientific law is—if we have succeeded in formulating it correctly—a "universal" which is strictly immanent in the particular instances and in each of them.

The instances themselves may indeed be such as never actually present themselves in concrete facts: there may never be an actual liquid which has the exact composition of chemically pure water, there may be no actual body in the universe which is moving "under the action of no forces." But our propositions in chemistry about the behaviour of pure water, or our "first law of motion" are meant as statements and exactly true statements, about what would be found to be the facts about such a liquid or such a body if they were to be discovered anywhere. The "pure water," for example, again under precisely specified conditions of atmospheric pressure which we may not be able to secure in practice, would vaporize at the precise temperature of 100°C and the process of vaporization would be precisely in accord with our scientific descriptions of it. Our formulae are only "laws" when we are entitled to say that, in the absence of complicating conditions for which we have not been able to allow, the mere substitution of precise values for the "variables" mentioned in them will yield a precise description of what would happen. But no conceivable formulation of a supreme moral principle for the direction of our willing will, in the same fashion, yield a precise

* Cf. the words of John Grote (*Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*, 269-70). Simply *a priori* ethics have no application, and therefore no significance and no value. Simply *a posteriori* ethics do not seem to me to be ethics at all. I should agree wholly with this dictum provided that it is borne in mind that what can be called *a priori* is in fact not the whole body of ethics but only the "fundamental principle" (or principles) and that the principle has applications though the applications are not indicated by the formula which expresses the principle but have to be found in the concrete situations of human life as we live it. And as regards the "fundamental principle" Grote was right in adding (*op. cit.*, 276) that Mill's moral doctrine is as much *a priori*, and as little "inductive," as Kant's.

description of that which it is proper to do in the particular case in which a man is called upon to act. I do not mean merely that just as the chemist very probably never meets with a sample of perfectly "pure" water, so we never meet with an actual agent whose orientation of willing is morally perfectly "pure," that, for instance, there is no actual friendship which is not vitiated by some secret self-seeking, no actual heroism not tainted by vanity and "exhibitionism." What I mean is that even if you suppose the "pure case" of a wholly disinterested friendship or a heroism contaminated by no trace of "exhibitionism," it is still impossible to deduce from your ideal of friendship or heroism precise conclusions about the conduct which will, in this particular contingency, express perfect friendship or unsullied heroism. Phintias, in the story, shows friendship for Damon in its perfection by returning to die, but there might be situations (it is not hard to inquire some of them) in which Damon might reasonably have felt that *not* to accept his proffered self-sacrifice would have been to fail in friendship. You can safely say 'if this is pure water and the circumstances are as stated, it will boil at 100° C, and if it does not, it must be an impure specimen.' You cannot say with the same assurance, "if this is a truly good and virtuous man, then, the circumstances being as stated, he will act in just this way, and if he does not, he cannot be the virtuous man we supposed."

And the reason of this greater uncertainty is not simply that the circumstances which have to be taken into account as relevant in deciding how to act in a given case are so numerous and so complicated. This would still be true if the problem of practical living could be reduced, as it cannot, to the mere discovery of means to a determinate end already known in advance. If I knew that my one concern in life is to "die rich, if I can," it would still be hard to know how to go about the business. But since, in fact, it is precisely for the discrimination between different possible "ends" that we most need a supreme directing principle, the principle, if we find it, will prove to be one of a higher order of generality, quite incapable of affording by itself the immediate applicability to the particular case needed in *axiomata media*. It will be some such direction as "Always do right for right's sake," "Seek the true good of mankind," "Do the will of God in all things," "Always be true to your highest self." All of them admirable as precepts for the general orientation of the will, but none capable of answering the question what is here and now the right which should be done for its own sake, the true good which should be promoted for just these men, the thing God wills me to do, the act which will be one of loyalty to my highest self. All are "separate" universals never completely "concreted" or "immanent" in their instances. This explains both why the life of

devotion to good or right can never become an affair of routine repetition of conformity to "the rules," as it might if good or right were an universal "immanent" in its instances and having no being except in them, and again why the supreme principle of any genuinely philosophical doctrine of ethics must be, as Kant rightly maintained, *formal*. Where Kant went wrong, if anywhere, was not in his insistence on this point (which is, indeed a proof of his insight) but in inconsistently proceeding to write as though the *matter* of our various specific duties could be deduced from the formal principle of dutifulness.¹ But this, as we have already said, is no more possible than it would be to deduce from the *general principles* of aesthetics a set of rules for the writing of a great tragedy.

There are such general aesthetic principles and it is the business of a 'philosophy of art' to detect them. It is not its business to tell the playwright whether a particular story is capable of being treated with the proper tragic effect, or how it must be reshaped for the purpose, that is just what the artist must divine for himself. He must *see* his subject in a moment of creative imagination, and if he has not this vision, there is nothing which will compensate for its absence. Attention to the directions of a manual of rules like Aristotle's *Poetics* will never of itself result in the production of a masterpiece. Such mere following of rules will at most lead in art as in life to uninspired respectability with its freedom from glaring surface faults. A Racine may produce works which observe all the rules and are also genuine masterpieces. But Racine would equally have produced tragedy of the highest order, though perhaps disfigured by some superficial blemishes, if he had never heard of Aristotle and his rules.

It is just because the great work of art is the offspring of such a direct and original vision that there is so much truth in the observation of Socrates about the inability of the "poets" to explain how their finest effects are achieved.

The great schoolmen in their way put their finger on the point, so far as it concerns morality, in the observation that it is only the *prohibitions* of the moral code which *obligant ad semper*, whereas of the positive commands we can only say that they *semper obligant*. If I am to

¹ Though it may be a question whether Kant really meant what his language has been held to imply. His illustrations may be intended not as deductions of specific rules of duty from the general principle but merely as evidence that these rules taken to be already known will all fall under the principle. Since he is professedly presupposing as the basis of his whole reasoning the "common notion of morality" he may fairly be assumed to have taken it for granted that his reader would not need to learn for the first time from him that a man must not defraud, steal, commit murder or adultery. Has a "metaphysic of morals" to prove these things any more than a "metaphysic of nature" to prove that an unsupported heavy body will fall?

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live as I should, there must be *no* moment of my life at which I am committing theft or adultery or blasphemy, but there is no "good thing" which I am called upon to be doing at every moment. I am not at every moment to be engaged in giving alms, or serving the State, or promoting the particular "duties of my vocation." If I am, for example, a teacher in a University, I am certainly to make my teaching as good as I can possibly make it, but not to be teaching every day and every moment of the day and night. John Wesley writes in his *Journal* that in the days when he was a tutor at Oxford he would have thought it dishonest not to lecture to his pupils daily. But even Wesley did not imagine it to be his business to be lecturing all day long, and a more reflective man would have considered that probably his pupils and the college would have got better value for their money" if his lectures had been fewer than they were. My main point, however, is simply that because it is only prohibitions of which you can say that they *obligant ad semper*, a man may comply all through life with every one of these regulations and yet his life may be morally a failure to be condemned because it has never risen above the level of uninspired respectability. He remains, when all is said, one of those who are further from the kingdom of Heaven than many of the publicans and sinners whose lives with all their palpable surface faults, have some positive moral achievement to show.

But if all this is true, it follows that the "moral fact" upon which it is the purpose of moral philosophy to pass a verdict of approval or disapproval is never an isolated "event," or even an isolated act." It is always a standing inner orientation of will. It is true that since we cannot directly inspect the direction of will in others, or even in ourselves we have to collect it, as best we can, from the observation of the expression it gets in "acts" but our interest in men's acts so far as it is strictly philosophical, is throughout dependent on the more primary interest in the "character" they disclose. We pass judgment on the things a man does because we want to reach a judgment on what he is. The "fact" on which the moralist tries to reach a judgment is thus in the end, never less than the "character" of which a whole life is the expression. Even Professor Reid's contention that the "units" of the moral philosopher are always "concrete bits of living" seems to me hardly to do full justice to the situation. It is an admirable reply to those who would make ethics consist in either the study of "acts" in isolation from their intentions and motives or of motives and intentions in abstraction from the doing apart from which they are no longer real intentions or real motives. But it still misses the point that such understanding of this "act" in the light of its intention and motive is impossible so long as we confine ourselves to consideration of what can be

discovered in this "act" apart from its setting in the context of a whole life. For the more completely my life is dominated by a standing "principal motive," the less likely is it that I shall be perpetually conscious of the fact. If a man, for example, really loves his work, he is likely never to tell any one so, nor even often to tell himself so. If he does find it necessary to talk about his love for the work, or even to remind himself that he loves it, his devotion to it is probably beginning to fail. To fall back on a careful distinction drawn by F. H. Bradley, examination of the single act or episode apart from its setting in the whole of the life to which it belongs, will at most disclose what is "before" the mind, not what is "in" it.

I conclude, then, that relevant moral fact is inherently different in character from relevant natural, or physical fact, and that, on this ground, it is idle to look to the procedure of the natural sciences for light on the methods proper to a moral science. Morality can be the subject matter of "science" only if 'science' be understood in the widest sense of the word to mean inquiry into the systematic interconnection of truths. An appropriate method for the prosecution of the inquiry must be one dictated by the distinctive character of *moral* fact, if we substitute for the moral fact of purposeful living inspired by an underlying direction of the will to a goal which cannot be more than dimly known in advance, since it always remains "beyond" after every achievement, the *natural* fact of an event which simply happens as the consequence of a prior event called its intention, our ethics will have been vitiated at the centre. Cranmer, says Macaulay in his spiteful attack on the memory of that unfortunate prelate, was "no more a martyr than Dr. Dodd," since though he was burned, he did not *mean* to be burned: he was burned only because "he could not help it." And it is, of course, true that to be a martyr it is not enough that a man should be burned, he must "*give* his body to be burned." But something more is needed, too. A man may actually intend to sacrifice his life, and yet the intention will profit him morally nothing "if he have not charity"; his death may be intentional, and yet no martyrdom but a display of 'exhibitionism'.¹ But the subtle distinction of motive which makes the differences between the genuine martyr and the exhibitionist cannot be translated into the terminology of 'events'. The "ultimate motive"—and it is upon it that our moral judgments have in the end to be passed, cannot be represented as an event which is an antecedent of the event we call the intention or proximate

¹ Is Thomas of Canterbury a genuine martyr in Mr. T. S. Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral*? He certainly presents himself voluntarily to the murderers—his intention is to lay down his life if they attempt it. But whether the martyrdom is wholly genuine depends on the more subtle question whether he has wholly escaped the insidious suggestions of the "Fourth Tempter."

intention. It is for that reason not representable at all in the terminology of the natural sciences, but lies for ever "on the other side" of them.

This is why what are sometimes called "moral statistics" lend themselves so readily to misinterpretation. These statistical figures have, of course, their value in their proper place. If I learn from them that forgery or arson is uncommon in the society in which I live, I know something which bears on the question whether I need constantly to be on my guard against having a forged cheque presented to me, or what rate of insurance against fire it is reasonable to be prepared to pay. But they tell me little or nothing about the morality of the people around me, if they rarely commit forgery or arson, the reason may be only that in a city with an efficient police bad conduct does not usually pay "and this is not a genuinely moral reason. The statistics are, in fact, statistics of behaviour, not of morality. Such light as they do throw on morality is mainly of a negative kind. If the statistics, for example, show that the proportion of the funds contributed to "charitable" purposes is steadily low by comparison with the resources of the society, I can safely infer that it does not include many persons of ample means who are also truly benevolent. It would not be so safe to infer that if the proportion is a high one, the well-to-do members of society must be persons of high benevolence, since the motive of the largest donations may have been ostentation or calculating self advancement.

It has been said that the motto of Kant's first *Critique* might well have been 'metaphysics, beware of mathematics!'. An equally good motto for the philosophical study of morals would be "ethics, beware of natural science." To quote words which I cannot improve upon: "Is morality simply a positive science of anthropology or is it anything more?" A true anthropology cannot be a positive science only, on account of man being a changing, improvable, and educable being: it must involve therefore an idea of 'ought' as well as of fact: of 'should be' as well as of 'is,' and therefore, however, ideas belonging to what we will for a moment call philosophy may yield in other sciences to (supposedly) truer notions of matters of fact, here they will not. "In one form after another philosophy tries to gain credit with the advancing scientific spirit by denying itself, and ever tries in vain. I have no fear that philosophy will really die: because, however in obedience to the supposed exigencies of scientific method people try to make themselves altogether mentally positivist, they cannot do so: our nature in some respects is better to us than our will."²

¹ J. Grote: *An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*, 201-2.

² *Ibid.*, 277. I speak of the development as a *reductio ad absurdum* because, of course, Mill and the other nineteenth-century writers who

The thesis of our contemporary "logical analysts" considered in the opening page of this essay is, in truth, a vindication of the soundness of this judgment (published in 1870), to declare all assertions which contain ethical predicates strictly in meaning is to present the *reductio ad absurdum* of "positivism." But it does not augur well for the intelligence of our generation that it should find acceptance, even with some who are old enough to know better, as the final word of wisdom, when it is, in reality, no more than the last despairing refuge of the "hard fact men."

plumed themselves upon being inductive moralists and supposed themselves to be doing for moral studies what Bacon was fancied to have done for natural science took it for granted that there is such a thing as moral truth and that devotion to the methods of "observation and experiment" would enable them to get that truth in a scientific form. Their positivism or semi positivism was only important to them as the supposed one method of attaining this truth. But the later more consistent development of positivist methodology leads direct to the conclusion that they were deluding themselves because if the positivist principles are sound there is nothing in morals to be scientific about.

JUSTICE AND EQUALITY

DOROTHY M. EMMET, M.A.

My purpose in this paper is to maintain that "justice" represents an objective and impersonal recognition of the nature of moral personality, and as such should retain its identity at all levels of human relationship. It is not, as certain idealist philosophers, and notably Bosanquet, have maintained, inappropriate at the deeper levels, at which it is said to be superseded by love.

I shall also raise Aristotle's question of whether differences in the conception of justice do not arise out of differing conceptions of equality, as applied to human beings, and re-examine the connection of justice with equality. I shall ask whether Aristotle's dictum that the equality which justice should maintain is "proportionate" has not misled subsequent discussion, in so far as justice is the expression of a recognition of moral autonomy.

The use of the word "equality" at once raises the difficulty that it appears to imply a standard of comparison if not of measurement. Yet it would seem that in the ways in which people can be measured and compared, they are unequal, and if they are held to be equal in some ultimate and perhaps metaphorical sense to be examined later, it is sometimes maintained that at this level justice is superseded. If equality be merely a term of measurement, it might be maintained that if there is any sense in which men should be equal, this should be in an equal apportioning of things to which a quantitative standard can be applied. This may indeed serve us with a rough approximation to equality at an elementary, but vital, level of human life. It is possible to estimate quantitatively the number of calories people need to keep in reasonable health, and to say that in this respect certain categories (for instance, adult males, females, growing children) are approximately equal. But when we get beyond the universal requirements of food and the necessary means to maintain physical health, which can be measured with some degree of objective accuracy, we then seem driven to say that distribution must be proportionate to things not strictly quantitative. This is implicit even in the most equalitarian of all social formulae: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs'. When seeking to weigh "ability" and "need," are we not soon moving among *imponderabilia*? This will be still more

* The other day a Church of England clergyman of my acquaintance was asked by a Roman Catholic family in his parish to baptize their baby. When he asked the mother why she did not want to have the baby baptized into

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the case if we hold with Aristotle that justice should take into account not only ability and need, but the relative "virtue" of the persons concerned.¹ We seem to be in the dilemma that if justice be simply correlated with equality in this sense, it seems to demand some standard of measurement, but to seek to apply it in material which is not strictly measurable. Is there then force in the old view that justice is a convention, either in the Sophistic sense in which it is a means to power or security, or in the religious sense in which it is held to be superseded by love and mercy, or in the idealist sense, in which it is bound up with an assertion of finite selfhood not ultimately to be taken as real?

Before we go further in asking what the relation of justice to equality may mean, let us look first at different kinds of personal relationship, and notice how justice makes its characteristic appearance. We start from the level of our natural likes and dislikes, of friendships and family ties, based on congeniality and kinship. At this level justice seems at first sight out of place, and we do not normally need to speak of it. But that it is implicitly present is shown by our appealing to it when such 'personal' relationships are abused—for instance in possessiveness, favouritism, neglect of children, and the like. "Justice" makes its appearance with the demand² of the conscious individual to his recognition as such in his sense of being distinct from others and having rights against them. Hence it appears, as Bosanquet says, in the world of claims and counter-claims.³ The other evening I heard this remark in a Tyneside unemployed club: 'What yer doin' to-neet Geordie?' "Demonstratin' for me reets." "What yer mean by yer reets, Geordie?" "Don't knoa, but ah mean to have them." Since the sense of justice typically shows itself in standing up for one's rights, idealist philosophers, and notably Bosanquet, argue that it is a form of the assertion of finite selfhood which must be superseded in the Absolute. In his remarkable chapter on 'The World of Claims and Counter-Claims,'⁴ Bosanquet says that our "claims" arise from our looking at the world as made up of separate terms in relation, of "units at arm's length." But this world of relational morality,

her own Roman communion she said, Your churchwarden's wife was very kind getting me my set of false teeth so I thought it was only fair that you should have little Jummie." We have here a nice attempt to weigh the possible destiny of a human soul against a more tangible consideration.

¹ Cf. St. Thomas *ST* II 2 qn. 58 a. 11. The proper function of justice is no other than to render to each person what is his own. But what is said to be each person's own is what is due to him according to an equality of proportion.

² The demand may of course be made on his behalf by others, e.g. maltreated children may not be conscious of their rights.

³ *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, chap. v.

⁴ *Ibid.*

of rights and duties, cannot be ultimately real, for it implies an individualistic assertion of finite selfhood which cannot finally be maintained in an organic system of reality. There is a certain pessimism therefore bound up with the sense of justice,¹ since it demands a proportion between the needs and fortunes of finite man which on a deeper view we shall find will not obtain, and it rivets the finite member of the world to his given empirical self, ignoring his power to transcend that self. Justice has its place as the self-assertion of the finite mind, maintaining some apportionment of externals to individuals. But it is transmuted along with the separateness of the finite mind in the final economy of the Absolute. We shall notice this view of Bosanquet's again later when I shall urge that it is unsatisfying in just the extent to which the idealist view of a merely adjectival relation of finite selves in an organic Absolute falls short of expressing a fully personal relationship. But let us take Bosanquet's point that justice means the self assertion of the finite individual. He does not bring out the significance of the complementary point, that it also means the assertion of the claims of any individual as such. I may not only stand up for my own rights, but for the rights of someone else as a matter of justice. This suggests that an essential note of justice is the impartial vindication of rights and weighing of claims, that it consists not so much in the application of a rule, but whatever our rule may be, in the impartial and impersonal treatment of persons before it. We see that two questions are involved here: (a) the criterion by which we may judge the rule which determines what rights and claims are to be asserted, and (b) the impersonal and impartial application of the rule, whatever it be.² Of these the latter appears to be more easily recognizable as a universal demand of justice. The distinction between a just and an unjust rule, though of fundamental importance, can be determined with less assurance than the principle that, whatever our rule, its administration should be impartial. The particular rules, that is to say, the content of justice, develop from one age to another through the development in experience of differing estimates of what is a person's "due." And it must be acknowledged that in practice the recognition of claims depends very largely on people's power to press them—hence the plausibility of arguing that justice is the will of the stronger. Hence also the adjustments of "particular justice" can never be more than a certain rough justice. Yet in spite of this we find that when a regulating ideal, as distinct from the mere pressure of claims and

¹ Cf. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 16.

² This does not necessarily mean the rigid application of the rule without regard to circumstances which may make a particular case distinctive and exceptional (as we shall see in considering Equity). It means that the distinguishing circumstances must be relevant and be impartially weighed.

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counter-claims, appears in the administration of justice, it appears as the demand that claims be weighed impartially and impersonally. This may help to indicate the other aspect of the universal form of justice—namely, the criterion by which we can determine whether a given rule be just. The demand that, whatever our rule, it should be impartially administered springs from a conviction that everyone's rights count, and should therefore be respected before the law. Hence it would follow that a just law will be one that facilitates the equal enjoyment of rights. The perception of what in fact constitutes "rights" will depend on a growing perception of the conditions necessary for the development of a proper subject of rights, namely, the morally autonomous person. Since at any given time this perception is only partial and limited, the laws to be administered will only be imperfectly just. But they show that they are aiming at securing the conditions for a less imperfect form of justice if the principle of their impartial administration is upheld, since this principle depends on a recognition of the duty to respect moral integrity in any person, whoever he may be.

The distinction between the meaning of justice as universal form and justice as a partially shifting content was of course pointed out by Aristotle in his discussion of Universal and Particular Justice, and indicated perhaps in a rather different sense when he pointed out the ambiguity in the word justice as meaning both what is prescribed by law, and what is fair or equal and in this sense reasonable. But Aristotle (I think) holds that Universal or Absolute Justice would consist in certain abstract general rules which would commend themselves to the reason as universally binding. This comes out even in the famous passage on Equity.¹ Equity is needed as a corrective of justice because (a) the lawgiver must oversimplify, so that his rule will not meet all contingencies, but to re-interpret it in an unusual case will be to fulfil his real intention, and (b) the subject-matter of practical life does not admit of being covered completely by universal statements. So the equitable decision, which adapts itself to the peculiarities of the particular case, is still (apparently) distinct from the rational principles of absolute justice, since it is necessitated by the partly irrational material of practical life (1137^b 25). But whatever Aristotle's own view, the Law of Nature as it developed from his "Universal Justice" came to be looked on in theory as consisting in certain absolute reasonable principles, binding on all men everywhere. This brings us up against the problem of how absolute reasonable principles are to be applied in the particular complex situations of practical life. So St Thomas says² that the distinctions of private property are not valid according

¹ EN 1137^b 10-1138^a 3

² *Summa Theologica* II 2 qn 57 a 3 Cf Vinogradoff *Collected Papers*, II, p 475

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to the absolute Law of Nature, but the absolute law must be modified to a certain extent in operation on account of the concrete circumstances of time and place. But if we look at the way in which the conception of natural justice has in fact influenced the development of law, we find that its appeal is not primarily to a set of abstract rules so much as to a general sense of "reasonableness" or "fairness," which demands that claims should be judged impartially, all relevant circumstances taken into account, and no wrong go unredressed. Natural Law, in England at any rate, is not looked on as a set of principles, but as a general sense of justice in court which guides it in the decision of doubtful cases. The attempt to construct a system of Natural Law in detail is apt to become either a somewhat transparent justification of existing positive law, or a series of somewhat fantastic deductions. And if we look (in Roman and English Law) at the development of Equity which is held to be in some sense an application of Natural Law, we find that it in fact consists in the growth of a body of law arising out of the correction of concrete anomalies. Thus Roman Equity developed by the help of the Stoic philosophy and the *jus gentium* as an attempt to meet the need of levelling out privileges of civic rights. English Equity has been guided by the Aristotelian principle of reasonable discretion in the interpretation of law, put in a Christianized form in the conception of a court of Conscience. While the maxims of English Equity might appear to be a body of abstract rules, looked at more closely they appear to be specifications of the universal form of justice, namely the impartial weighing of claims, in maintaining that no wrong should be suffered to be without a remedy, and that Equity can only intervene when there is some important circumstance disregarded by the Common Law.

In the use of precedent in Common Law the principle that what has been allowed in one case must be allowed in similar cases is clearly paramount. Precedents are of course used in order to establish a principle. But the principle may be called in question and in course of time revised, whereas equality of treatment before the principle whatever it may be for the time being, remains. This is so even in code law. The particular provisions of the code are less fundamental than its impartial application. This does not mean, of course that it does not matter how bad a law is, provided it be applied impartially. But it means that while the distinction between a good law and a bad is something to be hammered out in experience as a result of a growing perception of the needs of human beings in their concrete historical setting, justice demands that whatever your law is there must be equality of persons before it. In historical practice (in England at any rate), the perception of the content of human rights has grown through the progressive removal of special

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privileges and abuses of privileges rather than through the application of any abstract doctrine of natural rights. We come to see that considerations of status and privilege are irrelevant and prejudicial to an objective view of the case.¹ Hence the guiding principle of justice becomes judgment without respect of persons. In this sense justice demands a certain impersonality—an extension of the principle that no man should be judge in his own case, which may well conflict with the personal ties of family and friends. We know the classical examples of such conflicts—the judgment of Brutus in condemning his sons to death for treachery, the problem of the *Euthyphro*, of whether ‘holiness’ demands the prosecution of a wrongdoer, though he be one’s father. Probably few of us can sympathize with the rigour of Brutus—the Roman father. Yet the problem remains of how the claim of justice is to be maintained, if we feel that natural family affection ought not to be violated. We should probably say (perhaps hedging) that in fact a man ought to refuse to give judgment himself in a case of this kind and to turn it over to someone else who is able to take up an impersonal attitude.

Let us now look more closely at what I claim to be the first principle of justice—that whatever the law, people should be held equal before it. This means that the law must aim at the objective assessment of offences and penalties. It must take into account not status, not who you are, but what you have done. Personal status must be taken into account only in so far as it means that one falls into a certain class of judicial person, for instance infants and lunatics. A man’s special circumstances and state of mind should only be taken into account in so far as they are relevant to an objective view of the particular case before the court, the case must not be prejudged by taking his character and past record into consideration until *after* trial and conviction, when it then becomes important in assigning an appropriate penalty. Nor should the judge’s own predilections—whether political, social, or religious, enter into his judgment of the case, though, judges being human, the complete elimination of all personal factors of this kind is of course an impossible ideal. So Mr. Justice Cardozo writes: “There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and action. Judges cannot escape that current any more than other mortals. All their lives forces which they do not recognize and cannot name have been tugging at them, inherited instincts, tradi-

¹ Although this may be true of the law as between individuals we must, however, ask whether, as a statement of fact, it does not need to be qualified in consideration of the privileges at present afforded to various group undertakings, such as large limited liability companies.

tional beliefs, acquired convictions, and the resultant is an outlook on life . which when reasons are nicely balanced must determine where choice shall fall In this mental background every problem finds its setting We may try to see things as objectively as we please None the less, we never see them with any eyes but our own To that they are all brought a form of pleading or an Act of Parliament, the wrongs of paupers or the rights of princes, a village ordinance or a nation's charter "1

Corrective justice aims then at the impartial application of the rule of law (How far its intention is thwarted by inequalities of distributive justice is a point which we shall raise later) In civil justice, the conception of equality clearly demands in addition, as Aristotle saw, the attempt to restore the balance as it was before the unjust act was committed—"taking away the gain, and adding it to the loss This is clear in the case of a straight recovery of damages, it is more difficult in cases where moral claims have to be estimated in material terms But Aristotle's account of corrective justice brings out the point that the aim of legal redress must be to give such compensation, on a basis of complex estimates, as will restore the parties as far as possible to their respective position before the injury2 When we turn from civil to criminal justice, Aristotle's principle of corrective justice, that "gain" and "loss" must be so weighed as to restore the original balance, cannot be realistically upheld, even if we were to introduce (as Aristotle does not)3 a theory of retributive penalties as in some way "making up" for the wrong done It was surely a merit in Bentham to challenge the conception that punishment, for instance hanging a man for murder, put something on the credit side of the world to balance the debit side and to raise the plain question why two dead men and two desolate families were not worse than one But nevertheless, some rough justice of retributive penalties guided by an 'object all sublime' "to make the punishment fit the crime" seems essential, not in order to restore some disturbed equilibrium, but in order to safeguard the rights of the criminal For if punishment be merely deterrent trivial offences to which there is strong temptation (e.g. stealing food when hungry) may be punished with drastic severity and the cynical saying that "it is expedient that one man should die for the people" will be defensible Again, if it be merely reformatory, the door may well be opened for the

1 *The Nature of the Judicial Process* (quoted by C. W. Muir *Justice in a Depressed Area*, p. 113)

2 *E. N. V. 1132b* This respective balance of positions is a form of equality, but Aristotle probably confuses the issue by describing it as a 'mean' Cf. Vinogradoff, *Collected Papers II*, chap. 1 "Aristotle on Legal Redress"

3 Except perhaps in 1132b, 29, ἀλλὰ καὶ καλῶς ἀθροῖται

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persecution of the unorthodox by the orthodox for their supposed soul's good. It would be interesting to know how far in Soviet Russia, where it is claimed that the "barbarous" and "vindictive" theory of retributory punishment has been superseded by theories of deterrence and reform, the rights of the criminal are adequately safeguarded. And when the Soviet Public Prosecutor at the Metro-Vic trial says that "Revolutionary justice is a special sort of cudgel with which the proletarian state carries out the task of suppression and compulsion," we wonder whether to make justice the means to the achievement of any further purpose, however desirable, will not be detrimental to its essential principle, namely the impartial weighing of claims and offences before the law. The element of retribution in criminal justice seems essential to ensure the attempt at some objective judgment of the nature of the act itself, however necessary it may be for other reasons to take into further consideration questions of social consequences, the deterrence of others from like acts, and the reform of the criminal.

But just because justice demands impersonal and detached judgment, it appears to take an external, unsympathetic view. This is because its principle of judgment without respect of persons becomes in practice the necessity of dealing with classes of offenders who have committed classes of offences for which classes of penalties are assigned. Hence the force in Bosanquet's saying that justice belongs to the level of human relationship in which people are treated as "units at arm's length", whereas in truth (to quote Mr. Walter Lippmann): "we know each of us, in a way too certain for doubting, that, after all the weighing and comparing and judging of us is done, there is something left over which is the heart of the matter. Hence our conviction when we ourselves are judged that mercy is more just than justice. When we know the facts, as we can only know the facts about ourselves, there is something too coarse in all the concepts of the intelligence and something too rough in all the standards of morality." Nevertheless, although the judgments of men fall upon behaviour, and their estimates of deserts and penalties may never reach more than a certain rough justice, we have seen that the very impersonality of justice points to a right of human beings to be respected in their moral autonomy. Here equality is expressed in the principle of the equal right of everyone to have his individual claims weighed impartially before the law. This is neither an abstract arithmetical equality, in the sense of a rule for measuring people as though they were quantitative units, nor is it a "proportionate equality" in the sense of being determined according to the relative value of the persons concerned. Such an estimate of the relative value of one man compared with another is something which

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if it can be judged at all, we certainly hold no law is competent to judge I would suggest that discussion of the whole question has been misled in so far as Aristotle's principle of equality as proportionate to the value of the persons was applied to it

I do not wish in the space at my disposal to go at any length into the allied question of equality of rights of citizenship, the problem of political justice I will only state summarily that the principle of equality as here understood would imply, not that all men are equally useful citizens, but that everyone's claim to citizenship must be allowed unless it can be proved that his alleged disabilities are relevant to and necessarily hinder him from the exercise of citizenship (as it may be questioned whether for example those of race or sex do) Moreover, if the principle of "one man, one vote" comes in the last resort from a deep-seated belief that "the poorest he that is in England has a life to live as the richest he,"¹ its importance may be held to consist not in the doubtful proposition that everyone can be got to use his vote wisely, but in its expression of the conviction that everyone in the community counts I do not say that this conviction is adequately safeguarded by universal suffrage, nor that this must necessarily be its condition in all circumstances, but universal suffrage does seem to give it a certain recognition, and as such has, I should hold, more than a merely utilitarian political significance

Distributive Justice (which, in itself, is of course not a judicial but a political question) is relevant to all these forms of equality in so far as (a) inequalities of wealth make it harder for a poor man to get equal treatment before the law through obtaining the most competent legal assistance,² (b) inequalities of education make it harder for working class people in police court trials to do justice to themselves under cross-examination, for instance, by not seeing the implications of the questions they are being asked, (c) people are deterred from asserting their full civic rights through fear of victimization, unemployment, and the like, (d) inequality of economic security in effect destroys equality of contracts For a contract to be just, which means of something like equal mutual advantage, it is essential that both parties should be free to make it or refuse it Inequality on one side through fear for instance of unemployment, must tend towards injustice and exploitation, the essence of which

¹ Colonel Randory in the *Clarke Papers* (Camden Society Publications 1891)

² Cf C W Muir *Justice in a Distressed Area* If he is right in alleging that the further you get from London the harder it is to get a fair trial, because the judges on circuit are hurried, and have imperfect understanding of local industrial conditions it means that the scales are also weighted against those who cannot afford to appeal and have their case taken up to a London court.

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is to take advantage of someone else being in a weak position in order to get something for yourself. To redress inequality of bargaining power to some extent through, for instance, rights of collective bargaining, provision for unemployment insurance, etc., is thus a clear matter of justice.

Distributive justice should therefore provide that equality before the law, equality of civic rights, equality in entering and refusing contracts is some sort of reality. This may not necessarily mean equality of incomes,¹ but it will mean that society be so arranged that (as Mr. Tawney urges)² a certain standard having been assured, then the size of a man's income matters less and less in giving him access to the means of health, opportunities for education, and competent legal assistance when necessary.

I should add here another aspect of equality, which is a part of distributive justice—namely the kind of equality which obtains between those who have some significant function to perform in society. Here we are close on to the Platonic Justice "doing one's job" τὸ καθῆκον πράττειν.³ There is a certain equality amongst people who know that they have a real job to do and can do it with reasonable competence, so that they meet on a basis of mutual respect which, in any healthy society, has little to do with difference of income. I am inclined to think that almost the most pernicious inequality in the world as it now is results from many people being unable to have the sense that the job they are doing commands their own or anyone else's respect, or worse still, from their being without a job at all.

But we are still moving on the level of what Bosanquet calls the

* I have not discussed the question of justice as proportionate requital for work done, because the problem of the just price seems to me incapable of solution in any general terms. Short of a rigidly dictated economy it seems as though the price of goods and services must be fixed by the interplay between demand and supply (subject of course to the possibility of fixing certain minimum standards of prices and remuneration). Great professional and business competence or the willingness to take heavy responsibility are sufficiently rare to be highly remunerated. But this is still determined by there being a demand for these services which gives them a market value, and by the bargaining power, individual or collective, of those rendering them and not by any requital proportionate to their value as persons, which is something impossible to gauge.

¹ See his *Equality* *passim*.

² One of my students has suggested to me that the puzzling Parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard might be taken as an illustration of Platonic Justice. The early comers who had borne the burden and heat of the day were refusing to mind their own business. The suggestion is an attractive one. But the parable is not surely a lesson on the nature of justice, still less on the principles on which wages should be paid. It teaches that even an eleventh hour entry into the Kingdom of God is possible, and that membership in that Kingdom is not nicely graded by "deserts."

world of claims and counter-claims, a world of individuals as "units at arm's length," contracting with one another and asserting their rights against each other. This is a sphere in which we meet impersonally as the bearers of rights and obligations. It is true that in all such relations there may also be a "personal touch" which may add much to the pleasantness of life, but it is essential that there be justice. In all such relations a "personal touch" without justice at once becomes patronizing and revolting, because justice stands for the respect of the moral autonomy of the other person.

But the world of claims and counter claims on which we meet impersonally is a kind of middle distance. On the further horizons of human relationships where we no longer meet as individuals conscious of our rights, the language of justice no longer seems appropriate. Does this mean that justice is superseded? Bosanquet says that it is, for we are getting beyond the limitations of private selfhood to which the notions of rights and obligation are appropriate. But this transmutation of finite selves in the Absolute is possible because Bosanquet thinks of the Absolute in terms of organic instead of fully personal relations. A personal relationship preserves in its wider context the individual integrity of its members, though this need no longer be self consciously emphasized as a claim to recognition. Correlative to this is the preservation of *obligation*, as an objective demand made upon the individual in each situation, which remains an objective obligation though it be of the most personal and intimate kind, and may no longer be felt as presenting a conflict. Kant found the essential of the categorical imperative to be that we should not make exceptions in our own favour, but should ask what would be demanded of anyone standing in the situation in which we now stand. However personal and intimate the situation, we thus still find the first distinguishing mark of justice—a call for objectivity without respect of persons. This objectivity of duty can be described as ethical justice. Equality here appears as equality of all men as responsible before the moral law. This of course goes back behind Kant ultimately to the Stoic conception of the equality of all men before the Law of Nature.

But even the Stoic divided the world into wise men and fools. The conception of all men as standing equally under the Law of Nature led to a distinction between those who lived and those who failed to live according to it. A more penetrating insight into the nature of the demands of an absolute goodness leads to a still more radical perception of human equality—"all have sinned," says St. Paul, "all have come short of the glory of God." We have here a glimpse of a perspective in which people's relative distinctions of goodness, ability, and the like become incommensurable. This is not to say that there is not a whole sphere within which such distinctions

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are real and relevant "Judge not that ye be not judged" cannot be an obvious motto, for instance, for a University which is largely concerned with judging people's capacity to do jobs, distinguishing first, second, and third class degrees and the like. But it indicates a further dimension in which instead of standing on one's rights and demanding to be judged justly, inevitably all alike must be driven to seek for mercy. If we believe that there is not only a level on which differences and inequalities are relevant, but also one on which they cease to be relevant because they are related to something infinite, we shall hold that "equality" is not simply a term of measurement, but also asserts a sense in which people are incommensurable. They are incommensurable because their relative powers and relative goodness are set in the perspective of an absolute goodness, and they are incommensurable because each one can count in some unique way in the final economy of things. In this ultimate relationship of persons as incommensurable, where the balancing of claims is inappropriate, have we reached a level at which justice itself must be superseded? Legal justice in so far as it consists in an external weighing of acts and requital proportionate to "deserts" is clearly insufficient—and if "justification" is sought it is not justification by works. But we have seen that the measurement of "deserts," in so far as this means an attempt to make some sort of quantitative estimate of something in fact not quantitative though it may play a necessary part in the practical administration of justice, is not the root principle of justice itself. Justice is fundamentally concerned with the respect for moral integrity, and so with upholding conditions within which such integrity may grow. There may be a sphere within which it finds it necessary to calculate rewards and penalties, but this is merely an incidental means to its real purpose. So even at the ultimate level of relationship the essential element of justice may still remain, though in a transmuted form: if there be a love which is no "respector of persons." Such a love would hold together the personal and impersonal sides of goodness. It would preserve the impersonal universality which is characteristic of obligation, yet it would see each individual uniquely with the intimacy of direct personal insight. So it could hold both the objectivity which is the essential note of obligation, and the personal tenderness of forgiveness. Forgiveness does not do away with the perception of objective duty, it may involve a recognition of a violation of objective duty for what it is, but it restores a personal relationship broken through that violation.

Here we may have passed beyond a weighing of claims and counter-claims in the application of any rule or law. But we still find preserved that objective universality which, I have maintained,

is in the end the inspiration of the principle of equality before the law. Thus we find that justice will be an essential element of all personal relationships at whatever level we can say that the respect for personal integrity and personal freedom should be maintained. For we have seen that the essence of justice is not the application of certain abstract rules, regardless of the concrete uniqueness of individual persons, but a respect for moral personality expressed through the impartial judgment of each individual claim in relation to others, in the light of such general maxims as may be the most equitable we have hitherto distinguished. Such maxims bear a similar relation to justice as do principles of moral conduct to the universal form of duty (which is the obligation to do the best we can in each situation). Such principles are never absolute and self-evident, they emerge from experience and are re-cast in the light of further experience. But the universal form of justice remains, that whatever our guiding principles, we should seek to judge objectively in the light of them without respect of persons. The claim of the equality of persons before the law derives, I believe, in the end from the belief in the ultimate and perhaps undefinable equality of men before the nature of things (however we may describe it). Without some such belief, the principle of equality of rights and of impersonal judgment without respect to status, will be likely to be waived for some standard such as the well being of the community. And such a standard may be used to justify discrimination and deterrent punishment to almost any extent. The principle of the impartiality of justice is not utilitarian—it appeals in the end to a faith in the value of the individual in the whole scheme of things which it may be difficult or impossible to justify on utilitarian grounds. The principle of equality is thus essential to justice not in any proportionate or quantitative sense, nor even merely in the abstract sense that "each one is to count for one, and no one for more than one," though as a working simplification of the principle this may serve us well enough. But a belief in the objective value of the individual in the final economy of things, in no merely instrumental or adjectival sense, implies a belief that the case of each should be considered as fully and impartially as that of any other. Justice therefore, in a sense the most impersonal of things, is an essential element in a recognition of the supreme importance of personality.

IMAGES IN ART

A. P. USHENKO, M. A.

I

OBJECTIVE communication—the principal aim of languages of any kind—meets with its greatest measure of success in science and art, which can both be precise, and therefore immune to misunderstanding born of vagueness or ambiguity, by giving *specific expression* to ideas. But, paradoxically, in order to reach specificity science and art must be developed along two opposite directions: in the first technical terminology replaces imagery bearing words, in the second images are cultivated to the utmost. The scientist's procedure is entirely justified. For it is undeniable that words are often misleading because they are clouded with different images in the minds of different people. Nor are the evil consequences of this subjectivity trivial. The whole world agonizes when to some of its leaders the word "war" pictures the victorious march of Roman legions so vividly that another representation, of miserable coolies torn to pieces by exploding bombs, retreats like a shadow into the mental background. In fact, if understanding were as much dependent on imagination as it is usually supposed to be, it would be surprising that things go as well as they do or that social organization can prevail over disorder. Should the use of such an ordinary word as "dog" require an image, I might think of a great dane, but then I could not follow even a simple statement like "The dog jumped on his master's lap." Without going into a discussion of the meaning of words it is sufficient to observe that one can claim to have mastered a language when one knows how to use its words correctly, i.e. when to apply them and how to combine them into sentences, even if these are unaccompanied by mental illustrations. A scientist, then, in using his technical 'imageless' vocabulary, is not an innovator, he is merely consistent where a layman would now and then relapse into a survey of mental pictures. Of course, even a scientist may occasionally need the aid of a figure or a diagram or a model. But he needs it mostly for pedagogical purposes, in any case at an introductory stage. Advanced science takes the form of a string of mathematical equations, which often—as in multi-dimensional non-euclidean geometry—could not have, even if it were desirable, a graphic representation.

But the short-cut to objective communication made by science is

a closed road in art. For it is its hold on imagination which keeps a work of art alive, however important its capacity to generate delight of sensation or intimate philosophical ideas may be. The striking thing about art is that in face of this dependence on imagery it can claim objectivity. Even some of the artists have misgivings on this score. Anatole France said somewhere about one of his books that it consists of as many novels as there are readers which it can find, since their response varies from one person to another. The remark is certainly false, it merely expresses the writer's greed for all kinds of favourable criticism and would not be made if the mass of foolish comments could also reach him. By disowning the judgment of the unqualified, the artist, no matter what he says, betrays his belief in the existence of a proper interpretation and therefore in the existence of *the* work of art. And if such is the artist's opinion, it would seem that no one else has the right to question it, assuming, of course, that the artist has succeeded in expressing what he wanted to express in his work. The existence of inferior or abortive productions must not deter one from making this assumption, for when it comes to the question of what *can* be done in art, anything short of a masterpiece should be disregarded. Since, furthermore, to deny the existence of masterpieces is sheer impertinence, the inevitable conclusion is that to receptive and suitably trained critics art is objective regardless of how much at variance these critics find themselves in being thrilled or displeased by the same works of art. But the fact of objective art is nevertheless a philosophical problem, since it remains to explain why images, of which art cannot be deprived, do not infect it with subjectivity. The general line which such an explanation must take is clear: if the images of ordinary language are impediments, whereas the images of art are implements, to objective communication, the former images must differ in kind from the latter. More particularly, as contrasted with ordinary representations art images are thoroughly specific. This means that a piece of literary craftsmanship must not offer an indefinite or ragged description to be patched up from the resources of the readers' imagination. As a consequence of its independence of the idiosyncrasy of imagination a portrayal of art does not vary with the variation of aesthetic appreciation, which is a negative way of saying that it is an objective expression.

The main difficulty in this explanation is its assertion that art increases the specificity of experience. This is contrary to the common belief in the specific nature of ordinary sense-images. But this common belief is seldom, if ever, accompanied by a clear understanding of what it means for a datum to be specific. In its widest sense, which as it will appear later is quite precise, "specific" signifies whatever is *closed* to further discrimination. When "specific" is so

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understood, one must realize that as a general rule our sense-data and percepts are not specific. In the first place, nature as perceived usually lacks definiteness in the arrangement of its objects, it is a medley which stimulates incessant investigations a *perpetuum mobile* of things, animals, and people. And even when as in a perspective of distant hills, nature seems to be at rest and closed to developments, one is always aware of the possibility of making the view clearer and more determinate by walking towards the hills. But as the contours come into prominence in a clear-cut outline of the main configuration, the approach brings for discrimination details of the scenery which were previously hidden a visual emergence which is practically endless. Also a perspective, although a mere cross section through nature, is never given as a whole at a single glance, but is an outcome of reconstruction in which the present sensory data are correlated with the memory images of preceding impressions. More technically, perception is an outcome of interaction between sensation and apperception a mosaic of which the fragments must be uneven in vividness, colour, and definiteness of their outline. Nor is it necessarily the case that perceptual indeterminacy is caused by "blurred" apperceptions which succeed in dominating the otherwise specific sensations. Under the influence of the Cambridge School many philosophers have assumed that sense data are always specific. This is a sheer dogma. It might appear to be plausible when you are told, for example, that if you take a book in your hand and look attentively at its cover, you will find that you have a visual sense datum of a specific shade of colour. Perhaps you have. But such a highly simplified and therefore artificial experiment with perception is certainly not a typical illustration of how pure sensation normally functions. On the other hand, a more complex instance would allow for different interpretations, and although it is customary to interpret it in favour of the existence of specific sense-data, an adverse interpretation is not only feasible but, if anything, is more convincing. Thus in the often quoted illustration of the success of memory in retrieving the number of the clock's strokes which were not consciously registered as they were struck, there is no evidence for supposing that behind the listless perception a specific sense-datum (of the number of strokes) must have lingered in order to enable memory to fall back upon it. A much simpler explanation would be given if one assumes a correspondence between sensations and feelings. In an effort to recall one represents imaginatively the successive strokes of the clock, until one comes to a number which "feels" like the feeling left as the sole residue of the original auditory sensation. And then this likeness of feelings prompts one to identify the reproduction in imagination with the past experience. To take another example,

the difficulty of noticing misprints while reading fast. This might be explained as an outcome of interference of memory-images of standard patterns of words with their actual specific prints. But such an explanation would mean the existence of friction between images, something which we certainly do not observe in our minds. If we want to remain within the field of observation, we should deny that in reading we begin with specific sensations of letters. At a first glance we have a general impression only, but it is capable of arousing a specific feeling which favours a representation of standard shapes of words taken as if they were actually read off the printed page.

This alternative account of such examples is given here without an intention to imply that ordinary experience has no specific sensory content. The suggestion is that specific sense-data are much more rare than they are believed to be. To deny their existence altogether would be overlooking the roots which art images must have in ordinary perception. But what is a general rule of aesthetic experience is an exception in perceptual practice.

II

When a percept is blurred or indistinct, its "focusing" requires its isolation from the background of change. An object for discernment must be rescued from the obliterating rush of events. The idealization of this truth gives the principle of the art of painting—a picture must be a *static* representation. It is no accident that pictures are framed, a frame breaks up continuity with the moving world. Thus encased and stabilized, the canvas can wait on the wall indefinitely for a spectator to take it in completely from an appropriate distance and angle of vision. But the immobility of the canvas is only one condition for a static perception— even more important is the size of the picture, which must be small enough to be grasped at a single glance. Of course it usually takes some time for the eye to travel from one figure or colour on the canvas to another until the composition can become both as a whole and in detail, entirely familiar and specific. But this visual transition in exploring the picture is unified, and therefore stabilized, by the original impression, which is never lost sight of throughout the experience. Besides the restriction upon change by the unifying impression of the whole there is the further restriction imposed on the spectator's capacity of discernment by the simplification of the artist's treatment of his subject. Such simplification expresses the basic convention of the art of painting which in effect rules out simple imitation of nature, which would be a reproduction of its wealth of detail. Even an

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"interior" of some Dutch master, crowded as it is with minutiae of appointment or decoration, cannot compare with the inexhaustible supply of items which can be detected even in a meagrely furnished real room. A static picture is thus essentially restrictive of the possibility of perceptual discrimination.

A very common error, disastrous to the understanding of the relations among the arts, would identify the nature of a static picture with that of an image created by the art of writing. The identification implies that the effect in words can be reproduced on a canvas and that a picture can be reported through a description. If this were true, either painting or writing, as existing side by side, would be a superfluous luxury. Also the fact that words can add unexpected vigour and vitality to a visual presentation—as when one blushes at the description of an act which in performance slipped by nearly without notice—would then remain a mystery. The truth is that description has an original power, and gives an experience untranslatable into painting, because it arouses images which are different in kind from static pictures. By contrast let them be called *dynamic*. For whereas concentration of the faculty of discrimination on the canvas enhances the specific vividness of a picture, an attempt to "arrest" a fugitive image of discourse defeats itself. Torn out of the context of other images, under the scrutiny of the mind the image would melt away like a dream upon awakening.

"Already this dream was beginning to fade away. In attempting to recall it in order to portray it I made it fade all the faster."¹

An image, however, is called here *dynamic* not so much because of the negative property of 'paling' at an interruption of the flow of discourse, but rather because it is a function of the piece of writing as a whole. I mean that an image within the context emerges empowered with the inertia of all the images which have preceded it and vitalized with anticipation of the images to follow. A line in a poem might leave one breathless as it comes in the order of the verse and yet fall flat if read in isolation. To take one example only, the somewhat awkward statement 'The sunbeam strikes along the world' becomes within the verse a touch of descriptive perfection.

The forest crack d, the waters curl d
The cattle huddled on the lea
And wildly dash d on tower and tree
The sunbeam strikes along the world

The dependence of an image on the context is more than the 'shine' which in a picture a figure gains against its background. In description there is no clear cut distinction between a figure and a background, because images are not segregated by such boundaries.

Marcel Proust, *The Captive* p. 162

as the contours of a drawing. The clarity of an image grows with the support which it receives from other images, their interpenetration does not erase their individuality, which surges out wave-like from the common flow of the narrative. But this interpenetration means a mysterious presence of each and every image throughout the recitation, even when the waves of imagery have not yet reached their crests. There is no particular word or phrase at which an image is born, for its predecessors make up a development of its expectation, there is likewise no phrase, unless it be the end of the description, at which the image ceases, for it is the driving spirit of its successors in which it finds completion of realization. Thus an image hovers, as it were, over the whole discourse—a dynamic immanence which is a condition of specificity of an entirely different order from the determinacy as an effect of painting.

An analogy with music is obvious. There also specificity comes through the relationships among the elements. A specific tune is so slightly conditioned by its constituent patches that transcription into a different key does not change the melody as such. But the contextual organization of images is even more binding than the co-ordination of tones within a composition. For while a sound in isolation is stripped of its brilliance, it is nevertheless recognizable as an effect of a definite pitch, timbre, and intensity. The specificity of auditory sensations is therefore an indispensable factor in the final specificity of a piece of music. On the contrary, an image out of the context is simply nothing. Hence its specificity is entirely conditioned by its gregarious or dynamic complexion. It would seem that, with regard to specificity, music occupies an intermediate position between the extremes of painting and discourse. The specificity of a picture is a specificity of a visual pattern of sensations. When sensations are, as in music, auditory, they are in a state of flux which would produce a blurring effect of confusion if not counteracted by the specificity of the dynamic order of composition. In the art of writing specificity of images is even less bound up with sensation, it is by compensation more dependent upon dynamic order.

But a specific order, unless it be merely a system of logical postulates, requires some concrete material for manifestation. And if sensations are not the stuff out of which images in literature are made, the question as to the nature of the substance of their composition remains to be answered. Here again a comparison with music is helpful. The invariance of a melody under transposition from one key to another shows that auditory sensations are not sufficient to account for the substance of music either. And since tones, their relationships, and the feelings (or emotions) which a composition embodies seem to be exhaustive of the make up of a piece of music,

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it is likely that *feeling* is the dynamic substance of music. This conclusion is also plausible by reason of the intrinsic connection between feeling and action or expectation of action. An isolated sound would leave one utterly cold, except for anticipation of sounds to follow, as they actually emerge a specific emotion is born. Of course, the dynamic character of tones is so different from either biological or social processes of transaction, that it is preposterous to think, although aestheticians have always believed it, that the feelings expressed by music are the practical feelings of sorrow or joy or love or anguish or some other labelled variety. That there is a faint similarity between the effects of art and emotions in life is undeniable, but even the use of the same word to characterize manifestations of both kinds need not keep one from seeing that their specific difference is much more significant. "Sad music," for instance, is an effect utterly incommensurable with depression of actual grief. A practical emotion, as Dewey has observed, is an urge for self discharge in a succession of acts or attitudes which, I should add, allow for a wide range of determination. An emotion in music is an urge of self preservation in a specific succession of auditory sensations. This digression on emotion in practice and in music is relevant to the comparison of music with description, because I wish to make the point that the specificity of images, like the specificity of a melody, must ultimately reside in the unique individuality of feeling which would be impossible if art were to give expression to the generic feelings of practice. On the other hand, it is not necessary to leave the ground of common experience in order to show that emotion is a condition of specificity. Only one must turn away from the socially registered feelings towards the host of unique and exclusive moods which are disregarded in practical transactions to the extent of being left unnamed. The part played by these feelings without labels in contributing to specificity can be best shown by taking the very common experience of recognition. The mental image which enables the recognition of a close friend or relative must be specific enough to detect an impostor however skilfully disguised, or to sort pictures, in the absence of the original, into good and bad likenesses. But this mental standard is not itself a picture with definite contours, for as a general rule it cannot be reproduced as a drawing, quite irrespective of one's technical skill for reproduction. If then the specificity of the image which is sufficient for recognition is not pictorial determinacy, it can still be accounted for by the uniqueness or exclusiveness of the associated feeling. All that is required for unmistakable identification is an intuitive awareness that the reappearance of the original *feels* just like its expectation in a mental representation. Identification of feelings is thus enough for recognition and identification of their

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respective objects. Furthermore, the specificity which it implies is not to be slighted as merely relative to a practical purpose. For in case of an unerring identification the object must be recognized as this particular individual. And it would seem clear that awareness of a trait which excludes duplication gives the utmost attainable if not absolute specificity in experience. It is precisely because specificity in identification of feelings gives the maximum of specificity that not only may it dispense with the visualizing of clear-cut contours, but it can even persist through a change in pictorial configurations, as happens in dreams when the same agent is recognized through a display of most fantastic transformations, or in reality when after years of separation the matured countenance of a friend does not conceal the youth that we knew.

"A miraculous identity may be felt emotionally even when the two descriptions of the identical thing differ in *every* sensible term, as happens in metaphors, in myths, in myself as body and mind, in idolatry, or in the doctrine—which expresses a mystical experience—of transubstantiation."

III

If representations of ordinary experience can be specific without being pictorially complete merely because *nothing else feels the same way*, this state is a necessity for images in the art of description. For a complete picture visualized and fixed in the mind would interfere with the dynamic development which the image undergoes in the process of reading. Hence the inevitable disappointment at the illustrated editions of one's favourite author. The reader is disappointed not because he has a ready made mental picture to match against the illustration, but because he resents the immobilized representation stifling the dynamics of his imagination. At the same time, even though an image grows, it gives no licence to imaginative excesses which might generate wrong or irrelevant ideas. It must not be forgotten that an image does not belong to any particular phase of the description, but carries on the momentum of the whole work, which must be powerful enough to suppress any false suggestion. Let the line "Or gazing on the new soft fallen mask" materialize into the appearance of a silk black mask at one's feet—a rather strained supposition since the image would be incongruous with the adjective 'new'—the fugitive image will be immediately chased away without leaving a damaging trace of emotion as the reading of the poem proceeds.

Or gazing on the new soft fallen mask
Of snow upon the mountains and the moors

Santayana, *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, p. 153. Scribner's N.Y.

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The elimination of the wrong image, perhaps, depends here on the poet's happy diction. But more is needed for the suppression of other, more subtle distortions. The choice of words must go hand-in-hand with the peculiarities of rhythm and rhyme, with the mobilization of metaphors, in a word, with the whole array of literary devices for creating an emotional medium in which there is no place for uncongenial figures. This is the contribution of the whole poem to the exclusive determination of its imagery.

The emphasis given to the negative office of elimination of inappropriate images is dictated by the consideration that specificity has essentially a negative significance. A manifestation is specific when it is so explicit as to *exclude potentiality for further specification*. How to perform this exclusion is a question for various arts to decide and they offer different solutions. In the art of description the performance consists in a full exploitation of the potentialities aroused at any stage of the writing by an image. The writer must take care of the realization of these potentialities in order not to have them at the mercy of the reader's imaginative resources. For unless the writer can impose his own view of things upon his audience, he would capitulate before their variable responses, which is another way of saying that his art would generate imagery which is defective in the sense of being indefinite and incapable of objective communication. Such indefiniteness, however, is the very opposite of the negative function of a specific image. A negative function which is as basic as the exclusion of potentiality must inevitably have a positive effect upon experience. For by the exhaustive division of reality into actuality and potentiality the exclusion of the latter is equivalent to the positing of the former. And certainly there is nothing more positive in experience than contact with actuality. This conclusion holds even though our interpretation of actuality as specificity requires a re-examination of the relationship between actuality and potentiality. Let it be granted that the two are not co-exclusive, that there are degrees of actuality since there are degrees of specificity. Also that actuality branches out into intensification of sensation as in painting and intensification of emotion as in writing. This complexity means that the sense of reality can be heightened by altering the quantitative relations between potentiality and the actual in favour of the latter—new evidence that art is more real than nature.

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JOHN C BEGG F R A S

CONTEMPLATING certain residual mists, the net proceeds of a material world exploded and disintegrated by the relentless penetration of scientific intellect, the more advanced physicist has been led in recent times to co-operate with the philosopher on a common plane. Not so long ago, and not always without reason, the philosopher was regarded somewhat askance. It is the old antithesis between the practical man and the theorist, the scientific man himself having been regarded for long as a dreamer. All depends upon the level of action. Operating in the wilds the black tracker has nothing to gain by pausing for the slow, if sure, dictum of the scientist, and if a Mercator projection of the world, or a sextant, were offered to a primitive navigator of well-known home waters, these important aids to the sailor of longer voyages would probably be thrown in a corner if not overboard. The launching forth on to wide oceans created the occasion for, and proved the value of, such products of exact thought. Thus, in his highest abstractions, the physicist must perforce become a philosopher. At the very least, the need of review and evaluation from a more general standpoint will be conceded.

Physical concepts have to do with Nature considered as objective, and, in the more simple form, they comprise the ordinary naïve view of the world (sticks, stones, etc.), a view which will continue to possess its value and importance. Logic and inductive science, however, seek an interpretation less beset with anomalies and inadequacies although the cynic might plausibly question the present success of this quest. However, the naïve picture of a world

' This essay (with but slight variation) was read at the Auckland meeting of the Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science in January 1937. It outlines and illustrates a doctrine that leaves unprejudiced a place for the real as transcendent, metaphysical, or mystical. The real of ordinary or scientific discourse, however, bears a relative significance and is subject to degrees the fluctuating boundaries of its denotation depending upon subjective organization, both sensory and intellectual, and being affected by instinct and purpose. [This does not by any means negate objectivity, but affords an analysis of its conditioning circumstances.]

It is worthy of note that at the same meeting Dr S. Moore, of Dunedin, propounded a psycho-analytic theory of knowledge in which similar conclusions emerged. He substitutes 'mass feeling' for Freud's 'unconscious' as the source which guided by purpose articulates varying fields of objectivity.—J. C. B.

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of objects disposed here and there throughout space, each with its detached quasi-personality (probably derived from primitive animism) received a severe set-back with the advent of "field" theories

It was Ernst Mach, a German physicist of last century, and regarded by his contemporaries as somewhat erratic, who met the difficulty of transmission of influence through empty space, such as the gravitational pull of the sun upon the earth, by denying the presence of any real difficulty. How can a thing act where it is not? But, said Mach, "it is WHERE IT ACTS". That is, a so-called individual object may pervade the environment, or, indeed, the Universe. Along this line also came the work of Faraday and Clerk-Maxwell, and later that of Einstein. Mach showed further that ideas used in ordinary explanation are just as inexplicable ultimately as recognized mysteries. That the sun should move the earth by gravitational action across the great gulf of empty space is no whit more wonderful than contact phenomena, as when one ball pushes another, for contact is not coincidence, nor yet separation, but something wholly indefinite. This mystery has grown familiar, and our minds, said Mach, are satisfied if we can somehow reduce uncommon unintelligibilities to common unintelligibilities. In the last analysis physics must simply accept the fact, and not search for the metaphysical "why".

An important question for philosophy arises when we ask whether Nature, as we look out upon it, is a detached, independent realm, or, on the other hand, a reflexion in some measure of the observing mind. The history of thought has exhibited an oscillation of opinion concerning the objective and the subjective. Indeed, this matter has been deemed so vital that a philosopher is largely characterized, by his views upon it. In this rapid survey we may set out with an assertion that is little more than a truism, namely, that all intellectual life, both of common sense and of the scientific order, develops in individual experience. If we could think of the pure experience of a single person at one time and one place, the objective world would merge in the subjective, but they would not be quite coincident, because will and emotion both contain a phase which defies objectification. Pure static experience is however an ideal. As soon as time intrudes (as is inevitable), and we move about, there commences a panorama which composes our minds. It comprises not merely orthodox perceptions, but illusions, dream images, pleasure, and pain. We have here the primary, individual world.

If, leaving the single personal standpoint, we step out among our fellows and live in the common domain of Nature, we are compelled to shed off a great deal of this primary train of experience, because there is so much that is evanescent and irrelevant to anybody but ourselves. To the things that assert themselves obtru-

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sively and consistently in the common domain of Nature we assign the abode of a single space and time system in which our bodies move. A rather more abstract Nature now emerges—the world of common sense.

Still, a great deal that in ordinary life we find objective and common property, although in space and time, are not of them—colours, odours, and, perhaps more ambiguously, tastes, etc. While we include all these in the common-sense world, physical science, which does not shy at a further step away from actual experience, finds many such things unsuited to be inhabitants of its more purified realm, and has, in fact, progressively endeavoured to confine its objectivity to space and time themselves, eked out by a content the mode of which tends to become merely formal, approaching pure number. So emerges in the third phase still another Nature, with radical departures from the two previously described worlds.

Sir Arthur Eddington, in developing his physical philosophy, has made much use of a sharp distinction between the familiar world of common objects—tables, etc.—and the scientific world of electric particles, waves, and mathematical functions. This twofold division, while doubtless serving Eddington's purposes in exposition, would seem to suffer from omitting the very important distinctions which differentiate the individual world from the familiar common world. A headache, for example, is an unquestionable citizen of the former, but, to say the least, is not fully naturalized in the latter. Again, setting the familiar and scientific worlds in sharp contrast is apt to obscure the continuity of ideas which unites them, diverse as they undoubtedly are. The threefold division here suggested is not intended to imply definite boundaries or complete diversity in the world as apprehended from different standpoints. On the contrary, similar notions are to be found in all three worlds, with, however, radically changing emphasis, as will be further illustrated presently. Meantime, it may be asserted that the individual world of an impossible paragon of knowledge, who would require also to be ubiquitous, would include both the familiar common-sense world and that of science. On the other hand, neither of the latter could contain the world of the individual in all its fullness.

Before proceeding farther along this train of thought, a few reflexions must be devoted to meeting an inevitable question. Which of these differing worlds is the real one? First, it is necessary to point out that the term "real" is commonly used in a transcendental or metaphysical sense to which we cannot assign any empirical meaning. Something is postulated within the veil, not only in abstruse metaphysics or theology, but also by materialism. It appears as unobservable "substratum" in Locke's philosophy.

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and as "thing in itself" in Kant. It may probably be true that the power of the metaphysical 'real' to invade popular thought is based upon the supposition of a vague potentiality of manifestation somewhere or sometime. Although physics has endeavoured to abandon transcendental notions, which have often played the role of stop-gaps, it must be remembered that such notions play a necessary part in ordinary life. When Laplace told Napoleon that his science had no need of the God hypothesis, he might have added truthfully that it had no need of the fellow-man hypothesis, the beauty hypothesis, the goodness hypothesis, the free-will hypothesis, and now we could add even the time hypothesis as formerly understood, for modern scientific interpretations of Nature have robbed time of its stability and character, substituting something variable and purely symbolic, in which past, present, and future have no absolute significance. But the human mind cannot easily place these things entirely to one side even in scientific activities. Mathematical physics indeed can scarcely escape entirely from metaphysics. Philosophical physicists emphasize over and over again that we cannot express "things in themselves," but knowledge or, at least, explicit knowledge, must be confined to relations. Nevertheless, the symbols by which the terms of these relations are expressed must mean something, or, as Bertrand Russell has said, they would be only marks on paper. The idea of entity is not easily exorcised.

It seems doubtful if the line separating physics from metaphysics can ever be clearly drawn, leaving no margin of overlap, but a valid distinction remains. In regard to the concept "real," it must, if used by physics, have some empirical import—perhaps not so crude as that indicated by Dr. Johnson when he refuted the idealism of Berkeley by thumping his stick against the ground, but based essentially on that principle. It would be a comparative term, like "tall," the degree varying with the importance and consistency (rather than the violence) of the appearance under consideration. The thump of Dr. Johnson's stick may carry a very significant tale, possibly the hammer of activity meeting the anvil of resistance generates the sparks (to speak metaphorically) which shape themselves into the objective world. However, this present discourse must not desert the cognitive level.

We have spoken of the similarities and disparities which characterize the three worlds in which each of us may, in a measure, hold our discourse, namely, the individual world, the common-sense world, and the scientific world. Taking these admittedly overlapping domains in the order named, we shall find that in moving out from intimate individual perceptions, and the cruder concepts which accompany them, and considering the series as it leads to the abstract universe depicted by mathematical physics, we encounter

regions progressively poorer in intrinsic content. The Nature of common sense no longer contains the myriad images, emotions, and fantasies that parade in and constitute the individual world. Yet it contains colours, sounds, etc., the significance of which, in the consensus of the generality of mankind, is sufficiently unambiguous to bestow upon them an unquestioned objective status. This is so despite the fact that there are blind and deaf people who cannot in themselves apprehend such objectivity. Physical science, considering colours and sounds in their actual character as subjective, will have nothing to do, except by structural function, with the red glow of the sunset or the feel of the velvet (to use Whitehead's illustrations), or any of those aesthetic experiences which we encounter in daily life. All such things are discarded in favour of a spatio-temporal or mathematical domain. Multi-phased Nature, as it throbs in harmony with the senses and inner responses of the spirit, becomes but a boisterous scene of electrons, protons, positrons, neutrons—a field of wave functions, or a chart of world-lines!

Why this slaughter? It simply means that the pursuit of science involves a temporary abstraction from that aspect of Nature which holds the ordinary amenities. It does not destroy the validity of these amenities. But our present inquiry concerns the principles of procedure. Let it be said again that science does not come in like a foreign dictator and impose entirely new principles, but it selects from emphasizes and makes consistent certain concrete elements and elements of procedure that are implicit in, and necessary to, all objectivizing even in our individual world. Science is certainly thorough and drastic. A dominant principle employed is generality. The degree of objectivity is always dependent upon the number of viewpoints that are concerned with and cohere in, the object in question. Thus, as was pointed out, differentiation of subjectivity from objectivity commences when a single mind moves away from a single point of outlook. It is then that a succession of aspects are consolidated in the notion of an external object. The greater the number of consistently sustained aspects, the surer and more steadfast the object becomes. For example, bodily pains ~~are~~ are an undoubted measure of objectivity to the individual, but they are deemed subjective because their occurrences and recurrences are not consistently related to the more insistent environment of the perceptive domain: they are occasional intruders rather than members of a stable system.

There are thus degrees of objectivity, and borderland cases occur. The rainbow is barely rescued from being an illusion by the fact that a contiguous crowd of people agree more or less as to its position, but the man who seeks the pot of gold at its terminal point is apt to explode the objective theory. A constellation, like

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the Southern Cross, has a much better status, for it is there for inspection by all mankind when the view is unobstructed by the solid earth, clouds, or competitive glares. Yet to inhabitants of a distant star system it would be non-existent as a cross even if the individual stars could be seen. These uncertainties are not dependent upon mere ambiguities of speech. The same principle applies all through the world of objectivity. From the viewpoint of an electron a brick, with its galaxy of atoms floating in space, would be much of the same character as a constellation to us. Inversely, to a being of cosmic proportions, our Milky Way might be a very definite concretion. Again to a blind or colour-blind population, what would become of the red glow of the sunset? We see then that while objectivity in some form is inherent in all worlds, the form it assumes is contingent upon viewpoint and instruments of perception.

Another principle, which is yet but an extension of the striving towards generality, is that of conservation or invariance. To show that this conception is related to the larger one of generality it is necessary to bring in the analogy between space and time which has exercised so much the minds of modern physicists. An object is constituted by the generality of its appearances—that is to say, if all observers are agreed upon the occurrence of a certain appearance universal testimony will insist on its objectivity, and such verdict is difficult to assail. Science requires a generality in *time* standpoint as well as a generality in *space* standpoint, and objects which dissolve away have not fundamental relevance. A block of ice in the ordinary interpretation is undoubtedly an object, with spatial boundaries sharply defined for all observers at the given time. But, as it melts away along the time line there is a very fuzzy termination to its existence. So in greater or less degree with all material objects that we see or handle. Not only a block of ice but a block of wood, a piece of glass, the pyramids, the earth, the sun, our galaxy of stars itself, would appear to a group of observers strung along the time dimension as variable indeterminate objects, fading away in the extremities to non-entities. Science, therefore, must find a set of objects which better withstand the test of time. It has sought such in the atom, but scarcely found it.

Clerk Maxwell, in a famous passage which reads strangely in the light of modern knowledge, wrote concerning the atom

Natural causes we know are at work, which tend to modify, if they do not at length destroy all the arrangements and dimensions of the earth and the whole solar system. But though in the course of ages catastrophes have occurred and may yet occur in the heavens, though ancient systems may be dissolved and new systems evolved out of their ruins, the molecules out of which these systems are built—the foundation stones of the material universe—remain unbroken and unworn.

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Hence arose the law of the conservation of matter and later the conservation of energy. Can such laws be called empirical, or are they man-imposed? Bertrand Russell has said that the great generalities of physics are much of the character of the "great law" that there are three feet in every yard! Conservation is a notion, essential to science and therefore it is sure to appear in a scientific scheme. Why? Because it serves the primal purpose and charter of science, namely, power of prediction, with control as a corollary. In ordinary life, no doubt, prediction and control are likewise essential, and therefore also some form of conservation. You simply cannot predict without some constant link between the present and the future. If the fact of the future were absolutely different from that of the present, prediction would have no terms in which to express itself.

The conservation in the individual and common-sense world is, however, limited, because prediction, although very important, is not the exclusive, or even the paramount, consideration. We live in the present, and, moreover, the present derives its interest and vitality, not from conservation, but from novelty. A universal conservation would be a universal death. Thus we find that the world of our individual experience is a perpetual excursion into novelty while, as objectification becomes more definite in the passage to the common-sense world and onward to the world of science, so does the ambit of conservation expand and that of novelty diminish. The conservation in the primary worlds is not necessarily of the same kind as that in the scientific world. For instance, we ordinarily consider a river to remain identical, although to science the enduring molecules which constitute its waters pass away out to sea. And so with other things.

Something has already been said about the radical variations in the world that can arise from varying viewpoints, and also from diverse organs and instruments of perception. The atomic and cosmic viewpoints were mentioned, and the assumed non-existence of atomic or cosmic observers does not vitiate these illustrations, for physics in its widest aims, is at liberty to embrace all viewpoints, whether occupied by conscious beings or not. Development of this thought must be preceded by enunciation of a thesis which is central to this discussion. It is, that neither the world of common sense nor the varying world of a progressive science is delivered directly to sensory experience. This may seem a rather startling statement to any who may not have given the subject critical thought, for is it not the glory of science that it is founded upon observation and experiment? Yet who has ever experienced an object as it is considered to exist in Nature? Our impressions really form a succession of aspects. I see the outside of a house to-day, and

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to-morrow I may go in and view the interior. Thus the unitary and steadfast house of the spatial world turns out to be "given" as a moving panorama, the components of which are separated in time and diluted with an indefinite amount of intermediate experience. And this always is, and must be, the case, even if we set ourselves to concentrate on a single thing, whether it be a lump of wood, an electron, an ether wave, or anything else. It follows, then, that Nature considered as objective is a structure of our selective and abstractive faculties. This point must be examined more closely, because if it is not fully realized, or if it is misunderstood, the remarks that are to follow will be only so many empty words.

It may mitigate the somewhat abstract character of the subject if we imagine a man with eyes like a cinema camera, with sound-recording ears, and with the other senses likewise provided with analogous instruments. As he passed through life, moving hither and thither, his whole sensory experience would be recorded in a series of film elements. It is plain that any one of these single film pictures would not contain an object in its full character, but only a casual aspect of it. Nor would the whole film composed of the separate elements have significance until projected and synthesized by a spectator. This is exactly the case with the chain of our sensory impressions: it has no significance apart from the constructive interpretations of the mind. These impressions are in themselves absolutely separate with no principle by which one can participate with the other in a common life. The Italian philosopher Gentile, in an article published recently under the title "Time in History," shows how history and physical Nature are together involved in this predicament of being disjointed movements save under the synthesis of some covering and unifying principle of interpretation supplied by the mind. Speaking of the common notion of a world of objects complete in themselves, with mind simply standing over against them, he says: "Common sense to escape being driven at the mercy of unbridled imagination over the boundless region of abstract thought puts its trust blindly in a hypothetical world of objects, but such a trust is destined to lure it helpless into a labyrinthine series of facts and objects without logical connection or kinship of the spirit which strives to catalogue them. For facts have no order or connection, even in a mechanical order, which is not derived from the system in which the synthesis of consciousness represents them."

The belief in facts becomes an atomistic theory which is essentially the negation of any order or system. As facts pile up before the anxious gaze of the researcher there creeps over him a sense of helpless mystery.¹ Something of the same sort may have been envisaged by Goethe when he wrote

¹ *Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936

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And all that flows unfixed and undefined
In glimmering phantasy before the mind,
Bid thought's enduring chain for ever bind
(Faust—Tr ANSTER)

Upon the cinema illustration hinge certain inquiries and perhaps reservations, for, in addition to sense perception, the mind has an inward eye of memory, so that every member of the whole train of preceding film elements projects its contents upon each new momentary record, the mingled aggregate being thus personal and unique, and not solely dependent upon the immediate sensory situation. In the case of the mind, moreover, all accretions of imagination and impulse may be carried forward in perpetuity under conditions studied by psychology. Physics has to do with the spatio-temporal deliverance of the senses.

Keeping the main thesis in view, however, it will be noted that we have the raw material of the individual pictures on the one hand, and the elaboration by selective abstraction and construction on the other, resulting in Nature as we know it by common sense or science—for an analogy in method holds for all interpretations. A question will obtrude itself here. Have we then unlimited free options as to the character of the Nature which shall emerge as we vary our constructional policy or methods? The extreme cases would be illustrated by regarding Nature as presented to us, on the one hand like the jumbled elements of a jig saw puzzle bound to one predetermined solution, and on the other, like a heap of bricks out of which any chosen edifice could be built. Before hazarding a decision on this issue it will be well to examine further the sources of variation in our constructional results. Let us continue, however, along our line of thought by applying this contingent characteristic which we have found in human perceptions to the cinema illustration. The individual pictures themselves, which were figuring as the raw material for the mind architect, turn out on closer examination to be full of subjective elements, and by no means simple or unique. The form of them is contingent upon our physiological organization and instinctive nature, which mould and transform the primitive impressions. In the film picture, although in the visual part a pretty close resemblance holds between the tiny element in the projector and its counterpart on the screen, it is not so in the sound record. This appears on the film as a manifold of shaded components which issue in articulate speech only after projection on a photo-electric cell, the graded impulses from which actuate the sound apparatus. It may be that in similar manner our apparently simple perceptions, as they appear on the screen of the mind, bear only a very remote functional relation to the primitive sense impressions—as is, indeed, suggested by vision, where, for example, two minute

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retinal images of a house upside-down appear in perception as *one upright* structure, totally disparate in its large dimensions. It is difficult to analyse back to elemental sensations, and indeed to do so philosophy must set out from the level of definite perceptions

For our present discussion perhaps the most important factor of variation in our emergent world picture arises from intellectual constructive imagination. Here is to be found the principal agent of physical science both in its systematizing work and in its formulation of the questions put to Nature in observation and experiment. Nature must be articulated into such patterns as best provide the keys for understanding and, in a measure, controlling it. The ordinary configurations which dominate everyday life are in science considered of minor importance, and the world is resolved into more significant, if less tangible, elements. Options in the principles of construction not only exist here, but, in contrast with the uniformity of instinctive urge in the sensory world, by which we mostly agree as to the objects which surround us, a wide divergence of systems has arisen in the realm of physics. Let me offer a few geometrical analogies to the progressive simplifications and multiple interpretations of physics. An unstructed man might be imagined to use very unwieldy methods in surveying a field. Take a parallelogram with unequal angles. Our novice might isolate the four triangles contained in the figure when the diagonals are drawn, laboriously compute their areas, and add them together, arriving at the correct total area. If he dealt with many such fields on the same lines he might easily acquire the habit of referring to the four sections of the parallelogram by symbols as if they were separate entities. One day he discovers that against such a parallelogram can be placed a rectangle which may easily be shown to equal it in area. He, therefore, in subsequent cases of the kind, simply multiplies the base by the altitude and dismisses the triangle entities from his system of thought. As a somewhat different example,^{*} a set of dots may be given in apparently promiscuous distribution. Investigation may then show that all the dots can, by a certain grouping, be absorbed as angular points in right-angled triangles. Of course any other grouping by threes would produce triangles, but probably they would not have an important uniform characteristic. These right-angled triangles, if repeatedly found in fields of dots, would soon acquire a claim to the status of definite entities in the vocabulary of a geometer dealing with them. Things implicit, although not actually embodied in concrete form, can thus be made manifest by mind, and read into the situation. As a non-geometrical example of the same thing one could imagine a picture like Leonardo's "Last

^{*} Professor C. D. Broad has used a similar illustration in a somewhat different context.

Supper" with the central figure omitted. The mind of the spectator would be almost compelled to supply the want, so meaningless and puzzling would the picture otherwise be. In this sense the figure might be said to be actually depicted.

In our perceptive experience we find a bewildering profusion of presentations with which we must deal, not only in the interests of speculation, but in the struggle for daily existence. The necessity for a classification and arrangement which will serve our purposes of economy of thought and action is forced upon us and instinctive urge sets us at the task from birth onwards. Our investigations may, and often do, stop at a point where we have become sufficiently expert to avoid accidents, gain sustenance, communicate with our fellows and prosecute daily life. It is presumed, however, that such resolution of the elements of experience is still very crude indeed, and scientific investigation proceeds to simpler and more general formulae by which the survey of the presented field moves on towards perfection. Diamonds and charcoal are very different things in the common view, but science unifies them in the atom. So came the resolution of the whole physical world to electromagnetic elements.

This is no prejudice to sciences with special subject matter, like chemistry, and particularly biology, which are fully entitled to their special concepts and methods as long as they need them. But whatever special concepts and methods may be employed by biology, the physical components of organisms must be subject to physical laws. Physics will never tolerate the exclusion of anything within the space-time domain from its jurisdiction. If within organisms behaviour inconsistent with known laws takes place, then these laws must be altered to accommodate the new phenomena even if not fully to account for them, just as within a state of a confederation federal laws must be obeyed although supplementary local laws may be imposed.

In the light of the position now arrived at it is possible to reflect upon the issue involved as between objectivism and subjectivism. Nature appears to be fairly rigid and self-willed, by no means clay in the hands of the mental potter, and it seems absurd to think that we could, e.g., bark our shins against a constructional ideal or a mathematical principle! I think we must always recognize the actual—the fact of things being what they are and not something else, no matter by what route such actuality has arrived on the arena of experience. I do not think that it matters very much for physics to what transcendental agency we ascribe the arrival, or whether we postulate transcendental agency at all. That is appropriate to another sphere, although it is true that even physics cannot be purely empirical. In any case it may be convenient to recognize

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two contrasted moments in the composition of systems—the consciously imposed forms being mental and the basic elements worked upon being physical. Probably there is nothing ultimately determinate in this distinction, particularly if we impose upon physics the heavy task of recognizing all possible viewpoints and all possible organs of perception, as well as complete freedom in intellectual construction. But we are human beings, and, willy nilly, find our external world moulded for us in large measure, and such moulding, according to genetic explanation, is attributed to the organization of our bodies and minds. Some philosophical physicists, Eddington, for example, claim the widest constructional field for the mind. He says: "There is often a tendency to divide our assertions about the physical world into 'hard facts' and 'theoretical conjectures'. There is no such separation." And again: "We have found that where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from Nature that which the mind has put into Nature. We have found a strange footprint on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after the other, to account for its origin. At last we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the footprint. And lo! it is our own!"

I suggested that perhaps it was not of any concern to physics to assign transcendental agency in explaining the world as we find it, but there is a sense in which it is possible to mark off the subjective from the objective components. For physics *that* becomes objective which is inescapable in any particular system of world constructs. There seem to be many such things, because human cognitive nature is common to all of us, and our physiological and psychological organizations are canalized in their operations, and limited by the senses and categories of the mind. It is not significant for physics whether the concretions which are associated with these canalized forms are attributed to a transcendental personality or to a transcendental material. The realm in which such a difference applies is essentially mystic, and in it we are beyond the application of mundane standards and boundaries. A mystic in an absorbing vision may spasmodically point his hands outwards, and whatever they chance to point to may serve as a symbol for the inexplicable. Appropriate symbols are important, no doubt, for metaphysics and religion, but they have no relevance for physics. Objectivity will vary in degree according to the proportion of automatic agency deemed operative in the task of delimiting the scientific world. Co-relative with this, and supplementary, is an extensive margin under the play of optional thought, and within this margin is supplied the subjective element.

¹ *Philosophy*, January 1933

² *Space, Time and Gravitation*

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The distinction between objective and subjective, although variable in differing contexts, is thus given an intelligible foundation. The metaphysical reality is ignored because it has no relevance. This must not be considered an agnostic or defeatist attitude, any more than would be the case if a mathematician were to decline to describe the taste of a triangle. Nor is there any justification for discussing *probabilities* regarding the pure metaphysical real within the context of the empirical, for probability means nothing if no test to determine presence or absence can be applied. If a test be established, then, *ipso facto*, the metaphysical loses its character and the entity itself may come within the domain of physical or other empirical science.

The illustration of the dots and triangles as previously presented may help in a further critical consideration of this immediate question. The dots themselves may be taken to represent the "given," and therefore in that context they are undoubtedly objective. The constructed triangles may be thought to inhere in the relative position of the dots, but that is scarcely a definitive character, for many alternative constructions are possible, e.g., the circumscribed circles might be more significant in some contexts. Therefore these optional constructions may be regarded as subjective. This distinction, however, is not absolute, because one may imagine the dots to have been produced, for example, by an engraving process, revealing themselves on close inspection as a multiplicity of minute lines. These lines could in turn become the objective elements, and the dots would then appear as constructs. The aggregation into dots, although natural to our sensory habits, would not be inevitable in itself. Aside from our sensory bias, there is involved (rather more subtly) that intellectual assumption of the special coherence attaching to *contiguous* elements, which reason could scarcely substantiate if the matter were brought in question. In this manner the subjective realm can invade the objective, and the frontier is not absolute but dependent upon the sensory and intellectual system dominant in any particular occasion.

That variable anthropomorphic considerations enter into a determination of reality is thought by some philosophers to be derogatory to the sublime detachment of a higher sphere, but it is difficult to imagine any significance for us attaching to anything totally unconnected with our nature. Moreover, what has been said does not imply that one assignment of objectivity is as good as another. A useful analogy with a pair of similarly variable terms may be given. It is certainly not a meaningless distinction that is made between coastal districts and interior districts in a continent. A crab would probably draw the line of distinction at a few yards from the edge of the water, while a seagull might consider as coastal a strip ex-

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tending a score or so of miles inland. From time to time these limits would doubtless be transcended, but a reasonable norm as between coastal and interior could be established, based upon the constitution and habits of the respective creatures. So with man the norm of objectivity is determined by the more or less fixed character of the senses while, as regards the critical intellect, this norm can be varied and indefinite according to the universe of discourse.

It might be possible to imagine a being who could vary his sense reception over a wide range, as indeed we do to some extent with instrumental aids such as the microscope and telescope. In such cases the subjective domain would be indefinitely extended and the objective diminished. On the other hand, if the intellect were more inflexibly fixed and canalized, like our sense organs, Nature would become definitely objective, thought being more or less a sinecure without range of selectivity. Hudibras, the prodigy of Samuel Butler's satire, had a mind something of this sort:

His notions fitted things so well
That which were which he could not tell
And oftentimes mistook the one
For th' other as great clerks have done

Could such perfection be counted as a blessing? It would merge with instinct or intuition which dispense with laborious mechanism of thought although at the sacrifice of that turmoil of speculation and striving which seem to constitute the essence of our life.

Law, object, and cause are important and related concepts in physics. Law is essential, not incidental, to Nature. To bring forth the heavens and earth out of chaos is virtually to create them, for chaos, although imperfectly conceived as a tumbling jumble of elements, must in the fullness of its meaning cancel all entity, which necessarily implies some trace of system and order. It is easy to see how a complete system of natural law would determine the correlated objects, because, it would prescribe the orbits of all particles, and consequently their aggregations. No doubt very many laws, particularly minor ones, are objective and inherent in Nature in a dominant degree. Others, the great mathematical laws like those of universal conservation, are subjective or man-imposed. Thus the variability in the objective versions of Nature as a whole, assigned by science from time to time, is accounted for. Nor need there be any finality in this direction.

Cause has usually been regarded as having reference to succession, the cause preceding the effect, but the idea could be generalized and extended to the co-existent in space—to say nothing of the future causing the present or the past. The nature of a curve, for example,

could be cited as the cause of a generated figure. In a penetrating article written for Swiss publication in 1934,¹ Professor Lauwerys developed this thought in a most interesting manner. He does not, however, use the word *cause* in a general sense such as I have indicated. The general principle is the *Uniformity of Nature* which is applied as *geometry* in *spatial* relations, and as *causation* in *temporal* successions. Now, in a mechanical problem, such as the trajectory of a bullet, it is usual to compress time as it were, so that the whole course of the bullet is shown as a simultaneity in a curve. Actually, of course, the bullet is only in one place at a time, but the continuous representation in a curve enables the flight to be dealt with analytically. This ruse, however, is not practicable in more complex physical phenomena such as an application of a light and a consequent explosion. It is necessary in such cases to invoke causation proper, which, Lauwerys points out, always involves the atomization of phenomena, for a cause must be individualized. This introduces two diverse and incompatible methods of dealing with Nature, and the result is the dilemma expressed in the Heisenberg Principle of Uncertainty, which asserts that it is impossible to know at once both the position and the momentum of an electron. You can *choose* which you wish to know, but once the choice is made there is a complete and systematic uncertainty as to the other element. This appears to be simply the result of applying simultaneously two not perfectly compatible systems of thought.

Owing to the option always offered in constructing Nature as viewed by science, it is apt to happen (often most subtly and elusively) that two systems are employed in a single argument, and hence we have many paradoxes comparable with those of Zeno the Greek, who held that motion is an illusion, because a body, in occupying all the intermediate positions, infinite in number, between two points, and spending any time whatever at each, would require an eternity to attain its destination. Similar confusion in a more obvious way was exhibited by the student who, in answer to an examination question as to whether he could give an example of an effect preceding the cause, instanced a man pushing a barrow. Or that other famous answer, that a circle has two sides, the inside and the outside. An illustration, certainly imperfect, of the Heisenberg dilemma might be found in the two diverse methods of indicating a geographical position, (a) by longitude and latitude, and (b) by pricking a mark on a map. The mark would of necessity be of a finite size, and so it would be to that extent indefinite for statement by precise numerals—and vice versa.

Much of what has been said may seem formal and likely to be barren in practical science, but it is highly important that clear

¹ *Annales Guldhard Séserine*

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ideas of scientific method and its relation to metaphysical ideas should be formulated. Confusion has reigned in high places. For example, the Heisenberg Principle has raised violent controversies regarding the validity of the principle of causation. Now, if it be definitely and consciously realized that a double system of thought is applied to a problem no harm is likely to accrue. Indeed multiple systems have often proved useful and supplementary, and perhaps they may be ultimately essential to science. But it is a different matter to assign as an indefeasible character of Nature what is merely the result of a particular chosen method of analysis.

Failure to distinguish between the individual world and the common domain of science has, it would seem, been responsible for the attempts of Sir A. Eddington to impose free will on Nature. Free will has to do with the individual world, and should never be argued (as such) on the plane of the very different world of physics which excludes by its very procedure not only free will, but the whole vital colour of life. The knowledge of free will is in no way dependent upon undetermined electrons. It is an immediate intuition, of a higher truth status than the derivative realm of physics. In any case Eddington's freedom does not amount to much. The writer had an opportunity of asking him a question at a philosophical Congress in Cambridge. Premising that physical laws with suitable transformation can be applied backwards, as when ancient eclipses are determined, it was suggested that on his showing the past must be undetermined in a similar manner to the future. He replied in effect "Yes, except in so far as the past is actually known from experience." Now, what an infinitesimal part of the past has entered into actual experience, and most of that is long forgotten! The most unbending determinist would surely be satisfied to believe that the future is as definite as the unknown past.

We cannot live backwards (Eddington elsewhere emphasizes) but physical laws can be interpreted either backwards or forwards. However, he finds an exceptional anomaly in the second law of thermodynamics. Energy, although always the same in amount in a closed system, must perpetually degenerate in form. To take a figurative illustration, a viscous column of, say, bitumen, could retain its constant weight although gradually collapsing from tall and thin to short and stout, and eventually spreading like a pancake on the ground. Eddington suggested that the constant degeneration of energy creates the inviolable onward flow of time. But surely this would involve a wholly anomalous backward flow of time in *restricted regions* where, as of course is admitted, energy can, by drawing upon neighbouring sources be boosted for the time being in an upward direction.

But the whole conception ignores the fact that the adventure of

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mind in time is a matter of the individual world, in which context time is not space-like at all (as Bergson's philosophy has emphatically proclaimed). It is, therefore, not directional in the spatial sense, unless, indeed, it be a genetic prototype of the spatial concept. Certainly it is not as a citizen in the space world. Would we expect distinction between "here" and "there" in the universe of science? Yet these concepts are vital to the individual.

The abstractive domain of physical Nature is like a map or index. It is not accounted as a blemish in a chart that it does not show pictures of individual ships, or that it can show the way on to the rocks as well as the way to avoid them. The index is not identical with the contents of a book.¹

Doubtless it will have been noticed that I have followed in a general sense the Kantian interpretation of Nature. But modern physics has gone beyond Kant, who held that space and time in their native character were unassailable foundations of thought. If so, they have shared the fate of the sensory qualities of the common-sense world, or have at best been admitted to the world of physics in a mutilated condition. The relativity theory and other theories have brought these background entities out into the arena of manipulative calculation along with the matter which occupies them. Indeed, the ideal is to whittle away content and express the Universe as a general configuration upon a spatio-temporal domain, in which mathematical character overrides intuitive simplicity.²

Einstein has set the ball rolling, and there is no end in recent cosmic theories to the liberties being taken with the space and time concepts. De Sitter, the eminent Dutch mathematical astronomer, suggested the necessity of different time systems for the occupied and unoccupied regions of space respectively.

Later still, E. A. Milne, who for some years past has been a prominent figure among English cosmologists, goes much further than Einstein. He alludes to the fact that owing to the abolition of absolute time evolution has lost its meaning, but concerns himself mainly with devising a character for a universe capable of fitting modern theory, particularly as to conflicting elements of time. The famous second law of thermodynamics, which implies the doom of the Universe by the running down of effective energy, is itself nugatory unless a specification be given of the particular time system to be applied. Many cosmologists now regard the Universe as expanding in such sort that a commencement to the expansive process seems to point to original creation. Milne embodies this conception, and his Universe comes out as one in which a leading thought is a diverse time system for each constituent world in the Universe, so that each, while growing old and running down in

Cf. Cassirer's Substance and Function

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energy level, may look back to a real creation epoch. Not only that, but the inhabitants of any ageing world will always be able to envisage within the Universe other equally real worlds in whose time system creation is an affair of yesterday. Thus, in the opinion of Milne, can reconcile creation, degradation of energy, and eternal duration.

One more aspect of time in Nature. Time systems are ultimately derived from physical law, but physical law aims at being itself timeless or permanent. Is this a modern version of the Parmenidean quest, endemic in the human breast, to reach out of the flux which is the mother of Time to pure Being which is one and for ever stable?

It is not possible on this occasion to discuss Nature as the bridge between mind and mind, but it may be suggested that the bridge having become so wobbly, the validity of the communication between spirit and spirit seems to come in question—a far reaching thought. In conclusion it may be hoped that one practical deduction can be drawn from this review of the status of physical concepts. The Nature of physics is a purposive abstraction from experience, intensely meaningful, but not an epitome, let alone an embodiment, of all reality. Things with which we have immediate contact in experience cannot be cancelled or contradicted by an elaboration of theory. The world of physics may hold the keys to the mansion, but the keys are not the mansion, nor is a map of the world, however useful, identical with the great globe itself.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

THEORY OF VALUE

In our last surveys we collected some new books concerning philosophy of nature and philosophy of history. To-day we concentrate on Philosophy of Value taking under review some books more or less closely connected with it. Here again we meet a different situation. German philosophy of history was in closest connection with its own history (with the "rise of the historical consciousness" at the end of the eighteenth century) and with the moral sciences analysing historical objects. It wished to give these sciences the rank possessed already by natural science, and to build up history with their help. German philosophy of nature on the other hand, was concerned with natural science: it was theory of science, epistemology applied to this specific field, trying to overcome the difficulties of former theories and those inherent in modern science itself especially in physics. The position in the sphere of the theory of value is different and still more difficult because no clear-cut series of sciences corresponds to its problems. Moreover, the theory of value itself is new, originating at the end of the nineteenth century as a generalization of former ethical, aesthetical and economic theories. Unfortunately the theory (debatable in itself) arose at a moment when the values on which European civilization of the last two thousand years was based were already in a stage of dissolution. Consequently the philosopher is in the unfortunate position either of facing the task of establishing a new order of values or of overlooking this very dissolution which confronts him.

Moreover the position in Germany differs from that in England because the dissolution of the bourgeois society is far more advanced there than here. Helmut Plessner's very able analysis *The Fate of German Thought at the End of its Bourgeois Epoch*¹ makes it clear enough. This book traces the dissolution of the old order of values: the replacement step by step of religious values by those of the Mind, by economical and sociological ones and finally by those of the blood. Its leading idea is that simultaneously with the bourgeois society its superstructure, especially its theology and philosophy, has been broken up as mere ideology. Regarding philosophy the author is very pessimistic: it has lost in his opinion any influence on life and on the conduct of human affairs: it is eliminated, and only one genuine task is left to it namely to develop a theory of man. Though I strongly disagree with this conclusion and though I think that there are still fruitful beginnings where he sees destruction only, and that the collective philosophies of our time deserve attention in certain respects, the dissolution of the old order of values cannot be denied.

It is astonishing to see that the most important new book on our question, a fruit of a lifetime devoted to it, Oskar Kraus' *The Theories of Value: History and Critique*,² does not take any account of this situation. It is a

¹ *Das Schicksal Deutschen Geistes im Ausgang seiner bürgerlichen Epoche*. Max Niehans Verlag, Zurich und Leipzig, 1935.

² *Die Werttheorien, Geschichte und Kritik*. Verlag Rudolf M. Rohrer, Brunn, Wien, Leipzig, 1937.

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very scholarly work, in the good and in the bad sense of the word. Everybody must be grateful to Krans, for he gives the first comprehensive history of the theory of value, from Heraclitus to the most recent writers including English thinkers like Hobbes, Hume, Smith, Bentham, Martineau, Sidgwick, Moore, psychologists, economists, and modern theorists of law. This vast material is ordered by being seen and criticized from Brentano's latest standpoint, the so-called "reism." Everybody in accord with him gets a good mark, everybody disagreeing a bad one (therefore we must be prepared. I am afraid, to get a very bad one). This reism (*Reismus*) is based on the dubious presupposition that the unity of the concept of consciousness (not the unity of consciousness itself) demands the unity of its object, and this unity Brentano calls "thing" or essence or real. The meaning of this theory may perhaps best be understood from Brentano's criticism of Plato. He rejected Plato's ideas not only as hypostasized universals, but as hypostasized fictions. Plato supposed concepts to have meanings of their own which are only syncategorematical or which have the mere function of adding to the meaning of the whole speech. But by his saying that not all substantives are concepts Brentano does not arrive at a pure nominalism. He, the follower of Aristotle, agreed with Plato that there must be a highest genus under which we may subsume every thing which we represent, judge, or evaluate. This he called *res* (*δὲν*).

I think this theory provides a very interesting demonstration that an antiquated scholastic theory which is in disagreement with present logic may nevertheless be of critical value. For this reism is the basis of a very interesting linguistic analysis of moral judgments. It criticizes the speech of 'the realm of values' of 'the hierarchy of values' etc. and demands its translation into propositions about things, reality or *res*. Criticism of language is regarded by this school as the presupposition of the critique of reason, and I draw the attention of the reader especially to Georg Kathov's *Researches regarding the Theory of Value and Theodicy*: in particular to his first chapter containing linguistic analysis and his appendix on W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good*.

If this linguistic criticism gives the negative basis to the research, the positive basis is supplied by the thesis that the man who judges rightly (*einsichtig*) is the measure of all things, of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not, and that a person evaluating in right evaluation is the measure of all things, of those which are good, that they are good, of those which are bad, that they are bad. Thus the author believes himself to have solved the old Sophistic Platonic controversy about relativity or absoluteness of values. The objectivity of values, their realm and hierarchy are destroyed, but nevertheless relativism is rejected for the 'rectitudo' of the subject gives a measure for evaluating. For to speak about evaluating in "right evaluation and of 'right' emotions, and to say that "right" evaluations and emotions are more elementary than ethical judgments means the reduction of truth (*verum*) and goodness (*bonum*) to the 'rectitudo' of the acts which are related to them. Truth and goodness are not a quality of objects but of the acts of the human mind.

The tendency to transfer the problem from the objective to the subjective sphere is interesting, and possibly a way to its solution. If Westermarck objects "to speak as Brentano does of right and 'wrong' emotions springing from self-evident intuitions and having the same validity as truth and error, is only another futile attempt to objectivize our moral judgments" (*Ethical Relativity*, 1932, p. 61), his criticism is too easy. For if Westermarck believes

* *Untersuchungen zur Wertheorie und Theodizee*. Rudolf M. Rohrer, Brunn, 1937.

himself to have proved the relativity of moral judgments by reducing them to "moral" emotions that is quite as much a "circular in probando," because emotions are in themselves neither good nor bad, but become such only because we judge them to be so. Brentano's theory contains considerable difficulties because to speak of "right" emotions, of "right" love, of evaluating in a justifiable manner etc. is merely to borrow the terminology of logic. nevertheless, it has the great advantage of being an earnest attempt to solve the problem. Therefore we hope the book will find in this country the attention it deserves. The abundant richness of its historical analyses in which there is no room to enter in this survey will make it indispensable to any student of the subject. Anybody however, who is interested in the fate of European civilization which challenged from more than one side, has entered its period of catastrophes cannot fail to notice that the two pages devoted to Nietzsche (compared with Heinrich Maier's nine pages) are wholly inadequate. This fact would not be so important if Nietzsche were not the most representative expression of the basic situation of our time (which is completely ignored by the Professor's book) namely, the dissolution of the system of values dominant in Europe for two thousand years and the inescapable problem of revaluation or as Nietzsche said "*Umwertung aller Werte*." This problem reappears in Brentano's language for how shall we make people love in the "right" manner or even understand what "right" love means if they have lost the faculty of loving altogether?

In this most distressing situation it seems not impossible that the general theory of value may profit from its applications just as philosophy of nature profited from natural science and philosophy of history from moral science. I have in mind the science of law. Perhaps a new book of William Ebenstein giving an account of the Vienna School's treatment of the pure theory of law, may be useful. It is the school of Hans Kelsen to which belong Adolf Merkel, Alfred Verdross, Felix Kaufmann, Fritz Schreier, Frantisek Weyr and his Czech school. The book which is to appear in English also, seems to me to contain an able and thorough account of Kelsen's ideas. This school introduces Kantian and Neo-Kantian ideas into the sphere of Law. Thence the speech of Pure Science of Law or of Pure Theory of Law. It demands that the science of law be purged of all elements foreign to it, of all elements of nature of biology, psychology, sociology and also of morals, grammar, and the so-called Law of Nature. It is not concerned with the matter of law but following Kant's transcendental method, it starts from the fact of existing law and analyses the conditions of its possibility. Kelsen himself is chiefly influenced by the Neo-Kantian Marburg School of Hermann Cohen others like Kaufmann and Schreier by Husserl.

Now the interesting point of this school is that the claim of law to absolute validity (as upheld in the Law of Nature (*Naturrecht*) and in the Law of Reason (*Vernunftrecht*)) is dismissed and replaced by the hypothetical validity of positive law. The underlying principle on which the theory of law is based is an hypothetical proposition, "If A is then B ought to be." It explains what is to follow in a juridical manner, if a certain state of affairs is given. The "ought" expresses the specific connection between condition and consequence. Thus juridical values lose their absoluteness their validity is hypothetical (even derived from their logical character of being the hypothesis of the facts which they have to explain). They are relative, yet their relativity is restricted even by the necessity that they have to provide a basis for empirical facts. I do not suggest that this solution is satisfactory.

* *Die Rechtsphilosophische Schule der reinen Rechtslehre*. Tauszig u. Tauszig, Prag 1935

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but it may be that the study of empirical law may teach us more about the nature of values than a precipitate return to so-called material values

Not without relation to our theme is the new volume of Fichte's posthumous works¹ with two unpublished though not unknown lectures, both taken from pupils' notes, the one "On Logic and Metaphysics as a Popular Introduction to Philosophy, following Plato's Aphorisms" the second one on "Theory of Science," the first unimportant but the other interesting In it Fichte, criticizing Kant tries to find the unity of theoretical and practical philosophy he treats philosophy as a whole disregarding the differences between theoretical and practical problems To Kant's treatment of both as different domains with independent laws Fichte objects that Kant does not even reach a consistent theoretical philosophy Kant formulates laws of our thoughts in relation to objects Fichte asks Why do we suppose that an object corresponds to our representation? To answer this question he says we must go back to the unity of our action for our ideal action is not independent of our real action We are conscious of our representations and of objects only because we are acting beings "An action must be directed towards an object an object which we call in our language *Gegenstand*, because this object is that which resists our action" In itself the thing in itself is nothing it is something only in relation to our action Only by this action do we become conscious of reality Fichte sees the new point of view of his theory of science in the fact that it starts neither from the object like materialism nor from the subject like idealism but from the inter relation of both If Fichte were right that in a basic sense theoretical and practical problems are united it would be of great importance to our problem (probably he is right and his problem is still important some of Professor Macmurray's remarks after his lecture at the last meeting of the Aristotelian Society pointed in this direction) Expressed in the language of logical analysis Fichte's thesis would mean that the meaning of terms is not simply a matter of linguistic convenience It may be that the meaning of a term in one sphere (e.g. of reality in the sphere of theoretical knowledge) cannot be cleared up in this sphere itself but that we have to go to a more basic and more comprehensive sphere in order to understand it (The lectures are identical with those treated in S. Berger's able dissertation *On an Unpublished Theory of Science of J. G. Fichte*, Marburg 1918)

David Banmgardt's original and stimulating book² may be regarded as a preliminary to a new ethics and to a history of ethics His elaborate and thorough treatment of Kant's rationalistic ethics and of Herder's Hemsterhuis, and Jacobi's irrational ethics anticipate his systematic point of view that ethics ought to give a universal law and to consider the material element of moral life as well Unfortunately the small space at our disposal does not allow a detailed analysis the interested reader will find it in Professor Liebert's *Philosophia* vol. II p. 316

Klaus Dockhorn's book on *The Political Philosophy of the English Idealistic School its Theory and Influence*,³ may find interest in this country because in treating of T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, B. Bosanquet, he pursues researches started by Professor Munroe. This paper is based on his master's, Professor H. Schoffler's dynamic interpretation of English literature which supposes the nation to be in a constant interchange with the surrounding

¹ Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Nachgelassene Schriften* Bd. 2 (*Schriften aus den Jahren 1790-1800*) Herausgegeben von Hans Jacob Tunkler und Duennhaupt Berlin, 1937

² *Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn unter den Vorläufern der modernen Ethik* Meiner, Leipzig, 1933

³ *Die Staatsphilosophie des englischen Idealismus ihre Lehre und Wirkung* H. Poppinghaus, Bochum Langendreer, 1937

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forces and impressions, and thus to change its form and organization. This notion, adequate to a nation without tradition like Germany, is not quite true applied to a nation with tradition like England. Consequently this book, which is rich in material and quotations, is in danger of Germanizing English thought (e.g. if somebody speaks of "community," of understanding it as corporate life).

In a looser manner H. Glockner's book, *The Adventure of the Mind*,¹ is connected with the theme of this survey. It owes its origin to the meeting of the German Philosophical Society at Berlin in 1936 on "Soul and Body." The author, expecting a clear word worthy of the great historical moment, was deceived, and wrote this book, with which however, he himself does not seem quite satisfied. "I am fairly well acquainted with the history of philosophy and know that few of my thoughts are really new." Strikingly new in any case, is the translation of index by "*Begriff Zeiger*." His thesis that the traditional distinction of the theoretical and practical sphere is wrong reminds us of Fichte's thought.

Thus, in the sphere of the Theory of Value, even more than in that of Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of History, everything is in a state of flux including the problems themselves.

F. H. HEINEMANN

¹ *Das Abenteuer des Geistes*. Fr. Frommann, Stuttgart, 1938.

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A Hundred Years of British Philosophy By DR RUDOLF METZ Translated by Professor J W Harvey, M.A. Professor T E Jessop, M.A. and Henry Sturt, M.A. Edited by J H Muirhead, LL.D., F.B.A. Library of Philosophy (London George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. New York The Macmillan Company 1938 Pp 828 Price 25s net)

To translate into English a German book such as that of Dr Metz calls for special qualities. The translator must not merely find good English equivalents for the German words and phrases: he must get back to the actual terminology used by the English writers whose doctrines are being expounded. I imagine myself, confronted with such a task, spending hours ferreting into the books and articles of Green and Bradley, Bosanquet and Hobbhouse, Alexander and Stout and Moore, and the rest to discover just which particular chapters were being laid under contribution: which sentences had been incorporated into the German exposition: and laying down the pen time after time with utter weariness. The three translators in the present case have done their work remarkably well. They and the Editor are to be congratulated on the successful termination of a formidable task. Dr Metz's book is prodigious for its industry and its completeness. He has made his volume a kind of Baedeker of the English philosophers of the last sixty years, preceded by a general introduction covering in a less thorough way the philosophic movements from the beginning of the nineteenth century. He was, of course, helped, and helped very greatly, by the two volumes of *Contemporary British Philosophy* edited by Professor Muirhead. But he has made it his aim to come into personal contact as far as possible with the actual philosophers of whom he was to treat: and his judgments on their work are expressed with a candour which an English colleague would not permit himself at least not in print. He was of course addressing his German colleagues: the translation enables us to overhear his talk. For many readers this volume will have all the interest of the volumes about Britain and the British character written by friendly observers abroad. We like to see ourselves as our neighbours see us, even though we may think them mistaken here and there.

On the whole Dr Metz has succeeded in maintaining an admirable perspective. His orders of merit are distributed in a way with which there will be pretty general agreement: though of course there will be disagreements in particular cases. His highest praise is given to those philosophers who have built up complete systems of philosophy in books specially written for the purpose. He is less happy about thinkers who have devoted themselves to detailed studies in regard to particular problems. And he does not like thinkers who do not produce definite solutions. Thus Moore's work is "that of clarifying problems rather than of solving them" and in consequence may evoke admiration but cannot satisfy thought (541). The intensity of the clarifying process not merely fails to help us to a solution, he says of one of Moore's papers "but even debars us from it" (549). In the work of Broad he complains, in the end most questions are left undecided, unless we choose to call a decision the somewhat higher coefficient of probability with which one theory is invested in preference to another. His work moves by preference in the shallows of probability without ever reaching or wishing to reach the firm ground of certainty" (668).

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Sorley once complained that "English writers . . . [on philosophy] have suffered much . . . at the hands of erudite German historians on the look-out for system rather than for thought".¹ Dr Metz is on the whole saved from this complaint by his general plan of considering individual thinkers on their own merits rather than as exemplifications of this or that "ism". His Baedeker permits travellers to arrange their own tours. And this is as it should be. Admirable as his backgrounds are, however, I am not altogether happy about his actual expositions of the thought of particular philosophers. Many of them are illuminating but many of them give merely a summary of conclusions arrived at by a thinker without any account of the method by which they have been reached and without any reconstruction on Dr Metz's own part. Perhaps more than this could hardly be expected, but the practice has its disadvantages. The reader who is trying to understand is left baffled, and in many cases is liable to be actually misled. Backgrounds seem to me to be his strong point. In spite of this, however, Dr Metz's book is a memorable achievement, and its translation opens to English readers a mine of information about British philosophic thought.

The index is merely one of names, and does not include reference to names in the footnotes. In it Samuel Butler and the Bishop coalesce into one. All the references to pages 121-183 are inaccurate, through an unfortunate transposition of pages at the indexing stage. The numbers in the index from 121-154 should read from 150-183; those from 154-183 should read from 121-150. 154 is thus ambiguous. But this is a matter of minor importance, the rest of the index is accurate, so far as I have tested it.

I have no space for a discussion of particular details of Dr Metz's treatment of individual thinkers. I must confine myself to noting a few general points. He regards British Idealism as constituting a renaissance of philosophic speculation in this country and puts it down to the influence of Hegel, brushing aside as without evidence the view of Professor Muirhead² that there was at work also a genuine English tradition, derived from Plato. He claims Green as a Hegelian, though he admits that there is little explicit evidence for this in Green's writings and he considers Green's political philosophy as of minor importance for the curious reason that "it has come down to us in the form of lectures edited by another hand from his remains" (283). Verily, publication is a great God! He prefers Bosanquet's account of the State, because it is more genuinely Hegelian. Green "fell back into the typical individualism of the English . . . not fully liberated from the fetters of the native tradition, he shrank from such radical consequences as Hegel had drawn" (283). Hobhouse's political theory also he regards as less valuable than the rest of Hobhouse's work. For it "does not spring from the scientific objective study which characterizes the rest of his work, but from the hate-impregnated and envenomed atmosphere of the World War, to which even a thinker of so steady and objective a judgment fell a victim." It represents "a typical form of bourgeois Liberalism defending itself against the omnipotence of the State because it feels its freedom threatened thereby" (168).

The other main characteristic Dr Metz sees in modern British philosophy is its closeness to the trend of thought of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume where it is not influenced by Hegel, and many of the thinkers he regards as not succeeding in getting far beyond Hume. The influence of Reid, with his appeal to common sense, does not seem to him to bode well for British philosophy; wherever he finds it, he mentions it as something to be deplored. He regards Dean Inge as introducing to present-day English philosophy "a noteworthy

¹ *History of English Philosophy*, p. 300.

² *The Platonist Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*.

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widening of its cultural horizon, the sharpening of its vision for far views over space and time, a training in genuine thought about and insight into history and the philosophy of civilization' (783)—which the English might have received from Hegel but did not and which Dean Inge owes to Troeltsch. And he thinks (777) that too many British philosophers have shown an uncritical interest in Psychological Research.

L. J. RUSSELL

Studies in the Philosophy of Religion By A. A. BOWMAN M.A., Litt.D.
 Edited with a Memorial Introduction by Prof. Kemp Smith (London
 Macmillan & Co. 1938 Pp. Vol. I, xlviii + 423 Vol. II, xiii + 438
 Price 30s. the two vols.)

I believe this to be one of those rare works which at once take their due place in the front rank of British Philosophy. It is a masterly presentation of original principles that must indelibly impress the thought of to-day. And thus not only so far as its main themes are concerned but equally as regards others which despite the detailed discussion accorded to them are skilfully subordinated to the Philosophy of Religion itself: Logic and Epistemology, Realism and Idealism, Science and History, Ethics and Psychology are all brought within one comprehensive viewpoint, and surveyed with a penetrative vision that never loses sight of the far-reaching forest owing to the innumerable trees. The subtlety of the argument indeed sometimes verges upon paradox, as in the question "Is it possible to experience what it is to be unconscious?" But however involved the analysis may become it is inevitably refocused upon Religion.

The Ontology, in the first place, is unambiguously realistic: to exist as an appearance is to be the function of an independent Real; every experience of an appearance is an experience of the object itself; the independent Real is a *real* object of *experience*. Needless to add that appearance in all its modes and experience at every level are conditioned, but always in such a way that despite the profound contrasts between the conscious self and its objects, direct and unbroken contact is sustained between them, however diversified or distorted it may be. Even if the problem of the Real and its Appearances is not finally solved, this discussion is of the highest value.

The mere statement of the issues in these terms, however, may seem to assign a relative unreality to the subject, but this suggestion is categorically rejected. For while experience necessarily implies having an object, it is far more significant in that it involves being a subject. Not, of course, that these two principles can be severed, rather is it a matter of emphasis and even of value, to be a subject has its own intrinsic character and far outweighs the implications important though these also are, of having an object and with this Realism is inseparably associated Permanence, in and of subject and object alike. However baffling or even inscrutable such Permanence may be, the arguments on its behalf are of the weightiest order and while the contentions of current Phenomenalism, Neo-Positivism, and Psychological Atomism are clearly recognized and evaluated, they are countered by a criticism so effective as to confront their advocates with extremely formidable difficulties.

The term "self" and "selfhood" are however employed in an unusually comprehensive, though perfectly legitimate, sense. All selves without exception, are 'highly integrated, self-identical wholes,' never to be fully understood simply in terms of their physical conditions. Thus far, then, "inanimate

nature, the actually existing world, is a system of selves," only "not of experience bearing selves", the first type possesses an inner, or intrinsic character of its own which must be rigorously distinguished from all relations, while it also enjoys some degree of the permanence already insisted upon. Incidentally, this principle seems to be very slowly forcing itself upon modern scientific theory, and even, though against the author's own contention, into Physics. But however this may be, the second mode—"selfhood-experience"—involves (to repeat) "a permanent subject," an "identity of selfhood actually experienced in the sense that every experience comes to us as an experience of the self. We feel ourselves to be the universal and uniform subject of every object and event." Thus all variants of Subjectivism are categorically rejected. The inclusive use of "self" to denote "the complex existent" as such, however, appears to me to confuse the further distinction between this "selfhood in general" on the one hand, and personality on the other. But this is after all a quite minor point, the essential principle is that we learn to think of ourselves as inviolably self-identical in the unique concept of personality. "A 'person' in short, is 'an experience bearing self' and personality implies not merely 'what it is to have an object,' but (once more) 'what it is to be a subject' while it is on the contrary "impossible to attribute modes of experience to the permanently unconscious." How then, do these conclusions bear upon Religion? To begin with, "a personalist interpretation of nature is one outstanding characteristic of primitive religion, but still more fundamental is the principle that "the notion of personality (is) the pivot on which everything turns" since it constitutes the differentia between the specifically religious, and the scientific secular, attitude to the Universe and also creates 'the issue that confronts religion itself in one of the most serious crises of its development." But this is no antiquated anthropomorphism. Quite the contrary the demarcation of the essentially personal aspects of Religion from the impersonal, the secular and the scientific forms one of the most original and valuable features of the entire argument.

In the first place primitive Animism and its derivatives themselves provoke the familiar and powerful drift towards the impersonal," substantiated as this seems to be by every advance in knowledge beyond early and crude superstition and culminating in Pantheism and the most prominent types of Mysticism. But however emotionally attractive and logically consistent these may appear to be, they fail, in the end, to meet the conditions of man's existence and to satisfy the demands of his being. Usually, I believe, this collapse is averted by the impossibility of any genuinely coherent formulation of such systems and if, on the other hand, they pursued their principles to the bitter end they would prove (to resume the author's own weighty contention) that Religion is absolutely inseparable from the instinctive and ineradicable desire for existence which, no matter how refined and elevated it may become, must ever retain its inherent finitude, simply because man is a finite being. 'Religion,' therefore, 'is a phenomenon of finitude, and to remove the finite factor is to cancel our concept of religion altogether.' This formulation of the Hegelian principle of Negativity, of course, neither questions the incalculable value of Mysticism nor imposes any narrow limits on finitude, as such, this to employ a scientific illustration, may expand like the Lemaître Universe, which nevertheless remains finite! From the purely religious standpoint then, thoroughgoing Mysticism is self-destructive. "to be completely lost in God is to lose God completely. To become one with the One that knows no other is to cease to be His worshipper. Brahmanism is the nemesis of oriental religion, Buddhism is the nemesis of

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Brahmanism As a solution of the religious problem of existence mysticism breaks down "1

In the opposite direction, similarly, "a universe which is all God is as incompatible with religion as a universe in which a god is altogether wanting"—the Universe in other terms, of thoroughly consistent secularism and impersonalist Science. This Universe and these cultures must nevertheless, be assigned their due role in human life, and this is achieved by Religion itself, as it steadily develops creating the domain of the secular as the sole method of transcending its own animistic beginnings. For the purposes of religion "then, 'man must be thought of as man—the essence of sane secularism—just as nature must be thought of as nature, as pure Science quite logically insists. In other words recalling what has already been argued about Mysticism 'it is a necessity of religion that the human agent should not lose himself in continual preoccupation with God he must perforce differentiate his attitude towards the things of this world in such a way that religion itself prescribes. Thus (to repeat) Religion conserves its essence and ensures its advance for it continues to pivot on personality and neither secularism nor scientific impersonalism can deprive even the scientist of his humanity. The apparent 'retreat of the religious attitude in face of the secularist, therefore, must be viewed in its true light as being one with the movement whereby religion becomes clearly and consistently theistic and theism definitely spiritual."

Once it has shed its animistic and crudely anthropomorphic swaddling clothes then Theism involves a stupendous dualism a fundamental duality in the nature of things which is at the basis of all religion. Man himself shares this duality even while he observes and investigates it and in realizing himself to be 'a finite personality' he must conceive God as the correlate of a completed personality in man. Not at all however in any abstract arbitrary or artificial manner but naturally and intrinsically the existence of a personal God is the necessary implicate of all personal experience man's practical belief in his personality implies the existence of a personal God', on the other hand, the discovery of order in the world does not necessarily imply the existence of an omnipresent Intelligence. This should suffice to show that the arguments advanced are original as well as weighty.

The supreme reality is personal in character. 'God must be a person, in the sense that He is "the Being to whom we cannot relate our personalities in any other way (than) in their synthetic completeness"—a criterion that is unmistakably pragmatic though by no means easy while at the opposite pole the concept of nature serves to stereotype the impersonal interpretation of the world" on which all Science is based.

It is however impossible, within the limits of a Review to do justice to the application of these principles to other fundamentally important aspects of human experience—to Ethics, marked by a devastating criticism of naturalistic moral theory to genuine creativeness within even man's activities and attaining its perfection in the divine, to the proper functions of History and Art. But in conclusion I should like to remove any suspicion that the author ever yielded to the besetting temptation of the philosopher—over intellectualization. On the contrary "Philosophy can never hope to take the place of experience. Religion is not truly religion until it has incorporated the moral life. Religion goes behind all intimacies of experience to the universal groundwork of reality. Effectual belief in

¹ This finds a remarkable confirmation in *The Bhagavadgita*. "When one sees Me every where, and sees everything in Me, I am never lost to him, nor is he lost to Me." *The Song of the Lord* (E. J. Thomas) VI 30. This Mysticism, in other words, is by no means absolute.

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the personality of God means more than a theoretical belief that God is a person. "No religion can live on its ideals alone." Inadequate though this must be, it should ensure the keenest interest in the forthcoming sequel, *A Sacramental Universe*.

J. E. TAYLOR

From Morality to Religion By W. G. DE BURGH, F.B.A. (Macdonald & Evans 1938 Crown 8vo Pp xxx + 374 Price 12s 6d net)

In these Gifford Lectures Professor de Burgh continues his defence of Reason in its wider interpretation to cover intuitive as well as discursive thinking. Reason thus interpreted is a function of man's whole nature, and includes the activities of the mind in moral, aesthetic, and religious thinking, as well as in science and philosophy. It is 'integrated with the will and the emotions in the living growth of personality.' This conception of Reason is supported by accounts of its functioning in ethical and religious experience. Referring to these Professor de Burgh writes: 'My purpose is twofold. I want first to show how moral experience presents a problem which philosophy is unable to solve, and which points to religion for its solution. The problem is that of the dualism of ethical principles: according as conduct is motivated by the thought of obligation or by desire for a rational good. Secondly, I shall consider the larger issue of the relationship by way of action and reaction of morality to religion and of religion to morality.' Professor de Burgh is aware that by his analysis and description of rational activity in these two important spheres he is attempting only a limited contribution towards the solution of his major problem. A complete solution," he tells us, 'calls for collaboration of many thinkers working forward each from his chosen angle, to the unification of the fruits of rational inquiry in science, art, morals and metaphysics, and with the knowledge revealed in religious experience, but no one who follows his weighty arguments can doubt the importance of the contribution he has made.'

Professor de Burgh's examination of ethical experience leads him to distinguish what he regards as two independent types of ethical activity: action for duty's sake, and action *sub ratione boni*. The key lies in the distinction between *theoria* and *praxis*: the former being pure *praxis* and the latter *praxis* governed by *theoria*. While endeavouring to do justice to the claims of both ideals, Professor de Burgh is mainly concerned to establish the independence and autonomy of each. We should be shutting our eyes to the facts, he holds, if we ignored or minimized a fissure that cuts deep into the structure of man's ethical nature.

In the main Professor de Burgh accepts Kant's conception of moral obligation, but he departs from Kant by insisting upon the existence and importance of another type of ethical experience. Kant fell into error, he holds, when failing to recognize the worth of action *sub ratione boni*. The discussion of these two forms raises for Professor de Burgh the central question: Can the concept of obligation be derived from that of good? His reply is decisive: for he is convinced that this can't be established by any philosophical argument. He is led to this conclusion by a comparison of what appear to him radically conflicting characters in these two kinds of experience. These may be summarized as follows: (1) Moral obligation or duty is purely formal, unconditional and absolute. It is universal, and is apprehended intuitively as such in every particular moral act. Duty can't be justified by anything other than morality, and there is no answer to the question

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Why ought I to act thus? save, because it is my duty! Action *sub ratione boni*, on the other hand implies the thought of an end and can be justified by the character of the end to be achieved—an end which is immanent within the process of achievement. Further the good pursued in particular actions is imperfect and since it is not yet realized is hypothetical. It follows then that the absolute unconditional, and universal moral obligation can't be derived from the hypothetical and imperfect good. (2) Moral obligation is negative being characterized by restraint, compulsion and discipline. It implies desire but only the stern desire to obey the constraining authority. Such desire is *sui generis* being derivative from the thought of obligation. As against this action *sub ratione boni* knows nothing of restriction and obligation but is characterized by spontaneously aspiration, and harmonious self-expression. In so far therefore as any action is *sub ratione boni* it ceases—we are told—to be moral since it is performed spontaneously and without any conflict. (3) A similar distinction is expressed when it is stated that in moral obligation *praxis* is for *praxis* sake whereas in action *sub ratione boni* *theoria* is primary over *praxis*—the vision of the ideal over the process of its actualization. (4) This leads to a further distinction regarding the kind of freedom expressed respectively in these two types of action. In moral obligation freedom is the freedom of choice whereas in the other mode of ethical experience freedom is a necessitation which is also spontaneously since it arises from theoretic vision. (5) Finally duty or obligation attaches to man-doing and not to any act viewed in isolation from the acting subject but good is a character predicable of the object judged good and the implication of the valuing consciousness compresent with the object does not affect the goodness.

Since in regard to the relation between goodness and obligation I hold the view which Professor de Burgh maintains cannot be established by any philosophical argument I feel bound to indicate my attitude to the problem here although I hope no reader will form any judgment on the matter without considering the powerful arguments with which Professor de Burgh supports his conclusions. My divergence can perhaps be presented most clearly as a difference in the conception of the manner in which Reason is autonomous. Professor de Burgh is concerned to establish the autonomy of Reason in its various modes. I on the other hand, hold that Reason is one and that it can't be entirely autonomous and independent in any of its modes. I am of course aware that Professor de Burgh also accepts the oneness of Reason but as against him I am convinced that such acceptance is not compatible with any claim for the absolute autonomy of Reason within its distinguishable spheres of activity if these are regarded as independent. In respect to the relation we are considering our conflicting views appear in Professor de Burgh's denial of the possibility of any necessary relation between the good and obligation, and my claim that this relation is necessary and synthetic. I should endeavour to support my view by examination and analysis of the relevant kinds of moral experience. Whether an argument so founded would be philosophical I must leave Professor de Burgh to consider. In making this claim I am not denying the validity or the importance of the distinction Professor de Burgh has expressed nor the accuracy of much of his description of the two types of ethical experience, but I reject his view of the relation between these. (1) Professor de Burgh maintains that unconditional and absolute obligation can't depend on hypothetical and imperfect good. This may be true but it is not a necessary assumption. The authority of duty is derived from Reason acting under guidance from such apprehension of the good in the relevant situation as

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is possible for the rational being concerned (2) Professor de Burgh further maintains that duty implies conflict, whereas action *sub ratione boni* is spontaneous and this difficulty is further illustrated by the distinction in the different types of freedom implied. In this connection he points out that as soon as any action is inspired by vision of the good it becomes spontaneous and therefore not moral—conflict having been eliminated. Although admitting the general accuracy of much of this description it still seems to me clear that in cases of moral obligation conflict may remain while at the same time the actions are performed under guidance by apprehension of the good. As Professor de Burgh himself insists goodness is a character of an object judged good it can't therefore always be identified with my good and surely it is a fact that there is frequently conflict between personal inclination and the acceptance of rational guidance from such apprehension of the good as is possible. (3) Further I am prepared to admit that frequently when acting from moral obligation there is no conscious apprehension of the good to be achieved. In such case it may appear that no ground can be given for action save the sense of duty or obligation. But is this not due to the fact that as rational beings we are members of communities, and that when required to act in many situations we do not depend for guidance upon personal apprehension of the good sought? Inherited convictions and beliefs are deeply embedded in our personalities and in situations of certain kinds we accept—whether consciously or unconsciously—guidance from these without inquiring again whether by such action we shall achieve the good. In cases of this kind the necessary connection between good and obligation is shown by the fact that whenever we become convinced that actions springing from such convictions or beliefs lead to human suffering rather than to the good which we anticipate they immediately cease to induce any sense of obligation. (4) Lastly when examining my own experience I invariably find that the obligation to act in any situation remains inoperative so long as I am genuinely perplexed in regard to the good to be achieved, but that the command becomes imperative immediately my apprehension of the good becomes clear. For reasons such as these I hold the connection between the good and duty to be necessary and any other kind of relation would appear strange in view of the fact that Reason is one, whatever the mode in which it may be operating.¹

Referring to his account of religious experience Professor de Burgh writes: I have tried to show on grounds conformable to intellect that religion is able not only to resolve the dualism inherent in ethical experience and to liberate ethical principles from formalism and ideality, but to raise morality to a higher plane of goodness through the motive of love to God. Professor de Burgh approaches religion by way of the paradoxes of ethical experience. That all actions performed under obligation should be valueless save in so far as they bring about moral goodness in the agent is, he says, a paradox 'which moral consciousness shrinks from but can't dispel'. Further, he holds that perfect fulfilment of the moral law by man is not possible in his present condition for man is helpless and hopeless before the austere injunctions of the law. But there is another and independent form of ethical experience and a step in the solution of the paradox is made by establishing the primacy of the good. At the same time the actualization of ideal good in temporal experience is ever defective and it follows that the tension between the ideal and the actual can't be resolved under the conditions of actual experience. Thus only in religious experience are the radical con-

¹ My view is probably nearer to those of Mr. Joseph and Professor Laird in opinion than to which Professor de Burgh develops his conception.

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traditions of ethical experience overcome. To religious faith God is revealed as the ground alike of goodness and of the moral law, and the 'unanswered problems of ethical experience find their solution in religion.' In supporting this position Professor de Burgh makes use of the moral argument for God's existence as the ground for moral worth, an argument which rests on the truth that essences or ideals so far as they are abstract, can't have value, since value is only value when actualized. Nevertheless though the moral law be grounded in God's nature he is not subject to the moral law and further the goodness of God is of a higher order than moral goodness. Therefore neither the moral argument nor any other based on non-religious sources suffices to justify the assurance or to give any positive knowledge of God's nature. The issue writes Professor de Burgh is of tremendous importance since it concerns the possibility of any rational knowledge of God by man. His solution of the difficulty is of the greatest interest although here it can only be mentioned. Professor de Burgh maintains that there is one type of religious experience in which man possesses direct and veritable knowledge of God. In the experience of man's love of God which is evoked by grace in response to God's love of man the love of God experienced by man is in its quality homogeneous with God's love. It follows therefore that in regard to this kind of religious experience the term love can be applied univocally to man and to God and not analogically as must be the case when the value predicates which characterize man's ethical experience are ascribed to God. This argument Professor de Burgh holds is confirmed by the experience of religious mystics who insist with one accord that the love of God participated in through grace gives knowledge. He further contends that the knowledge acquired through this experience of love carries man beyond the limitations of propositional statement. Professor de Burgh carries his argument further in his account of *virtus infusa* where he explains how in religious experience the contradictions of ethical experience are transcended through the operation of the religious motive of love for God, which imparts a new form of life affecting it in almost every detail and implies a transformation of ethical values which is radical and all pervasive.

There can be no doubt in regard to the importance or value of this account of religious experience yet I feel that the difference in our interpretations of the autonomy of Reason leads also to divergence in our attitude towards the value as truth of religious experience. I agree with Professor de Burgh that Reason is for life and is not exclusively an instrument for logical analysis and inference. The pursuit of truth demands reflection upon *data* presented in all kinds of intuitive experience—whether in sense or in aesthetic, ethical or religious experience. It is clear that such *data* can't be completely explained in propositional statement but this seems to be true of the *data* presented in sense as well as of the *data* presented in other modes of experience. It is clear also that since Reason is for life there must be tests for truth other than that of the clarity and logical coherence of its propositional statements. At the same time I am convinced that in the search for truth no privileged position can be given to religious experience save that which it has in virtue of the richness and fullness of its content. It seems to me that Professor de Burgh claims for religion some such privilege when he argues that 'Religion gives knowledge of the truth.' Does he mean by this that religious *data* unlike those presented in other modes of experience should be exempted from critical examination by logical and discursive thinking? Surely this is one of the functions of universal Reason. It may be I am wrong in this assumption, for Professor de Burgh himself points out that any spiritual revelation is "*ex parte hominis* of necessity fallible calling for criticism and

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interpretation by the God given faculty Reason', but the acceptance of this view appears to me to exclude any claim that religious experience gives truth, and to necessitate a conception of progressive approach to truth through inquiry and co-operation in all fields of experience

I have not been able to mention Professor de Burgh's discussion of problems of the present age which is not only of the greatest interest, but is also integral to the development of his conception of Reason, but must express the indebtedness which those perplexed by the deeper problems of life, whether they be speculative or practical owe to Professor de Burgh for this important contribution to modern thought

G. H. LANGLEY

An Introduction to Spinoza's Ethic By ALEXANDER SHANKS (London Macmillan & Co 1938 Pp vi 104 Price 4s 6d net)

Mr Shanks disarms criticism by the very modest account that he gives of his intentions in preparing this book for the press his treatment is divided into three sections the first two of which (on *Definitions* and *Restatement of Spinoza's Argument*) are intended merely to enable the student to come to grips with Spinoza's argument before forming an opinion as to its merits or demerits and the third (containing *Notes and Conclusion*) is 'intended to indicate some of the problems which arise and occasionally, to offer interpretations which seem to make for a constructive view of Spinoza's philosophy as a whole. Many of these interpretations moreover he warns the reader,

are such as are not generally accepted and (he) should not treat this book as a substitute either for Spinoza or for the standard criticisms of his philosophy. It is intended merely to supply him with the tools with which to work on both of these more valuable mines of information. In spite of these limitations and warnings very rightly emphasized by the author, there is a very real place for such an introductory discussion as this slight (and very well printed and produced) volume offers. Whether it would not have been better done by a more accomplished student of Spinoza than Mr Shanks claims to be is a question that need not be answered since no such person has attempted to do it. The text of Spinoza is not very easy reading for the contemporary mind and there is little doubt that discussions round about the central concepts may well prove illuminating for a beginner, even when the guidance is inaccurate frequently superficial and occasionally heterodox. That the earlier epithets do apply to almost every page of Mr Shanks's book I think the author himself would not deny and this renders detailed criticism out of the question in a short review.

Let me restrict myself therefore to noting a few of the more outstanding features of Mr Shanks's exposition and interpretation. The first section on *Definitions* occupies only about nine pages and deals with about a score of key-conceptions—giving thus only about half a page to each. This would be very cavalier treatment of such important notions as Substance, Attribute, Causality, Essence, Imagination and so forth were it not for the somewhat fuller treatment of them in the third section but in any case some of the explanations do not seem to me very effective even as preliminary indications. Terms like substance and attribute for example are among the most ambiguous in the philosophical vocabulary, and it is of prime importance in any exposition of Spinoza however modest or utilitarian from the very outset to distinguish the special use of them by Spinoza from those of philosophers like Locke or Kant and even to attempt to make clear their positive significance and importance. It is not enough to say that Spinoza does not

make clear "which side he favours" in the (later) disputes of those who side with Locke and Kant on the one hand and the 'out and out Idealists' on the other, or again that "Substance is the ultimate reality of whatever we experience either in a spatial or psychical context. Spinoza does not himself define Substance as 'ultimate reality', but as self-created and self-explanatory being and that is the definition that should have been made the basis of the explanation and distinction. It would then have been clear how far Spinoza is from Locke as far it seems as the purely intelligible is from the absolutely unknowable. A further step in the argument would then have been to indicate that Spinoza's idea of the intelligible was plainly different from that of Locke and perhaps nearer to that of Kant. It is of course, difficult to plunge into such questions right on the threshold of an introductory volume but at least it is essential to preserve right from the start the correct impression of so fundamental a conception as that of Substance. Mr Shanks was perhaps well advised not to attempt in this section the difficult question of the relation of Substance and Attributes though his way of avoiding it by use of the analogy of the dimensions of space and time is rather unhappy. As Mr Shanks returns to this analogy in his *Notes* perhaps a reviewer may be allowed to say that this vulgarly attractive comparison for the use of which there is better authority than there ought to be when it is anything more than intellectual dope must be positively misleading. If one could provide a spatio-temporal analogy in which one dimension was visual another auditory and a third tactual the beginnings of a useful illustration might be perceived but the four dimensions of space-time with the qualitative distinction of space and time abstracted by the reduction of time to a sort of space miss the very point of the desiderated analogy.

On the subject of Causality I think Mr Shanks is confused—he is certainly confusing. Again and again in the course of the volume he speaks as if Spinoza was thinking of causes operating in time *a tergo* after the manner of what are sometimes called natural causes (though nothing could be more unnatural) so that the finite modes are arranged in an endless temporally successive series to which each is related to the next as cause to effect or as effect to cause. I do not think that Spinoza held such a view of even the 'common order of nature' and certainly not of the order of the intellect: he is thinking always of genetic causes whether considered as they truly are for *Ratio* or as they are imagined in the first kind of knowledge. This is what is really meant by those who wrongly affirm that for 'cause' Spinoza substituted ground. This confusion is probably responsible for at least some of the difficulties discussed in the third section under the heads of "Modes and Regress."

Another term that the author has either not himself cleared up or has failed to make clear to his readers is objective but as this is probably traceable to his views about the relation of Substance and Attributes I will not spend time in discussing it. A good deal of modern philosophy is permeated with ambiguity by the curious fallacy that the objective is the real.

In the second section Mr Shanks undertakes a rapid restatement of the argument of the *Ethics*, Part by Part with marginal references to the pertinent Propositions. As the whole occupies only about a score of pages the treatment, in order to be intelligible is compelled to be superficial. Some of the points already noted naturally tend to obscure the exposition here and there for example, Mr Shanks's views about causality which reciprocate with his views of the finite modes as spatio-temporal sections of Nature, determine the form of the difficulties that he finds in the deduction of the finite from the infinite modes.

In connexion with the account of Part II of the *Ethics* (and also his remarks on Thought and Extension in the third section—especially on p. 69) I should like to draw Mr. Shanks's attention to the contradiction between his statement in the last paragraph of page 27 and Spinoza's own assertion that 'the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing considered under one and the same attribute' (*Eth.*, II, xxi, Sch.), i.e. are *absolutely* identical. I can hardly blame the author for this serious error since it is shared by that essential Spinozist the late and much lamented, Professor Samuel Alexander (cf. *Space Time and Destiny*, 2nd impression, p. xvi).

Next I wish I could understand in greater detail what Mr. Shanks means when he says that 'an idea in God's intellect must be true, since it then is in a sense its own correlate' (p. 28). It is connected doubtless with the suggestion on which I shall presently comment that Extension is not an attribute of Substance in the same sense as Thought, but only from the point of view of inadequate ideas. With this is evidently connected the notion of the divine intellect creating its objects within itself. I am not suggesting that this is not Spinoza's view (he even tells us that God's intellect is *totò coelo* different from that of a man)—but suddenly thrown out in the middle of a discussion of Truth and Falsity it will be bound to strike the young reader as paradoxical. But perhaps after all that is no great harm.

The only other thing that I should like to say about this section of the book is that the author seems to me to underestimate the importance of the second half of Part V of the *Ethics*. He has nothing to say about the eternity of the mind except for a few references to individual immortality in some sense, and he devotes only a page and a half to the synopsis of *Ethics*, V, xxi-xlii which contain some of the crucial propositions of the system.

Section Three consists mainly of notes on important conceptions, and is probably the most valuable and original part of the discussion. It is also the longest occupying about half of the book. Once more I restrict myself to comment on outstanding subjects.

In his note on *Substance* Mr. Shanks again fails to distinguish the uses of this term by philosophers so far apart (or so it is commonly believed) as Spinoza and Locke (whom he explicitly names). Of course he may be of the opinion (which I should respect) that they are not so remote as has usually been held, but if so I think the matter should have been made a subject of distinct comment. This could not but have been very illuminating to a young student.

The notes on *Attribute* reproduce the current confusion about subjective and objective in relation to the real. 'Attribute is defined as being 'what the intellect perceives of Substance as if constituting its essence.' This seems to indicate that the attributes are subjective. But surely what it indicates is that since they are objects-of intellect they are essentially *objective*, nor do I see how it can even *imply* that they are subjective in the other sense of the term, viz. creations of intellect. It leaves that question entirely indeterminate, at least so it seems to me—though Mr. Shanks has his own views about the natures and relations of the Attributes and Substance, and, as I have already said, goes so far as to suggest that not only is Thought pre-eminent (as others have held, and as is the natural suggestion of a *theoretical* account of reality), but that God has the attribute of Extension in so far as he is revealed through the system of inadequate ideas, and the attribute of Thought in so far as he is revealed in the system of adequate ideas—Extension being thus reduced to mere appearance. This is a somewhat novel suggestion in this connexion, but one towards which I personally entertain feelings of toleration and the speculative interest that arises from the movement of my own mind.

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in recent years though I fancy it will be difficult to fasten it upon Spinoza.

On the *Infinite Modes* Mr Shanks is not very helpful or sound: he gives the idea of them as abstractions—types, or forms—a mistake that may partly be due to his confining them to the *immediate* infinite modes. But for Spinoza, as I understand him, all these modes are individuals—fixed and eternal things, whether we refer to Motion and Rest (not mobility), Infinite Intellect (not intelligibility), "the face of the whole universe," or 'the infinite idea of God.' Mr Shanks's argument too suggests that the production of these in their hierarchical order is a real production out of the conceptions of extension and thought—though he realizes that it is not temporal production. But perhaps what is given is rather the stages in the progressively detailed objectification of the essence of Substance.

It is for the reader to decide whether my criticisms of Mr Shanks's book imply that I do not think him yet qualified to write an introduction to Spinoza's *Ethics*. Even if it were so—that would not involve serious disparagement of his obvious philosophical powers. Elementary textbooks are notoriously more difficult to write than textbooks of Elements. The fact is that he advances and discusses views about Spinoza far indeed from the customary interpretations, but well worth careful consideration and capable perhaps of revolutionizing our views of the philosopher. I need only instance his views on Extension and otherness already referred to and hints such as are to be found on page 60 and on pages 70-1. Mr Shanks has at least thought for himself to some purpose and it may well be that he will make other students think for themselves—no small thing in a world increasingly prone to habitual cerebration.

One last word. Mr Shanks is a Scot: but he should try not to irritate the English reader with constant insistence upon such ungraceful and not specially *juste* Scotticisms as *outwith* and *independently on*.

H. F. HALLETT

La Morale Antique. By LÉON ROBIN (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1938. Pp. 180. Price Fr. 15).

Every new book from the pen of Professor Robin will be welcome to the serious student of Ancient Philosophy. For not only is he the recognized authority in France on Platonic philosophy—he has edited the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* in the *Collection des Universités de France* (*Collection Budé*) and has written three highly valuable books on problems connected with Platonism: *Etudes sur la signification et sur la place de la Physique dans la philosophie de Platon*, *La théorie platonicienne de l'Amour*, and *La théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres d'après Aristote*. The last by itself would be important enough to establish his name as one of the greatest scholars of our time in the field of Classical Philosophy. He has also given us recently an account of Plato's philosophy as a whole in a monograph belonging to the series *Les grands philosophes* which contains a very accurate description of the various stages and development of his Theory of Ideas: and in his *Pensée grecque et les origines de l'esprit scientifique* (in the collection called *L'Évolution de l'humanité*) proved himself to be a master far beyond his special subject and even beyond philosophy itself when taken in its narrower sense as a particular branch of our University curriculum.

It is, therefore, with high expectations that we turn to his latest book, *La Morale Antique*, which has appeared as Vol. XVII of *La Nouvelle Ency-*

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dopédie Philosophique And, indeed, in this expectation we are not disappointed It is really astonishing and impressive what a wealth of learning and how many valuable suggestions he has been able to pack into its mere 180 even rather small pages

The book does not proceed along an unbroken historical line like its forerunner, *La Pensée grecque* In it Professor Robin rather proposes to deal separately with three main ethical topics, viz with the question as to what is the ultimate moral good the question of happiness and virtue, and the problems connected with the psychological conditions of a moral act showing what the several great thinkers and schools of thought have said about them This method has the advantage of bringing into stronger relief the important and sometimes fundamental divergencies which existed among these ancient thinkers about one and the same issue It might be feared that this method would lead to some repetitions, but Professor Robin has been remarkably successful in avoiding this danger

Another attractive feature of the book is that it begins Greek philosophy, not with Thales as is usually done but goes further back (like Bréhier's *Histoire de la Philosophie*) to Homer Hesiod, Theognis the seven Wise Men and the Mystery Religions Especially striking seemed to me a remark of Professor Robin's on page 32 on the irony of Socrates, where he pleads that this irony consists not only in his feigning to know nothing in order to deliver his pupil from ignorance but also in feigning to love him sensually in order to free him from his self love and too great attachment to himself. Noteworthy also is the contention (on p 41) that Plato's ethics when all is said should be regarded as something like a philosophy of mysticism—in which he apparently agrees with Dr Inge (see his *Philosophy of Plotinus*, II p 51) Lastly of great interest is the suggestion on page 51 that the mixed life while it was for Plato only a second best which borrows as it were its goodness as far as it goes from a strictly transcendent "Good" becomes with Aristotle the highest good itself and to such a degree an immanent quality of this world that it can be described as the peculiarly human good The Stoics are on the whole severely handled, almost as in Plutarch's *De repugnantiis Stoicis* but as far as I can see, fairly and justly Epicurus on the other hand finds more favour with Professor Robin The importance of Neoplatonism is perhaps a little underrated Christianity, finally is hinted at as the religion which for subsequent times has profoundly transformed all ethical thought although this transformation is not described in great detail

There is one point about which I venture to disagree with Professor Robin It is this I do not believe that it is permissible to deal with the problem of free will under the head of "Les conditions psychologiques de l'acte moral" as is done in Part III For moral acts as Professor A. E. Taylor aptly remarks (see his *Freedom of Man* in *Contemporary British Philosophy* ed Muirhead, vol II pp 270-304 especially p 292), do indeed occur in time and so far are psychological events But it may well be that they are far more than mere events so that formulæ which have been devised to describe mere events may become useless when applied to them Accordingly it would seem to me that the solution which Plato offers as an explanation of the Socratic paradox that *eûdêi; ênou; âpaptarein* in the Ninth Book of the *Laws* has not been duly appreciated by Professor Robin and that his insistence on the Myth of Er at the close of the *Republic* with its necessarily highly symbolical language does not fully make amends for that omission But it would be unjust to conclude this review with a criticism Let me therefore add that at the end of the book there is a list of references (pp 177-180)

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which is extremely helpful for anyone who wishes to penetrate further into its subject-matter and which once more shows how solidly Professor Robin's statements are based on first hand knowledge of the texts and of the best expositors of them

H GAUSS

The Philosophy of the Act By G H MEAD Edited with introduction by C W Morris in collaboration with J M Brewster A M Dunham, and D L Miller (Chicago Univ of Chicago Press London Cambridge Univ Press 1938 Pp lxxxiv + 696 Price \$5 22s 6d)

Mead (1863-1931) of the University of Chicago owed almost all his reputation to his oral teaching. He published very little. The above is a third volume of his collected papers. It was intended to be the conclusion of a series, but may be followed by one supplementary volume of reprinted articles. All the material in the present volume is here published for the first time. It is doubtful whether the editors have done a service to the memory of their teacher by carrying so much private material into print. Their remark that "the discerning reader would prefer in the main to make his own selection" is tantamount to an abdication of the function of editorship. In consequence they have given us a very bulky book whose mere bulk makes a heavy demand on the reader's pocket and his time and without any commensurate return for the pages are crammed with repetitions due both to overlapping chapters and to a most tedious repetitiousness within each chapter.

The general impression one gets is that Mead's philosophy was pragmatism made difficult. It is expressed in a language like that of Whitehead at his worst which is particularly unsuited to a theory that lays all the emphasis on practice. The editors in their introduction speak the same language. Perhaps I should confess that I do not understand it for where I do get any meaning from it the meaning can be put easily into the *lingua franca* of philosophical students. What I have to say may therefore give an unfair idea of the writer's attitude and achievement. Mead reaffirms the general position of pragmatism that the process results and significance of thinking lie wholly within the ambit of practice. Thinking is what arises when a biological impulse meets with an obstacle to its smooth expression and fulfilment. According to the editors Mead's distinctive contribution to pragmatism consisted in a wealth of detailed analysis exhibiting and vindicating the pragmatist thesis in a variety of fields. There certainly is a good deal of analysis and a good deal of detail even when the repetitions are discounted but it is markedly unsystematic, and the relevance of much of it is not clear. The Mead of this book displays a strongly associative mind the wandering quality of the essayist rather than the selective and progressive mind of a reasoner but we must remember that we are peeping into his private papers, not reading finished statements prepared for the severe test of print.

The main preoccupation is to show that everything about which a philosopher can speak is a phase function, or relation of a biological act, the general stages of which are asserted to be impulse perception, manipulation, and consummation. The position is very interesting because it brings out very plainly I think, the instability of any attempt to unite the biological approach with anything resembling radical empiricism. For the former there is a real environment, faithfully described in biology and the related sciences, for the latter, anything beyond the perceiving or the perceiving act is highly dubitable. It appears to be one of the chief claims made by and for Mead that

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he reconciled these two approaches I can find nothing but an oscillation between them. On the one hand he speaks repeatedly and emphatically of the things that "are just there" on the other hand he interprets the material world or all that we know it as "a social creation". A view for which the material is only a world of common meanings can only be reached from a radically empiricist position and is therefore not entitled to take advantage of the notion of the social. If "the analysis of perception does not take us to a reality which lies outside an actual or possible perception" (p. 23), everything except my own actual perceptions cannot be anything but a possible perception.

The problem of perception especially the relation of perceptual objects to the objects of physics occupies the greater part of the book. Pragmatically, Mead says that "the reality of what we see is what we can handle" (p. 105), but this does not turn out to be a statement of the meaning of "reality". He is against the view that there is a material reality consisting wholly of primary qualities over against a mind in which secondary qualities reside. The separation he declares, is a device of reflection, and is based on the claim which he endorses that primary qualities are the same for all of us. Yet it would be much too simple to say that for Mead things really have both sorts of quality. I cannot gather what for him the nature of the perceived world or of the environment to which we react really is. All perception of it is said to give but an individual perspective of it and all reflection upon it to proceed by the co-ordination of these private but socially communicable perspectives. The distance experiences lead us to form hypotheses which predict determinate contact experiences and are verified if these ensue. I suppose that if the world as we conceive it is a construct of a merely pragmatic intelligence, there is no point in asking what it *really* is. Yet Mead uses metaphysical language speaking of emergence as against mechanism, and of mind as an ordinary natural fact. What he seems to me to say is that the world we construct and pragmatically verify though even as verified only a world of socially common meanings is the world in which we really live. This paradox comes out most clearly in what he says of space. "A permanent space is not only not independent of the percipient events or individuals that inhabit them [?] it but exists only in relation to them—yet it does not exist within them. On the contrary they exist within it" (p. 180). The space we exist in is surely more than a social construct. A statement on the next page that reflection is a fact in nature and not simply in mind is not surprising when what is meant by nature is left so unclear. Mead is trying to found an objective naturalism by means of a subjectivist epistemology.

The remainder of the book is occupied by some very incomplete notes on value, and by fragments on a variety of topics. Values are neither absolute nor merely individual preferences but are social. Religion can no more transcend the social reference than anything else can. It is part of the effort to achieve more satisfying social values but falsely projects these upon a purely imaginary ultimate.

T. E. JESSOP

The Clandestine Organization and Diffusion of Philosophic Ideas in France from 1700 to 1750 By IRA O. WADE (Princeton, U.S.A. Princeton University Press London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1938. Pp. xi + 329. Price 18s.)

This fascinating book, richly documented and embodying heavy and (despite the author's much too modest disclaimer) pioneer research, is an

outstanding contribution to the study of the cradle-period of a momentous age and therefore demands a place in every university library and on the shelves of every student of French literature and philosophy

The emergence in France about the middle of the eighteenth century of a vigorous group of freethinkers—the Encyclopaedists and others—is one of the apparent jumps that set problems to the historian. It has usually been solved by reference to England—the Enlightenment crossed the Channel with returning visitors like Montesquien and Voltaire. True Bayle's *Dictionary* (1695-97) is bold and big enough to be adduced as a native stimulus and pointer to freethinking but the difficulty has been to understand the gap between its appearance and the outburst of the new thought and since the latter was led by writers who explicitly acknowledged a debt to England this country has been given almost all the praise or blame for being the source of the French Enlightenment. The virtual absence of liberal or radical publications in France during the first forty years or so of the century is, however sufficiently explained by the rigour of the censorship. The problem has therefore been whether during that period there was any verifiable and not merely supposed radicalism of thought propagated secretly and gathering force and courage until at last it burst into the open and challenged the civil and religious censors. Before freethinking could make itself irresistible as it did it must have developed widely underground.

The problem was solved in 1912 when G. Lanson in an article in the *Revue d'histoire littéraire* drew attention to a number of liberal treatises in manuscript in the libraries of Paris. He was able to give evidence that some of them had been copied and recopied and circulated clandestinely. Professor Wade's book is a continuation of Lanson's work. The author has sifted not only the Parisian but also the provincial libraries and has brought to light ample material which adds corroboration and detail to Lanson's discovery. He lists and examines 102 different treatises in manuscript which handle the topics of politics, morality and religion in an unorthodox manner. Nearly half of them eventually found their way into print mostly after 1750 and ostensibly in London (though I would regard a Londres unprint in such cases with considerable suspicion). Of some of them he has traced ten to thirty copies in widely removed places and shows from the records of the Bastille that copying and distributing became a trade. The greater part of the book is devoted to a summary of the treatises taken severally and to an investigation of their authorship.

A book so closely packed with what is largely new material requires an essay to welcome it and show its worth. A brief notice can do little with it. Not the least valuable aspect of it is that it sets the stage for further research for a fuller investigation of the origins of the clandestine doctrines and of the extent to which they passed effectively into the minds of the Encyclopaedists. On these points Professor Wade, dealing at length with prior questions as perforce brief and himself demands that they be pursued further. I may note two points of interests to philosophical students in his conclusions. Firstly the English influence is smaller than one would have expected (though nine of the treatises are translations or adaptations of English writings) and there is less of Locke than of Hobbes, Mandeville, Toland and Collins. Secondly the dominating influence appears to come from Spinoza, especially from his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, a translation of part of this, a few essays in Spinozistic metaphysics, and Lucas's *Life of Spinoza* figure in the author's lists.

T. E. JESSOP

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Kant's Pre Critical Ethics By PAUL ARTHUR SCHILPP (Evanston and Chicago, North-Western University Studies in the Humanities, No 2 1938 Pp xvi + 185 Price \$2 50)

The development of Kant's ethical views prior to the *Fundamental Principles* has been almost completely neglected by English writers, despite the inherent interest of the subject and the great wealth of material to illustrate it. Besides the published writings, which, even when not primarily ethical, contain many indications of his ethical views, there are the letters, the scattered notes collected in the Berlin edition as "Reflections on Ethics," the Fragment from about 1775, and the recently published *Lectures on Ethics*. Mr Schilpp discusses these chronologically in considerable detail. This is at times wearisome and the main argument difficult to follow, but he introduces several summaries which help one to "see the wood." It is one of the merits of the book that it quotes all the most important passages in English translation.

The generally accepted view, and that maintained by Paul Menzer in his standard essay on Kant's ethical development,* is that for a number of years Kant passed completely under the sway of Rousseau and the British 'moral sense' school, and then, about the time he was roused from his dogmatic slumber suddenly veered round to the (allegedly) entirely opposite position found in the *Fundamental Principles*. Against this Mr Schilpp forcibly argues that, though Kant was certainly much influenced by these writers, he never accepted their views uncritically and in their entirety. If he spoke of *moralisches Gefühl* he did not mean quite the same thing as a moral sense. It follows that the *Dissertation* of 1770 does not indicate a sharp break with Kant's previous views, and that instead of discontinuity we have 'the slow and painful explication of ideas present in his ethical thinking from the very first' (p. 171). While these points are well argued, it would have been better if some account had been given of the philosophic background and in particular of the views of Wolff, to help one to understand how the problems first presented themselves to Kant, and the apparent discontinuity is hardly satisfactorily dealt with.

The main theme of the book, however, is that the accepted views of Kant's mature ethical theory have greatly distorted it. Mr Schilpp would say that the solution of the ethical problem towards which Kant was moving was a methodological formalism. This seems to imply—though it could have been more clearly stated—that the solution of the moral problem is not to be found in terms of norms and rules, but in a formal and creative procedure (p. 96-7). The moral objective is regarded as 'a new creative construction' (p. 97), morality is dynamic not static, and is 'the method of rational reflection: construction and transition from old accepted to novel untried objectives' (p. 163). It is freedom limited by the need for self-consistency (p. 119). (It would have been helpful if a brief account had been given of Mr Schilpp's own ethical position instead of references to articles merely.)

There is much in this view to stimulate thought—though it could bear considerable elucidation—and it may help to correct the one-sidedness of many views of Kant's ethics. But the 'one side' which existing views emphasize does seem to be the important one. Without Duty and the Categorical Imperative Kant would lose most of his importance as a moralist. Mr Schilpp's view, if it is to win general acceptance, would have to show much greater appreciation of this aspect of 'unconditional obligation.' On the

* *Kant Studien*, 1895-9.

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surface it is impossible to think that the discoverer of categorical imperatives could have believed that morality is "the construction of fresh objectives"

Mr Schilpp promises a further volume applying his views to the main ethical works and it seems unfortunate that he did not publish this first. His aim is a fresh interpretation of Kant's ethical theory and that can only be given on the basis of the major writings. Otherwise the critic may argue that whatever incongruous teaching is found in the earlier works was rejected as Kant achieved maturer insight. Because of this mistake in strategy Mr Schilpp fails to convince on his main point though there is much of interest and value in the book.

W M WATT

Time, Cause and Eternity By J I. Stocks (London Macmillan & Co 1938
Pp xii + 163 Price 6s)

The late Dr Stocks's posthumously published Forwood lectures are a further proof if such were needed of the loss which philosophy as well as university administration sustained in his lamented and untimely death. Few books published in recent years contain more matter in such small compass and certainly few show such a combination of keenness and clarity in their mode of expression.

The modesty of the author's avowed programme does something less than justice to the importance and value of his argument. He is concerned with the conflict or opposition between the claim characteristic of religious philosophy down the ages that the temporal order is wholly dependent upon a timeless eternal and the point of view natural to modern science and to the modern mind in general that temporal categories are supreme. But he sets himself to treat this opposition from one specific approach by discussing the bearing upon it of the notion of cause and of the interpretation given at different times to causal explanation.

He begins with a short account of the typical Greek view as exemplified in Plato and Aristotle especially in the latter's doctrine of the Four Causes, but the Greek subordination of Time and Change is illustrated also interestingly from other features in the Aristotelian philosophy, e.g. his political theory in which the constitution and laws are conceived of as in principle unchanging, the supreme body in the state being first and foremost a deliberative rather than a law-making body. We then pass to the modern view of Time and Cause. Here Stocks selects two features of the modern period as decisive for our point of view, namely, the dominant influence of physical science and the more recent emergence of the historical outlook and attitude. Under the former formative influence Causation has come to be interpreted wholly in terms of "efficient causes" and "efficient cause" as the event in a mechanically conceived system which makes possible or necessary a subsequent event. (This idea of necessity is, of course, rather an expression of uncritical nineteenth-century "Science" than of a more circumspect standpoint that has taken into account the sceptical analysis of Hume.) This scheme presents us with an ideal of human knowledge reducing it fundamentally to the composition of two factors which may be called respectively *physics* and *geography*. Physics is required to give us an ordered list of the various elements at work in the world and of the laws of their combination. Geography is required to tell us of their actual distribution at a given time. The result of this is, he urges later, inevitably *Materialism* in the sense of explaining wholes in terms of their component parts variously arranged and moved about.

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The more naive presentation of nineteenth-century materialism has, of course, come under revision and suspicion in the light of recent physical discoveries and the upasses which they have suggested. But we are here warned (and surely justly) against attaching too much importance to alleged idealistic tendencies in contemporary physics. In part these are simply based upon assertions of ignorance and of the unpredictability of certain physical ultra-microscopic facts and "it is certain that ignorance explains nothing but other ignorance even if the claim is warranted that this ignorance is necessary and irremovable. On the other hand, if the present-day 'scepticism as to the value of the causal category' means (as it does e.g. for Planck) the admission that Science must surrender its "fundamental assumption that the course of a process can be represented by means of an analysis of it into its spatial and temporal elements' and must apply the concept of wholeness in the field even of purely physical inquiry, then that signifies a return to something like the Aristotelian doctrine of the Form as a causal factor.

Before arguing the case for such a return, however, Stocks turns to consider the second formative influence upon the modern mind, the idea of history. The impact of the historical point of view on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is briefly described. The idea of Progress is 'the first hasty *a priori* form of the historical attitude, which the fuller comprehension of the nineteenth century superseded and corrected.' Later, History attempts to become 'scientific just as Science under Darwinian influences, is infused with something of the spirit of history. But the attempts (such as that of Bur.) to interpret history completely as a science fail (it is suggested) because they do not and cannot do justice to the ineradicable element of individuality, which (whether the individuality be that of persons, societies, or civilizations) must always be the principle of explanation for the historian. The scientific and historical attitudes are naturally opposed, at best complementary, at the worst in open conflict: neither can ignore or usurp the place of the other.

That this is so is seen when we turn to consider the attempts made to base a metaphysic either exclusively upon science and its findings or exclusively upon history. The former fail because 'science' is essentially preoccupied with the material cause only. As an example of the latter Stocks takes the philosophy of Bergson in which Time comes so definitely into its own as an ultimate real. Bergson's is an effective protest against the exclusion of the element of novelty and variety in nature characteristic of the outlook of a certain type of scientist with his concentration upon uniformity, correlation and law. But Bergson's *elan vital* is, when examined, seen to reintroduce not merely Purpose and the Final Cause but with it in addition all the other three causes which Aristotle used, yet in a way that does less than justice to the point of view of physical science (as Aristotle's own metaphysic also failed to do). Final causes here ignore too much the claim of the material cause.

The reconciliation which it must be the task of Philosophy to attempt between 'the Materialism of Science and the Individualism of History' cannot be stated in the old terms belittling the significance of Time and tending accordingly to merge both Final and Efficient cause in the Formal cause. It is suggested that Alexander's phrase that "Time is the mind of Space and Space the body of Time" is helpful here. It intimates that in attempting a combination of the two points of view "a certain priority must be granted to that of Science. Body must be there before it can become the vehicle of mind, as letters and words must be before they can be used. But this does not in the least deprive history the story of life, of significance, rather it saves temporal processes from being a somewhat awkward and unwelcome

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intruder' upon the world as science sees it. Yet this is not enough for we seem to demand a conspectus more satisfying than can be found in an infinitely extended temporal process, however rich this may be in accumulated meaning. What is needed is a postulated eternal order, a general plan or idea not itself temporal in which all the significances of the temporal order may be comprehended.

Is there any empirical evidence of such an eternal order? This question might be answered by an examination of the claims of religious experience, but this is excluded as beyond the scope of the book. The author is content to remind us that the very consciousness of succession proves that the experience is in some sense other than temporally successive and to point to the evidence of wisdom down the ages that for the effective mastery of the life of action (in time) detachment from the flow of temporal interests and desires is a necessary condition. Mind is disclosed as actively operative upon temporal processes and therefore as itself more than temporal, a member of a higher order from which it draws its power and its freedom and which stands in relation to the lower order as controlling form to determined matter. The eternal then is formally definable in general terms as that higher level of being for the realization of which time and the time process provide the means and the necessary vehicle, as that by which they are justified, that in which they are perfected.

Being in very close agreement with the author's main argument and conclusions, there is little that I have to offer by way of criticism. I will touch on only two points. The first is the selection of Bergson's philosophy as an example of a metaphysic based upon History rather than upon Science. Stocks realizes that Bergson is not a very satisfactory example and has some pertinent criticisms of his views in this respect. But they hardly go far enough. I do not think the Bergsonian interpretation of Time squares with an historically oriented metaphysic at all. What the historical point of view demands is not only the reality of Time and the relevancy of Final Causes but the distinctness and uniqueness of occasions and I do not find this in Bergson's 'durée réelle'. At its core Bergson's philosophy is more mystical than historical. If it is difficult to substitute a more satisfactory example, the reason may be that a philosophical bias in favour of the historical point of view has never been able to ignore or disparage Science, the occupant already in possession of such large and well developed estates of human experience to the same extent as Science has been able to ignore the late arrival History.

We are asked to find in the Greek ideal of leisure (*σχολή*) an expression of a recognition of the place in life of an absolute good implying a higher order than the temporal. This is nuphed; it is said, in the Platonic Aristotelian ethics of detachment from worldly interests. This is no doubt true in a sense. The study of the Platonic Forms or of the Aristotelian First Being is the study of the timeless. Yet as an ethical doctrine the ideal of *σχολή* surely not one of detachment from temporal interests so much as selection and re-attachment to certain opportunities afforded in life as temporally conditioned. Contemplation (the word so often used to translate Aristotle's *Theoria*) misrepresents the intensely activist character of that way of life. It stands in strong contrast for instance to such an ideal as that put forward by Schopenhauer, in which deliverance from the everlasting dissatisfaction of temporal experience is to be in some sort achieved by a passive aesthetic experience freed from all elements of desire.

The revised statement of the principle of the Formal Cause seems to me in its logical aspect to contain most of the value of the old Idealist conception of the Concrete Universal. It is deeply to be regretted that the author did

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not live to work out much more fully the logical and metaphysical implications of his thesis, or to expand his discussion of many points upon which he has confessedly touched but lightly. None the less, the reader will attach to these lectures a value out of all proportion to the number of pages they occupy.

The book is prefaced by a foreword in which the Archbishop of York pays a moving tribute to his friend

J. W. HARVEY

A History of Chinese Philosophy The Period of the Philosophers By FUNG YU LAN Ph.D. Translated by DERK BODDE (Peiping Henri Vetch, London G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1937 Pp. xx + 454 Price in England 25s. net.)

This is a translation of the first volume of the two volumes entitled *A History of Chinese Philosophy* by Dr Fung Yu Lan, Professor of Philosophy at the National Tsing Hua University, Peiping. On the wrapper mention is made of a projected translation of the second volume next year. The few alterations made by the translator are carefully noted (p. xii), and the division between the present volume and its successor is natural and not artificial. The four centuries from Confucius to about 100 B.C. when Confucianism achieved official orthodoxy are properly called "The Period of the Philosophers," the later philosophy being called "The Period of Classical Study." It has continued to the present day, although now, according to our author, Chinese thought has for the first time suffered revolution and is assuming a new aspect. The book contains an extensive bibliography of translated and of untranslated books and articles.

Since I have no acquaintance with the language and little with the philosophy or with the literature of China, I had some compunctions in allowing the editor of *Philosophy* to persuade me to undertake this review. Dr. Yu-Lan's book has every indication of being a standard work, but I cannot vouch for its adequacy or for its accuracy. This gives its author and his translator a legitimate grouse. Indeed, I am rather perturbed to note that according to certain eminent Chinese philosophers of old time punishment was due both to those who exceeded and to those who fell short of the thing they had undertaken to perform. In this delicate situation I shall attempt only to indicate the sort of impression that the book has made upon me.

The author has written the book in his own language, but he has been trained in Occidental philosophy, and his recent anthology called *The Importance of Living* has recently been included in our Sunday Press as one of the books that should be packed for Bank Holiday reading. It is therefore fair to assume that he hoped to address a Western public, and it seems plain that he himself has a Western as well as his own cultural attitude towards his theme. I am unable to conjecture how far the Western and the modern features of his outlook are an advantage to a book like this.

The tone of the book is rather detached. Its expositions (I should judge) are clear, and there are extensive quotations, but as it seems to me, rather little that is quoted is very striking or even very quaint. One wonders whether the author's selections or the literature itself is the cause of this result. Although the author is a clear expositor, he has the habit, excusable if not inevitable in a lecturer or in a coach, but less excusable on the printed page of repeating his points in close recurrence, not from delight in a phrase or in a thought, but so to say as a matter of routine.

The discussion of ethics predominates, and this, we are told, was charac-

teristic of Chinese thought in the relevant period. Nevertheless the discussions of cosmology, logic, dialectic, and epistemology that are to be found in certain parts of the book are of much interest and seem frequently to describe a philosophy that attained a high level (It was written, of course, very long ago.) I should gladly have read more about these ancient discussions and should judge that the author has relatively little interest in them. In that however, I may be grossly mistaken and I have no means of judging whether he gave them proportionately sufficient attention.

What then about Chinese ethics?

As I have said we are dealing with a period remote by two millennia. Nevertheless ethical ideas do not age so rapidly as say, the ideas of experimental science. On the other hand clear ethical notions and ethical systems are among the later products of most civilizations. Our author gives us very little guidance regarding the extent to which Chinese thought was influenced by ideas that were developed outside China but we should rate the ancient ethics of China very high if either its analysis of moral ideas or its orderly presentation of them in a connected system were worthy of respect and of commendation.

In these respects Dr. Yu Lan (even if he has been trying to see the affair with Western eyes) seems to me to have shown very successfully indeed that Chinese ethics had attained a high pitch of development.

The Confucian conception of *jen* (translated human heartedness) seems to have been conceived with care and insight and to have been a proper foundation for an ethics of character. In this, and in his doctrine of the 'rectification of names' our author's comparison of Confucius with Socrates seems to be not unjust. The doctrine of Mencius in a sense his follower seems to have been a genuine development of the same set of ideas particularly in its discussion of the relations of *jen* to shame, modesty and the sense of right and wrong and in its explicit opposition to utilitarianism. Take again the Confucianism of Hsun Tzu. In it there are highly developed conceptions of nature, desire and the place of artifice in morality. Among the Confucians of the Ch'in and Han dynasties the relation of *jen* to *li* (righteousness) and of harmony (or music) to form are discussed in a way that is penetrating and unantiquable. Again the doctrine of the mean or of the 'timely mean' was very fully discussed and many other elaborate and difficult moral conceptions.

Although Confucianism ultimately triumphed in ancient China other philosophical moralisms were also elaborated skilfully. Early Mohism it is true (i.e. the philosophy of Mo Tzu who died a little later than 400 B.C.), seems to have had gaping lacunae and great internal difficulties. It attempted to combine frugality, universal love and pacifism on a utilitarian basis and its odd combination of a doctrine of renunciation with the said utilitarianism does not seem in the account given in these pages to have been excogitated very profoundly. But the later Mohists made amends, giving a strict exposition of hedonistic utilitarianism that may reasonably be compared with Bentham's in its apparent clarity (I think however that its pacifism is oddly allied with its attempted justification of capital punishment, and the argument that to kill a robber is not properly speaking to kill a man seems to belong to the baser sort of sophistry).

If Confucius may properly be compared with Socrates, Lao Tzu may appropriately be compared with Spinoza with the important difference that quiescence rather than acquiescence was his goal. "All things, howsoever they flourish, returned to their root. This return to their root is called quiescence, which is called submission to fate. Submission to fate is called the invariable

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To know this invariable is called enlightenment." In the later Taoism of Chuang Tzu, a monism of emptiness seems sometimes to have been preached, but a richer form of wisdom was also present "Heaven and earth have their constants The sun and the moon have their brightness The stars have their groupings Trees and shrubs have their life and growth You, sir, first liberate your instincts and follow Tao." Comprehension of the qualities of Heaven and Earth this is called the great root and the great foundation It is to be in harmony with Nature To be in harmony with Nature is the happiness of Nature

There is much freshness in these ancient treasures

JOHN LAIRD

Consent Freedom and Political Obligation By J P FLAMENATZ (London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1938 Pp xii + 163 Price 7s 6d)

Philosophy "Mr C K Ogden has remarked in cynical mood, 'is 99 per cent the unconscious misunderstanding or the unjustifiable exploitation of the elliptical the metaphorical and the fictional' " Mr Flamenatz has written a treatise which may be said to be almost entirely the other 1 per cent His purpose in his own words is 'to provide definitions of a number of words generally used by political thinkers and to discover whether the duty of the governed to obey their governments is on the whole, greater in proportion to the extent to which the latter act with the consent of the former' " With this twofold purpose in view he examines the concepts of "consent" "rights," and freedom' and incidentally the ideas of "general will" "common good," and political obligation

The author contends that the idea of consent has two facets It involves the expression of a wish that another or others should perform or abstain from a certain action or actions It also means that the right of one man to act in a certain way is conditional upon another man's having expressed the wish that he should act in that way Consent is distinguished from "approval" consent to a man's action is quite distinct from approval of its effects for the giving of consent is essentially the granting of permission Moreover consent can be given strictly speaking only to the actions of others and never to one's own It is shown that under both pure and representative democracy there is no such thing as government by the consent of all the persons supposed to owe obedience to the government Therefore consent may be one basis of political obligation but cannot be taken to be the only basis Locke and Rousseau were perfectly right when they insisted that protection by the law creates an obligation to obey the law, but they were wrong in maintaining that the acceptance of protection by the law implies consent to its enforcement

The same distinctions are applied to the theories of the Idealist philosophers and in particular to their conception of a general will Idealist theory is the most complete attempt yet made to base political obligation entirely upon consent The notion that law gives effect to a social will which is at the same time, the real will of the governed, is used by Hegelian philosophers to prove that we must obey government because it is really doing nothing other than enforcing our own will We are always consenting parties to its actions even if we are not conscious of being so The enforcement of the law against our own actual will at any moment is only an appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober, and we can—in Rousseau's famous phrase—be 'forced to be free' Mr Flamenatz shrewdly attacks the basis of the whole theory when

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he contends that "there is simply no argument from the existence of a good common to several people to a will which is also common to them" Moreover "will" in Idealist theory, is sometimes regarded as simply individual volition, sometimes as an immanent, moral "goodwill" It is this double ambiguity which alone makes possible the paradoxes of Idealist theory

The hinge then upon which the whole ultimately turns is the conception of freedom Mr Plamenatz contrives to avoid entanglement in the old controversy between free will and determinism by defining freedom in its primary meaning as action from a motive from which a man desires to act or, at least does not desire not to act in its secondary meanings (freedom from restraint and freedom from coercion) as 'action from a motive other than an undesired motive' Thus, to act against one's will means to act from a motive which one wishes did not exist in one's mind The discussion of the idea of freedom is as illuminating as it is brilliant but one is left wondering whether a distinction between impulses and motives might not have still further advanced the discussion

The ultimate case for the largest possible element of consent in government is briefly this co-operation should be undertaken under such conditions that the greatest possible number of the actions which it involves are the effects of desired—or at least of neutral—motives In order to minimize restraint and coercion, the consent of those who co-operate must be obtained as extensively as possible This is the almost platitudinous conclusion at which the author quite unashamedly arrives Its truth could of course, be elaborated indefinitely by practical illustration (the Prohibition Laws of America for instance which have proved as great a godsend to the political scientist as they proved to the gangster) But this is a work not of political science but of political philosophy And Mr Plamenatz has made a valuable contribution to the theoretical discussion of those ultimate political values which are so apt to be perverted defiled or even forgotten in modern politics

DAVID THOMSON

The Problem of the Individual University of California Publications in Philosophy Vol 20 (Berkeley University of California Press London Cambridge University Press 1937 Pp 206 Price \$2 00 9s net)

This book consists of eight essays by different authors each of considerable importance and merit but varying so much in their view and argument that the only unity which they possess and characterizes the book as a book lies in the fact that they are all concerned with the *individual* About the latter however there is no common thesis

Neither singleness (indivisibility) nor uniqueness according to Professor Loewenberg who criticizes empiricism and subjects the processes of distinction and separation to examination can serviceably define individuality for there is no demonstrable knowledge of what is in itself single or unique and both catalysis and synopsis lead to insoluble difficulties such as Kant emphasized in his Second Antinomy Professor Pepper, considering the *Individuality of a Work of Art* analyses the latter into physical object and aesthetic object and agrees with Professor Loewenberg that the individuality of both is remote In Physics Professor Leuzen traces developments from the classical to quantum theory, and discussing the questions as to what is the concept of physical individuality and what is the ontological status of the ultimate physical individuals finally answers that the atomic individual becomes a correlation of series of possible numerical measures" and that

the pictorial image of a corporeal individual "serves merely as a mental support for the abstract concept of an ordered set of numbers" Professor Dennes contends that uniqueness indivisibility, complexity, or simplicity are each irrelevant to individuality, develops his argument by defining the individual as an instance of a type, and emphasizes—a point relevant to theories such as those of Plato, Aristotle, and Bosanquet—that a view of this kind can prescribe no limits as to what is or is not ontologically individual any assertion that some things are more truly or genuinely individual than others being merely the expression of a *preference* for some things as against others Professor Adams, on the other hand, working on the basis of a conception of continuity, argues that far from being an instance of type individuality is always that which is more and other than an instance of type. it is relevancy to context, its contrast being the "abstract universal" which is indifference to context but both of these have to be regarded not so much as being mutually exclusive as ideal limits between which there exists a sliding scale Professor Strong deals with the question as to how an individual is to be specified identified or described relevantly to the problem of human rights and distinguishing though not separating three aspects of individualization has some interesting things to say on topical social and political issues

This hunt for the individual can be no doubt exciting, but there seems to be a certain degree of confusion which is probably traceable to the initial absence of agreement about the meaning of individuality It shows itself in the obscurity of Professor Lowenberg's phrase the remoteness of the individual—a phrase accepted and repeated by several of the others, it leaves one in doubt whether the individual is reached by a laborious dialectical inquiry or whether the individual cannot be known even by this means, or whether anything answering to the term individual exists at all There is a lack of clearness concerning the three terms—definition existence, and knowability of the individual According to one interpretation of Plato's theory, the individual is relegated to a level of unreality and consequently is not an object of knowledge but Professor Mackay, dealing with the problem of individuality as he sees it in Plato a philosophy, comes to the conclusion that 'far from denying the substantial existence of particular individuals, Plato takes them to be the ultimate basis of his dialectic Professor Marhenke deals with the problem as it is treated by Hume in his discussion of Identity, and while he brings out the difficulties inherent in that treatment, he would have brought his essay more into line with the main discussion of the book if he had made it clear whether Hume in saying that personal identity is a fiction, was saying that the individual is not *known* or is not an ontological fact whether in saying so he was right or at least in line with things said by other writers in this book though his argument for this conclusion was bad, or whether he was wrong both in his argument and for what he argued

B M LAING

An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature, 1740 By DAVID HUME Reprinted in type facsimile With an introduction by J M Keynes and P Sraffa (Cambridge at the University Press 1938 Pp xxxii + 32 Price 3s 6d net)

In a letter dated March 4 1740, to Francis Hutcheson, Hume refers to an "Abstract" which he had succeeded in getting printed in London and to a 'Mr Smith' who evidently had a copy of this Abstract or who was acquainted with it Hitherto this Abstract has remained unknown, and doubts have been

expressed regarding its ever being discovered, in the absence of further details Hume's biographers have identified 'Mr Smith' with the famous Adam Smith and connected him with the authorship of the Abstract—a concise précis of the lately published *Treatise*. The interpretation constituted a charming story expressive of the esteem in which Adam Smith was held but lacking any cogent evidence and not very consistent with Hume's own statements in the letter. Now the public is presented with that Abstract, and the editors deserve the thanks for their discovery and publication which includes a valuable introduction.

Three main points arise. First, who was 'Mr Smith'? Second, who composed the Abstract? Third, if Hume is the author, has the fact any importance? The answer given to the first question by the editors is that 'Mr Smith' was John Smith, a Dublin publisher, with whom Hume dissatisfied with the result of the publication of the *Treatise*, hoped to effect an Irish edition of the latter work. This is admittedly conjectural nevertheless it provides a motive on the part of Hume for making an Abstract and securing its publication in some form. The editors answer the second question to the effect that the Abstract was made by Hume himself—a careful correlation of passages in the Abstract with passages in the Appendix to Volume III of the *Treatise*, guided by consideration of the chronology involved convinces the editors that no one but Hume could have written it—it must be granted at least that it could not have been written without Hume's collaboration. The third question is not touched upon by the editors. Yet a short and concise Abstract might be expected to reveal something of the author's main purpose and argument. One gets the impression for instance that the Abstract in structure and in phraseology is largely an anticipation of the *Enquiry* of which it is a miniature. Other features worthy of notice are that it stresses the need of supplementing prevalent logic by a theory of probability and evidence that it selects causation not because of any special importance it possesses or of any special interest which Hume personally has in it but because it serves the purpose of illustrating the argument in one detailed instance, that in discussing the nature of mind (as of body) Hume was attacking directly the philosophical notion of mind as a simple, identical substance and that in regard to necessity constant union and inference are the data from which the idea of necessity is obtained.

B. M. LAING

Humanism and Naturalism. A Comparative Study of Ernest Seillière, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More. By FOLKE LEANDER (Göteborg Wettergren and Kerbers Förlag 1937 Pp vi + 227 Price Kr 8)

This comparative study of three authors, one French and two American, who are little read in Great Britain is of considerable interest and value. As the writer remarks in his first sentence, "Terms like humanism and naturalism may mean almost anything nowadays." Hence the title throws little light upon the contents. It is a work of in the wide German sense 'anthropology'.

Seillière and Babbitt (and to a less extent More) have spent much strength in tracking down and lopping off the hydra heads of Rousseauism which under the name of "naturalism" or "naturalism" seems to them the arch enemy of Western culture. Mr Leander's outline of their analyses and interpretations in this matter is lucid and I think, convincing.

While the three agree in their historical interpretation, Babbitt and More diverge from Seillière in their psychology and their ethics. As to the former,

indeed, with reason, since Seillière's elaborate doctrine of "imperialism" (an odd, and, I think, a misleading term) comes at bottom to Hobbes's egoism *sans phrase* and was therefore finally refuted by Butler by mere process of accurate description. To this Seillière adds fresh difficulties by his singular pseudo-divinization of "reason-experience" or "synthesized experience of mankind" by which he would have man's native egoism controlled. Indeed, the vast bulk of this author's incubation would hardly seem warrant for too serious treatment of it as philosophy.

Babbitt and More, however, are in different case. The former's *Rousseau and Romanticism* alone gives him a right, in his field, to respectful attention. Yet even these in their 'humanism' seem to lack philosophical *Grundlichkeit*. It is to risk a charge of prejudice more than a little 'woolly.' Indeed Babbitt's task (which More finally gave up, embracing instead a Christian view of man) is to establish 'a superindividual *telos* or a human universal which is at once our inmost self and transcendent of individuality' (p. 121) without trespassing beyond the realm of the human without falling into metaphysics or theology. A difficult task enough. In his last phase Babbitt does not deny that a theistic basis may be given to his humanism, but he does deny that it is necessary. Mr. Leander contributes a chapter on the psychology of volition the point of which is to show that good empirical grounds may be cited for Babbitt's view to which, however, he does not commit himself in any final way. Perhaps the central theme of Babbitt's humanism is *voluntas superior intellectus*, by which he is affiliated (but not identified) with the main current of American Pragmatism.

Throughout his earlier course More's development followed closely that of his friend, but during the last decade he moved over to orthodoxy, parting finally from Babbitt on the doctrine of grace. Mr. Leander sides, on the whole, with Babbitt who wants 'the same ethical and spiritual results' (as those of Christianity) 'without a dogma.' The question remains: Can he have what he wants?

RALPH E. STEDMAN

Readings in Political Philosophy. By FRANCIS WILLIAM COKER. Alfred Cowles Professor of Government, Yale University. Revised and enlarged edition. (New York and London: The Macmillan Company, 1938. Pp. xviii + 717. Price 17s.)

The aim of this volume is to furnish a handy collection of readings from foremost political philosophers. In furtherance of this design it has seemed wise to include substantial parts of a few pre-eminent works rather than to cover a wide range of writings with brief passages from each. This, in Professor Coker's own words, is the aim and gist of the book. It is an anthology of political theorists starting with Plato and Aristotle, Polybius and Cicero and coming down through the medieval thinkers (St. Augustine, John of Salisbury, St. Thomas Aquinas, Dante, Marsiglio of Padua, and Nicholas of Cusa) to modern times. The sixteenth century finds adequate representation in Machiavelli, Luther, Calvin, Bodin, Hooker, and the *Vindiciae contra Tyrannum*. The seventeenth century, in Grotius, Milton, Hobbes, Harrington, Locke. The eighteenth century is represented only by Montesquieu, Rousseau, Paine and Bentham. A serious omission from such a catalogue is, surely, Edmund Burke, who would have been a more fitting climax to this lineage than is Bentham. It is a pity, too, that a sample of David Hume could not have been included, though when so many treasures have been collected between two covers, it is perhaps churlish to ask for more.

NEW BOOKS

Teachers of political theory at Oxford and Cambridge have for years past been conscious of the need to persuade students to read the actual texts of politics, rather than summarized expositions of them or second hand criticisms of their ideas. A book of this nature should prove invaluable for this purpose. It was first published in America twenty four years ago but has scarcely been used in this country. It is to be hoped that a revised and enlarged edition may lead to its more extensive adoption by students in English Universities for I know of no counterpart to it.

The recurrent themes of discussion are inevitably the origin and nature of state and society the basis of law and liberty the grounds and limits of political obligation. The selection from the writings of each man is admirably made with a view to embodying his essential approach to these problems as well as exemplifying the general tendency of his thought. The result is one vast symposium in which the greatest minds of Europe all play a part. And one becomes acutely aware of the real continuity of political theory. Thus Aristotle and Cicero refer back to Plato Augustine to Cicero Harrington to Machiavelli and Hobbes Montesquieu to Harrington and so on. Rapid consecutive survey has a value of its own it offers a hill top view whence rivers and tributaries can be seen in relationship.

The necessary accompaniment of chronological selection is an index giving logical rather than chronological cross references. This has been attempted but is not always adequate. Thus for example the reference to Tom Paine's remarks on sovereignty (p. 682 f) does not appear in the Index under sovereignty nor do the remarks of Nicholas of Cusa on representation (p. 267 f) appear under representation in the Index. The reference to Harrington's ideas on property (p. 503) would also be better made under property—along with the references to Aristotle and Locke—than under the separate heading land ownership. I would suggest therefore that in a future edition the already valuable index be made still more valuable by elaboration along these lines. The selected bibliographies appended to each excerpt are excellent and leave nothing to be desired.

DAVID THOMSON

Books received also —

- C LAMBEK *Studies in the Dynamic Coherence of Mental Life* Copenhagen Levin & Munksgaard London Williams & Norgate Ltd 1938 Pp 131 Kr 6
- J KATZ *The Will to Civilization: An Inquiry into the Principles of Historic Change* London Secker & Warburg 1938 Pp viii + 346 12s 6d
- J HALL (Editor) *Readings in Jurisprudence* Indianapolis Bobbs Merrill Co 1938 Pp xix + 1183
- N O LOSSKY *Mystical Intuition* Prague Universite libra russe 1938 Pp 41 Kc 10 Al etranger 0 50 doll Amer
- W MACNEILE DIXON *The Human Situation* (Gifford Lectures 1935-37 Cheap Edition) London E Arnold & Co 1938 Pp 438 7s 6d
- E M FORSTER *Goldsworthy Loves Dickinson* London E Arnold & Co Pp xii + 277 5s
- A PETZALL *Ethics and Epistemology in John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding* Goteborg Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag London B H Blackwell Ltd 1937 Pp 83 4s 6d
- J YAHUDA *Bio Economics* London Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd 1938 Pp xx + 204 7s 6d

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- I A RICHARDS *Interpretation in Teaching* London Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co 1938 Pp xxii + 420 18s
- F E ENGLAND *The Validity of Religious Experience*, London I Nicholson & Watson, Ltd 1937 Pp 288 8s 6d
- F M HNIK (Translated from the Czech by M and R Weatherall) *The Philanthropic Motive in Christianity An Analysis of the Relations between Theology and Social Service* Oxford B Blackwell 1938 Pp xu + 318 16s
- PRYNS HOPKINS *The Psychology of Social Movements A Psycho-Analytic View of Society* London G Allen & Unwin, Ltd 1938 Pp 284 10s 6d
- R R MARETT *Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, 1864-1937* (From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol XXIII) London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1938 Pp 15 1s 6d
- A WALFY (Translator and annotator) *The Analects of Confucius* London G Allen & Unwin Ltd 1938 Pp 268 10s 6d
- A WOLF *A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century* London G Allen & Unwin Ltd 1938 Pp 814 25s
- R L HAWKINS *Positivism in the United States (1853-1861)* Cambridge, U.S.A. Harvard University Press London Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford 1938 Pp ix + 243 3 dollars, 12s 6d
- VARIOUS AUTHORS *Background to Modern Science* Cambridge, at the University Press 1938 Pp xu + 243 7s 6d
- A N WHITEHEAD *Modes of Thought* Cambridge, at the University Press 1938 Pp ix + 241 7s 6d
- D L WATSON (Foreword by J DEWEY) *Scientists are Human* London Watts & Co 1938 Pp xx + 249 7s 6d
- C H DODD *History and the Gospel* London Nisbet & Co 1938 Pp 189 6s
- N ABERCROMBIE *Saint Augustine and French Classical Thought* Oxford, at the Clarendon Press Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1938 Pp 123 8s 6d
- R M OGDEN *The Psychology of Art* New York C Scribner's Sons 1938 Pp xviii + 291 2 dollars 50
- V F HOPPER *Medieval Number Symbolism Its Sources, Meaning, and Influence on Thought and Expression* New York Columbia University Press London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1938 Pp viii + 241 15s
- J WELTON and A J MONAHAN *Intermediate Logic* (Fourth Edition revised by S H MALLONE) London University Tutorial Press 1938 Pp 498 10s 6d
- T M HANON *Plato's Republic* (The Interpreter Series) London Thomas Murby & Co 1938 Pp 62 1s
- R B HENDERSON *Belief in God* (The Interpreter Series) London Thomas Murby & Co 1938 Pp 63 1s
- W McDougall *The Riddle of Life* London Methuen & Co 1938 Pp 279 7s 6d
- ARNE NESS *Truth as Concealed by those who are not Professional Philosophers* Oslo I Kommissjon Hos Jacob Dybwad 1938 Pp 178
- A C EWING *A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* London Methuen & Co 1938 Pp viii + 278 8s 6d
- F H BARTLETT *Sigmund Freud* London Victor Gollancz, Ltd 1938 Pp 138 3s 6d
- KARL KORSCH *Marx* London Chapman & Hall 1938 Pp 246 6s
- NOREEN BLYTH *Which Way To-morrow?* London Chapman & Hall Pp 350 5s.

NEW BOOKS

- SADHU SANTINATHA *The Critical Examination of the Philosophy of Religion*. 2 Vols Amalner Pratap Seth Pp 1110
- SADHU SANTINATHA *Mayatada, or the Non-Dualistic Philosophy (Vedanta)* Amalner Pratap Seth Pp 153.
- MAURICE MANDELBAUM *The Problem of Historical Knowledge* New York Liveright Publishing Corp Pp 323 \$3 50
- JAMES WILKINSON MILLER, Ph D *The Structure of Aristotelian Logic* (Psyche Monologues) London Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, Ltd Pp 97 10s 6d
- STEPHEN HOBHOUSE *The Selected Mystical Writings of William Law* London The C W Daniel Co Ltd Pp 395 8s 6d
- ALEXANDER DRU *The Journals of Kierkegaard* A Selection edited and translated by Alexander Dru London Oxford University Press 1938 Pp xl + 600 25s
- PETER ANTONY BERTUCCI *The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought* Cambridge Massachusetts Harvard University Press 1938 Pp xv + 311 15s
- JOHN MACMURRAY *The Clue to History* London The Student Christian Movement Press 1938 Pp 242 7s 6d
- LAWRENCE HANSON *The Life of S T Coleridge The Early Years* London George Allen & Unwin Ltd 1938 Pp 575 £1 1s
- L DE RAEYMAEKER *Introduction à la Philosophie* Louvain L Institut Supérieur de Philosophie 1938 Pp vii + 269 25 frs belges
- J KORNIS *L'Homme d'État Analyse de l'esprit politique* Paris F Alcan 1938 Pp 576 Fr 60
- M GORCE ET F BERGOUNIOUX *Science Moderne et Philosophie Médievale* Paris F Alcan 1938 Pp viii + 179 Fr 15
- U CAMPAGNOLO *Nations et Droit Le développement du droit international entendu comme développement de l'État* Paris F Alcan 1938 Pp 305 Fr 50
- J J BACHOFEN *Du Règne de la Mère au Patriarcat* (Pages choisies par Adrien Turel) Paris F Alcan 1938 Pp 165 Fr 30
- J PALLIARD *Le Theoreme de La Connaissance* Paris Fernand Aubier 1938 Pp 135 Frs 15
- ÉMILE DURKHEIM *L'Évolution Pédagogique en France de la Renaissance à nos Jours* Paris Librairie Felix Alcan 1938 Pp 226 Frs 25
- DR G VILLEY *La Psychiatrie et les Sciences de L'Homme* (Essai de synthèse scientifique) Paris Librairie Felix Alcan Pp 194 Frs 30
- WALTER RIESE *L'Idée de L'Homme dans la neurologie contemporaine* Paris Librairie Felix Alcan Pp 96 Frs 30
- P LÉON VEUTHEY *La Pensée Contemporaine* Editions Montaigne Paris Aubier Pp 283 20 frs
- W EBENSTEIN *Die Rechtsphilosophische Schule der Reinen Rechtslehre* Prag Taussig & Taussig 1938 Pp 181
- IGNAZ LICHTIG *Diem Entstehung des Lebens durch stetige Schöpfung* Amsterdam N V Noord Hollandische Uitgevers Mij Pp xx + 371 6 Gulden
- G DEL VECCHIO *Saggi Intorno allo Stata Roma* Istituto di Filosofia del Diritto 1935 Pp 246 Lire 10
- VARIOUS AUTHORS *Malebranche Nel Terzo centenario della nascita* (Pubblicazione a cura della Facoltà di Filosofia dell'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore) Milano "Vita e Pensiero" 1938 Pp xiv + 380 Lire trenta
- L PELLOUX *La Logica di Hegel* Milano "Vita e Pensiero" 1938 Pp vi + 243 Lire venti

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- C. A. SACHELI *Regione Pratica Preliminari Critici* Firenze G. C. Sansoni 1938 Pp 351 Lire 20
- M. TREVES *Trattato d'Estetica* Firenze "La Nuova Italia" 1938 Pp 319 Lire 14
- GUIDO DE RUGGIERO *La Filosofia Moderna Parte Quattro L'Era dell'Illuminismo* Bari Gius. Laterza & Figli 1938 2 vols Pp 320 and 275 Lire 45
- W. H. HAY II (Translator) *Petrus Pomponatius Tractatus de Immortalitate Animae* (Followed by a facsimile of the *editio princeps*) Haverford U.S.A. Haverford College 1938 Pp xxxv + 60
- J. MARITAIN *Metafisica de Bergson Freudismo y Psicoanalisis* Buenos Aires Instituto de Filosofia 1938 Pp 73

"TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR PHILOSOPHIE"

THE foundation of a new Dutch philosophical periodical is being announced the title of which will be *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*

The new periodical will be at the service of the strongly increasing philosophical movement in the Dutch speaking countries, and it is especially intended to improve the relations with the international philosophical activity. Contributions of the most representative foreign philosophers will regularly be published in this periodical in the original language (English, French, German, Italian).

The object of the periodical includes the philosophical problem in its entire scope. Its spirit will be positively a constructive one. The editors consider this enterprise as an attempt to co-operate in the spiritual renovation which is being performed in present philosophy.

Each number will contain articles and critical studies, a chronicle, annual reports which will give a critical and complete survey of the philosophical literature, and finally a complete bibliography (books, articles from periodicals, reviews of books).

Moreover, the editors expect to print unpublished old texts and also symposiums concerning the actual problem of methods in the different branches of philosophy. These symposiums too will have an international character.

The editorial is composed of C. Barendse (Zwolle), L. Camerlynck (Ghent), G. De Brie (Ghent), E. De Bruyne (Ghent), P. de Bruin (Amsterdam), D. De Petter (Ghent), L. De Raevmaeker (Louvain), H. J. De Vleeschauwer (Ghent), A. De Vos (Ghent), A. De Waelhens (Louvain), P. Janssens (Ghent), N. Luyten (Ghent), A. Reischling (Amsterdam), F. Sassen (Nymegen), P. Tump (Ghent), A. Van de Vijvere (Ghent), C. Van Gestel (Louvain).

The periodical will be published four times a year, the first in February 1939, each number from 250 to 300 pages, size 24 x 18. Editorship and direction are established in Ghent (Belgium), Hoogstraat 39. Rates of subscription for Belgium 90 Fr. (18 belgas), abroad 110 Fr. (22 belgas).

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

I should like to comment upon Dr Bourke's article 'Responsibility, Freedom, and Determinism' appearing in *Philosophy* for July 1938. His argument which in its inception and early stages gave promise of shedding significant light on the problem of freedom seemed to me to lose at its climax all claim to validity. Yet if this part of his argument were sound it would set at naught at the very outset any attempt to defend the determinist's view. So apparently devastating an argument merits examination.

A crucial point Dr Bourke contends in the defence of freedom and responsibility against the strictures of the determinist is made by attributing to the determinist an inconsistency in the very holding of the view that freedom and responsibility are not real. Merely to maintain the non-existence of responsibility he observes is already to admit its existence for the reason that one cannot hold any position without thereby taking responsibility for the holding of it. One imagines that a determinist would very quickly reply to this argument that his responsibility for adopting this or any other view would not be a genuine responsibility in the sense of one resulting from a free choice among possible alternatives; but only the kind of responsibility that any member of a causally productive series of events would have in performing its causal function. So that the determinist in maintaining his determinism is himself determined by antecedent events in such a fashion that given these events only the act of maintaining determinism could have eventuated. Such an explanation it would be insisted would be free from involvement in self-stultifying inconsistency.

But Dr Bourke's case against the determinist it appears goes farther than this. The determinist's denial of all responsibility Dr Bourke says involves the further denial that it is possible to distinguish between what is true and what is false. Conviction that a certain theory is true comes only when one is able actively to pronounce in favour of it as against other possible theories. If theories are merely mechanical processions of events then they are all equally valuable and valueless and the determinist is not entitled to prefer and put forward his own theory as claiming truth any more than any other.

Are these really the implications of determinism? Does it make it impossible for any theory to be either more or less true than another? Does it destroy the foundations of knowledge? Does it prevent the determinist from even arguing his own case? It must be insisted at once that even if the determinist could not consistently claim to know that a theory is true that fact would not militate against the theory's being true. It may be that Dr Bourke does not mean to allege that it would, but his language at times comes close to suggesting something very like this. In any case it seems evident that the truth of a theory does not rest with the ability of a person to maintain that theory—except in the special case where the theory in question is precisely the theory that the person can (or cannot) maintain that theory. And it is no part of the determinist's thesis that he can maintain (in the sense of freely choosing from among alternatives) the theory he is proposing.

But what reply can be made to the contention that the determinist theory if it be true cannot be known to be true? Certainly conviction of truth comes in other fashions than by free and intelligent reflection. Compare William James's famous anaesthetic revelation produced by the dentist's nitrous oxide. A view of things obtained in this highly deterministic manner might well be held and asseverated with great vigour.

But conviction it will rightly be held is not knowledge. Knowledge involves discrimination, selective attention, sifting of evidence, reflection. Are these possible under determinism? In one sense in which these terms may be taken it is true

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that they are not. It is in this sense that the determinist denies that we have knowledge. But the terms have their deterministic interpretations in accordance with which the determinist holds that knowledge exists. Even in a deterministic universe we turn our attention to objects, we look at evidence, we find some evidence more relevant and compelling than other evidence, we draw conclusions though all this takes place according to deterministically operative laws of cause and effect. Laws such as these that govern the thinking organism in its relation to its environment are the determinist would maintain, fundamental for knowledge. Unless evidence—fact—does *compel* the mind's acceptance—as the Stoics would describe the relation between known object and knower—there is no real knowledge. Ultimately knowledge goes back to the direct deterministic relation of fact compelling mind. To see a fact is to be unable not to acknowledge it as fact. This may involve a kind of lack of freedom (though many would regard it as of the very essence of freedom), but it is what knowledge reduces to in the last analysis.

If the non determinist objects finally that those who hold theories based on such knowledge are not really responsible for them that the theories are not really *theirs* to maintain the determinist replies that if this means that such people have had the theories thrust upon them by forces beyond themselves then in all instances of genuine knowing these forces can only be facts. But to free the mind from the pressure of facts is equivalent to dooming it to utter ignorance, and hence utter irresponsibility. So that responsibility is not inconsistent with, but rather dependent upon the compulsion of facts. And this view of responsibility the determinist believes he may maintain without refuting himself in so doing.

Yours faithfully,

LUDWIG CARMY

OBERLIN COLLEGE
OBERLIN, OHIO U.S.A.

November 12 1938

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

In the very interesting article "The Relations of Philosophy," by Professor Jared S. Moore in the last July number of this Journal (Vol. XII, No. 31) he says: "Religion is unlike both Philosophy and Science in that it is a way of living whereas Philosophy and Science are theories about life. In other words, the aim of Philosophy and Science is knowledge, the aim of religion is personal fellowship with God and the inspiration of daily life." May I here point out that in India, which has devoted thousands of years to the pursuit of religion and philosophy, the opposite view is held. In India philosophy is *pre-eminently* a way of living. It is knowledge based upon life and life based upon knowledge. Philosophy is *nothing* if not *lived*. It is theology, dogma, scholasticism and the like so often mistaken for Philosophy that are mere theories or opinions, and they contradict each other. Religious beliefs being based upon faith and mystic life are likewise held to be of the nature of opinions (*matam*) in so far as their experiences contradict each other and are not ordinarily verified or verifiable. Philosophy is what is based upon Truth (*Tatnam*) actually verified or verifiable by ordinary facts of life, as being something beyond contradictions like two plus two are equal in four.

Philosophy being an interpretation of the facts of life, it is of value in India solely as that which enables one to make attempts to live a life as perfect as possible, it being based on a knowledge of the Truth of All Existence. This Truth is tested only in practical life taken as a whole. Every kind of activity, social, political, religious, intellectual and emotional is comprehended in life as interpreted and lived by the Philosopher. This Truth is illustrated in Indian Philosophy from the lives of rulers, politicians, warriors, tradesmen, hunters, butchers, menials, priests, ascetics, housewives—nay, men, women and even children. In all walks of life. In fact the greatest and the most widely known philosopher of India was a king and a warrior who taught Philosophy on the battle-field. Philosophy in India is most emphatically no theory, no speculation.

CORRESPONDENCE

Religious beliefs on the other hand are opinions formed by men according to *tastes*, "temperaments" and "capacities". Such opinions have undoubtedly their influence on men's lives, which makes men feel religion to be a necessity. This influence is however, limited to individuals or groups only. It often becomes an endless source of hostilities among men when they become conscious of the differences in their beliefs. In spite of the contacts that men are said to make with Gods, in their religious life it is the religious differences that have been the causes of a larger number of wars, a greater amount of bloodshed, cruelty and homicide in the world than mere economic distress or other circumstances. The unimpeachable facts of history point to the fact that it is not Religion that helps most to promote the social good of humanity *in general or as a whole*, but Philosophy whose objective is Truth verified in *actual* life as known to all here in this world not in the next or a different world. One's *life* is the best exposition of one's philosophy as understood in India. Philosophy is not the spinning of yarns out of one's own mind from within.

In the same issue of this journal is published another thoughtful article on 'The Concepts of Politics' by Mr. J. D. Mabbott. It deals specially with the implications of the terms 'Society' and 'Common Good'. Though modern Indian Philosophy has not much to contribute to discussions relating to such topics, yet her ancient wisdom appears to contain something that may be found useful.

The ancient Indian goal in political life is summed up in such formulae as *Sarve janah sukhino Bhavantu*, *Sarve Satwa sukho hitah*, *Sarva bhuta hita ratah* and so forth. They indicate that individuals cannot attain any *real* or lasting good unless the community, society or State attains it, and that the community, society or State cannot attain it unless all humanity (*Sarve Janah*) attain it. In other words, no individuals or groups can attain *real* or lasting good unless they realize that all human beings form a single body. It may be remembered by some of your readers that this was the message sent to the last International Congress of Philosophy held in Paris by His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore (India) as the message of Indian Philosophy.

This shows that the concept 'society' acquires wider and wider significance as men progress till it comprehends the whole of humanity. We are now somewhere on the way. So are the Totalitarians at the stage of the State and they have yet to reach that of 'all humanity'.

Next the term 'common good' takes us further. Since 'good' and 'common' are topics dealt with in pure Indian Philosophy, I shall not go into that subject here. It will be enough to refer to the Indian view that *ultimately* the 'individual' implies the 'all'. As such, unity is always implied in multiplicity. It is only what is good for all that is good for the individual. Otherwise the 'good' is not *real*.

'Common' implies 'unity'. Hence Indian Philosophy holds that 'common good' is not what is good only for a body of individuals as a body, but to each and every one. It is good to each *in the same degree*. Here also there are different stages through which man passes before he realizes this Truth. The *real* 'common good' is attained only when every individual realizes his identity *with all* humanity. This looks like mere theory and that of a most impracticable kind. But that it can be most practicable will be evident only when we go deep into *Philosophy*—not religion which is beyond the scope of this note.

V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER

MYSORE, INDIA

September 29, 1938

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

DEAR SIR,

Professor Turner in his review of my *Beyond Humanism* has somewhat misunderstood the view there suggested of the relation of God to nature. I did not mean to deny, but to assert what he describes as the 'traditional theistic view' that God is to all nature (including past cosmic epochs) as a man is to the few cubic feet and years of nature occupied by his body. This view, which is too complex in its implications to be easily understood (think of the various mind-body theories),

has been bitterly combated in most Protestant and all Roman Catholic theologies. True, some of the older theologians accepted it, such as Spinoza and Schleiermacher but to my mind they ruined it by such assumptions as determinism, which Professor Turner also accepts. It is essential to the 'new theology' that the parts of the body, its cells in the widest sense, can react upon the mind of the whole and that the latter is not "pure actuality," but *passive* as well as active. The primary question is whether or not God is completed perfection in every sense, therefore incapable of change or of being acted upon or of having genuinely individual active parts. Many of the most distinguished Protestant theologians of our time hold, at least implicitly, the doctrine that God is perfect only in righteousness, wisdom, and power, while his aesthetic value, his happiness or bliss is capable of endless increase to which we may contribute how much depending upon our free action. This view, many now admit is in accord with the Bible, but it certainly is not traditional in technical theology though I hope and believe that it is fast becoming so.

Against Professor Turner's pronouncement in favour of determinism I am moved to be equally dogmatic. If by "reaches of philosophy" is meant schools of philosophy then no doubt some of them will be ruined by determinism but if it is branches of the subject such as ethics, metaphysics, or logic then, on the contrary since philosophers have largely abandoned determinism (Boutroux, James Peirce, Whitehead, Ward, Bergson, even Santayana), these subjects have been doing rather well. Professor Turner is an able representative of a tenet which in two hundred years very nearly did destroy philosophy (in Comte, Nietzsche, Mill, and their immediate successors). Has not the subject been enjoying one of its greatest renaissances precisely since determinism ceased to be the generally accepted philosophic view?

That a doctrine acceptable to men like Whitehead, Bohr, Jordan, and many others of high competence in the philosophy of science spells the ruin of science requires stronger support than I find even in Professor Turner's vigorous discussions of this matter.

Yours very truly,

CHARLES HARTSHORNE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
October 16th, 1935

THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, a class by The Director of Studies on Wednesdays at 5.45 p.m. at University Hall 14 Gordon Square WC1 in the Michaelmas and Lent Terms. The class will be resumed in the Lent Term on January 18th (omitting January 25th). Fee for the Session £1 is Terminal 12s. 6d. Members free.

The **EVENING MEETING** for the Lent Term of the Session will be held at University College Gower Street WC1 at 8.15 p.m. on the following dates —

Tuesday January 17th The Present Relations of Science and Religion
Professor C D Broad

Tuesday February 14th The Permanent Significance of Hume's Philosophy
Professor H H Price

Tuesday, March 14th Ethics and the Supernatural The Very Rev
W R Matthews KCVO DD B Litt, Dean of St Paul's

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THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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THE PRESENT RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION^{*}

PROFESSOR C D BROAD

FIFTY or sixty years ago anyone fluttering the pages of one of the many magazines which then catered for the cultivated and intelligent English reader would have been fairly certain to come upon an article bearing somewhat the same title as that of the present paper. The author would probably be an eminent scientist, such as Huxley or Clifford, a distinguished scholar, such as Frederic Harrison or Edmund Gurney, or a politician of cabinet rank, such as Gladstone or Morley. Whichever side he might take, he would write with the moral fervour of which Englishmen at that time had an inexhaustible supply. Nowadays the so-called "conflict between Religion and Science," which was then appetizingly hot from the oven, has acquired something of the repulsiveness of half-cold mutton in half-congealed gravy. There seems to be a widespread opinion that Sir Arthur Eddington and Sir James Jeans, with some highly technical and not readily intelligible assistance from Professor Whitehead, have enabled the lion to lie down with the lamb. Well, I have no wish to pipe a discordant note in this scene of Messianic harmony. But I cannot help reflecting that psychology, anthropology, and psychical research have made considerable advances as well as mathematical physics, and that they seem *prima facie* much more likely to be relevant to religion. Even the ordinary common sense of the lawyer and the historian may still have something useful to say on such topics. So, at the risk of being thought a profane disturber

^{*} A selection from this was given as a lecture to the British Institute of Philosophy, on Tuesday, January 17, 1939.

of the peace, I propose to raise once more the old questions, and to ask what bearing, if any, recent scientific developments have on the validity of religious beliefs

In considering such beliefs I shall devote my attention mainly to Christianity, since this is the religion in which most of us were brought up, and is the only one with which most of us have any first-hand acquaintance I fear that there may be some degree of unfairness in this For there are certain peculiarities about Christianity which make it vulnerable to attacks that might be harmless to some of the other great religions, such as Buddhism, or to religion in general I will therefore begin by mentioning the most striking of these peculiarities

(i) The first and most important peculiarity of Christianity is that it is, to an unique degree, a doctrine about its own Founder Some religions, e.g. Brahmanism, do not claim to have any definite historical founder Others, such as Buddhism in its original form and Confucianism, which trace their origin to a certain ostensibly historical person, claim no more for their founder than that he was an exceptionally wise and good man who first discovered and promulgated certain important moral and philosophical truths, and illustrated his doctrine by the special sanctity of his life Others, again, such as Judaism and Mahometanism, would claim more than this for their founders Moses and Mahomet are supposed to have been the recipients of special revelations from God This, it is alleged, enabled them to know facts about God's nature and His commands to humanity which no amount of reflection on the data of ordinary experience would have disclosed to even the wisest and the best of men But Judaism and Mahometanism would claim no more than this for Moses and for Mahomet respectively These prophets are regarded as ordinary men who were extraordinarily favoured by God, not as supernatural beings occupying a uniquely important position in the universe Now it is an essential part of Christian doctrine that, whilst it claims for the man Jesus all that Judaism claims for Moses or Mahometanism for Mahomet, it also claims something else which is different in kind and not in degree

I have not been so fortunate as to meet with any account of the details of this doctrine about Jesus which I could fully understand But, for the present purpose, a rough outline will be enough; and it may be given in the following propositions (i) There is a single eternal and supernatural existent on which everything else that exists depends one-sidedly both for its origin and its continuance This may be called "the Godhead" (ii) Within the unity of the "Godhead" there are three and only three most intimately interrelated "factors" or "moments," each of which can properly be called God (iii) A certain two of these factors in the Godhead stand in a

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peculiar kind of asymmetrical dyadic relationship, which is least imperfectly adumbrated by the analogy of fatherhood and sonship. In respect of this, one of them is called "God the Father" and the other is called "God the Son." The third factor in the Godhead is related to both the others by another kind of asymmetrical dyadic relation. This is denoted by the phrase "proceeding from," and the factor in question is called "God the Holy Ghost" (iv). There is some uniquely intimate relation between that eternal factor in the Godhead called "God the Son" and a certain man Jesus who was born at the village of Bethlehem during the reign of Augustus. This relation is such that it is appropriate to say of Jesus (and of no other man) that He was divine as well as human, and to say of God the Son (and of no other factor in the Godhead) that He is eternally human as well as divine. (I must confess that I can think of no interpretation of these statements which would enable me to attach a meaning to them.) (v). The birth of Jesus was miraculous, in so far as He had no human father. His mother was caused to conceive Him through the direct agency of the third factor in the Godhead, viz., the Holy Ghost. (vi). After preaching, and collecting a body of disciples, Jesus was eventually crucified by the Jewish ecclesiastical authorities at Jerusalem. He died on the cross and was buried, but His body never suffered decay. On the contrary, at some period during His burial it underwent a miraculous change in consequence of which it ceased to be subject to the physical and physiological limitations of the ordinary human organism. He emerged from His tomb, which was found empty and open, although it had been carefully guarded, and for a period of forty days He appeared from time to time, visibly, tangibly, and audibly, to certain groups of His disciples. The circumstances of some of these manifestations were such that no ordinary living man could have appeared and disappeared in the way in which Jesus is alleged to have done. (vii). After the expiry of a certain time these manifestations ceased, and Jesus is said to have ascended to His Father in heaven. Since this statement can hardly be admitted to be intelligible if taken in a literal spatial sense, it may perhaps be interpreted as follows. At the end of this period God the Son resumed a relationship with God the Father which had been suspended during the earthly life of Jesus, and He suspended or modified a relationship to the material world which He had entered into at the conception of Jesus. (I do not pretend to understand what could be meant by changes in the relationship of an eternal being either to another eternal being or to the temporal order of nature.) (ix). Henceforth Jesus guides and influences individual Christians and Christian communities by insensible means. He will continue to do this until the Day of Judgment, when He will reappear physically and sensibly, will allot fitting rewards and punishments to the

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whole human race, and bring the present order of nature for ever to an end

(2) The second peculiarity of Christianity is that it took over without question the Jewish sacred scriptures; that Jesus Himself appears to have accepted them, and that apostles, such as St Paul, whose writings are held to be inspired by the Holy Ghost, used certain statements in them as premises for the exposition and development of Christian doctrines. Now these scriptures contain an elaborate cosmogonical scheme purporting to describe the creation of the world, of animals, and of man. They profess to account for the origin and propagation of moral and physical evil by the disobedience of our first parents to God's commands at the instigation of an evil supernatural created being. It is an essential part of the Christian doctrine that mankind was thus alienated from God, rendered incapable of amending themselves *proprio motu*, and justly liable to be eternally punished. It is also an essential part of that religion that the incarnation of the Son of God in the man Jesus, and the life, death, and resurrection of the latter, rendered it possible (though not inevitable) for men to reconcile themselves with God, to amend their lives, and to attain eternal happiness. I think it is fair to say that there is no general agreement among Christians as to the precise way in which this cause renders this effect possible, and that there are profound differences of opinion about the part played by the voluntary co-operation of men, which is admitted to be, in some sense, a necessary condition of their salvation.

(3) There is a third peculiarity of Christianity which is closely connected with the first. The Christian scriptures and traditions like those of most religions, contain accounts of ostensibly supernatural events. Now these reported miracles fall into two very different classes, viz. those which are part of the *content* of Christianity, and those which are, at most, part of the *evidence for* Christianity. It is an essential part of Christian doctrine that Jesus survived the crucifixion, and in some sense emerged from the tomb with a transformed body. Any ground for doubting or denying this is *ipso facto* a ground for doubting or denying a part of Christian doctrine. But it is no part of Christian doctrine that Jesus raised Lazarus from the dead or walked on the water without sinking. If every one of the latter miracles were rejected, this would not directly involve the rejection of a single Christian doctrine, though it might weaken the force of one line of argument for accepting Christian doctrines. Now the miracles of most religions fall entirely into the second class, i.e. they are, at most, evidential and not constitutive.

I hope that I have now indicated adequately and fairly the main peculiarities of Christianity. We can now ask ourselves how far, if

at all, the various sciences are relevant to the truth of that religion. I must begin by mentioning an elementary logical distinction which is often overlooked. It is one thing to say of a fact that it conflicts with a certain theory. It is quite another thing to say of the same fact that it undermines the grounds on which people hold that theory. It is quite possible that the former statement should be false and the latter true. If that were so, the theory would not have been refuted and would not even have been shown to be intrinsically improbable, but we should have shown that those who accept it have no valid reason for doing so. Thus our question divides into two: (1) Do the generally accepted methods and results of the various sciences conflict with Christian doctrines, i.e. are they either logically incompatible with those doctrines or such as to render them extremely unlikely to be true? (2) Do they undermine the only grounds which people have ever had for believing Christian doctrines? We will now take these two questions in turn.

(1) The doctrines peculiar to Christianity may be divided into two classes, viz. those which are *about* Christ and those which, though taught by Him or inferrible from His teachings, are not about Himself. I have already enumerated the former doctrines. As examples of the latter we may take the ethical doctrines enunciated in the Sermon on the Mount.

Now it is quite clear that none of the empirical sciences has or could have any logical bearing on a great deal of the Christian doctrine about Jesus. It is absurd to suppose that empirical science could prove or disprove, make probable or improbable, the doctrine of the existence and triune structure of the Godhead and of the uniquely intimate connection between one of its differentiations and the man Jesus. The fundamental question is whether any part of this doctrine is intelligible, or whether it is nothing but meaningless verbiage masquerading in the grammatical form of intelligible sentences. Obviously that question cannot be answered by appealing to the methods or results of natural science. If any part of the doctrine be intelligible the second question is whether it is true or false, antecedently probable or improbable. Now natural science is concerned with the interconnections between things or events in space and time, and it is specially concerned to discover *uniformities* of co-existence and sequence among *classes* of phenomena, and to collect these, so far as may be, into a deductive system with a minimum of first principles. Therefore the question whether nature as a whole system depends on a timeless non-natural existent, and whether a certain *one* man once in the whole course of history was related in an absolutely *unique* way to the latter, evidently falls altogether outside the sphere of natural science. Either these questions are meaningless or they are not, and it is for philosophers, not

scientists, to settle this preliminary question. If they are meaningless, conflict between science and Christian theology is impossible for the reason which prevents a lion from fighting with a hippogriff. If they are significant, such conflict is impossible for the reason which prevents a lion from fighting with a whale. And similar remarks apply to co-operation.

It would seem, however, that natural science might have a considerable bearing on the miraculous element which forms, as we have seen, an essential part of the content of Christian doctrine. This includes, undoubtedly, the resurrection of Jesus and his subsequent super-normal physical manifestations to His disciples. Whether it also includes the story of His super-normal conception is a doubtful matter which we may leave to experts. I think that here we are at once faced with the general question: "Do the results of science make the occurrence of super-normal events impossible or highly improbable?" This question concerns other religions as well as Christianity, and it concerns alleged Christian miracles which are cited only as evidence for Christianity as well as those which are part of the content of Christian doctrine. Unless science has something to say against the possibility or probability of miracles as such, it can have nothing special to say against the possibility of those miracles whose occurrence is part of the content of Christianity. So it will be best to defer this question.

The sciences of geology, biology, archaeology, and anthropology have collected evidence which, in the opinion of every one competent to judge conclusively, refutes the cosmogonical, biological, and anthropological doctrines of the Jewish scriptures. Though these doctrines are not in themselves essential parts of Christian theology, they are almost inextricably intertwined with others which are, e.g. with the doctrine that mankind is tainted and alienated from God, and that the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus were necessary conditions without which no man could be saved. Moreover, the fact that these false propositions were, to all appearance, accepted literally by Jesus and made the basis of certain parts of His teaching would seem *prima facie* to throw some doubt on the Christian doctrine of His divine nature.

The only other point to be noticed under the present heading is that Christianity plainly presupposes that human beings survive the death of their present bodies and are, in fact, immortal. Since this doctrine is common to many religions, and is perhaps a necessary condition of any religion, we will defer the fundamental question whether science has anything relevant to say for or against it. For the present it will suffice to remark that, unless science renders the doctrine of an after-life, as such, impossible or highly improbable, it will hardly affect the probability or improbability of the specifically

Christian form of that doctrine. It is true that there are no empirical facts or scientific theories which would suggest that the present order of nature will be suddenly, radically, and permanently transformed at some date in the future. But it is no part of the Christian doctrine to assert that such a transformation will be due to the automatic development of natural processes. On the contrary, the Christian alleges that it will be due to the miraculous intervention of the Godhead. Therefore, unless science invalidates the other parts of Christian theology or renders survival and miraculous interventions unlikely or impossible, it has no relevant objection to make against specifically Christian eschatology.

It remains to consider whether science could render those parts of Christian doctrine which are not about Jesus and the Godhead improbable or impossible. For this purpose we may confine our attention to the ethical teachings of Jesus. Some people would hold that science makes complete determinism certain or extremely probable, and that if men's actions be completely determined, the notions of moral good and evil and moral obligation can have no application. Some people would hold that anthropological and psychological investigations show that sentences in which ethical words and phrases occur merely express non-moral desires and emotions, repressed in the infancy of the individual or inherited from the pre-history of the race. We might describe either of these views as a form of "ethical nihilism" based on science. Now the question whether science proves or strongly supports ethical nihilism is absolutely fundamental, and goes far beyond the relation of science to Christianity. We will therefore defer it for the present and content ourselves with the following conditional statement. *If* we have any moral obligations, then natural science can throw no light whatever on those of them which are *fundamental*. At most it might support or refute certain derivative and secondary moral rules which profess to tell us how to carry out our fundamental obligations in certain specified kinds of situation. No conceivable development of any of the natural sciences could be relevant to the question whether a person ought or ought not to love his neighbour as himself. At most it might show that some secondary rule, such as "You ought to pour oil and wine into the wounds of persons whom you find lying injured by the wayside," should be rejected because it is not an efficient means of doing good to your neighbour in the circumstances supposed. Now most of the ethical teachings of Jesus express primary or fundamental obligations. Either science shows that *all* talk of moral obligation is meaningless or inapplicable to men, or, if not, it is completely irrelevant to this part of Christian doctrine.

It should now be fairly clear that there are not many points at

which the results of science and the doctrines peculiar to Christianity come into close enough contact for either conflict or co-operation between them to be possible I think that similar reasoning would lead to a similar conclusion about the doctrines peculiar to any of the other great religions. If there is conflict, it will be over doctrines like the occurrence of miracles, the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, and the question whether moral predicates are significant and applicable to men and their actions. These doctrines are common to all, or nearly all, religions, and they are peculiar to none.

(2) We can now pass to our second question. Do the methods or results of the natural or the historical sciences undermine the grounds on which men have believed the doctrines of Christianity?

It seems to me that there is a fundamental logical difficulty, which is prior to any special objections that might be made to the evidences for Christianity on the score of literary and historical criticism or the comparative study of religions. It is this. I think it would be admitted by most Christians that an essential part of their reason for believing specifically Christian doctrines is that these were directly taught by Jesus or are necessary or probable consequences of other statements which He made. But this at once raises the question: "On what grounds do you accept Jesus as an authority on these matters?" I suppose that the answer would be "Because He was a being of superhuman wisdom and goodness, who was in a position to know the facts and whose mission on earth was to reveal them to men." But this is itself the most central and fundamental of Christian doctrines and, if Christians accept it on the ground that Jesus asserted it or other things which imply it, their whole position is logically circular.

Are there any independent grounds for accepting it? So far as I am aware, the only grounds that have been suggested are the following. Jesus wrought miracles in His lifetime, and was Himself the subject of the stupendous miracle of the resurrection after His death. He produced on those who knew Him so strong an impression of His divine nature and mission that many of them were ready to devote their lives and to meet a painful death in preaching His doctrines. St. Paul, who had never met Jesus and was bitterly and actively hostile to Christianity, underwent an experience which he took to be a manifestation of the risen Christ, he was converted thereby and confirmed in his new beliefs by subsequent supernatural experiences, and he spent the rest of his life in developing Christian doctrine and disseminating it throughout the Roman empire. Lastly, throughout history many people have found that certain Christian doctrines harmonize with their own deepest convictions, they have been willing to live and die for them, and

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they have had experiences which seemed to themselves to be evidence for the continued existence of Jesus and for His personal intercourse with them

Let us begin by giving the fullest weight to this evidence and raising no questions as to whether there is adequate ground for believing that the alleged miracles really happened. At the very utmost it would show only that Jesus was an extremely remarkable and impressive personality, that a whole cluster of noteworthy super-normal phenomena, both psychical and physical, were initiated by His death and continued for some time afterwards in the regions in which He had preached, that certain parts of His teaching harmonized with certain deep-seated feelings and aspirations which the existing philosophies and religions of the Roman empire failed to stir or to satisfy and that subsequently, when Christian institutions had been established and children were brought up in Christian tradition and doctrine these teachings (developed, interpreted, supplemented, and modified almost out of recognition) continued to express the aspirations and to evoke the devoted loyalty of many good men.

I can see nothing in all this to justify the doctrine that Jesus occupied that uniquely exalted position in the universe which Christians assign to Him. Therefore it seems to me (as it has seemed to almost everyone *not* brought up in the Christian tradition) unreasonable to allege the mere *ipse dixit* of Jesus as an adequate ground for accepting otherwise unverifiable propositions about the Godhead, about His own relations to it, and about the supernatural origin and post mundane continuance of the human race. I should hold, then, that the only reasons which have been alleged for accepting the doctrines peculiar to Christianity are invalidated by these general objections, prior to all appeal to the methods and results of natural or historical science. Similar remarks would apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to any other religion which grounds its specific doctrines on the authority of its founder or its prophets. No doubt it is true to say that the development of Christianity was a unique phenomenon, but in the only sense in which this is true, it is also true of any other great historical process taken as a whole. No single historical event, such as the growth of Communism or of National Socialism since 1918, is *precisely* analogous to the growth of the Christian Church. But we can find a number of different *partial* analogies which, taken together, suffice to bring it into line with the rest of history. Again, it is true that the survival of Christianity in its infancy and its subsequent immense development depended on certain unpredictable and antecedently most improbable events, such as the conversion of St. Paul. It is natural for Christians, afterwards, to point to these events as "providential." But a moment's reflection shows that there have been, and indeed must be, such

events in the early stages of *any* historical movement which starts from very small beginnings, is faced with strong opposition and has to compete with many rivals, and does nevertheless survive and become dominant. The innumerable germs of possible religions and politics which have perished and left no trace in history were just those in connection with which no such unlikely event happened. That is why such an event is called "providential" when it does happen and is viewed in retrospect.

Before leaving this part of the subject, I must very briefly consider the following contention, which is sometimes made by Christians. "If and only if," it is said, "you will consent to act as if Christianity were true and will take part uncritically in the corporate life of a Christian church, you will eventually have certain experiences which are in fact evidence for the truth of Christianity, and you will be in the right state of mind to appreciate their cogency." Now it is just conceivable that this contention might be true. But it is evident that there would be other, and considerably more plausible, psychological explanations of the apparent facts. Moreover, a precisely similar claim might be made by the adherents of any other religion, and it is in fact made by the practitioners of the Indian systems of Yoga. Lastly, it is obviously impracticable to carry out this recommendation in connection with all the important rival religions, and it is unreasonable to pick out one of them and to perform the experiment with that one only.

So far we have supposed, for the sake of argument, that there is good evidence for the miracles recorded in the Christian scriptures. We must now examine this supposition. Here again we can go a long way with the help of ordinary logic and common sense without needing to appeal to the special methods and results of the sciences. Let us grant for the present that miracles are not impossible, and that it is not inconceivable that there should be evidence available of such strength that it would be unreasonable to doubt that a certain alleged event did happen and was miraculous. Then I assert, without the slightest fear of contradiction from anyone who has studied the records, that there is no direct evidence for any of the New Testament miracles which is comparable in weight to the evidence for some of the alleged miracles of modern mediumship. For the levitation and other super-normal physical phenomena of D. D. Home we have the contemporary autographic testimony of Sir William Crookes, one of the ablest experimental scientists of the nineteenth century, who was deliberately investigating the phenomena in his own laboratory under controlled conditions. It would be merely impudent to suggest that the direct evidence for the resurrection or the ascension, available to us here and now, is comparable with this.

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Now either a Christian apologist accepts these alleged mediumistic miracles or he rejects them. If he accepts them, he acts consistently, and moreover he can use them to show that the New Testament miracles are not altogether without parallel, and therefore not antecedently so improbable as sceptics allege. But, if he does so, he must give up the contention that the New Testament miracles testify by their uniqueness to the unique status of Christ and the complete reliability of His metaphysical and ethical teachings. If he rejects them, he can continue to hold that the New Testament miracles are unique. But now he must justify himself in accepting on very weak direct evidence, antecedently improbable stories similar to those which he rejects where the direct evidence is extremely strong. So far as I can see, there are two and only two moves open to him at this point. The first is to allege that it is antecedently very improbable that miracles should happen in connection with a decidedly second rate human being, like D. D. Home, whilst it is antecedently quite likely that they should happen in connection with a divine being such as Jesus was. So weaker evidence will prove in the latter case what even the strongest evidence cannot prove in the former. To this contention the simple and sufficient answer is that anyone who uses it cannot, without logical circularity, adduce the New Testament miracles as evidence for the divine nature and mission of Jesus, since he assumes the latter as part of his ground for accepting the former on the evidence available.

The other possible move is as follows. It might be said that, although the *direct* evidence available to us for the resurrection and the subsequent appearances of Jesus is incomparably weaker than the direct evidence for certain mediumistic miracles, yet the *indirect* evidence is overwhelming. The indirect evidence would be such facts as the change in the attitude of the apostles from despair to an active and lifelong conviction of Christ's survival, the conversion of St. Paul, and so on. I am certainly not inclined to underrate the force of this contention, for these changes seem well attested and very remarkable, and they do demand some kind of explanation. But the utmost that can be inferred is that *something* very queer must have happened soon after the crucifixion, which led certain of the disciples and St. Paul to believe that Jesus had survived in some supernatural way, and that they were able to transfer this conviction to many others. The following remarks may be made about this.

(a) I hold that the careful work of the Society for Psychical Research has made it almost certain that there is a residuum of truth in the many accounts of phantasms of the living at crises in their lives, of the dying, and of the recently dead, being "seen" by educated Englishmen who were awake and in normal bodily and mental health at the time. I assume that such experiences are

initiated by some kind of telepathic "impact" received from the person whose phantasm is "seen", that this sets up a subconscious process in the mind of the recipient, analogous perhaps to that which takes place in post-hypnotic suggestion, and that eventually this ends by producing a sensory hallucination relevant in its details to the circumstances of the person from whom the telepathic impulse originated. Now I should think it quite likely that Jesus, who was plainly a very remarkable personality, might be strongly gifted with the power to send out such telepathic impulses at the great crises of his life and perhaps at other times too. But this would not be any good ground for attaching implicit belief to all His ethical and metaphysical teachings. I should not be at all surprised, e.g., to find that Herr Hitler had this power. But, if he has, I should not *ipso facto* accept without question all those racial and political theories which he has preached with such intense conviction and applied with such conspicuous success.

(ii) However this may be, it is plain that a telepathic impact, once received, would be much more likely to develop into a full-blown sensory hallucination in the minds of men like the disciples than in a contemporary educated Englishman. With the latter any such development has to overcome extremely strong inhibitions, since the final product would be utterly alien to the whole "climate" of scientific materialism in which he has always lived and thought. Therefore I should expect that telepathically initiated sensory hallucinations, such as the S.P.R. have studied, would be far commoner and far more detailed and impressive among persons like the disciples than among contemporary educated Europeans.

(iii) A "tough-minded" scientist, who rejects without question all the alleged evidence for contemporary super-normal phenomena, might find it difficult to deal with the indirect evidence for the resurrection and the subsequent appearances of Jesus, if he ever fairly faced it. Actually, of course, he adopts the attitude of the ostrich and faces *neither* problem. But even he could claim with justice that there might well have been some quite simple and honest mistake, or some deliberate malpractice or deception on the part of some interested person or group, in connection with the body of Jesus, and that no direct evidence for it remains. Any particular theory of this kind will, no doubt, seem highly gratuitous and unlikely. But, after all, none of them can be so improbable antecedently as the theory that Jesus really rose from the dead, unless we assume what we have to prove, viz. that He was a divine being. And we must remember that, whilst *each one* of a number of alternative theories may be antecedently very improbable, it may be highly probable that *one or other* of them is true in view of the facts to be explained.

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I should claim now to have disposed of all the alleged grounds for accepting specifically Christian doctrines, by the use of quite simple arguments without needing to appeal to modern science at all. I think we can safely assume that no appeal to science will *reverse* our decision, though it might reinforce it. It is also safe to say that we could have used similar arguments to show that there are no grounds for accepting the specific doctrines of any rival religion which relies on the authority of its founder or its prophets as the evidence for its teachings. I shall therefore devote the rest of my paper to certain wider questions, which we have hitherto set aside as being relevant to all or most religions, and not only or specially to Christianity. I will now take them in order.

(1) Has science anything to say for or against the possibility or the probability of miracles? Before we can answer this we must try to explain the term 'miracle' or "super normal event". This is not easy to do, but I think that the following method of treatment is fairly satisfactory. There are certain very general principles, mostly of a negative or restrictive kind, about mind and matter and their mutual relations which we all commonly assume without question. These form the rigid framework within which all our everyday practice, our scientific theories and even our ordinary fictions and speculations are confined. The following are some of the most important of these principles: (i) A body cannot enter or leave a closed vessel so long as the walls are intact. (ii) The weight of an object at the earth's surface cannot be altered except by immersing it in fluids of various densities. (iii) A human mind cannot *directly* initiate or modify the motion of any material thing except certain parts of its own organism, such as its arms and legs. (iv) It is impossible for a person to perceive any thing or event at a given moment unless this object has set up a physical process which affects the percipient's organism at this moment and produces characteristic sensations in his mind. (v) It is impossible for a person to have knowledge of a past event, except by inference or report, unless one or other of the following conditions is fulfilled: (a) The past event initiated a physical process which was transmitted with a finite velocity through space and has now reached the observer's organism and produced a characteristic sensation in his mind. Or (b) the past event was either an experience had by this person, or was the object of such an experience. The first condition is fulfilled in the case of a man perceiving an event which happened long ago in a remote star. The second condition is fulfilled in ordinary memory of past events. (vi) It is impossible for a person to have non-inferential knowledge of an event which has not yet happened. If he knows beforehand that such and such an event will happen, he must do so either by inferring this himself from his knowledge of

general laws and particular facts about the past and the present, or by accepting the results of such an inference made and recorded by another person. Examples are provided by the two cases of an astronomer, and a student of the Nautical Almanac, knowing that a total eclipse of the sun will happen at a certain future date (vii) It is impossible for one man *A* to know what experiences another man *B* is having, or what propositions *B* knows or believes unless one or other of the following conditions is fulfilled (a) *B* makes a statement in speech or writing or some other form of conventional symbolism, and *A* perceives the record and is able to understand and interpret it. Or (b) *A* perceives *B*'s gestures, facial expressions, interjections, etc., and draws inferences from them and from his knowledge of the general laws of human behaviour as to what is happening in *B*'s mind (viii) After a person has died, his mind either ceases to exist, or, at any rate, ceases to be capable of affecting, inanimate matter or the bodies or minds of living men and animals.

I would not claim that this list of eight restrictive principles is exhaustive or that they are all independent of each other. But I think it is good enough for our present purpose, which, it will be remembered, is to explain what is meant by "super-normal" or "miraculous." By an "ostensible miracle" I mean any event which *seems* to conflict with one or more of these principles, whether it does so in fact or not. By a "miracle" I mean an event which *really* does conflict with one or more of them. Phenomena which appear to conflict with well established laws of nature, or which cannot be explained in terms of them, but which do not apparently conflict with any of these restrictive principles, may be called "abnormal" but they will not be even ostensibly super-normal or miraculous.

Evidently there are always two questions to be asked about any account of an ostensible miracle. (i) Did such an event as is reported really happen, and is the description of it which the witnesses give completely accurate so far as it goes? (ii) If so, is it really miraculous? Does it really conflict with any of the restrictive principles which mark off the realm of normal and abnormal phenomena from that of super normal phenomena? Could it not be accounted for without going outside these limits?

About the first question two of the sciences, both of fairly recent origin, have something very important to say. These are Abnormal Psychology and Psychical Research. It had always been known that human testimony is somewhat unreliable, and that human observation is somewhat defective as regards the details of perceived things and events. But no one had suspected how extremely unreliable they are, even under quite favourable conditions, until the S.P.R. investigated the matter experimentally. The classical paper on this subject is by Mr. S. J. Davey in Vol. IV of the Society's *Proceedings*.

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The extent to which intelligent and educated persons, who were under no emotional stress, erred, both by omission and by supplementation, in their reports of what they had seen, is almost incredible, but Mr Davey's results have been fully confirmed by later experiments. The contribution of abnormal psychology and psycho-analysis is to show that the real causes of much human action are hidden from the agent's introspection, and are concealed rather than revealed by his overt speech and action. We know that these causes often produce an inability to perceive or to remember or to report certain facts which were physically and physiologically well within the witness's field of observation.

In regard to the second question the most important points to be made are the following (i) We may dismiss at once, with the contempt which it deserves, the statement that 'Science proves miracles to be impossible.' This is just ignorant bluff and bluster, which a moment's reflection on our definition of 'miracle' and the nature of inductive evidence suffices to deflate. (ii) The development of physical science has shown that many events which were ostensibly miraculous are capable of a normal explanation. The growth of our knowledge of hypnotism, of multiple and alternating personality and of the extreme sensory hyperaesthesia which characterizes certain hypnotic and hysterical states tends in the same direction. (iii) The facts and theories of psycho-analysis already mentioned above, very much weaken the force of such familiar arguments as the following: 'This act must have been miraculous unless the agent was deliberately cheating. But it is incredible that a man of his high character, with absolutely nothing to gain by cheating, and much to lose if detected in fraud, should have practised deliberate deception. Therefore it must be miraculous.' (iv) In spite of all this, I must express my conviction that psychical research has made it far more probable than not that certain kinds of phenomena which are miraculous in the sense defined above, do in fact occur. I include under this heading telepathy (both experimental and sporadic), certain of the *mental* phenomena of mediumship, and precognition. I should not as at present advised, include with confidence any of the ostensibly super-normal *physical* phenomena of mediumship. It remains to note that, if these super-normal phenomena should ever become familiar and be found to fall under general laws, we should eventually reject the restrictive principles with which they conflict and should then cease to call them "miraculous" or "super normal."

(2) This naturally leads to our next question. Has science anything to say for or against the possibility or the probability of a person's mind in some sense surviving the death of his body? I will begin by remarking that, in my opinion, it is almost a *sine qua non* of any religious view of the world that some men at least should

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survive bodily death I take it that one minimal demand of religion is that what we count to be the highest spiritual values shall not be merely ephemeral by-products of complicated material conditions which are fulfilled only occasionally in odd holes and corners of the universe, and are unstable and transitory when fulfilled. Another minimal demand is that there shall be at least rough justice, e.g. that evil deeds shall in the long run bring evil consequences on the doer of them, and not wholly or mainly on others. I do not see how either of these demands could be even approximately met if no man survives the death of his body. For, if this be so, not only does all the value which depends on the character and dispositions and the personal relationships of an individual vanish at his death, but also human society must eventually come to an end, and with it must perish all the values stored up in social institutions, works of art, and scientific treatises. Moreover, it is a commonplace that wicked men often die before they have brought on themselves either bodily suffering or remorse, or the disintegration of their characters or intellects, whilst wise and good men are often stricken down at the height of their powers, or survive into an old age of disease and dotage. Therefore, if science does make human survival impossible or very improbable it does, in my opinion, deliver a fatal blow to *all* religion.

Now, with the doubtful exception of psychical research, none of the sciences tells us anything which lends the least probability to human survival. On the contrary, all that biology teaches of the detailed affinity of ourselves with the other animals, and all that physiology and anatomy tell us of the intimate connection between lesions of the brain and nervous system and aberrations or obliterations of consciousness, produce an overwhelming impression of the one-sided dependence of mental life on certain very specialized and delicate material structures and processes.

As a professional philosopher, I am, of course, perfectly well aware that these scientific facts do not constitute a "knock-down" disproof of survival. If there were any positive grounds for believing in survival, it would be easy enough to devise hypotheses to reconcile it with the biological and physiological facts which seem to make it so unlikely. I am also well aware that there are philosophical arguments against accepting the one-sided dependence of mind on body as an ultimate truth. (I have dealt with these in various parts of my published writings, and I do not find them very impressive.) In my opinion there is literally nothing but a few pinches of philosophical fluff to be put in the opposite scale to this vast coherent mass of ascertained facts, unless empirical evidence from psychical research should be available.

Do the findings of psychical research up to date do anything

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serious to redress the balance? Here we must distinguish between direct evidence for survival, and evidence which tends in the first instance only to throw doubt on the epiphenomenalist view of the relation of mind and body. As regards the direct evidence, there certainly exists a considerable amount of mediumistic communication which undoubtedly involves super-normal knowledge, and is in some respects strongly suggestive of the posthumous intelligent action of certain definite human beings, such as Edmund Gurney, Dr Verrall, and others. Yet even this is so incoherent and repetitive, and so full of surprising ignorance and error, that one feels driven to seek some other super-normal explanation of it. Moreover, the contents of the communications give us no help in the frightfully difficult task of forming any plausible positive conception of life after the death of the present body.

This brings us to the second kind of evidence. If the occurrence of telepathy, clairvoyance, and precognition were established, this would have no *direct* bearing on the question of human survival. But it would have the following indirect relevance. It would tend to throw doubt on the adequacy of the theory (which all other known facts seem to support so strongly) that the human mind is one-sidedly and completely dependent on the brain and nervous system both for its existence and for every detail of its actions. Now it is this apparently well-established fact which makes the hypothesis of human survival antecedently so incredible. On the other hand, the establishment of telepathy, etc., would also work, for a different reason, in the opposite direction. For, if we grant these powers to ordinary men during their lifetime, we may be able to explain by means of them the mediumistic communications which constitute the only direct evidence for survival.

My conclusion is that, for this essential doctrine of religion, psychical research is the *only* possible gift horse in the field of the sciences, and that even it is quite likely to prove to be a Trojan horse. In spite of the ambiguous character of the animal I should hesitate, if I were a religious man, to look it quite so superciliously in the mouth as the leaders of religion habitually do.

Before leaving the subject of human survival I must touch very briefly on the following point. Christians often allege that the resurrection of Jesus constitutes evidence for human survival, that, without this evidence, the doctrine would be a mere pious aspiration, but that, with it, human survival becomes an established fact. This is a favourite theme of Easter-day sermons. Now, if I may say so without offence, this seems to me to be one of the world's worst arguments. Let us grant, what is at best questionable, that the resurrection really happened as described. Even so, the case of Jesus would differ from that of any ordinary man in at least two quite

fundamental respects. In the first place, if Christianity be true, though Jesus was human, he was *also* divine. No other human being resembles him in this respect. Secondly, the body of Jesus did not decay in the tomb, but was transformed, whilst the body of every ordinary man rots and disintegrates soon after his death. Therefore, if men do survive the death of their bodies, the process must be utterly unlike that which took place when Jesus survived His death on the cross. Thus the analogy breaks down in every relevant respect, and so an argument from the resurrection of Jesus to the survival of bodily death by ordinary men is utterly worthless.

(3) I have now taken in turn two general doctrines, viz the possibility of miracles and human survival, one of which is vital to Christianity, and the other perhaps to all religions, and I have considered the bearing of science on each of them. In this, the concluding section of my paper, I find it convenient to proceed as follows. I propose to take certain of the sciences, to state how they have been relevant to religion in the past, and to consider whether (and, if so how) their effect has been modified recently or is likely to be modified in future. Before doing so I will make two remarks. (i) The influence of a scientific discovery or theory on a religion can hardly ever be put in the form of a definite argument which can be tested by the criteria of formal logic or probability-theory. It may not refute the religion, but it may make one's whole intellectual and emotional background so utterly different from that in which the religion originated and flourished that it becomes psychologically impossible for one to take the religion seriously. The religious beliefs of the ancient Greeks have never been refuted, and I do not see how they possibly could be. But no one would think it worth while nowadays even to raise the question whether there are beings answering to the description of Zeus or of Hera given in classical writings. (ii) In the case of any religion which is still alive, such as Christianity in contemporary England, the effect of such influences as I have been describing varies enormously from person to person even among those of much the same level of intelligence and culture. Moreover, those who are differently influenced now will, for that reason, be liable to make very different estimates as to the influence which the sciences are likely to exercise on religion in the future. Where this element of subjectivity is greatest I intend to make it quite explicit by talking in the first person and stating how *I* am affected and what *I* should anticipate. Such statements need not be of merely biographical interest, for they might happen to make explicit what many of my contemporaries are vaguely feeling. If and only if this is so, they are not wholly impertinent.

For our present purpose we may divide the sciences into three groups, viz (i) the sciences of ostensibly non-living matter, (ii) the

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biological sciences, and (m) the sciences which deal with specifically human topics. This classification is hierarchical, in the sense that the second group presupposes the first, and that the third presupposes the second. In the first group the most important for our purposes are astronomy and physics. In the third group the most important are history and archaeology and anthropology; psychology, normal and abnormal, and psychical research.

I will begin with astronomy. Any religion which can be taken seriously by intelligent men must be cosmic and not merely parochial. As men we shall necessarily be most concerned with that part of the divine system which immediately affects our race and our planet; and, if we believe that a religion has been revealed to men, we may reasonably expect that the revelation will be most explicit about that part of the system which most concerns ourselves, and which we could not have discovered by our own unaided efforts. Nevertheless, it is essential to any religion on the grand scale that what immediately concerns us should not be something isolated and self-contained, but should be an integral part of a wider system which covers the whole universe. Now Christianity, like all the great religions, claims to be cosmic in range. But it is also to a very marked extent geocentric and anthropocentric. Christ came to *earth*, he became a *man*, and eventually he went back and *ascended* to His Father in heaven. Now, as it seems to me, Christianity contrived to be at once geocentric and cosmic only because it originated and evolved against a background of astronomical theory in which the earth was the centre of the universe. This would naturally be assumed without question as a popular belief by the apostles and all the early Christians, and, in the detailed scientific form of the Ptolemaic system, it is explicitly taken by the great medieval theologians as the material setting of the divine drama. It seems to me to be assumed by Christ Himself, and some of His statements which are perfectly sensible on that assumption, seem to be pointless on any other hypothesis.

Now, since the eighteenth century we have known that the earth is one of a number of planets at various stages of development circulating about one of a number of suns. Naturally I am not so silly as to suppose that this constitutes a *refutation* of Christianity. All I can do is to record the fact that for me personally the Christian story and the Christian theology in a Copernican universe wither like a plant taken from a hothouse and bedded out in the Siberian desert. I know well that many of the greatest astronomers have found no difficulty in remaining simple and earnest Christians. I have no comment to make except that the human mind has a wonderful power of keeping different parts of its knowledge and belief in water-tight compartments. If there is anything at all in

the difficulty that I feel at this point, no progress in astronomy which has been made since Galileo and Newton and no progress that may conceivably be made in the future can make any difference.

I do not think that the revolution in astronomy need have that detrimental effect on religion in general, or on most of the other great religions which, in my opinion, it has on Christianity. It has been said that an atheistic astronomer must be mad. I am not at present concerned to dispute this. What I do wish to suggest is that a *Christian* astronomer must have a more than Nelsonian capacity for applying his blind eye to his telescope on occasion.

We may now leave astronomy and pass to physics. In my opinion the logical bearing of mathematical physics, whether of the classical or the relativistic and quantic kind, on any form of religion is quite trivial. I am inclined to think that the only real logical connection is the following. The fact that all the immense variety of inorganic natural phenomena fall under a few very general laws, and that these laws are of a comparatively simple mathematical form, seems not to be logically necessary. It looks like a kind of uncovenanted mercy, and it constitutes a certain resemblance between inorganic nature and certain products of intelligent human action, such as games of skill, puzzles, musical compositions, etc. Again, the fact that human beings have been able to discover these fundamental laws of inorganic matter, and to acquire thereby a considerable degree of practical control over it, exalts our estimate of the human mind and enlarges the gap between it and any animal mind. These two facts and their interrelation do, so far as they go, lend some support to a view of man and nature which may fairly be called "religious."

I must next mention a supposed connection between mathematical physics and religious belief which I suspect to be unreal. A distinction has been drawn between two kinds of physical law, viz. "deterministic" and "statistical." Until quite recently the fundamental laws of physics were held to be of the deterministic kind, and the statistical laws were held to be derivative. Nowadays, in the opinion of many eminent physicists, the situation has been reversed, and henceforth we must hold that the fundamental laws of physics are of the statistical kind. Now it has been alleged that, if the fundamental laws of physics are deterministic, all human volitions must be completely ineffective, i.e. that nothing in the material world would have been different if there had been no volitions, or if human beings had made different decisions. It is also alleged that, if the fundamental laws of physics are statistical, it is at least possible that some human volitions do make a difference to the course of events in the material world. Now it is plain that the ethical content of religion is closely bound up with the common-

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sense opinion that some human volitions are effective. Therefore, if the allegation which I have stated were correct, it would be true to say that the classical physics was incompatible with an essential presupposition of religion. And it would be true to say that recent developments of mathematical physics had eased, if they had not completely removed, this conflict.

I believe that this argument is full of fallacies and confusions. I have gone very fully into the question in my contribution to the symposium on *Indeterminacy and Indeterminism* in the Aristotelian Society's Supplementary Volume X. I will therefore confine myself here to the following obvious remark. If the principles of classical physics do entail that all human volitions are ineffective, they conflict with the presuppositions of natural science just as much as with those of religion. For every scientist who ever devises and carries out an experiment assumes that his thoughts and volitions are making a characteristic modification in the course of events in the material world.

It remains for me to mention a certain psychological connection which probably does exist in the minds of many people between their religious beliefs and what they have heard about recent developments in theoretical physics. The conceptions of classical physics were perfectly straightforward and easy for anyone to grasp and to picture. Mathematical knowledge was needed only for working out their detailed consequences. The concepts of relativistic and quantum physics cannot be grasped except by a person of considerable mathematical training who sees them as factors in a whole complicated context of theory. And they cannot be pictured at all. When attempts are made to express these concepts and laws in familiar language to uninstructed persons who interpret it literally, a mass of paradoxical and apparently self-contradictory verbiage results. Now in the good old days those who attacked Christianity from the standpoint of science could make great play by contrasting the plain common sense of physics with the mind-destroying hocus-pocus of theology. It can now be retorted that the principles of modern physics look as nonsensical as the Athanasian Creed, and yet are vouched for by eminent scientists and validated by practical applications which we can all use and abuse. In consequence some people are inclined to think that there may be something in the mysterious and apparently nonsensical verbiage of Christian theology after all.

Well, it is not for me to say that there may not be. But I do say, without the slightest hesitation, that the psychological cause which I have just described is no rational ground for thinking that there is. There is nothing mysterious or paradoxical or self-contradictory in the physical concepts and laws so long as they are formulated in

the symbolism which is appropriate to them and are viewed in their own proper context. The mystery and the paradox arise only when this symbolism is translated into ordinary words which have certain familiar associations, and when those words are heard or read by persons who lack the knowledge which would enable them to reject or correct the images and ideas which they naturally evoke. I do not think that any theologian would pretend that the paradoxes and apparent contradictions of Christian theology arise simply from this kind of distortion of something which can be quite clearly and intelligibly stated in an appropriate symbolism to experts who have mastered it. Be this as it may, the following reflection is surely obvious. The fact that contemporary physics has to enunciate its principles in the form of apparent paradox and nonsense may be a good reason for hesitating to reject off-hand *any* doctrine *merely* because it looks paradoxical and nonsensical when stated. But it cannot be a good reason for accepting any *one* form of apparent nonsense, e.g. the Athanasian Creed, in preference to any *other* form e.g. the Kabbalah or the Hegelian Dialectic.

We can now leave the science of inorganic matter and pass to the biological sciences. I said that Christianity was essentially geocentric and anthropocentric. We have considered its geocentric aspect in connection with astronomy, it is the anthropocentric aspect of it to which biology is relevant. Christianity arose, and Christian theology developed, in a certain context of beliefs about the relation of man to other living beings on earth. Man was created "a little lower than the angels" and he occupies a unique status in a hierarchy of living beings at the dividing point between the angels, who are purely rational beings without material organisms, and the brutes, who are perceptive and sensitive but wholly non-rational animals. I must confess that this seems to me to be still the best available description of the peculiarities of man as he now is and as he has been throughout the whole of his written history. But contemporary biology makes it practically certain that, if we go back far enough into the pre-history of the human race, we find it developing by insensible steps from ancestors who were purely animal.

Now I do not think that there need be any great difficulty in fitting religion in general, or certain of the great historical religions, such as Buddhism, into this changed biological framework. But, for my own part, I find it difficult to see how Christianity can be fitted into it without being so radically transformed as to be unrecognizable. Certainly I know of no satisfactory attempt at such a reconstruction of Christian belief, and, unless it can be accomplished, I suspect that Christianity will become less and less credible with each succeeding generation. It may survive for a long time as a kind of religiously toned "ethical uplift", but I cannot believe that this

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will persist indefinitely when cut off from its cosmological and biological roots

I have already said all that seems necessary about the bearing of abnormal psychology and psychical research on religious belief in general and on Christianity in particular. It only remains for me to add a few words about the influence of the other specifically human sciences. I think there is no doubt that, for many people, the results of the comparative study of religion, and the data supplied by anthropologists and archaeologists, make religious belief impossible. It seems to them to be a pathetic survival of certain beliefs, emotions and practices, which were natural enough in the childhood and ignorance and impotence of the human race, but have now lost all meaning and relevance. This is not quite the impression which these facts produce on myself. It seems to me that science has equally humble and disreputable origins, that there has been a development in depth and insight in religion as well as in science, and that both must be judged ultimately by their fruits rather than by their roots. On the other hand, I find that the facts of anthropology and comparative religion make any claim by any particular religion to an exclusive possession of the truth too utterly ridiculous to be worth a moment's consideration.

I have one more remark to make before ending my paper. To me the occurrence of mystical experience at all times and places, and the similarities between the statements of so many mystics all the world over, seems to be a significant fact. *Prima facie* it suggests that there is an aspect of reality with which these persons come in contact in their mystical experiences and which they afterwards strive and largely fail to describe in the language of daily life. I should say that this *prima facie* appearance of objectivity ought to be accepted at its face value unless and until some reasonably satisfactory alternative explanation of the agreement can be given. Now I am well aware that certain psychoanalysts would give one explanation of it, and that certain Marxian theorists would give another. Such explanations do satisfy some people who have studied them, and they form the staple diet of a great many more who have not done so, but have swallowed them whole in order to be in the vanguard of culture.

Now I think that each of these two types of theory contains some interesting speculations which may turn out to be true, and may cover some of the facts. But each of them seems to me to suffer very obviously from two defects. The first is that they are plainly constructed by persons who have very little first-hand or even second-hand experience of religion, and are strongly antipathetic to it from one cause or another. I should feel some hesitation in accepting theories about the nature of music and its function in

human life, excogitated by a tone-deaf psychologist whose wife had recently eloped with a musician. The psycho-analytic and the Marxian theories of religion seem to me to wear too jaundiced a complexion to inspire complete confidence. The second defect is this. Although the exponents of these theories make a tremendous parade of being "scientific," it is perfectly plain to anyone who has studied any genuine science that they have no idea of the *general* difficulty of proving any far-reaching explanatory hypothesis, or of the *special* difficulties which exist in a field where experiment is impossible, and even the "observations" consist largely of hearsay and tradition. The degree of their confidence is a measure of their scientific incompetence. They seem to have no notion of the importance of confronting their theories with negative instances, or of considering whether half a dozen rival hypotheses would not explain the facts equally well.

I have been obliged to paint the scene as I see it, and the prospects of Christianity as I see them, are somewhat gloomy unless applied science (that blind Samson) should uproot the pillars of the house and bury pure science with it in the ruins. Though I am not a Christian, and never have been one since I began to think for myself, I take no pleasure in this prospect. Whether Christianity be true or false, Christ's parable about the subsequent fate of the man who was left "swept and garnished," after the expulsion of a demon that possessed him, seems to me to be profoundly true of humanity as a whole. Ordinary human nature abhors a vacuum, and it will not for long rest content without some system of emotionally toned and unverifiable apocalyptic beliefs for which it can live and die and persecute and endure. When I contemplate Communism and Fascism, the two new religions which have entered into the clean swept place and possessed it, and when I consider the probable consequences of their sisterly bickerings, I appreciate the concluding lines of Mr. Belloc's *Cautionary Tale* about the boy who ran away from his nurse in the Zoo and was eaten by a lion. "Always keep a hold of Nurse, for fear of finding Something Worse."

ON THINGS IN THEMSELVES¹

PROFESSOR H. F. HALLETT

THE subject on which I am to address you this evening is one which, though it is of fundamental importance both for philosophy and for practice, cannot but present the gravest difficulties for such treatment as falls within the limits of this occasion. Philosophical problems are always difficult, but those of ultimate metaphysics are in this respect egregious. For the simplifications that are open to the scientific phenomenologist who can rest content with a spatio-temporal world, or to the analyst who concentrates on the objective content with which the human understanding most conspicuously concerns itself, are not open to the metaphysician. He must meet the full complexity of things, not limiting himself to their appearances as objects within human experience, nor to a reflective analysis of their objective content, but taking them as they must be in themselves in order that they may appear as they empirically and reflectively do appear for the special cognitive faculties of man. I ask, therefore, for your patience and attention as I try first of all to lead you into, and then, as I hope, out of, the metaphysical labyrinth. For what I have to describe is something of a metaphysical adventure, or, if you like, a metaphysical ghost-story, in which the ghosts assume such reality as to make the solid things "give up the ghost"—which is just as it should be in a good ghost-story!

Nothing has been more noteworthy, I think, in the history of recent and contemporary philosophy than the widespread acceptance of what have been styled 'realistic' theories, both of knowledge and of the nature of things. Subjectivistic theories have suffered total eclipse, and idealism has fallen well within the penumbra. My own philosophical development has belonged almost exactly to this "realistic" epoch, and my opinions have been uniformly of that type from the days when I came under the direct inspiration of Seth Pringle Pattison—a philosopher noted for his "realistic" criticisms of the Hegelian school, both with reference to the nature of the finite individual, and also with reference to general epistemological theory.² The persistence of this "realistic" bias in my own speculations

¹ Lecture delivered in outline at the Evening Meeting of the Institute on December 13, 1938.

² These views were put forward primarily in the three series of Balfour Lectures *Scottish Philosophy, Hegelianism and Personality* and *Realism* (the last named being first published in book form posthumously in 1933).

must be attributed to the great impression made on my callow mind by that distinguished teacher—nor was there much in the intellectualistic system of Spinoza, to which I turned for the subject-matter of my 'prentice work,¹ to lead me to modify my bent; at least not at the start. But, if I may for a moment or two continue on this personal note, nothing has impressed me more in recent years with respect to my own opinions, than the change of emphasis that I find between the present direction of my thought on fundamental issues, and what appears to have been my prevailing tendency only a few years ago, so far as I can recover that from my published writings. I am not conscious of any sudden conviction of error, or change of course, but only of an increasing enlightenment (which I fear some of my friends will name the reverse), a loosening of intellectual bonds, that has focused and clarified some of the great issues.²

As to the source of this change of outlook, I make no doubt that somewhere is to be found the influence of that transcendent genius among philosophers, Immanuel Kant, for I find myself thinking more often and more fruitfully of his conceptions and conclusions in relation to the great problems of metaphysics. I think no one could cease to be influenced all his life by the close study of the Kantian philosophy that used to be an essential part of the training of a young philosopher. Yet the changes in my outlook did not come immediately from that source. They issued more directly from my often repeated reflections on the doctrine of Substance and its Attributes in the philosophy of Benedict Spinoza—a subject that has occupied the intellectual ingenuity of every student of this twin star of the philosophical firmament, and has received a wide variety of interpretations. That, however, is not my subject this evening, and I must not linger upon it, suffice it to say that these reflections at last led me to concentrate attention upon the general notion of *Being* and its varieties, and I came to see, with great illumination to myself at least, that the real nature of a thing³ must be what it is *in itself*, and

¹ *Aeternitas* (Clarendon Press, 1930). In the voyage of philosophy every man is partly a "sailer" and partly a "tacker", and though it is by tacking that philosophical progress is made and the mind comes to discover itself, it is by sailing that we gather way and come to understand the traditions of our craft.

² Like a planet originally drawn off from its sun under the attraction of a passing giant into an outer orbit of "realism" the mind returns to its centre along a slowly narrowing spiral, under the centripetus of an inescapable logic, and even against its native centrifuge.

³ It would be an appropriate though anachronistic, nemesis if philosophical progress should prove to have taken its true rise and course from the complementary speculations of a German and a Jew!

⁴ By "thing in itself" it will be seen that I mean *ens in se*, not *corpus sine objectum in se*. The argument at this stage is metaphysical and refers to *Being* as such, without special reference to this or that sort of existent the conception

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not what it is *for another*. For its nature as it is for another can be no more than an external view of it as an *object* of perception or thought, and this cannot precisely and completely answer to the nature that it possesses in itself *as it lives and operates*.

Now this principle seemed to bring the doctrines I had previously accepted as near axiomatic into serious question. I had inferred the ultimate nature of reality from the character and criterion of knowledge. The Real I had said following the celebrated "ontological argument," must be the perfect, for by the truth of a belief we *mean* the perfection of its object, or, more modestly, this perfection in the object of the belief is our only possible *test* of truth. But now I saw, or thought I saw—and with some dismay at first—that the most perfect object must fall short of reality, and the most adequate belief be wholly beside the mark. For knowledge is essentially knowledge *of objects*, the relation of a knowing subject to an object that is known,¹ and an object is by its very nature and definition a thing as it appears *for a knower* other than itself, it cannot be the thing as it is *in itself*. I saw also that there must be some means of checking our beliefs other than an analysis of their objects somehow and somewhere we must have direct access to the things in themselves. So far from objectivity being the same thing as reality, it can never be more than external appearance. Thus I came to recognize that the really fatal error of recent and contemporary thought is what I have called its 'radical objectivism'—its identification of the real with the objective. I saw that I must retrace my steps towards the opposed, unpopular, and supposedly refuted doctrines of the older subjectivists like Berkeley and Leibniz, though not perhaps accept those views as a final resting place. I did not immediately grasp the connection of these conclusions with the Kantian theory of the noumenon—the thing in itself² or as the *Critick of Pure Reason*

of which may happen to be prevalent. If *ens in se* were taken as equivalent to *objectum in se* we should have to assert the reality of a—Nothing that nothings—an expression negative in form it is true but nonsensical only for those who dogmatically identify the objective with the real yet (and indeed therefore) particularly well suited to the understandings of such radical objectivists as signifying Being that is not objective and operates non objectively.

¹ And this applies be it noticed to both knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Not, however to 'enjoyment' as it is defined by Alexander though I am less sure about his actual use of it. Cf. especially *Space Time and Destiny*, I p. 19. 'The angel's view', and pp. 103-8. 'Subject and object self'. And in the issue of course Alexander's 'radical objectivism' is not in doubt.

² One of the chief signs of the greatness of Kant was it seems to me, his constantly reawakened and justified resistance to the elimination of things in themselves. Even that great scholar Professor Kemp Smith from whom many of us have learnt so much is inclined to *complain* of Kant's repeated failures to conform to the genuine critical doctrine, as if this signified irresolution in

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sometimes misnamed it the "transcendental object", for like Kant himself, at least in some moods as the third designation emphasizes, I had always thought of the noumenon as some sort of objective existence, though of course as an unknown object. In spite of being a "thing in itself" it might also be a being *for* another, though not for any human knower, and I remembered the seemingly conclusive inference that an unknowable entity is a *nonentity* that has no real right so much as to appear in intelligent discourse. But the Real, as a thing in itself, I now saw might well be unknowable *as an object*, yet be judged to be real *in itself*, and this might explain what idealist critics had sometimes noted with merriment the extensive "knowledge of the unknowable" possessed by some philosophers; and also that "dissatisfaction with the form of knowledge as such" that had disturbed Bradley, and been judged by Pringle-Pattison to be "chimerical". A belief might have all the marks of truth, its object be completely coherent and comprehensive, and thus devoid of no objective perfection, and hence merit the name of "knowledge", and yet provide no satisfactory apprehension of the Real as it is in itself, i.e. as real. Indeed, it *could* not do so, for its object would still be only an object, a being *for* something other than itself: an external view, an appearance, an objectification, not an inward being, a reality, a thing in itself. I saw that to be real *means* to be unknowable as object. What I had always regarded as the very *perfection* of knowledge, viz. its revelation of an external and independent object, I now saw, by an intellectual *tolle face* (not uncommon in our recognition of truths that lie, as Berkeley says, "so near and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them"), to be its *essential vice*. Here, indeed, was a "transvaluation of all values" for an intellectualist! I had opened my eyes and the ghost was beginning to take solid form, and horror to possess the victim!

I do not, of course, claim that this "Copernican revolution" is the grasp of his own principles and a feeble recession to dogmatism. On the contrary as I think the analysis of the *Critique of Practical Reason* indicates it was genuine insight that led Kant to refuse to make the more analysis of human knowledge or experience the measure of the Real, i.e. to take the unproved bifurcation of subject and object as the essential form of the macrocosmic-microcosmic Real. This is not to reject "criticism" but to relegate it to its proper subordinate place in methodology. In ontology it is nugatory.

* *Man's Place in the Cosmos* p. 122. It is surely a curiosity of metaphysical obstinacy that Bradley, who saw so clearly that the fatal difference of subject and object implies that 'not even absolute truth is quite true', could not infer that the real is not object, but he must needs fall back on a real that saves its objectivity at the price of merging, blending, fusing, dissolving appearances in a 'higher' unity that, as Pringle-Pattison said, is "asymptotically approached in the lowest organisms".

* I use this Kantian phrase to indicate, what I cannot now expound, the relation that exists between what I am advancing and the Critical standpoint.

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constitutes a new discovery in philosophy. In philosophy new discoveries are rare, and I doubt not that these distinctions have, in one form or another, been noted again and again after periods in which the native "radical objectivism" of the finite mind has prevailed. An obvious instance of this is to be found in the philosophy of Berkeley, though it can hardly be said that he made very much of his clear recognition of the distinction of active and passive being. We have no *idea*, he tells us, of the self: it is not the passive object of knowledge, but its active subject. Yet it is not wholly hidden from us, for we certainly know the meaning of the words 'spirit' and 'soul'. But beyond this 'notion' that each conscious spirit has of its own nature, we can only perceive it by the effects that it produces, i.e. by changes produced by it within the world of objects.¹ But, as has often been objected, the use of the word 'notion' in place of the word 'idea' for our apprehension of active being, solves no problems and produces no special enlightenment. In Berkeley's case, indeed, it was made the foundation of a destructive criticism of his doctrine, both in the writings of Hume (who was led to search—and surely with a *a priori* unsucess—for the subject among the objects like an anatomist looking for life or mind among the tissues, an astronomer searching for God among the stars, or an idiot hunting for tigers among the moral virtues) and also among those less sceptically inclined, who found his afterthought about 'notions' a

The thesis might even be defended. I think that the essence of Kant's doctrine is unconsciously epitomized in Spinoza's definition (*Eth. I. Def. iv*) of an Attribute of Substance (*quod intellectus de Substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens*): at least as it is applied to known Attributes. Substance would then be the *ideal thing in itself* and the Attributes the *ideal objects of knowledge*. Spinoza's view seems to have been that where object and thing in itself are ideal they are also identical. But this is what I am disputing.

¹ There can be no *idea* formed of a soul or spirit: for all ideas whatever being passive and inert they cannot represent unto us that which acts.

Such is the nature of Spirit: or that which acts: that it cannot be of itself perceived: but only by the effects which it produceth. So far as I can see the words *will, understanding, mind, soul, spirit* do not stand for different ideas: or in truth for any idea at all: but for something which is very different from ideas: and which being an agent cannot be like unto or represented by any idea whatsoever. And added in the second edition.

Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some *notion* of soul, spirit: and the operations of the mind—such as willing, loving, hating—as much as we know or understand the meaning of these words. (*Principles of Human Knowledge, Part I. sect. xxvii*.) A grudging admission!

² For my part when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself* I always stumble on some particular perception or other. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. Were all my perceptions removed I should be entirely annihilated: a perfect nonentity. (*Treatise of Human Nature, IV. sect. vi*.)

serious contradiction of his vigorous polemic against "abstract ideas" Yet the distinction that he was attempting to make was, it seems to me, not merely ineluctable, but metaphysically vital in the highest degree, and capable of transforming the whole range of our ontological conclusions

At this early stage of our inquiry I will be more moderate, however, and say that the metaphysical principles that I have sketched out do raise some very difficult problems that must not be lightly brushed aside, or secreted under an amplified terminology The difficulties concern both epistemological doctrine, and also the foundation and movement of ontological inference If knowledge is to be taken, as *prima facie* seems to be necessary, as a relation of subject and object, and if no object can, from its very nature as object (or external appearance for another) be in the full sense real it would seem that knowledge is impossible because its very notion is incoherent For by "knowledge" we must mean *true* belief, i.e. belief about the *real*, yet the real can never be the *object* of knowledge From this incredible set of relations I draw the conclusion that the *prima facie* view of knowledge as a subject object relation is in some way defective for I must not reject the *a priori* principle that every real as such is a thing in itself, and that no being *for another* can be more than appearance I ask then, whether the view of knowledge as, not merely prevailingly but even essentially and exclusively, knowledge of objects has not been taken uncritically from the sort of apprehension that is most conspicuous in the experience of the unreflective finite being, viz the perception of material things? For even our conceptual knowledge is thought of as knowledge of a range of objects, though of a new and more general type, and that, plainly, on the time honoured assumption that *nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*, and in total disregard of the Leibnizian *careat nisi intellectus ipse*, which, inadequate as it is, at least should give us pause

But not only must we extend our conception of knowledge, we must make a more piercing and unprejudiced inquiry into the foundations of our ontological inferences Like Descartes, though with even greater urgency, we must put aside all the generally accepted objects of human experience and science, not because we may be deluded in this or that matter by the special nature of our faculties, or by some interfering *deus deceptor*, but because, one and all, they are objects, and therefore no more than appearances, and that, even when they are not distortions, but objects of the most unequivocal objectivity We must discover some indubitable existent or existents that are not merely things as they appear *for others*, but

* Nor must we forget that the conclusion that knowledge is impossible itself claims to be knowledge, so that the assertion conflicts with its own purport

things as they are *in themselves*. Our doubt gnaws deeper than any conceived by Descartes for he had but to assure himself that God is perfectly good, and the deepest of his doubts was put to rest, but we, on the contrary, might almost say that the doubts that have threatened to devour us are not dispelled by but founded upon, the perfection of "God" at least we must say that they are founded upon the limitations of the knowing "self", in virtue of which in experience it is always confronted by an 'other' which because, and in so far as, it is an other, and not the self, can only appear objectively, but not be grasped as it is in itself. This is the essential 'Idol of the Tribe', which we must be able to correct or be compelled to settle down in a final scepticism.

But is our search for truth then, altogether and in principle hopeless? I think not for if the self is confronted by an other, equally that other is confronted by the self if the self can only know its other as object, and not as it is in itself, may it not know itself, not as object but as a thing in itself? For in its apprehension of itself it is not balked by otherness it possesses itself. It seems strange that, in his theoretical discussions at least, Kant seemed always to be thinking of things in themselves as *others* in themselves and made no use of the fact that the distinction between its nature in itself and its nature for another afflicts not only the others but also the self. This too has a nature in itself as well as an appearance for others, and thus affords a more favourable case for our inquisition.¹ It is true that in his practical philosophy Kant made a nearer approach to this point of view, for the moral law within the individual has its origin not in man's phenomenal nature but in his noumenal being as a rational thing in itself. Yet even here, the natural "radical objectivism" of the human mind deflected him from undertaking an inquiry into the light thus shed on the nature of things in themselves, and confined his discussion to ethical questions relating to the character of moral action. I do not wish to suggest that the problem is easy if we attack it in the self's own citadel it is in fact intolerably difficult, and some may think it inscrutable, but what I am saying is that it is here *if anywhere* that it can, by man actually be met and solved. But we must approach it cautiously and by a circuitous path if we are to penetrate to its very heart.

¹ Of course he discusses the distinction at some length (cf e.g. *Critick of Pure Reason* B 157-9) making use of his characteristic account of the difference of knowing and "thinking". I am conscious that I am though even this is a thought and not an intuition what I am in myself I cannot know but only my appearance to myself, i.e. as an object in time. Yet I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination.

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For our primary and typical thing in itself, then, I shall look where René Descartes himself looked to the self, and not to the nugatory world of objects. For each man, his own active self is the cardinal and indubitably certified reality. This, in the real, he is; this, as his part of the real, he can infallibly assert, this is his sample thing in itself. No man can doubt his own reality: he may doubt its *prima facie* appearances, even the appearances of himself to himself. The whole of his life may be a dream from which he has never, and will never, awaken, but he cannot doubt that his life, or his dream, is founded upon an indubitable core of reality. Certainly of no being can he be more certain than of the being that he fundamentally is. The certainty is, indeed, complete when he defines it as certainty *that* he is, and refrains from any positive assertion as to *what* he is. Not that it can be true that he is, unless he does also possess a distinct nature: the assertion that whatever he is, he can be certain *that* he is means no more than that he is certain of his reality while keeping an open mind about the precise character that he really possesses; not that he exists without character: as an empty objective *punctum* of being. He is certainly real: he is an *ens in se*, a thing in itself. He also appears to himself, and perhaps also to others, he is a thing *for* himself and *for* others, an object. He is conscious that his appearance often belies his real nature, and suspects that what he really is, is never fully manifested by his objective appearance. What, then, is he? He is all that he is as a thing in itself, not what he is as an object for another (even when he is, in some sense, himself that other—as when he sees his own limbs and trunk). He distinguishes most clearly between his body and his mind, and thinks of himself as an embodied mind, or a rational animal, according as he is chiefly impressed by his intellectual or by his physical characteristics. Are these only appearances of the man, or are they his real character? Can he—as he is in himself, be an extended body with a mind capable of thinking and perceiving objects? If he is a *mind*, he must be that mind as it is in itself, actively performing the functions of a mind, if he is a *body*, he must be that body as it is in itself, actively performing the bodily functions. In himself he cannot be that mind as it appears as an object for another man, i.e. as it is viewed either by the classical psychologists as a set or system of psychological entities: perceptions, volitions, judgments, and the like (mere mental entities or constructs about which we may speak, but which clearly have no existence as things in themselves, or even, perhaps, as real objects for others), or by behaviouristic psychologists as a complex function of the behaviour of an organized body, as that body and its behaviour appear for the perception and understanding of another man, or of

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the man himself using his external senses. We cannot, therefore, look to psychology in either form for the nature of the human mind as a thing in itself—it is vitiated by objectivity. If again, man is a *body*, still in himself he cannot be that human body as it is commonly and outwardly perceived, as an objective appearance for an external perceiver (even though that perceiver is the man himself viewing himself as an external object). Nor will anatomical dissection lay bare his bodily nature as it is in itself—for all the dissected parts remain as objects externally perceived. You cannot discover the body as it is in itself by external perception either of the body as a whole, or of its dissected parts, to do so you must *be* the body actually carrying out its proper bodily functions. Thus we cannot look either to common perception, or to physics, physiology, and neurology, for the nature of the human body as a thing in itself. So that body and mind alike, as commonly perceived and scientifically understood, are no more than objective appearances.¹

Next, I shall try to discover what the human mind and the human body *are* as things in themselves, and not as things for others, or in relation to others.

(a) THE HUMAN BODY AS A THING IN ITSELF

The nature of the human body as a thing in itself is a question to which I have devoted some attention elsewhere,² so that I must not, this evening, stay to elaborate the subject in much detail. This was, indeed, my point of entry into the present set of problems, for it was the precise function of the human sense-organs in external perception that led me at the start to see that all our views on these subjects are vitiated by the natural "radical objectivism" of the finite mind, and that unless we can correct this "Idol of the Tribe

¹ Even the view of the mind as the *subject* of knowledge, when we do not try to objectify it, bears relation to the object that it knows—and therefore as such stands condemned with its object. This is true whether we adopt a subjectivist or a realist view concerning our knowledge of objects—the subject of knowledge would bear relation to objectivity whether it created its object or received it complete—or took a part only in its construction. In the issue it will be seen that I derive objectivity from otherness, and the object from the opposition and co-operation of self and other.

² See especially *The Roots of Duality in Human Knowledge* (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 1937–38 pp 168–88). Perhaps I may be allowed to say here that the account of perception given in the present lecture constitutes a development of the above-named paper and is, I hope, therefore more credible. I think that this may be especially the case with reference to the heavy work that seemed to be assigned in some sections of the former paper, to the human body as it is known to physiology. This left me unsatisfied at the time, and I am relieved to find that it was not necessary to the theory advanced.

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par excellence" we shall never gain insight into any subject that involves real action on the part of the body or of the mind. Now plainly the body *does* something in perception, though it does not perceive, and we can only discover what that action is if we leave the objective appearance of the body, i.e. the body as it is for common perception, physiology, and neurology, and try to take up the point of view of the perceiver himself in the very act of perceiving. This is easily said, but not so easily done, so firm is our interest in external perception.

How, for example, does the seeing eye perceive itself, what does the eye look like in the act of vision? How does the touching finger feel itself, what does the touching finger feel like in the act of touching? If we can answer such questions we shall gain knowledge of what the percipient's body is, not indeed in itself as a merely unconscious physical thing, but *for its own mind*, for its superadded consciousness. We shall not have achieved our end, but we shall at least have taken up an "inside" view, in place of the habitual external view of the body. Using an optical analogy, I have expressed this refocusing of perception by saying¹ that the mind has a "dioptric" view of its own body, but an "external" view of other bodies, and that in this inner view the man's own body, as partially "resonant" to things other than himself, appears as identical with perceived nature. I am sorry that it seems paradoxical to say that my eye, as "dioptrically" viewed by my mind, is identical with visual nature as it is for *me*, though for *you*, necessarily taking up an external standpoint, my eye is only an insignificant part of *your* visual nature, but I still think that there is no means of escaping the conclusion.² So important, indeed, do I take this distinction to be that until it has been incorporated into the theory of perception, I see no hope of solving many of the problems that are discussed and discussed interminably in this part of philosophy, and I desire, therefore, seriously and urgently, to commend my suggestions to the notice of philosophers.

I now go further and say that all particular features of my perceived objective world are attributable to the nature of things other than my body in so far as they fall within the limits of that body's possible "resonance", but that the space-time in which I perceive them, and which is the ground of their contours, is attributable to my body as it brings me itself under the stimulus of their obstruction: visual space-time to my "eye", tactual space-time to my "organ of touch", and so on, and that these several space-times

¹ *Loc. cit.*

² The paradox is even more pronounced if I look at my eye in a mirror: for then my "dioptrical" eye actually *contains* my objective eye (or an image of it) as one of its minor details.

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are reducible to one because the different senses are but modifications and complications of the primitive sense of touch

You may remember that Berkeley¹ said that empty space is unresisted physical motion, and occupied space, physical motion resisted what I am saying is related to this account of the generation of space, but goes far beyond it Berkeley's assertion as it stands might in fact be regarded as analytical, seeing that it merely derives space from what already involves it, viz motion Such an interpretation would I think, miss the point of Berkeley's discovery, according to which the motion that generates space is the inward experience of moving, and not the outward appearance of being moved and this is essentially what I mean to assert when I say that empty space-time is unresisted physical action, and occupied space time that action resisted Let me try to make clear the significance of this attempt to generate space time from the action of the self When I stretch out my arm and touch this lampstand with my finger, the distance of the tactual sense datum at the point of contact of my finger and the object is the amount of physical action that has taken place before resistance was met and the sensation occurred Now you will say what do you mean by "amount of physical action"? We have, you will say, in fact no perception of any such physical action as such, but only the continuous series of sense data that we locate in the muscles of the arm, very much as we locate the final tactual sense-datum at the tip of the finger or at the surface of the lampstand If no knowledge of the occurrence is supposed to be available except what comes from the experience itself then all you will possess will be a series of "kinaesthetic" sense-data followed by a tactual sense-datum at the point of contact of the finger and the lampstand How can it be supposed that this series becomes a tactual sense-datum experienced at a distance? How do the "kinaesthetic" sense-data (as we call them, supposing a more complete knowledge than our hypothesis warrants) become distance? My reply is that no one, not even Berkeley, ever supposed that to be possible these

¹ "When I excite a motion in some part of my body if it be free or without resistance, I say there is *Space* But if I find a resistance then I say there is *Body* and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or less *pure* So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be supposed that the word *space* stands for an idea distinct from or conceivable without body and motion Though indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others, which hath occasioned infinite mistakes When therefore supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains *pure space* thereby nothing else is meant but only that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance but if that, too, were annihilated, then there could be no motion and consequently no *Space* ' (*Principles of Human Knowledge* Part I sec 116) Cf also *De Motu* sect 55

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"kinaesthetic" sense-data are *objects*, and not what is asserted to be the distance, viz the *action* that we objectify as "stretching out the arm and touching the lampstand" Let us take an even simpler case, and reduce the movement to the little tap of the finger that I give to the bulb of the lamp to feel whether it is hot There is the slight "kinaesthetic" sense-datum in the finger, then the sting of the heat But is there not more? Is there not the *possessed action* of tapping that unites the kinaesthesia and the sting into the total object "finger tapping bulb and feeling it hot"? In a more prolonged movement there is a greater complexity of kinaesthesia, but still the same unification by the *action* that is being performed, and that we *read into* the series of sensations, and make into the perception of motion in space, with the stages marked off by the sense data This action is no object but a thing in itself, it *appears* as an object, under the stimulus of resistance, in the form of space-time with the resistance at a contour Nor is the action itself a motion it *appears* as a motion, through the unification of the sense data under the *schema* of space-time That *schema* is thus the objectification of action, just as the special distance is the objectification of *that* action If it were not for the resistance offered by an other to the action of the self, we should never conceive space time at all its otherness induces us to interpret the action that we consciously *possess*, as motion that we can *observe*, and from this, as Berkeley says, we derive distance The action in itself is no object, the other, as it is experienced, extends or objectifies our action as space-time What I assert, therefore, is that if we had no apprehension going beyond the "kinaesthetic" and tactual sense-data, we should never apprehend distance, but only, at best, a series of data in time But because we are *acting* while these data are presented, we find them to be "kinaesthetic", i.e. we regard them as stages of a physical action The action that is not in itself physical, is objectified as such, with a limiting contour qualified by sense-content¹

¹ I am anxious to make it clear that I am not asserting that there is a *sense of action* when we act consciously This is in fact what I am denying for a *sense of action* implies a sense-datum of action comparable to a colour sense-datum But this would be an *objective content* whereas the action of which I am speaking is a thing in itself, and no object When we act consciously, we consciously *possess* the action as it is in itself It is this action consciously possessed that unites the sense data of kinaesthesia as marking stages of the action the action has stages only as thus operating and objectified as space-time in which the objective contents are ordered The important thing is that I am *acting* in this set of changes I am walking I am moving my finger, and so on The difficulty we experience in grasping this derivation of space time, arises from the developed character of all our conceptions and expressions of physical action such as the exploring of the shape of a body by touch or sight The muscular sensations are so called only in so far as they are referred to the muscles that are already spatio-temporal contours, our exploring of an

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Let this, then, stand as an account of what I mean when I say that the distance of the object from the perceiver is the amount of unresisted action that is performed before a limit is reached where further action is resisted by an opposing other. Now this action limited by the other, takes the self beyond itself to an awareness of that other, which thus becomes an object *for* the self, and not what it really is *in* itself, viz. an action. Its otherness as apprehended by the self is objectivity, that is, external or spatio-temporal existence. The action of the self thus comes to be interpreted as motion in space-time generating distance, and the limit to it, as an impenetrable spatio-temporal barrier. This gives us a contour at which the tactual quality resides.

But further the representation of the action of the self as motion in space-time also implies the presence of the self as a 'percipient frame of reference', and it is from this that the idea of the human body develops (through complex and ambiguous interperceptions), as both a set of exploring 'organs', and also as a 'region of reference' from which spatio-temporal 'distances' are reckoned—a body distinct from, yet within, the general world of objects, and mobile in relation to them. In the simplest case that we have been considering, it is the percipient spatio-temporal 'origin of reference' rather than an objective 'organ' only in more complex perceptions can this

object is already thought of as physical action of the arm and hand in running over the contours. But if we think ourselves back into the primitive stage of beginning to act and finding an obstruction or resistance registered as sense-content it will be understood how our action is spatio-temporalized by the urge to arrange the sense-data in an order of co-existences and sequences—an urge founded on practical needs. The action does not itself appear as an *element* in the objective world but as its objectivity i.e. as space-time. The orders of the various sense-data only determine the special conformation of the 'bodily' contours of space-time—not its spatio-temporality. This is the objectification of action in terms that will synthesize with the sense-data. We do not know that they are the only terms—a consideration that may throw light on the unknown Attributes of Spinoza's Substance. Private space-time is the space-time required to do this for the sense-data of the individual actual space-time that required for the common sense-data of the social whole standard space-time that required for the standard sense-data of science, which is thus so far a modification of the uniform space and time of Newton. We need not suppose that the most elementary sense-data are already spatio-temporal—they are so only in so far as they are complex. Thus also they become varied by appropriate spatio-temporal synthesis and are distinguished from the primitive sense-datum of touch (which is indistinguishable from resistance) as sound colour taste etc.

* The same is true of the 'effort' that Berkeley makes the determining factor in 'absolute' motion: we say *we* move over the road and not the road under us, because we are conscious of *our effort* in moving. But if this were a *sense* of effort it would not help in the least, for it would only be a new sense-datum. It is because it is *consciously possessed action* that it determines the motion as *ours*, and not the road's.

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develop into an objective organ, or set of organs, capable of being perceived externally by the self itself, working from adjacent places within a total region determining the contours of the body. Thus the human body is then a "region of view", or percipient contour, at or from which we variously observe the world of objects spatio-temporally separate from it, and with which it establishes "resonance". Thus we think of the finger as moving towards the lampstand, or in the simple case we were considering in which we are confined to the present 'touch', of the percipient "place" as doing so, and of the distance of the object as being the space traced by the finger or the moving "point of view", respectively. In still more complex cases, we may substitute for the movement of the finger, the length of a stick with which we touch the object: the tactual quality then resides still at the impenetrable contour, i.e. at the far end of the stick. This, indeed, is essentially what happens in vision, though the complication has usually made difficulties for the inquirer. Viewed externally, vision is no more than a highly developed and differentiated mode of touch, in which like the blind man groping with his baton,¹ we explore distant objects with a vast assemblage of synchronized "batons"² composed of "lines of force" or "rays of light"—whatever these phrases may properly be made to stand for. So again for hearing we exercise the sense of touch with the ear, making use of a complex baton composed of vibrant air. Now think once again of a self capable of receiving no more than a very simple tactual sensation, and devoid of all the data derived from the other senses: the body of such a self is, for its percipient mind thus limited to di-aesthetic³ perception, no more than the space-time in which its physical action is limited by a qualified contour beyond which it

¹ Cf. the use of this analogy by Descartes in his account of vision (*La Dioptrique* Discours I).

² The complexity of the organ of vision, as a vast assemblage of elementary organs all working together as compared with the relative independence and simplicity of the organs of touch, reciprocates with the total appearance of visual space as compared with the cobweb-like character of pure tactual space. The finger e.g. traces the outlines of the object while the eye sees the complete outline at once at least with small objects. For an animal with isolated and independent visual spots distributed like the touch spots of a man visual space would be very like our actual tactual space when uncorrected by vision. Auditory space is most vague from the relative fluidity of its medium—like a blind man groping with a baton made of plasticine.⁴

³ Hence the stars that we see with a blow on the eye, the noises produced by the surgeon's probe in the ear, the silence of the vacuum and our blindness in a dark room. The specialized sense-qualities are I think spatio-temporal modes of synthesis of the primitive touch-datum—at least from the external point of view. In themselves they are actions.

⁴ I now substitute this term to avoid the exclusively optical suggestions of "dioptric"—the term that I have previously used to express the perception we have of our own sense-organs in the act of using them and not by external perception: their being in and for self not their being for an other.

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cannot act, while its object is that resisting contour occupied by the simple tactual quality¹

Consider such a self as finding no resistance to the action that constitutes it—then its body (if it could have a body) viewed by its mind (if any) di-aesthetically, would be empty space-time. We must remember, however, as my parentheses are meant to suggest, that such an unimpeded self would perceive no objective world, and would have no "di-aesthetic" body, and hence no subjective mind. For it would have no "other" that it did not itself eternally create. Thus neither objectivity, nor the reciprocal subjectivity of a perceiving mind, would arise for subjective mind and object are mutual emanations of the finiteness of a self at once limited and stimulated by its other: yet that other, equally with the self, is no object but an action. Like the solid mass of barium sulphate that is precipitated from the intermixture of sulphuric acid and barium chloride, objectivity, or decorated space-time, emanates from the mutuality of acting self and reacting other. From the action of the finite self in relation to its limiting other, space emanates from the poverty of that action in comparison with eternal creation, time emanates from the mutual resistance of self and other, the limiting contours of objects are traced as appearances of the other in relation to the self. As to the qualities that occupy these contours, I will say less at the moment, I shall have good reason to speak of them at some length before I have done. The original primitive tactual 'quality' is, I think, not different from resistance of action to action, or positive impenetrability. The action and the resistance or reaction are, of course, mutual, and the simple 'quality' thus occupies the spatio-temporal contour.

The analysis to which I have now subjected the notion of body as a thing in itself is sufficient for my immediate purpose. As a thing in itself it must be unknowable,² but we can make some approach to

¹ Originally the quality simply occupies the contour confronting the self's point of view—and is thus perceived as common to the body and to the object. Where the quality is very intense it tends to attach itself to the body, as pain or pleasure—where it is more gentle and varied (as with softness or roughness) to the object. Successive complications of the perception tend to confirm the attribution of the quality to the object as first suggested by the resistance of the other—our combined external and di-aesthetic perception of the body (in which the body may become an object, while other objects do not become the body): the use of the mirror, intersubjective intercourse, the conditions of sight and hearing which make use of physical media through which the object is felt as remote from the body—all tend in the same direction.

² Unless, of course, we regard its action as including the action of self-apprehension or conscious possession—as perhaps we may. The question is not of great importance for ultimate metaphysics if we must deny that body, even as di-aesthetically perceived as space-time, survives in the ultimate Thing in Itself as eternal Extension, as perhaps we must.

the conditions of its reality if we view it from within its own actively functioning being, as it appears for its own mind. When we do so, as with our own organism, when we view it "di-aesthetically", we find it to be, not an independent thing but an emanation of the relation of self and other—an appearance of the other arising from the opposition to the conscious self by that other. In its spatio-temporality, equally with its primitive "quality", it is derived from the relation of self and other. Abstract the content from the contours, and the spatio-temporal *schema* collapses from vacuity. It can only be maintained by the mutuality of self and other, for absolutely empty space-time is not even spatio-temporal. It is the absolute ghost.¹ Man as a thing in itself cannot therefore be a body—a solitary self must be bodiless. That the body is a *phenomenon bene fundatum* is doubtless true, and follows from my analysis—but it is not a noumenon—a thing in itself. Nor is its phenomenality due to the imperfection of our apprehension of it as an object, but to the mode of its origin. It is an emanation of self and other—it cannot therefore be a self in its own right.²

¹ Thus the most perfect and conclusive science, for which all knowledge would be mathematical, would have for its object Nothing. Not, however, the *Nothing that nothings*, but the *Nothing that is nothinged*—the science of ideal contours posited for the sake of argument.

² Spinoza, on the contrary, asserts that Substance is objectified, among infinite other ways as Extension, i.e. not empty space nor space as an abstract concept—but the eternal genetic cause of all physical phenomena. This seems to me to involve the presence in Substance as being in self, of action that is specifically physical (though not "corporeal"—cf. *Eth* I, xv, Sch.) together with the infinite other forms of action. If this meant no more than that Substance (*Natura naturans*) creates the physical world (as well as every other kind of world) the question would then arise at what point in the hierarchy of creation does physical action first appear? Not, *ex hypothesi*, within the creative source—but somewhere within *Natura naturata*. The further question would then be where precisely are we to draw the line between *Natura naturans* and *Natura naturata*? It has been usual to draw it between Substance (= Attributes) on the one hand, and the Immediate Infinite and Eternal Modes on the other. In that case the Attributes are not *creations* of the divine objectifying intellect—but fall within its creating nature. That seems to make Extension a distinguishable thing in itself or divine action among infinite other forms of action in Substance—and this conflicts with my analysis of it. But if we draw the line between Substance as ultimate action in itself and the Attributes as divine objectifications of that action produced by a creative Intellect—we might then accept Extension (= physical action) as an Attribute of Substance—objectified not by commerce of self and other (as with us) but by creative action. Its objectification among finite beings might then be traced to a transcendent source expressing itself in the transcendental genesis I have described. Spinoza's own proof (*Eth* II, i et ii) is a *posteriori* in that it infers the Attributes from individual thoughts and bodies by removing their limitations.

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(b) THE HUMAN MIND AS A THING IN ITSELF

My treatment of the notion of the human mind as a thing in itself can, happily, be much more summary than that of the human body which has involved us in such complications and difficulties. It is important, however, that I should consider it, even if but briefly in order that my conclusions may not be mistaken for a crude mentalism. To minds versed in the contrasts current in recent philosophy, it might seem that my reaction from "realism" (i.e. objectivism) must necessarily involve me in a retreat to idealism (i.e. mentalism) and that I must hold that a thing in itself must necessarily be subjective mind. My references to Berkeley might also tend to foster this supposition. I must, therefore, lose no time in dealing with the claim of the human mind *taken strictly as a knowing subject*, to the status of a thing in itself.

First of all let me re-emphasize that this knowing mind must not be identified with what has sometimes been called the 'empirical self', i.e. the self as it is supposed to appear as an object of reflection within the range of experience. There are no Lockian 'ideas of reflection'. I confess that I have for long been very sceptical about this common object of psychological inquiry. *Subjective* mind cannot appear as an *object* of reflection, we have no ideas of the operations of the mind. Indeed, the "empirical self" is no more than a mental artifact produced by desperate psychologists in a misdirected and vain effort to make the study of the soul a 'science' by assimilating its content and methods to those of the physical sciences. It is this fundamental error that makes a great part of psychology no more than an exquisite instance of the 'radical objectivism' of the human mind. Certainly, then, we must not look for the human mind as a thing in itself to any such quasi-object: we must agree with Berkeley that of the soul or mind or self, we have no idea: it is not, and cannot appear as, an *object* of knowledge. If we are to apprehend its nature we must take it as a *functioning subject*. And why, let me ask, should we not do so? Our hypothesis is that, at least on one side of our empirical nature as men, we *are* such minding subjects: must we not then, in the very act of minding, mindfully possess ourselves, in the very act of knowing, consciously possess ourselves? Why should it be thought to be necessary, how should it be thought to be possible, in order to gain acquaintance with ourselves as minds, to carry out a mysterious process of objectification, and then to reflect upon the vicious appearance? Except, as I have said, in the interest of a psychology framed upon the mistaken analogy of the physical sciences.¹ We need not, and we cannot, project ourselves outside of

¹ I do not wish to affirm that psychologists have in no degree succeeded in avoiding this vicious objectification of the soul. But the fallacy has, I think,

ourselves, in order to apprehend ourselves; there is no *speculum mentis* for the mind cannot appear as an object—not even when it is the mind of another. We possess other minds in mutuality, we do not know them as objects, though we know their bodies, note their behaviour, and "impute" their mentality. With our own minds this is even more evident: as knowing, we possess our knowing selves; consciousness illumines both the object and the subject, though differently, to match the difference of status. More truly, perhaps I should say: what we call "consciousness" is the knowing itself masquerading as an abstract substantive, *more psychologico*. To say "I am conscious of an object" is *a fortiori* to say "I am conscious". In knowing, we apprehend in appropriate ways both the object that we know and the subject that is knowing it, and it is both inconvenient and misleading to call both apprehensions by the same name, "knowing", without qualification.¹ For though it is true that the knowing mind cannot be prevented by its own conscious nature from consciously possessing itself as active, yet this possession should be called *being* rather than *knowing*.² If we are consciously active in being actively conscious, we do not know our action as an object, we possess it as cognitive relation to objects. The mind's action constitutes its reality as a thing in itself, and not those fictitious entities that are conveyed by the psychologist's abstract substantives: experience, consciousness, perception, knowledge, thought, belief, complex, emotion, and the rest. These are false objectifications of subjective actions, and are devoid even of those empirical foundations that seem to support the analogous process of objectification in the physical sphere. For while it is true that in some sense we do perceive physical or extended spatio-temporal objects, no one in any sense has ever apprehended, or could ever apprehend, these false psychological objects. They are not *entia realia*, or even *entia objectiva*, but *entia rationis*: if not, indeed, *entia ficta*.

never been sufficiently recognized for psychologists to be as keenly on their guard against it as it deserves. Even the psycho-analytic schools that have made the most determined efforts to get at the real action of the soul, have produced not a few new monstrous mythological psychical objects.

¹ Spinoza, however, as a good intellectualist, has, it would seem, no qualms. Strictly speaking the idea of the mind—that is the idea of an idea—is nothing but the reality of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object: if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so to infinity. (*Eth.* II, xxi, Sch.) The philosopher is I think, emphasizing the same point, viz. that consciousness illumines the whole experience both on its subjective and on its objective side. For an idea is not a passive thing like a dumb picture on a tablet, but involves the very act of thinking (*Eth.* II, xix, Sch.) But his expression is obscure.

² And in the same way our apprehension of another mind is a discovery of identity rather than a contemplation of difference: or it is nothing.

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Thus we must reject the objectification of subjective mind even more vigorously than we rejected the objectivity of body. But further, our rejection of body as a thing in itself extended even to the relatively truer inner or "di aesthetic" perception of it, because it contracted to objective nonentity when deprived of relation to its other, so also we must deny the *inselas* of subjective mind even in its subjectivity, because it thus bears relation to objects. We need not, it is true, go so far as to say either that the objects create the mind, or that the mind creates its objects, for the objection applies to knowledge as a relation even of mutually independent subject and objects. Subjective mind is vitiated by that relation for without objects it must contract to subjective nonentity.¹ My principle therefore, that objectivity is an emanation of the interaction of self and its other, condemns not only objective body but also subjective mind—because knowing as such bears essential relation to objects and disappears with them.

II

We have been compelled to deny that the *human mind*, whether taken as a psychological "object", or as a knowing subject related to objects² in some sense given to it, and also the *human body*, whether

¹ This condemnation only concerns *subjective* mind i.e. mind *qua* knowing objects and not mind in its conscious self-possession. In the same way the rejection of body concerned only its objectivity, and not its self-occupation. But it remains a question for me at least whether the action that is the real "body" in itself and the action that is the real mind in itself can be distinguished except in their relative perfections as actions. For the self-occupied "body" is not spatio-temporal and the self-possessed mind, though it is conscious is not in the strict sense "knowing". The common distinction of body and mind has thus been superseded in the action in itself that constitutes the self. Whether the perfect self-possession of an infinite being involves its spatio-temporal objectification and reciprocal subjectification is the question that Spinoza answered by making both Extension and Thought Attributes of Substance. The question is to some extent one of definition for plainly Spinoza did not mean by Extension a quantity of space (*Eth* I, xv, Sch.) yet neither does he mean merely that the action that is Substance is absolutely free, i.e. has no limiting other for this truth appears as a separate proposition (*Eth* I, xvii). Perhaps he means that since Substance is an eternal action, perfectly possessing itself, this entails a double objectification of its essence, as eternal Thought of action, and as eternal action thought of viz. Extension. But though we must not forget that he does not conceive the divine Intellect anthropomorphically as dependent on the action of its independent other (*Eth* I, xvii, Sch.) his view certainly seems to involve an ultimate intellectualism that may well be no more than the last refuge of the radical objectivism² that I have deplored. But, on the other hand, objectification may be synonymous with creation the essential action of Substance.

² This applies to conceptual objects as well as to perceptual, in so far as the content of the former, *qua* objects, is derived from the latter.

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viewed externally, or even di-aesthetically, are things in themselves. Both subjective mind and objective body are derived beings, they constitute together the experiential bifurcation that issues from the relation of finite self and its complementary other. This is what I have meant when I have sometimes asserted that a finite being is no mere "section" of the Real, but one of its real "parts". As a section it could never have "subject-object" experience, it could not transcend itself even so far as to apprehend "objects". It is a finite-infinite, transcending itself because its other is its complement. Out of this self-transcendence arises "experience", or the bifurcation of self as knower of objects, and other as object known. Because it is finite, the action that it is in itself is limited by the actions that are its others, because it is self-transcendent, its action is brought into relation with those actions. These, then, it apprehends as objects (i.e. beings for other), because, as other, they limit the indeterminacy¹ of its action. In themselves its others are no more objects than is the self, their objectivity is their appearance for the self as finite. Yet its other is not merely the limitation of the "free" action of the self, it is its opportunity, its field of determinate action, through which its freedom of indeterminacy becomes a real freedom of purpose. Thus objects are never merely expressions of objectivity: they are never mere spatio-temporal contours determined by mutual impenetrability, but at least *qualified* objects, often *materially reacting* objects, sometimes *vitally responsive* objects, while here and there appears a friend, an *alter ego*, a beloved. But these qualities, this technique, are not what make the object spatio-temporal, but are progressive triumphs over objectivity, by which the self finds itself in its other, and its other in itself.² This is the more fruitful obverse of objectivity, by which the empirical scissura of subject and object is progressively cicatrized. This is the *realization of the object*, that offsets and corrects the *objectification of the real*. Nor is it ever wholly absent from our experience: even the objects that we most passively observe are never pure objects or spatio-temporal contours. We find in them the resistance or impenetrability that the self shares with its other—for here, too, action and reaction are equal and opposite. We assign to them also the sense-quality which in di-aesthesia decorates their contours, and in external perception is traced to the external appearance, or body, of the self, rather than to the

¹ The abstract freedom of the finite self is "indeterminacy" only in so far as it is conceived as abstract. In its concrete relation with its other, the supposed indeterminacy is realized as partial self-determination, and even self-legislation. This reaches its ideal expression in the real freedom of the creative One.

' So by my love
Thyself away art present with me still "

objects And to these qualified objects we impute materiality, and sometimes life or vitality, on the analogy of these modes of action as they fall within our own experience correlated with our external perception of our own bodies It is as absurd to think of life as an objective thing in itself, as it would be to think of materiality as a thing in itself,¹ or as we have shown it to be, to think of mentality These are modes of action, real in themselves in their degree, and as actions, but infected with unreality as they are 'imputed' to spatio-temporal objects For thus they are externalized, objectified, and either taken as no more than functions of spatio-temporal motion, or what is no less erroneous, though better in intention, as mysterious objects of unknown character, inhabiting and actuating spatio-temporal contours

I have just spoken of the way in which we "impute" quality and action to objects, but, as I explained at an earlier point of my argument, this "imputation" is no more than the appearance in the ambiguous perception of our common life, of that which is, for di-aesthesia, immediate possession This is most evidently the case with our apprehension of subjective mind in another person from the double standpoint of our common experience, it seems that we 'impute' the mind after an examination of the behaviour of the object and on the basis of an analogy with our own inner experience and externally observed bodily behaviour But no one really *believes* that this is the way in which we have contact with our friends and associates, much less the child with its mother, or the lover with his mistress Our possession of each other involves no inference we are united in rational intercourse just as material things are united in mutual action and reaction and living things in organic mutuality We call an object that resists our push, material because we have possessed its resistance, the object that responds to our organic stimulus, living because we have possessed its vital response, the object that converses with us, rational, because we have possessed his meaning, and where the understanding is perfect, a friend while in love we directly possess, and are possessed by, the beloved No concrete object in our experience is purely objective,² and in the beloved, objectivity is superseded, so that bodily death itself, and the cessation of all knowledge, cannot overcome love Here we have no longer the recognition of something objective to degrade our possession by distance and transiency, but the direct intuition and

¹ Thus vitalism like materialism and mentalism, is only an expression of our radical objectivism These are all forms of action, and not spatio-temporal objects Nor can we escape by the Human expedient of "neutralism"

² Space-time is the pure object (= O)

"Love's not Time's fool though rosy lips and cheeks
Within his bending sickle's compass come

mutual possession of self-transcending selves.¹ And so the bifurcation of experience is healed—no longer is the self divided from its other by "a great gulf", and negated by its determination, but the self possesses itself in its other, and is determined by its negation. All finite experience lies between these limits, and is the emanation of our finite infinite nature as action. Its transcendental origin has been expressed as "imputation" of content, or quality, or action, to spatio-temporal contours—but, as we have seen, it is "imputation" only in so far as we view the cognitive situation externally; as a relation of an embodied self to a world of objects. In that view, we suppose that the content in the knower is "imputed" to the object. The appearance, I have said, is ambiguous, in that it implies a double mode of perception—the *di aesthetic*, in virtue of which we perceive (e.g.) the "red" as located at the objective contour of the "rose", and the *external*, in virtue of which we perceive our own body as compresent with the red rose, that acts upon it to produce a certain "resonance" in the eye. We then conclude that the red *as we perceive it* must be really in the stimulated eye, and not in the rose, so that we think that we impute the red in the eye to the rose that we see. Yet as I have sometimes said—how snugly the red fits the contours of the rose, how impossible to separate them!²

¹ Thus the distinction between the qualified objects that we *perceive*, and the active objects that we *recognize* by their reaction to—or their co-operation with—our active bodies—is a difference between the object that is *given* us in our concourse with our other and the object that we *construct* by imputing action of various grades on the analogy of our own active body. The Kantian categories are primarily principles of the constitution of physical bodies; objectivity belongs—as we have seen—primarily to space-time, though the categorized objects are still infected with objectivity. So with all the types of action 'imputed' to objects—they are infected with objectivity because our active body is itself an object—though ambiguously so, because the self is viewing it externally—rather than as it essentially should, *di aesthetically*. Thus we assign the action that we really possess as selves, to a body that is no more than an appearance of the self—then on this confused analogy we impute action in the other to its appearance. In love these confusions are put to confusion when the self possesses the other, not as other—for the other in itself is not other but self—but as self. It is thus that love is the "emendation of the intellect."

² My analysis of the perceptual situation agrees in principle, I think, with that given by Reid—but goes beneath it to provide a transcendental explanation of the suggestion and belief of the real existence of an object, that he asserts to belong by nature to the 'simple apprehension' or sensation, and to be neither *subsequent* to it nor an *inference* from it. It explains also Reid's refusal to make sensation the mere abstraction that his analysis of perception would seem to entail. The suggestion and belief I have combined as 'imputation', and assigned to an external view of the perceptual situation, which in common experience is made at once more adequate and more ambiguous by the inclusion of relations that can be apprehended only in the *di aesthesis* of the percipient.

Now we may ask what corresponds in the "di-aesthetic" perception to the "resonance" of eye and rose that appears in the external view? In di-aesthesia the eye is not an object among the other objects within the visual field—it has, so to say, expanded¹ to include all that falls within visual nature. Thus in di-aesthesia there is no "resonance" of eye and rose as objects within the field, that "resonance" is the objective transcript of the relation of the real "eye" and the real "rose", i.e. of the visual action and its congruent other. The objective 'red rose' is the offspring of that relation, in which the spatio-temporality is the expression of otherness, and the quality content the expression of identity. For the quality belongs to the spatio-temporal contour that expresses the limits of the action of self and other. The objective red rose is an appearance of some 'filament' of identity in difference of self and other. Berkeley, it is true, denied that colour could be divorced from extension (though his own theory of the *minima visibilia* refutes his assertion)—my assertion is that the qualities of the red rose belong to the real other, as actions, while the objectivity is appearance. Thus we do not "impute" either the quality "red" to the spatio-temporal contour of the object-rose, or the action "red" to the rose as a thing in itself—we find them there in both cases.² The term "imputation" only has application within the ambiguous perception of our common life which needs both externality and di-aesthesia, and "bunches them together" uncritically thus giving rise to problems that have "gravelled" philosophers for centuries.

The same is true in essence, and in some respects even more obviously, of all the content that we apprehend as present in spatio-temporal contours: materiality, based on action and reaction, vitality, based on stimulus and response, mentality, based on rational conversation—in each case we have possession of the other appearing as at a common boundary in space-time, though with increasing discomfort. Only when we come to love does the spatio-temporal appearance at last utterly collapse as incongruous and futile, here neither "imputation" nor "discovery" will serve, but only 'possession'. The self and its other coalesce to a concrete unity in difference. If we continue to regard the beloved as embodied, that

¹ The expansion is less incredible if we remember that sight has been extended even on the external view by the optical batons that correspond to the blind man's stick in the case of touch. The blind man's hand has for his di-aesthesia, been transferred to the ferule. So my eye touches the Great Nebula, and rests upon Orion.

² I will go so far as to say that the real 'rose' enacts red—and does so consciously, in so far as it is capable of acting consciously. Thus also the reddened retina of my eye enacts red and consciously when the optical "batons" are working badly through some error of focussing. Cf. also Descartes's remarks on night vision in cats in *La Dioptrique*. Discours I.

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identity is bifurcated, and we experience love as physical contact, as physiological intercourse, as social co-operation, as "the marriage of true minds", as a complete understanding, but love as it is in itself, is that identity of self and other that is ideally expressed as "the infinite love wherewith God loves himself." For this is the full self-possession of his creative nature (*Natura naturans*) in the full expression of that nature (*Natura naturata*). In God the two are necessarily one, because the other is not given, but is a perfect self-creation in us, because the other is given, their union is contingent. Nevertheless, it is possible, for, as I have said we are no mere sections of nature, but real parts of it, not dead finites, but self-transcending finites, or finite-infinites.¹

In all knowledge of objects, then, there is a simultaneous opposition and co-operation of self and other so far as the other limits the self, it appears as spatio-temporal, so far as it is its opportunity, its "opening", the spatio-temporal contour is occupied by quality or technique. That content is apprehended by possession. In so far as we possess the action that is colour, or sound, or touch, we find it in the other, in so far as we possess the action that is materiality, we find it in the other, as we possess the action that is life, we find it in the other. And we find each truly only where it is to be found, though under the categories of our impotence, i.e. in spatio-temporal contours we apprehend objects as active—though in truth only selves can be active. The activity that we impute to objects is a derived activity, or relative degradation of it. Motion, causation, instinct, technique, viewed as operating among objects, are exiles in a strange land. Yet they are not exiles to the self that acts because I am material, I can grasp and make use of the materiality of the stocks and stones, because I am living, I can enter into and respond to the vitality of the animal, because I am a knowing mind, I can understand and converse with the minds of other men, because I am active, I can understand and co-operate with the endeavours of my fellow men, in so far as I love, I can possess the action of the beloved, and be possessed, for this is love's technique. It is thus that spatio-temporal contours become objects, sense-data become things, the physical, vital, the vital, animate, the animal, intelligent, and man, a god.² It is thus also that artifacts become "works of art"; the politician, a statesman, and the moralist, a saint. We may, indeed, go so far as to describe the interaction of material things, the intercourse of living things, the communion of minds, as their "love" for one another, for love lays bare "the pith and marrow of our attribute." Knowledge of objects is the nostalgia of the self *dépay sé* by otherness.

¹ Cf. B.D.S. *Eth.* V, xxxvi.

² "He said, 'Ye are gods given' (John x. 35)

unto whom the divine apprehension was

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Thus our original "dissatisfaction with the *form* of knowledge as such", that destroyed our confidence in all the objects with which knowledge has to do, is at once established and mitigated by a closer scrutiny of the *content* of knowledge. We have found that no actual object is entirely constituted by objectivity, though by its objectivity it must needs be infected and vitiated. Even the objects of pure dynamics are possible only through the inclusion of action that is not objective: nay the very contours of space-time are expanded, and determined, and sustained, by action. And the elaboration of scientific knowledge concerning more and more concrete objects: material, organic, animate, conscious, involves an increasing reliance upon internality and action, by which space-time progressively loses its pre-eminence. So the form of knowledge is qualified by its content, its objectivity by technique, and with increasing intimacy as knowledge perfects itself in love: for love is pure technique.¹ Thus while the form of knowledge divides the object from the subject, and thus desubstantializes both, the content of knowledge is their reunion and reconciliation. The ghostly things in themselves are realized as knowledge blossoms into love, meanwhile, the external objects with their *prima facie* ineluctable givenness and impenetrable solidity, and all the mighty frame of things in limitless space and unending time, correspondingly "vanish away into nothing, by a regular and just diminution."

My adventure is at an end: we have explored the labyrinth together, and come safely out at last. The ghosts that first startled us have established themselves as the soul and essence of reality, the objects that seemed so real have been shown in their true colours as the essential "double gangers", with space-time as the ghost *par excellence*. And so, though bitten desperately by a deeper even than Cartesian doubt,

"The man recovered of the bite,
The dog it was that died!"

¹ Cf. Descartes, *Meditations*, Reply to Obj. V. Med. iii. sect. 10.

THE AESTHETIC DOCTRINES OF SAMUEL ALEXANDER

LORD LISTOWEL, Ph.D.

THOSE, like the present writer, for whom the late Samuel Alexander unlocked doors to new realms of wisdom and delight, or who basked in the sunshine of encouragement and kindly advice he gave so readily to younger men, will understand with what alacrity this opportunity was seized of paying a small tribute to the memory of so unusual and attractive a personality. To resurrect the mind that has built of its own fabric a mansion so vast that its chambers have room for every fact of experience and every theory of science will always provide a happy and appropriate memorial to one whose main business in life was the disinterested speculation idolized by the Greeks as the worthiest employment to which the human spirit can devote its powers. My own share in this labour of love is small and limited in scope, I want to fill in one corner of the picture of Alexander's philosophical system, drawn by Professor Muirhead in the last number of *Philosophy* by describing in some detail what he thought about Art and Beauty in their most important aspects and relations.

If one were to venture a conclusion from the sheer bulk and volume of Alexander's philosophical writings, one would say with little hesitation that aesthetics was his youngest, and after metaphysics, his favourite child. Putting ontology on one side as naturally the most serious topic for a born system builder, nourished from intellectual infancy on the Bradleyan tradition, there was no branch of philosophy to which he devoted more time and study, or about which he wrote more voluminously and talked more incessantly, than the theory of the Beautiful. Prior to the production in 1920 of his *magnum opus*, he managed to find leisure in the interstices of teaching for one book on ethics and another on epistemology, but from that date until his death last summer, a span of eighteen consecutive years, he was constantly reading papers and publishing pithy manifestos on aesthetics alone of the many subjects that might have absorbed the unfettered attention of his final period. It has happened on numberless occasions that a poet's creative impulse burned brightest in the years of his youth, growing steadily dumber and more pedestrian with the passage of time, but crabbed age, with its passionless serenity and detachment from personal preoccupations, is more usually the blooming season for philosophy

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It was certainly no disadvantage to Samuel Alexander that he took the plunge into aesthetics from the topmost pinnacle of fame, at a moment when he was already recognized on all sides as the leading spirit of his generation in British philosophy, and long after the laurels of academic prowess and professional success had lost whatever glamour they may once have had. In the cool evening of his life there was nothing left to distract him from the single-minded quest of truth.

But why of the many unsailed seas he must have been tempted to chart, did his insatiable curiosity launch him on a last voyage into the rough waters of aesthetic theory? There is no certain answer to this question. What we do know is that the third person of the hallowed trinity whose members are Truth, Goodness, and Beauty had hitherto been sadly neglected as compared with the first two, and that a treatise on aesthetics was urgently required as the coping stone of a neatly finished philosophical system. Yet it would be a grievous error to suppose that his fondness for the subject was due solely or even mainly to systematic grounds. Art, in its manifold shapes, attracted him irresistibly, and poetry in the wide sense most of all. Professor Muirhead has described his habit of reciting great chunks of Shelley to his friends.

His temperament was not that of the cold blooded intellectuals whose main interest in a work of art is that of a surgeon in the corpse he has successfully dissected. The wealth of illustration in his writings afford us a glimpse—rare enough in a philosopher—of one who wrote and talked about Art because he really loved the pictures, statues, mansions, poems, novels, and plays that are its concrete manifestations. Communion with the fictitious characters of the dramatist and the inanimate figures of the sculptor or the painter was much easier from him than communication with real people, and one likes to think that much of the happiness denied him by his infirmity in personal relations was given back by a closer intimacy with the more distinguished inhabitants of an imaginary universe. However that may be, the meticulous care he himself paid to the manner in which his ideas were expressed showed a keen appreciation of and a high esteem for verbal artistry. No writer practised more faithfully than he the precept he laid down about words being used by the literary artist for their own sake, and not as mere handcars in which meanings are trundled about from one mind to another. Not that he ever allowed the philosopher in him to play second fiddle to the artist, his prose, for all the richness and harmony of its texture, is forged in the first instance to yield perfect clarity of definition, to sustain rigorous argument, and to convey to his readers the logical structure corresponding in the mind of man to the material structure of the world about us. A

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Pater or a Flaubert would probably have despised him as a mere craftsman

He had in full measure those blessed gifts of good taste and minor executive ability that aesthetic theory can no more educe from the ungifted than racial theory can bestow blue eyes and flaxen hair upon the most naïve believers in Aryan superiority. Besides, the range of his appreciation was not limited by exclusive attachment to any single branch of fine art, or by an engrossing enthusiasm for any one school or style, classical or romantic, ancient or modern, to the detriment of the many other offshoots of the artistic faculty in the last five thousand years of history. His appetite for Beauty was insatiable, and his sensibility responded like a well-tuned instrument to every note that was struck upon it. One important and unhappy limitation does, however, deserve mention. The deafness that plagued him throughout his life, and grew painfully worse in his later years—one could only speak to him latterly through the black sound box of an electrical instrument—shut him off from what many of us still believe with Schopenhauer to be the queen of all the arts. For he listened to music at second hand, with the ears of competent but often one-sided critics, and that explains why his comments on the purest of the arts are scanty and strangely unsatisfactory as compared with what he writes about things seen or read with his own eyes.

Such was the psychological background of the most interesting contribution to a clear intellectual grasp of Art and Beauty made by any English writer on these topics since the time of Bosanquet. And now let me sketch, quite briefly and in broadest outline, Alexander's attitude to the principal problems, philosophical and psychological, of aesthetics. Nowhere in his writings do we find any definition or even discussion of the nature and scope of the most recent outgrowth from the main stem of philosophy. We can only infer from the field over which he roams in the course of his inquiries that the object he is studying covers the whole range of our experience of the Beautiful in art and nature, and the relation in which it stands to our experience of the other values and to the total, all-inclusive reality of which our reflective consciousness is aware. The method of his research into this miscellaneous bunch of problems is the method he used throughout his philosophical work, the empirical method that leads from observed facts to broad generalizations and back again to the stubborn particulars by which they must be verified. It would be platitudinous nowadays to mention the *a posteriori* method in aesthetics were it not for certain Italian thinkers who still sin against the light. It is perhaps remarkable that Alexander never succumbed to the temptation that besets a system builder to squeeze facts willy nilly into the logical strait-

jacket of his preconceptions His happy blending of Herbert Spencer's patient empiricism with the bolder systematic sweep of Bradley and the giant figures of German idealism was nowhere more fruitful than in his treatment of aesthetics

The more technically philosophical aspect of his intellectual task was to compare and contrast Beauty with the other members of the value trinity to locate the rightful place of their common parent in the scheme of things, and to decide whether the Beautiful is a simple quality of outside objects or born of their relation to an artist's mind, for axiology, ontology, and epistemology are inalienable perquisites of the professional philosopher Let us take as our starting point his definition of value, and follow out the path described by one of its consequences "Value" he says in the second volume of *Space, Time, and Deity*, "in its greatest dilution and least intention is the relation between things in virtue of which one satisfies a want of another" Now as 'wants' and their 'satisfaction' permeate and pervade everything everywhere, and as possible sources of 'satisfaction' are as varied and numerous as the 'wants' they cater for a value is not a prerogative of man or a faint gleam of what is changeless and abiding amid the flux of nature Beauty, whatever the Platonic philosophers and theologians may say, is no better equipped than Goodness or Truth to furnish a short cut to a transcendent reality, for like all our values it is relative to the mentality of human beings and its future is inextricably bound up with their history upon earth A little more humility, a little stricter impartiality, would convince us that the universe is not moulded to accommodate the needs and desires of our puny selves, but rather that our noblest cravings and boldest aspirations are simply a special instance of ordinary happenings observable at every level of organic and inorganic being Thus it is that we have below the philosophical values those 'psychological' values which spring from the satisfaction of our biological urges,—hunger, thirst, sexual need—the "economic" values arising from the relation between material wants and a limited number of material goods, and the "instinctive" values pervading animal and plant life from the complex organism of the anthropoid apes down to the pullulating unicellular families of ultra microscopic bacteria Descending yet lower in the scale of being, we find the drama of worth being vigorously enacted by the atoms and molecules of inorganic matter, for lo and behold, the lordly and bivalent oxygen atom refuses stoutly to be satisfied by anything less than the constant attendance of two hydrogen atoms And what about the irresistible fascination, termed 'natural election' by Professor Laird, of a magnet for the iron filings that fly like a flock of lovers to its embrace? It would seem indeed, that wherever two things are related in time and space, they have a value for one another

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In the evolutionary cosmogony of Alexander, values in the narrower and human sense are the highest and most recent emergent from a changing but progressive universe. The infinite and everlasting space-time continuum—surely a modern version of Spinoza's substance—which encompasses all that is and carries in its womb all that is to be, has blossomed forth at immense intervals, by a process of spontaneous emergence, into the whirlwind dance of electrons, into the delicate tissues of living organisms, into the sudden light of consciousness, and into the rapturous awareness of values or ideals, and is still in travail with an unborn God who will be as superior to the most god-like man as he now is to the sanguinary carnivores of the jungle. Such, very briefly, is the relative but elevated function of Beauty in the life of man, and its proper status in the boundless empire of nature.

If we probe deeper into the separate values that lend dignity to personality and provide a fixed purpose among a welter of conflicting aims, we shall find that their worth derives from the satisfaction they give to certain deep-seated impulses we all share. Thus Beauty, we are told "is that which satisfies the constructive impulse used contemplatively," while Goodness gratifies the social or herd impulse of the virtuous man and Truth slakes the disinterested curiosity of the scientist and philosopher. As seen from the viewpoint of the relative importance of mind and its environment in the manufacture of value, fine art, in which the artist mixes in some sort his personality with his materials, stands mid way between Goodness and Truth. For in science the brute facts of nature control and direct the mind, whereas virtue appertains to motives and draws all its nourishment from volitional sources. But these superficial differences only serve to mask an underlying identity, for Truth is the intellectual awareness of reality, the reflective self-consciousness of the whole unconscious universe, and therefore includes within its boundaries the Good and the Beautiful as well as much that is actively opposed or stonily indifferent to these highest values.

It might not unnaturally be supposed that so intransigent a realist as Alexander would have joined the school of thought that has singled out some common characteristic of external objects, such as the form with which they have been invested by natural forces or in which they have been moulded by man, as the hall-mark of the *Beautiful in art and nature*. Not so, however, for a mind sufficiently elastic to respond to the rich variety of experience. The "tertiary" qualities of things cannot be regarded like their "primary" and 'secondary' qualities as real properties of the objects to which we attribute them. For Beauty does not belong to the full-blown rose in the same sense as its contour, its size, its colour, its texture, or its fragrance. These so called qualities are in fact the product of a

unique combination of mind and matter, of subject and object, being a superior mongrel bred of the undeclared marriage between man and nature "In every value" we are told in the second volume of *Space, Time, and Deity*, "there are two sides the subject of valuation and the object of value, and the value resides in the relation between the two and does not exist apart from them" This happy compromise between realism and idealism enabled Alexander to avoid the pitfall of an undiluted subjectism as successfully as the snare of a naïve objectivism in aesthetics, for there can be no glimmer of Beauty in the universe without the work of art as well as the artist, without the sunset or the starlit sky as well as their human witness, without an assortment of material objects in an outside world as well as minds that people it with the animated figments of their happiest dreams

An obvious but paradoxical conclusion is that when we wax enthusiastic about the beauty of natural scenery, we are really praising our own artistic perception of what would be a matter of utter indifference to the philistine onlooker or the domestic cat The so called "beauty" of nature is an illusion that not even Ruskin could shatter, for it is we who clothe its naked limbs with fine raiment spun from the thread of our own imaginations In a pamphlet on *Art and Nature*, Alexander states as follows the problem as he saw it and its solution 'Does nature of herself possess beauty as what the philosophers call a tertiary quality? That is the question of my discourse, and the answer I am about to give is that she does not and that nature and works of nature possess beauty only so far as they are converted into works of art' It follows from this that we are all artists to a greater or a lesser degree when we discover beauty in the countryside, in the sea, or in the sky and, like a painter or a poet, that we read into the impassive countenance of nature the storm and sunshine of the human soul The relation of art to nature cannot be that of a copy to its original and even the landscape painter never "imitates" literally a pleasing scene, for the artist's creative imagination is the common source of Beauty both in the fine arts and among the phenomena of nature So much for the narrowly philosophical side of Alexander's aesthetics, let us now pass on to his proposed solution of the remaining problems that confronted him

Writers on aesthetics do not seem as yet to have been able to agree as to where they should look in order to lay a finger on the essence of our experience of the Beautiful Philosophers have often found in the keenest appreciation of art or nature a direct revelation of some transcendent reality, psychologists have concentrated the bulk of their attention upon the frame of mind of the spectator, while those rare critics and art historians who have speculated about the nature of the fine arts have usually confined their inquiries

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to an analysis of its products. The most original feature of Alexander's theory of aesthetics is that he goes for its backbone neither to the keen enjoyment of the spectator nor to the material work of fine or applied art, but to the process of artistic production, exemplified in the labours of the creative artist. In this connection, there is a revealing *obiter dictum* on the views of Lipps at the end of a letter dated April 30, 1933, there he writes "I have a suspicion, which may not be well-grounded, that he (i.e. Lipps) takes too much the point of view of appreciation and I like to approach the subject from the point of view of creation."

Now though the production of works of art depends to some extent on the technical procedure and the raw materials employed, it is an event in which the imagination and the emotions of the artist play the leading role. And being a psychological manifestation, it can only be studied scientifically with the assistance of psychological science. Alexander was never afraid to make use of psychology when it could help him to throw light on the problems of aesthetics. And indeed, when he is not engaged in discussing purely philosophical questions, he is usually applying psychology to a sphere of mind which the professional psychologist has rarely ventured to explore.

Following in the footsteps of Herbert Spencer, Alexander tries to disentangle from among the manifold tendencies and impulses that direct human actions the conative source peculiar to the activity of the artist. But he does not attempt to resuscitate the long discredited impulse to play, instead he traces the origins of art to a sublimated and unpractical urge to material construction. According to the psychology of McDougall, it is an irresistible constructive instinct that sets the beaver to build, the bird to nest, and the nightingale to sing. In man, this primordial instinct ceases to be blind and becomes purposive though still subordinate to biological need, and we have the products of his handicrafts which are soon followed by the mechanical marvels of his technological inventiveness. Finally, emancipating himself from the dull task of providing for his daily needs, he begins to make things for the sheer joy of making them and without a thought for their usefulness or profitableness, the humble breadwinner at last becomes an artist. To use the writer's own words in his pamphlet on *Art and Instinct*: "The thesis which I submit to you is that the aesthetic impulse and the aesthetic emotion which goes with that impulse and is part and parcel of it are an outgrowth from the instinct of constructiveness, and are that impulse or instinct when it has become first human, and next, contemplative."

In his early comparison between "artistic" and "cosmic" creation, he explains why the former event is not a prototype of the latter,

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and has no metaphysical significance. The brilliance and clarity of this psychological theory of artistic creation should not blind us to the fact that it is based on a more than doubtful analogy between animal instinct and human design, and that it ignores much of the little psychological material that has been collected by students of what is probably the toughest problem in aesthetics. It is difficult not to be persuaded that Alexander's most original contribution to the subject is also his most fragile, and that no aspect of his aesthetic doctrine is less likely to survive the legitimate criticism of his successors.

In his treatment of the arts he is at pains to dissociate himself from the popular fallacy of Croce, according to whom a work of art is made of mental stuff, being an "intuition" or "expression," and its material embodiment is merely a practical convenience whereby the artist shares his imaginative conception with like-minded people. He maintains, in contradistinction to this view, that the artist's material actively influences his conception of the object he is fashioning or composing, and that the growth of a poem or a portrait goes on *pari passu* with the recitation of the verses and the brush work of the painter. There is a familiar ring about Alexander's emphasis upon the synthesis of form and content in the finished work of art when one calls to mind the unity of "characteristic" and "abstract" expressiveness in which Bosanquet summarizes the thesis of his *History of Aesthetics*.

The skill of the artist lies in his capacity for "imputing" a "meaning" to materials in themselves emotionally neutral by moulding them so that they become suggestive and eloquent to all beholders of the tenderness and defiance and despair, of the striving and the conflict, that stir in the depths of the struggling and sensitive soul. But a human significance can only be acquired by dumb, inexpressive objects when they have been invested with a form they lacked in the raw state, and there is as it were an organic relationship between the form or pattern of a work of art and its significance for the spectator. In the representative arts it is easy enough to distinguish between the subject and its formal treatment, but in abstract arts like architecture or textiles the two are fused and the subject is no more than the form itself. In his last publication on the subject of aesthetics originally a broadcast lecture, he writes as follows of the unity of form and content: "The artist's imputation of himself to his materials is represented by the form which he gives them." It would be a simple matter to show that this act of "imputation" is extremely similar in character to what earlier writers have called "aesthetic Einfühlung" or "Empathy," and that Alexander is here re-stating in his own terminology one of the cardinal tenets of modern aesthetics.

Branching out from the parent stem you get the separate members

of the two related families of fine and applied art, and each of these derives an individual flavour from the material—words, tones, pigments, clay, glass, etc.—used by the artist to embody and express his imaginative vision. Raw material in the crude state is thus a convenient principle for dividing art into its component elements. A distinction of some importance that Alexander liked to draw was between "beauty" and "greatness" in the arts. The latter quality is conferred by the subject-matter alone, so that a drama can be both beautiful and great, whereas a Chinese vase or a Persian carpet must content themselves to be just beautiful. Thus it is that supreme poets like Dante, Sophocles, or Shakespeare, bring right home to us the mystery of life and death, reveal the tragic conflict between the forces of good and evil in the world, and show us by the enchantment of their impassioned language how courage and generosity can overcome the sluggish egoism that fetters the majority of human beings. Poets of this order are also, as Shelley claimed in his celebrated *Defence of Poetry*, prophets and preachers who turn the eyes of the multitude away from the trivialities of the daily round towards the shining heights of moral and intellectual achievement. It is not often that aestheticians have laid so much emphasis on the intellectual content of an artistic object, but the stress is natural enough in a philosopher, and especially in one for whom poetry was an adored favourite among the arts. In this respect Alexander shares Volkelt's partiality for a "menschlichbedeutungsvoller Gehalt" wherever anything of profound human significance can suitably be enshrined and imparted by a work of art.

It follows from the conception of art as a mixing of the artist with his materials, and from an interpretation of natural beauty according to which the spectator is an artist travelling incognito even to himself, that there is an element of "illusion" in the appreciation of both art and nature. The 'illusion' lies in our spontaneous attribution to physical objects of mental qualities they do not really possess. A vibrating string is neither glad nor sorrowful, a solid mass of marble or bronze is neither heroic nor defiant, a large volume of salt water neither laughs nor rages nor laments. Yet the aesthetic illusion is not a mere perceptual error or a mistaken judgment because we do not attribute the illusory quality to a real object as one of its genuine and lasting properties, but rather indulge in a passing fancy that we know full well to be fictitious for the duration and for the sake of the aesthetic experience. The pleasure inspired in us by things of beauty is the purely subjective side of the reaction, for it cannot be shared with or communicated to others. It is a private reverberation set up in our minds by communion with the beautiful in art or nature, and should not be regarded as an intrinsic element of the essential experience.

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The obverse of this private side to our reactions in face of art and nature, a factor that fluctuates according to the sensibility of individual art lovers, is the public side that seems universally communicable and enables us to speak of standards of taste having general validity. The standard judgments of approbation and disapprobation, with all the fine shades that lie between the two, are laid down once and for all by the critical verdicts of the practised art critics, the connoisseurs, and the artists themselves, and in so far as our personal judgment approximates to or agrees with this standard aesthetic judgment we have good taste or the reverse. The objectivity and universal validity of the standard judgment is guaranteed in the last instance by the identity between the perfect critic's mind in the moment of contemplative delight and the imaginative vision of the artist himself. Actual diversity of taste in art can be accounted for as an aberration from the common norm due to the interference of personal idiosyncracies or to the lack of sensibility among the cohorts of the indifferent. This bears out the common-sense view that what we actually like is not by any means always what we should like, and that taste can be improved by cultivation or allowed to deteriorate through neglect.

A word or two to wind up this exposition of Alexander's views about his attitude to the minor but interesting problem of the aesthetic categories. He starts by explicitly repudiating the Crocean denial of the very existence of these different types of experience, and sets out to describe a number of them in considerable detail. Curiously enough, he has nothing to tell us about the most fascinating variety of all from the standpoint of the philosopher—I mean tragedy and the tragic. That he had spent on this problem much time and thought is evident from a passage in a letter dated May 5, 1935. 'I am now reading Volkelt's *Ästhetik des Tragischen*, and it's a very good book, but it could have been said in half the span.' What conclusions he reached, or why he was unable to reach any at all, we shall never know. Caution forbids him to generalize broadly about "comedy or the comic spirit." But he relished the comic talent of Molière and offers us a theory of his type of comedy, according to which its essence is the humorous contrast between the average, commonsensical person who faithfully observes the social conventions and the foibles and follies of those eccentrics who resent them and find the courage to rebel against them.

The beautiful in the narrow sense is that which lends itself to effortless aesthetic enjoyment apart from its handling by an artist, while the ugly is what in nature is repulsive or repellent but is transmuted into something aesthetically attractive by the skilful touch of the painter or the poet. This distinction is based on the subject-matter of the work of art, and follows Bosanquet's contrast between

"easy" and "difficult" beauty It is strange that in this connection he has nothing to say about the graceful In his treatment of the sublime he sticks closely to A C Bradley's superb essay. Sublimity is a more than ordinary greatness in man or nature whereof the magnitude does not exceed our powers of imaginative sympathy. It is a "difficult" variety to appreciate because we must overcome the initial disharmony of terror or dismay by a strong effort of self-control before we can sympathize imaginatively with the awe-inspiring grandeur of the sublime object He concludes these observations by an interesting and original discussion of the sharp contrast between the "classical" and "romantic" styles in art He attributes their difference to the relative emphasis laid by the artist on the subjective and objective elements in the work of art, thus romantic art is more personal and has greater warmth of emotion, while classical art is colder and more impersonal in conception

In this essay I have contented myself with displaying Alexander's wares as prominently as possible in my shop window, with just here and there a sentence of praise or blame for what I estimate to be their quality, to have succumbed to the temptation of writing a critical study would have transformed my small effort from a brief article into a stoutish book Yet I would not care to bid farewell to the friend and philosopher whose opinions I have endeavoured to describe in these pages without one last word about his rightful place, so far as I am able with my scanty qualifications to judge, as an aesthetician among his fellow aestheticians and in the British tradition of speculation on this sorely neglected philosophical topic

I scarcely think he would himself have claimed to be in the same class as certain continental authorities who have covered the whole field in systematic fashion, he lacked the time and, with advancing years, the energy to emulate the detailed and exhaustive inquiries of the greatest experts Acknowledging an article I had sent him on British aesthetics, published in a German periodical, he wrote at the end of November 1934 "I accept humbly your reproaches of my want of vigour to do something really thorough and systematic What I may yet contrive to do I don't know—but I think I can be most useful in taking up special topics " And so we had to content ourselves with the published lectures and papers on a number of these special topics, as a substitute for the slender volume we dared not hope to see

Yet among English writers on aesthetics, it would be hard to find a compeer in the ranks of his contemporaries, and even harder would it be to fill the gap he has left from among the rare aestheticians of the present day The mantle of Bosanquet had fallen on his shoulders, and he wore it worthily though with a difference; for there is not one of the main problems of aesthetics, whether philosophical,

psychological, or objective, that he did not illuminate by a treatment that was always fair and quite often original. No English philosopher who has grappled with this thorny subject in recent years better repays the student for his midnight oil as well for his clear formulation of the essential problems and the spirit in which he advanced to meet them as for the theories he evolved for their solution.

In academic circles Croce was hailed at this time as the thinker who had said all but the last word on aesthetics, and the two stout volumes of his *Aesthetic* had become the vade mecum of the average university lecturer and professor interested in the subject, but Alexander was not afraid to challenge orthodoxy when it became an excuse for loose thinking or a source of erroneous conclusions. He mentions Croce often in his writings, but it is almost always to refute a misleading fallacy to which the Neapolitan idealist had given currency. He was a scholar in the true sense of the word, being familiar with all the leading authorities on his subject in the English, French, Italian, and German tongues. Judging from occasional conversations and some intermittent correspondence, I should say that his favourite authors were some voluminous and erudite Germans, whose work was so sound and thorough that he even forgave them the weariness of spirit caused by their native prolixity. He had a special liking for Dessoir, whose *Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* he was anxious I should translate. "Dessoir," he wrote in the spring of 1933, "seems to me so sane as well as complete." I cannot myself conceive how a man with so many intellectual interests and attainments was able to read the prodigious number of books on one subject alone to which his scholarship testified. How well I remember my crestfallen astonishment when, soon after the publication of a history of modern aesthetics in which I cited with scholarly pride upwards of two hundred volumes in various languages, I received a letter from Alexander reminding me in the kindest way of two or three authors of some distinction who had escaped my attention. This was a shining example of those rare qualities of heart and mind that made Samuel Alexander one of the most encyclopaedic scholars as well as one of the most inspiring and original thinkers in the long history of English philosophy.

PHILOSOPHY AS ACTION

PROFESSOR J W SCOTT

IN studying the problems of philosophy, it is commonly considered an advantage to approach them through the history of philosophy. But to be compelled to spread one's sails, and take one's solitary course, "as if no Plato or Kant had ever existed," has perhaps its advantages too.

At any rate, the work of Professor Levy¹ has shown what a courageous Marxian scientist can do in that kind. Leaving tradition on one side, and looking chiefly to physical and mathematical research, he sets down what seems to him obvious about the universe as known to science, and the result is a "philosophy for a modern man" which not only is accepted of the people, but which the people seem to have rushed to read, and which, apparently, they came in crowds to hear discoursed of, in public, by its author.

The achievement exacts a tribute, and if, as philosophy, it should be found by the orthodox to be obnoxious to every criticism and to "sail unconcerned through all the charted shoals," the tribute will still be sincere. After all, why should foot-looseness be other than a virtue in a modern thinker? These are days of revision. And in the past the philosophical path-breaker has often enough sat free from the libraries. Spencer did it. And no less a thinker than Thomas Hobbes was also guilty. Did not Hobbes presume to write philosophy before, in the opinion of his contemporaries, he had mastered the literature of the subject? And wasn't it he who met their taunt with the memorable rejoinder, "if I had read as many books as my friends, I should have known as little"?

Any lacunae that may exist in Professor Levy's philosophical scholarship have nothing to do with his knowledge of what he knows. And if the reading he takes, of what he knows, is being eagerly received by intelligent sections of the public as philosophy, the challenge to any who, like myself, may disagree, is not to be content with weakly complaining that old-fashioned Naturalism is being taught again, but to make some shift to exhibit the fallacy—doing this, if we will, in the strength of what Plato or Kant may have taught us, but in any event, without talking Plato or Kant.

¹ This article is the substance of an address on Professor Levy's *A Philosophy for a Modern Man* given at the Left Book Club summer school, 1938, under the title *Some Reflections on Professor Levy's View of the Social Situation*.

It is on this kind of difficult adventure that I am daring to embark in the series of reflections I am offering here

And in the course of them—it may be well to say at once—I shall not attempt to submit any alternative reading of the social situation. The latter, I can see, would alone be constructive criticism. Moreover, Professor Levy's work more than usually deserves it. For it itself means to be practical. It is a metaphysic, by intention, and like all the best work of metaphysical type, it is entangled in "the web of thought and action"—to employ a phrase of the author's own. It conceives itself in fact to be a work thrown up by a movement which is engaged in "making history", and to be such that, assimilated by the people in this movement, it will equip them better for their practical task. If a difference between the naturalistic teaching which it purveys and another type of teaching be worth establishing at all, I recognize that the difference ought to be capable of statement in terms of some alternative conception of social progress and social destiny. I am not prepared to say whether any other type of metaphysic is thus competent. I only wish to acknowledge the legitimacy of the demand, while resigning myself for the present to the pursuit of a much narrower aim: an aim hardly even in the full sense critical, my object being little more than to show the grounds, if I can find them, of a certain personal dissatisfaction with Professor Levy's position, a dissatisfaction which I admit is easier to feel than to articulate and define.

I can at once expose the place where it is felt. It comes most clearly to the surface in the principle of his practical proposals. As metaphysician he finds reality to consist of 'groups'. Whatever we isolate as a 'thing' in the widest sense of that word, proves to be a group. For example, the Marxist movement can be isolated as something. But *qua* 'isolate' it is one of many 'in history and in nature,' in which "groups of people linked together, or groups of things, or of ideas, intertwine and interact." The metaphysical question concerns these groups: "What settles their nature and their order?" An answer is sought in the changes they undergo, and the laws of those changes. And the naturalistic bias appears at once in the assumption that a group is a group, and is under one and the same set of laws, whether it be of men or insects, of atoms or stars or ideas. "When it is a group of things" scientists study it, when of human beings it is important to scientific Socialists."

The above citations are from Professor Levy's preliminary page describing "What this book is about." The description is fully

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borne out by the sequel. The book offers us a strictly scientific metaphysic, which is made to point the direction from which the chief contemporary human problems are to expect their solution. And its answer to the main question, namely what we are to do about the social situation—or at least the principle of its answer—is *Put science on the throne, and let us hear a great deal less of reckonings taken from another order of things than the scientific*.

These last words are not quoted. But I believe they are fair. The moment they are understood, it is easy to feel a certain intellectual mistrust. For people oriented to another than the natural-scientific order of reality have been very common in the world, and the social order is very difficult to conceive without them. But it is easier to feel this massive necessity for something other than the natural, than to locate the grounds of it in terms of Professor Levy's own discourse, which yet seems the only thing much worth doing.

I should have found my mistrust easier to locate if I could have been sure that I saw the precise bearing of certain entertaining, and intrinsically perfectly lucid chapters in the body of the work, which carry the main burden of presenting the scientific background of the whole.

Their general theme is the changing qualities of things. The point of underlying interest seems to be the idea of miraculous change. A distinction is made between change by gradual increments, and real or drastic change. And evidence is accumulated to show that drastic change needs no miracle. Gradual changes culminate in drastic change, of themselves. You drive a submarine through water faster and faster, accumulating increments of change, or in another phrase "intensifying" a "quality", or you speed up a piece of shafting, or you whip a skipping-rope round more and more times per minute, or you make the load on a girder heavier and heavier, or bend a stick further and further. In every case you accumulate increments of a quality, and you can go on at this till, in ordinary parlance, you break something. Whether it be a case of driving, or whirling, or whipping, or loading, or bending, the increments are due to some "external activating cause", and their end is "drastic" change.

There is a rationale of this. If *Q* be the external cause—say the bending force exerted on a stick—we can see that, besides occasioning the stick to change its shape and thus intensify its bentness by increments, the external cause gives rise to a secondary cause, within the substance of the stick—namely, a certain stretching and dislocation of the fibres. And we also see that the bent stick ultimately breaks—a change of quality, or drastic change. Here, causal

¹ *A Philosophy for a Modern Man* pp. 93 ff.

responsibility for the change "shifts from what was the primary cause of the mere sharpening in quality, to a secondary internal cause, which is itself brought into being by the external cause" When the critical point comes, and the crack or break is precipitated, we have a "change of phase" A quality, the bent ness, had just been going through a whole phase of changes It is now dispossessed It is gone It gives place to *another quality*, the broken-ness, which perhaps may undergo a new phase of changes, as when, having broken the stick, one might proceed to twist, continuing to do so until, by cumulative increments, the two pieces come apart—which is another crisis and "change of phase" Drastic change, apparently, is always on this wise We have here a 'general qualitative law of change' which, we are told is usually referred to, in Hegelian terminology, as the passage of quantity into quality But since we are now seeking to disclose an identical scientific law embracing the phases of change which occur in social, as well as those occurring in physical fields, further inquiry into the Hegelian context is not called for 'What we are seeking is a generalization that will have a meaning for a succession of qualitative states usually regarded as outside the confines of orthodox science' The main point seems to be that the same law appears in history, as in the physical world, and that no 'element of creativeness' is required to account for change in either sphere To postulate such an element would be "to introduce a special assumption regarding the nature of existence" which "is not only unessential and confusing but stands outside the whole range of human experience It would be to use "a name without an objective referent," to make "an unnecessary *ad hoc* assumption" Whether a change is only a modification of an existing quality or whether it is a transformation, and whether the thing going through it be a piece of wood or a human mind or a social system, no incursion of anything other than the natural is anywhere required

The abstract scheme of social change is now quite clear Let Q be the bending force exerted on stick or beam It "arouses in it, or intensifies in it, a structural quality q "—strain in the fibres—whose intensification is inimical to the continued existence of S , the given state of the substance "Accordingly, at a critical stage of q the state S is transformed by it into a new qualitative state T "

The immediate cause of the intensification of q to its critical value is Q , the immediate cause of the transformation is q "And with the quaint disregard for the meanings of Hegelian terms sanctioned by the Marxist tradition, this kind of process is called dialectical

¹ *A Philosophy for a Modern Man* p 111

² See e.g. *ibid.*, pp 53 ff

³ *Ibid.*, pp 112-13

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But another instructive point of identity appears here between the physical and the social types of change. In both cases there are ways of seeking to circumvent the crisis, i.e. of obviating or escaping the effects of the internal cause *q*. In the case of the stick it might be thought that by bending sufficiently slowly, or by putting an indiarubber sleeve round the middle of it, or by some other such device, the break would be averted. But it is, of course, not so. So long as *Q* is operating, you may delay *q*, but you are powerless to prevent its getting into action.¹

Now, if I could be sure what the incidence of this analogy really is, I think I should find more easily what I am in search of—the exact place at which I have to part company with the author. The nearest I can come to seeing a point in these illustrations is this. Marx's tremendous bid for the "scientific," i.e. for a socialism which was being brought along, not by anyone's ingenuity and cleverness, but by the entire drift of human evolution, led him into disparagement of all the little Utopianisms of the human will. He relies on the economic forces to *take* men somewhere. See e.g. the Preface to his *Critique of Political Economy*. "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their mode of existence, but on the contrary their social existence that determines their consciousness," and so on. But by tracing changes to a double cause, an outer and an inner, *Q* and *q*, our author finds a place for the human factor in the process of social evolution. The "thing" or 'isolate' which we call human society is seen to have undergone several distinct phases of incremental change in the course of its history, each having been inaugurated by a drastic change, a transformation, or revolution. Thus there was a slave holding a feudal, a capitalistic stage of human society. No stage is static. Each is going through a phase of changes. An "external activating cause" is operating all the time, intensifying the reigning "quality." It makes the slavery always more slavish, the feudalism more pronouncedly feudal, the capitalism more capitalistic, until, in each case, the internal *q* reaches critical value and brings the denouement. Now the great external changing force, in the case of the social "isolate," is technique.² "The drive of technique," the author emphasizes, "is the main causal agency which, as it rises, accentuates and enriches the quality of communal life." And "just as a liquid when subjected to heating takes this up by a mutual adjustment and agitational quality of the molecules, so a community, when subject to a growing technical pressure, must show this somehow in the actions of its constituent members."³ Having thus found

¹ *A Philosophy for a Modern Man*, pp. 125-27.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 190 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

that the Q in social change is technical pressure, the author seems to want to stress the fact that q , the internal cause, is human. And so human agency gets itself inserted into the Marxian picture. The "agitational quality" shows itself in "what is called the class struggle", this being, in any period, "an inseparable physical consequence" of technical pressure, i.e. of the way in which production and consumption are organized. This is clearly a process carried on by conscious human beings. Feudalism, let us say, has persisted for a time, despite the onward march of technical improvement. But when it yields at last, it is made to yield by a certain q , namely the intervention of men. The "change of phase" only occurs when men have been provoked to a high enough pitch of determination and purpose and clearheadedness and idealism. This I think is the position Professor Levy means to endorse. And if so he will, of course still want to adhere to the earlier position that it is of no use trying to circumvent the crisis. That would only be putting an indiarubber sleeve round q . Such is the net main result of all "Utopian" efforts as of all others which do not lie back upon the advancing tide, and take as theirs the direction in which the great world itself can be seen to be irresistibly moving.

Now clearly this general picture of the course of human development must make one of the main subjects of study for the 'science' which Professor Levy would put upon the throne. And I am compelled to ask, *is it in that case science which he would see in this position of responsibility?* It may be. But if it is it is certainly science with a difference. I am not sure that he does not even mean it to be science with a difference. And the question by which I am haunted is, whether the difference is enough to fit it for the throne. I know very well what I think would so fit it. It would be such a change as would make it philosophy. Philosophy, in fact, is what it would become, if it could really do the work to which Professor Levy puts it, and which (I think) he thinks it really does—nowadays. For science is not what it was. It has come of age. It has become fit (I think Professor Levy thinks this) *for a new task*, whose nature, however I find it hard to bring to clarity, but which it is intriguing to me to try to track down. And this I must attempt now to do.

Scattered all over the book,¹ I seem to be continually coming upon some such view as that science should be fit for observing something more now than mere natural facts. It is time it turned to history, and this, without forgetting that it itself is part of the history. In fact the time has come for science to throw itself down under the microscope, and see how it itself looks among the other facts.

¹ Cf. e.g. pp. 96 ff., 154 ff.

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that are there. Now we need not forget, though it is a circumstance affecting a long past speculation, that David Hume tried that. He tried precisely that. He was going to have *science itself* under the microscope, with the world which it gives us, and look at it, as a detached observer should, with no prejudices and no illusions, *abiding by what is there*, like our own Einstein, all with the one result, now well known, but to him sufficiently amazing—that of the thing he thought he had put there, namely science, nothing was to be seen, nothing, that is, of what was essential to it and characteristic of it.

If this indication is anything to steer by, it would appear that there are things which *science misses*. It *misses itself*. And lest it should seem for a moment that this is nothing of any great account—no disqualification of science for the throne—we must remember that it is only part of a still more disconcerting discovery which Hume made when he turned his scientific glass upon the knower of science, the entity called by his own proper name. *That* had even disappeared. Perceptions he could find in abundance, passions and ideas and impressions, but no possessor of them, no personal ego, no David Hume. He could play a game of backgammon and forget about it. And when he forgot, he believed again in this person. But—what is important for us—science could never find him.

Now I have no wish to drag a particular estimate of a particular historical philosopher into this controversy and shelter behind its authority. I should have to sympathize at once if Professor Levy told me that David Hume had nothing to do with him. At the very most I, as a believer in the usefulness of the history of philosophy, am pointing to a straw on the current. In truth historical accuracy makes little difference to the argument. The voice that the ear of tradition has heard in Hume, whether it was his real voice or not, is a genuine voice. It is awake now, and is speaking, in all our positivistic approaches to psychology and metaphysics, with precisely the result which has been taken to be Hume's result. If, as psychologist, I seek the aid of the behaviouristic glass, and look within myself, I find that "*I*" am nothing, just as the substantial world without is also, from the same standpoint, nothing, so that, when Professor Levy asks us to put science in the saddle, with only the proviso that the scientist must see *himself*, now, among his other data. I cannot help wondering if he ever really will. I will put my doubt *once more in positive terms*. What I am saying is: if we are to enthrone such "*science*" as will give us man, *and not everything about him except him*, I question if it is science at all that we are asking for, and not philosophy. Science observes, and you cannot observe science, nor yet the intelligent personality whose utterance science is. And an inability to know personality does rather rule out a claim to authority on the social situation, which

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is made of persons and is made of nothing else. Any failure to grasp personality, any inadequacy in our conception of selfhood, must write itself out in our social programmes.

But I cannot longer delay making some attempt to say what this "philosophy" is, of which I have been speaking. If persons are hidden from science, what are they to "philosophy"? What does it mean that we are to *do* about persons? And at all risks I would seek to answer unambiguously. What philosophy would have us do about persons is, *understand them*. For that alone is how you come at them. And having said this, I suppose I may expect to be asked at once whether our author has *not* been doing this, whether he has in fact been doing anything else than this very thing with persons. Is not his whole work I shall be asked an endeavour to understand their behaviour in the mass?

Let me then amend my answer—even if I have to put it still a little further out of focus, so to speak in order to get it into focus. When I say *understand them*, I mean *literally walk among them*. The ideal of science is to observe—and keep out. Philosophy is the observer's attempt to plunge in, though if I may put it so, without shutting his eyes. This step has to be taken. It is the step from thought to action. In making science take it in making science be active, Professor Levy is pulling science in the direction of philosophy. He calls it philosophy 'a philosophy for a modern man'.

Philosophy involves a moment of immersion in, and identification with, something objectively and ideally human. Speaking of history, Spengler says somewhere "It is the mark of the real appraiser of men that he understands how the 'other man' is adjusted," and regulates his intercourse with him accordingly. This is the quality of the historian. And he speaks of the difficulty, and the importance, of "the art of appraising some man of the past (say Henry the Lion or Dante) of *living myself into his history-picture so thoroughly that his thoughts, feelings, and decisions take on a character of self-evidence*." Philosophy is this same living understanding, only, of ideal man. This kind of understanding is really action. It is the inner side of action. It alone can ultimately guide social action.

Society consists of persons, and there is a social problem. Persons, *en masse*, have somehow got wrong in their mutual adjustments. Far from being the beautiful thing they could be, in their "social order," they are become a chaotic crowd, a very formless rabble on the earth. But they are trying to march. They are fumbling for the step. Nay, there is a music, by stepping to which—in their presence—you can give them to find the step. Not the very doing

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of this, indeed, but the inner side of the doing of it, the suspended doing of it, is philosophy

The "web of thought and action" is very closely woven I am persuaded nonetheless that there are two things, either or both of which the writer of any "philosophy for a modern man" can do; and that it makes all the difference whether or not he is conscious of the distinction between them. He can be scientific, and he can lead. He can be the cool, observing scientist, or the warm leader. But there is a hiatus between the first of these two postures and the second, which must not be smoothed down or glossed over, if the science is ever to make itself fit for the throne. One must distinguish the two clearly, and having done so, one must clearly let the one borrow from the other. That done, another attitude is born, which is neither leadership nor science. It is an attitude of sympathy with ideal man. It is an adjustment, of theory, to that in the ordinary man in the street which cannot be observed. It is what I call, and what I rather think has been always called, the philosophic attitude. It alone, in the ultimate resort, is socially competent—able to move man man-wards.

Science does not move men. It observes how they move, and notes it down. It compiles statistics, draws up indices, makes curves, shows the births, the deaths, the divorces, the curve of suicides in the hot months, and so on. It reveals what happens. And an almost endless amount of work of this kind, such as Professor Levy calls for, still waits undone.¹ But offering men information is not what moves them. What moves men is understanding them—not knowing them, but knowing them as what they are not, knowing them as ideal men, or, more simply, taking their own inner view of themselves, and carrying it further in the direction in which it wants to go.

We cannot do without science in understanding man and human affairs. But if it is to have sovereignty, if it is to be itself the thing that uses science, its observation and description must graduate into something that will be revelatory of human beings as human. Unless it helps its cool observations by a breath from that atmosphere which moves men, it will never so observe as to be able to indicate effectively the line along which man grows to his satisfaction.

Let us again recall those historical "phases" of which our author speaks.² We look at the "isolate," human society. It has a history. Glancing down the course thereof we see phase after phase, always a *Q* operating without, and slowly pressing some inner *q* into action, and at last bringing the crack which inaugurates the next phase. All this is observation. Social history is here being passed before

¹ See *A Philosophy for a Modern Man* pp 248 ff

² *Ibid*, chap v

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the camera and recorded. That is not *understanding* men. It is not seeing them from within. But you the observer may be able to come within, and bring all this that you see, with you. If you are lucky you will thereupon find yourself with a gospel, e.g. the Marxian gospel, and thrill men to the marrow. By "coming within" is meant that you lie along men's inner view of themselves, catch that view, enlighten it, broaden it, carry it further. That is action, and *the suspension of that* is the philosophic perspective. I would call it an intellectual attitude of action, or an active observation. And if we would find society, in its living identity, we must approach it in that attitude.

One further point in this aspect of our theme has to be mentioned. It concerns *that which we bring with us* in the moment when we thus come within men's own perspective of themselves. I have called it our observation. But I have qualified it with an adjective. I have called it 'active'. It is not just observation. It is an observation destined to come within, and already tinted with its destiny. We must be men, not mere observers, while we are doing this observing. We must be men if we are to see men. This means that we must see them with our being, not with our eyes only.

Professor Levy's book takes us to history, and it lets us see a pattern as we glance down the centuries. Everyone would agree that this is the right thing to do if it can be done. My point is that, under his leading, we turn to history seeking a pattern, without having scrutinized what we are taking with us when we go to do the seeking. In all such seeking that is the one important question. Had we, in going to look at history, gone to it equipped with an active understanding of man, of his real make-up, of the destiny shadowed in his structure, of the dialectic inherent in it, then we should have gone to the facts with another selecting apparatus, and social history would have taken on another aspect, and this voiced in men's ears might possibly, for all we know, have given a different practical lead. For instance, it might have planted the flag a little out of line with men's economic interests. In any case, we have to take an understanding of human good with us into our assessment of history, if we are to get from it a helpful indication of where that obscure wicket gate lies which leads into the next new phase. Our primary need in all this matter is for balance in our view of the psychological structure of man. We may thereupon hope to clear our ideas concerning what makes him man, the one helpful thought when we are considering the larger questions of social arrangement. We must be content with what little pattern history shows when we look at it as a man-making process. "How is man made man in it?" is the only question we can fruitfully take to history. And no "escapeology" is of any use as an answer.

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This brings me within sight, I think, of the exact point at which I must diverge from Professor Levy. He looks at history, and I also try to. But going with a different selecting-apparatus I get a difference in the pattern. What pattern, then, am I to say is there? Down what line do I see man rolling and staggering, when I go looking in history, as I must do, for some drift of humanity towards manhood?

Hegel's "simple, clean, and noble" view, in all this matter, is of very little service, standing as it does "like a marble temple shining on a hill." But it can be taken as a background—and that chiefly for the following reason.

If the glass through which we must scan history for a pattern, be an inward view of man, Hegel's glass was at any rate an inward view of man. But he was weak in psychology. He over-rationalized the creature. Hence his "noble" view. The phases of history, for him, are governed, each of them, by an idea—the reigning idea of the time. Keeping to our own scheme we may ask why, e.g., did mankind establish the slave-and-master relationship? "Because at that time," would run the answer, "this was their idea of the best form of social life." And how are we to explain the feudal order? By the fact, again, that it was man's idea of the desirable at a later time. Man, in a word, is intelligent, he has ideas—he tries one conception of what life ought to be and perseveres with it until he discovers it at fault, when he tries another one and a better, working it out through another phase of his development. Thus as a free, creative being shaping his life always after the last and best idea he has, he climbs the slow spiral of progress. Such is man's movement towards humanity, in Hegel's view.

This view Marx turned upside down. No doubt those leading ideas were there, but they did not make history. Rather the reverse, it was history that made them. History takes its own course. It merely throws off all those ideas in the passing—to keep itself right in the eyes of men. True, the leading idea of the period does receive utterance in the period. It finds vehicles for itself in all the features of the reigning culture, books, sermons, politics, pictures, dramas, poems. But all these "spiritual" voices are but the by-product of something that is indifferent to them. Events follow a course of their own. The Great Hunter crashes through the forest, and men get trampled and cry out, or they stand safe and applaud. Their "ideas" are but the expression of that cry. History heeds no such cry. The real track that history follows is that of economic advantage. Plunging down that channel, it carries men's ideas with it like bubbles on a river's surface, which bubbles, Hegel assumes to be directing the stream. They of course think that they are. And Hegel is sympathetically inside them taking their own

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inward view of themselves and carrying it further. But in truth they are like the drunken rider who thinks he is taking the old horse home, when really the old horse is taking him.

I cannot see that Professor Levy, by introducing *q*, alters this position. He would insist, if I am interpreting him rightly, that ideas are something better than bubbles, that they do work—that the revolution cannot come without them. But this is not open to him, on the premises he adopts, which say that they work always at the instigation of a great *Q*, namely, the economic forces. These remain the real causal agent. "Needs and desires, ideas, ethics and morality, science, art, literature, social institutions, social theories," are all derivatives, in his view, from the fundamentals—the stresses and strains of economic life.

This leaves to man, as human, no real agency. And I must moreover dispute the truth of it. In doing so I am not denying in any way that the spiritual forces work *within* those stresses and strains, if one only means by that that they all work within the laws of nature. But that, surely, is a commonplace. As an individual human creature trying to live a life, I do continually send my ideas scouting ahead of my action, and they do carve out a path for me—and of course it is a path in the world, and only within the limits of the nature of the environment. With man in history it is the same. His scouting ideas, if they carve out the course of history, do so always within definite and irremovable limits. No one ascribes omnipotence to ideas. No one claims that *any* idea can do *anything*. When one speaks of ideas one ought not to mean only wild or rotten or foolish ideas. Those do go under. They are carried down the stream. Well that there is a stream to take such debris away! All this is surely common ground. What is between us then? I think it is the view that *when idea calls man in one direction, and economic advantage whispers to him to take another, man can never resist his economic advantage*. Hence history must go where economic advantage leads. Social history must be technological history. To all this, I simply have to demur. I must think that man *can* resist his economic advantage. *When I observe him with my being and not with my eyes only I seem to observe that fact*.

Perhaps, however, I may be granted this point (or up to a point I may be granted it) by the defender of the economic view of history. The individual, I may be allowed to say, can indeed resist the lure of economic advantage. He may put it from him, for a whole long life, as the total abstainer does drink. The mass, however, will never do that—at least, not in the end.

But I cannot see any better foundation for this than an eye-observed view of the end. Such an end is irrelevant. The earth will

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drop into the sun in the end! In the true "end," the non-temporal end, the mass does not enslave itself to its economic advantage. Has not one seen the Scottish Sabbath Day? Did it not persist through a whole nineteenth century? And in a country not insensible to its economic advantage! Would it have gone even yet, if it had been better preached? Who is to say that it would? Have not cathedrals risen, and holy days and fast days, and papal, imperial, monarchical pomps been maintained till peoples have staggered under the expense of them? I would not dream of denying that *it is more difficult to get the mass to follow a lead, when the lead veers off from their economic advantage, as it must ever and again do.* A foolish lead—according to the standard of the wisdom of a period—would have a small enough chance of life, if it asked the masses finally to forgo elements of economic advantage which were open to them. But will anyone say the same of a wise one? The position which I find irrefragable in the matter, I can only conclude by setting down—and it is not without a certain sense of gratitude to Professor Levy's book that I do so, for having forced the view into some degree of articulation.

I say that economic advantage has no power to resist the ascendancy, even with the mass, of ideas really essential to the making of man man, if such ideas ever get themselves fairly presented to consciousness. The view that energies so directed are bubbles on the stream is unacceptable just for the old familiar reason, that it cannot logically be taken. I am a man, and interested in the course of that stream, a man, and therefore worried and disconcerted when it takes the wrong course. When that happens, I immediately find myself appealing to the bubbles—that is to say, taking them *not* to be bubbles. I want to influence men's ideas. It is not in my option—or in any man's—not to want it. Everything turns on men's being bitten with the right ideas. All men believe this. I do, Professor Levy does, Marx does. We have to be serious with it. We have to let it into our observation. This is what it means, to be men in *observing* men. The moment we observe historical man with more than our eyes, we see that what makes history is not forces, *but men trying to be men in the midst of forces.* And we may have good hope that the forces are really adapted provided men can be sensible, to make men of them.

DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S *MODES OF THOUGHT*¹

THE appearance of a new book by the most distinguished living philosopher of the English speaking race is to use Dr Whitehead's own terminology an occasion of serious importance in the annals of thought. Or rather it is a whole society of occasions so richly suggestive is his handling in these lectures of a host of speculative problems. The vague presuppositions of knowledge ignored in the epistemology of the last three centuries owing to exclusive emphasis on what is clear and distinct in perception and thought and the structure of reality as process—these two questions are in the fore front throughout but woven into the web of the argument with unflinching relevance to the central themes are discussions of the origin and nature of language the method of history the analogy and distinction between aesthetics and logic the problem of evil the validity of moral codes and the theological doctrine of the immutability of God. Of Dr Whitehead we can truly say that 'age cannot wither him nor custom stale his infinite variety'. This book is bound to prove both exciting and provocative. For Dr Whitehead does not hesitate to trail his coat before the champions of what he holds to be error, however fashionable the error may be in contemporary thought. What we wonder will the mathematicians say when they find a master of their own science writing these words. A prevalent modern doctrine is that the phrase 'twice three is six' is a tautology. This means that 'twice three' says the same thing as 'six' and that no new truth is arrived at in the sentence. My contention is that the sentence considers a process and issue. Of course the issue of one process is part of the material for processes beyond itself. But in respect to the abstraction 'twice-three is six' the phrase 'twice three' indicates a form of fluent process and 'six' indicates a characterization of the completed fact. (125) What will the logical analysts think of this virtual resurrection from Kantian depths of 'synthetic *a priori*' judgements, or of the relegation of tautology as implying completion of the unending task of understanding to be the intellectual amusement of the Infinite. (71) 'How will the Behaviourists or their American survivors like being told *à propos* of the implication of value in all human thinking that a consistent Behaviourist cannot feel it important to refute my statements. He can only behave? Or the scientists that we find them at one and the same time denying infractions of natural order, and denying any reason for such denial and denying any justification for a philosophical search for reasons justifying their own denials.' (120) 'They will retort perhaps that here is one who though in past time a great thinker has anchored in his declining years in a haven of exploded fallacies. A perusal of this volume is sufficient refutation of such an absurdity. It shows beyond possibility of question that Dr Whitehead's speculative vision is not yet dimmed nor his intellectual force abated. His provocation is never inappropriate or diffusive. Like his master Plato—a master be it noted whose doctrine of Forms he is not prevented by loyalty from criticizing—he goes unflinchingly whether the argument leads "'

¹ *Modes of Thought* by Alfred North Whitehead F.R.S. F.B.A. Sc.D. LL.D., Cambridge, at the University Press 1938. Pp. viii + 241. Price 7s. 6d.

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The book before us consists primarily of six lectures delivered at Wellesley College, Massachusetts, in 1937-38, to which are added two earlier Chicago lectures on "Nature and Life," and as an epilogue, a brief address on "The Aim of Philosophy" given at an annual reception for graduates at Harvard. In the Wellesley lectures, here printed for the first time, the author develops certain important aspects of his philosophy, not fully treated in his previous works. He expressly disclaims the intention of entering upon systematic metaphysical cosmology. That is to be found in *Process and Reality*. His aim, he tells us, is "to indicate those elements in our experience in terms of which such a cosmology should be constructed" (231). What he means by this is clearly explained in the opening lecture. All systematic thinking arises amid a background of indeterminate presuppositions: the explicit premises are abstractions from a vague beyond of awareness that stretches forth in varying degrees of relevancy over the whole infinitude of natural process defying formulation in clear and distinct concepts. To ignore these obscure but basic presuppositions is the besetting temptation both of science and philosophy, and to yield to it entails slow but certain retribution. "The conjunction of premises from which logic proceeds presupposes that no difficulty will arise from the conjunction of the various unexpressed presuppositions involved in these premises. Both in science and in logic you have only to develop your argument sufficiently, and sooner or later you are bound to arrive at a contradiction, either internally within the argument, or externally in reference to fact" (14). The disjunctions of what Hegel called "the abstract understanding" break down when we discover the limitations of the closed system within which our mind is working. Henry Sidgwick once observed, with Hegel in mind, that he was unable to grasp the difference between the kind of contradiction that was just a contradiction and the kind that conveyed a profound truth. Dr. Whitehead would reply by reference to the grade of abstraction in which the contradiction had its source. "Consistency grows with abstraction from the concrete" (82). Geometrically, a patch of red presents no inconsistency with an adjacent patch of blue. Yet, for aesthetic valuation, the juxtaposition of colours may mean the ruin of a masterpiece. The moral is that the philosopher must keep his system open, by constant reference to the presuppositions and the interpretations of ordinary life," i.e. to the implicit *Weltanschauung* which limits and conditions all systematic construction. Otherwise speculation will degenerate into pedantry. "Philosophy can exclude nothing. Thus it should never start from systematization. Its primary stage can be termed 'assemblage'" (2). This task of "assemblage," that is "the free examination of some ultimate notions" of wide generality, inherent in literature, in social organization, in the effort towards understanding physical occurrences" (1) is the concern of these lectures.

The argument is at once critical and constructive. On the negative side, Dr. Whitehead calls in question the whole trend of epistemology during the last three centuries in that it takes its start from the data presented in sense perception interpreted in the light of clear and distinct concepts. His grounds for this conclusion and the method by which he reaches it are already familiar to readers of *Process and Reality*. What is new in his latest presentment lies in the tracing of the error to its source in the neglect of the aforementioned presuppositions of knowledge. The thinkers in question repudiated "our intimate vague experiences in favour of a mere play of distinct sensations, coupled with a fable about underlying reality" (43). To do this is like attempting to explain modern civilization as wholly derivative from the traffic signals on the roads (*ibid.*). The nemesis befalling such a mythology is illustrated (in the first of the two Chicago lectures on "Nature and Life")

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more convincingly perhaps than anywhere else in Dr Whitehead's writings from the history of physical speculation. He shows there how the common sense view of Nature as 'the world as interpreted by reliance on clear and distinct sensory experience visual auditory and tactile' accepted uncritically by the founders of modern science and developed to such high issues by Newton and Hume has generated its own nemesis in the denial by twentieth century physicists of every detail in the original concept. The doctrine of inert matter in simple location in space and time has given way to a doctrine of sheer activity. If we ask activity for what? physics can give no answer. For that nature must be integrated with life and value. A dead nature can give no reasons. All ultimate reasons are in terms of value. (184) Of course Newton and Hume are right as far as they go. Their error lay in the omission of those aspects of the Universe as experienced and of our modes of experiencing which jointly lead to the more penetrating ways of understanding. (185) In a word they systematized without previously assembling.

This brings us to the positive side of Dr Whitehead's argument. We might take as the text his final dictum that the key notion from which such construction should start is that the energetic activity considered in physics is the emotional intensity entertained in life. (231-232) In elucidation of this principle he starts in the first three lectures with a discussion of Importance Expression and Understanding. As his manner is he uses these terms of popular speech with a meaning of his own. Two things are clear with regard to all three terms: they indicate no mere subjective fantasies but universal characters of occasions in the objective process of Nature and they imply activity of valuation. We need not remind our readers how for Dr Whitehead everything that exists partakes essentially in the nature of organism and how selective prehensions stretching outwards over the whole universe of actuality are directed and utilized in the light of a subjective aim. In other words what the human mind distinguishes as fact and value are integrated in the basic structure of all existence. This is the main point of the first lecture: the Importance of things signifying that they have meaning and value—and for Dr Whitehead all meaning is of the nature of value—and that they rouse a feeling of interest in each experiencing subject. That something matters is a primary disclosure of experience which systematic reflection when it arises can disregard only at its peril. 'The notion of importance is like nature itself: expel it with a pitch fork and it ever returns. The most ardent upholders of objectivity in scientific thought insist upon its importance.

The zeal for truth presupposes interest. (12) It follows that the knowledge of any single fact presupposes a co-ordinated environment which is the whole universe in perspective to the fact. Matters of fact whether taken collectively or in atomic isolation are mythological abstractions: connectivity and value have their roots in the bedrock of actuality. The second notion Expression presupposes the first: representing the reaction of the individual occasion to the importance of its environment. Importance stresses the monistic aspect of the universe in its relevance to its finite constituents. Expression is the gift from the world as many to the world as one. (29) Here lies the evidence for the presupposition of an external world. The human body which is at once part of ourselves and continuous with surrounding nature is the primary field of expression. (30) Dr Whitehead enlarges this definition so as to apply the idea of expression to infra-human animal organisms vegetable organisms and finally to the inorganic world which is dominated by the average and where individual expression is at a negligible minimum. The impersonal methods of science fix attention exclusively on the manageable relationships of man with the world and on

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the 'traffic lights' of sensa which, for all their practical utility, are yet completely superficial as a revelation of reality. This brings us to the discussion of language, 'the outstanding example of the way in which mankind has fabricated its manageable connections with the world into a means of expression' (44). In speech, 'while a superficial, manageable expression is diffused, yet the sense of the vague intimacies of organic existence is also excited' i.e. in the functioning of the lungs and throat. Herein lies the superiority of the spoken to the written word. Language is not thought, as some hold—were it so, translation, even the most imperfect, would be impossible, but it is thought's most important expression, apart from which the rise of human civilization would be inexplicable. "The account of the sixth day should be written. He gave them speech, and they became souls" (57). In the third lecture we pass to Understanding i.e. to the ideal of completed knowledge, in which all differences are synthesized in unity, all process in achievement, all inference in self-evident intuition. The attainment of this ideal transcends the capacity of finite minds. For man, to understand means ever increasing penetration into the unknown, and the arrangement of novel disclosures in patterns of order, which represent the measure of self-evidence realized at a given stage of intellectual advance. In mathematical thinking for example self-evidence—the *scientia intuitiva* of Spinoza—is very restricted, only such a 'snippet of knowledge' as that $1 + 4 = 2 + 3$ seems self-evident to Dr. Whitehead, though Ramanujan's power of intuition is said to have covered the first hundred integers (65). We confess to finding it hard to grasp the topics successively treated in this chapter with anything approaching to self-evident understanding. But two points stand out clearly. Among the many types of pattern revealed to human knowledge, at varying levels of abstraction, the extreme poles are represented by logic and aesthetics. Logic concentrates upon high abstraction, moving from details to the totality and achieving the enjoyment of an abstract unity of composition; aesthetics keeps close to the concrete and moves—the reference here is to the spectator's enjoyment of the finished work—from appreciation of the whole to appreciation of the parts (84-86). The other point is the moral on which Dr. Whitehead is never weary of insisting: that for philosophy as for the life of civilization it is the inclusion of novelty that is all essential. The gathering of details into pre-established patterns is necessary indeed, but not sufficient. The main concern of the philosopher is with the discovery of new patterns adequate to his "new vision of the great Beyond" (79-80). That is why a genuine philosophy is incapable of proof. Its aim is to convey self-evidence. 'Unless proof has produced self-evidence and thereby rendered itself unnecessary, it has issued in a second-rate state of mind producing action devoid of understanding. In philosophical writings therefore proof should be at a minimum. The whole effect should be to display the self-evidence of basic truths concerning the nature of things and their connection' (66-67). Dr. Whitehead sets the cat out of the bag without compunction.

The second part of the Wesley Course is entitled "Activity" with the sub-headings 'Perspective', 'Forms of Process', and 'Civilized Universe' for Lectures IV, V, and VI respectively. The governing thought is the differences of the perspectives of the universe for different entities i.e. what the universe is for each entity 'either in the way of accomplishment or in the way of potentiality' (91). Familiarity with Dr. Whitehead's previous writings is presupposed throughout. In Lecture IV he discusses types of being with special reference to the Platonic conception of a world of timeless Forms characterized by the question-begging terms, 'self-sustaining', 'completely real', 'perfection' and "certainty". Theologians, scientists, and humanists

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alike have enslaved themselves to dogmatism ignoring the intrinsic reference of the forms to process of actuality to potentiality True Plato in ascribing life and motion to the Forms revealed an insight beyond the cadres of his own system, as also did Hume, when he appealed for explanation of the connectedness of phenomena to the fact of expectation (113) For reality is process characterized fundamentally by three pairs of opposites, Clarity and Vagueness, Order and Disorder, Good and Bad There is a close affinity between the first members in this triad of contrasts it was natural for Plato to think of number when he gave his lecture on the Good But transcendence of mere clarity and order is necessary in dealing with the unforeseen for progress for excitement (109) Dr Whitehead does not we note explicitly mention a need for transcendence of Good The fifth lecture asks and answers the question as to whether the universe has intrinsic value Organic life implies both frustration and stability Any process can be analysed—it is the doctrine of *Process and Reality*—into data form transition and issue Every fact is inclusive of potentialities constituting the driving force of process But the universe is more than process The reflective consciousness discerns within the universe not only the two moments of attainment and transition, but ideals of value beyond ourselves thus apprehending three realities which, with explicit reference to Alexander we may designate Space Time and Deity (139-142) Deity is that factor in the universe whereby there is importance value and ideal beyond the actual Apart from the sense of Deity we should be enclosed in a solipsistic prison Within our primary grasp of realities—so we read in the last lecture of the series—prior to the clear disclosures of sense perception we vaguely and obscurely discriminate three factors The Whole That Other and Myself (150) The discrimination is of worth rather than of distinct existence We enter the room of clear presentation and reflective thought already equipped with an active aesthetic experience to which sensory experience adds vividness and colour The primary glimmering of consciousness reveals Something that matters and Totality Externality and Internality are its primary characterizations' (159)

Two points remain for special notice concerning respectively the ground work and the coping stone of Dr Whitehead's argument (I) Readers of his later books cannot fail to have been both excited and perplexed by the distinction drawn between two modes of direct awareness viz perception in the mode of sense-presentation and perception in the mode of causal efficacy Everyone understands the former but the latter was bound to provoke a demand for further elucidation In the fourth and sixth of these lectures, Dr Whitehead sets himself to satisfy this requirement Direct experience, he tells us, falls into two divisions On the one side there is a qualitative experience, complex vague and imperative embracing the sense of derivation from without the sense of immediate enjoyment within, and the sense of transmission beyond and involving past present and future In this experience we are immediately aware of our historical connection with the outside world (through our body which is continuous therewith) with our own individual existence and with the distinction between the animal body which is the region of intimate intense mutual expression and the rest of nature where the intimacy and intensity of feeling fails to penetrate (98-99) In the mode of sense presentation on the other hand we distinguish clearly, but with no sense of personal intimacy forms of quality (*sensa*) in the external world in their spatio-temporal relations The knowledge thus acquired is rigorously impersonal devoid of emotional significance and of value The former mode of apprehension is primary the latter a sophisticated abstraction 'Our

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experience starts with a sense of power, and proceeds to the discrimination of individualities and their qualities" (162) That is Dr Whitehead's answer to Hume His language in exposition is often cryptic, especially in regard to the cognitive value of these primitive and vague causal experiences The appeal is not to logical demonstration, but to "self-evidence," in the sense in which that term is defined in these lectures The doctrine makes sense of civilized experience (144-145) If we build a theory of knowledge exclusively on the basis of sense-presentation, we find ourselves inevitably landed in absurdity and paradox A public world, the connectivity of self and things, valuation and all that makes civilized life worth living are alike inexplicable We are left with a universe without expression and without importance If, on the other hand, we take the primary experiences of valuation as the groundwork, the disclosures of sense-perception fall into place Dr Whitehead is far from degrading their significance for civilized thought and life, they render the world manageable, in the service best understood of purposes which they are unable, when taken as the sole data of knowledge, to explain What he rejects uncompromisingly is their claim to primacy It is strange, surely, that so pregnant and revolutionary a doctrine should not already have aroused more discussion among contemporary thinkers For the most part they have been content to exclaim 'How very interesting!' adding 'How very improbable!' and to pass by on the other side Such a step-motherly attitude is hardly adequate in face of what promises to be the most significant contribution of the last half century to the advance of philosophic inquiry

Our second comment (II) has reference to the concept of God In the closing pages of *Process and Reality* Dr Whitehead outlined what might be called a novel form of the Cosmological Argument 'God' he there wrote, 'is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse He is their chief exemplification The governing thought that the process of Nature requires an actual entity who is the *locus* (can we say, the *bearer*?) of all value is clear enough, but its development by Dr Whitehead is bound to raise a hornet's nest of questions, in the minds both of those who accept Theism and of those who reject it What precisely does he mean by God's 'primordial nature,' which though eternal is yet unconscious in conceptual appetition? The extension of the field of "conceptual feeling" to cover what is generally called inorganic nature is intelligible—we recall Professor Laird's doctrine of natural election—but why is the experience unconscious in God? Because consciousness implies integration of conceptual with physical feelings which are absent from this primordial nature But it is hard to conceive an eternal act of infinite conceptual valuation as in any way deficient in actuality When we read of the static majesty of God's "appetitive vision," the language seems unrecognizable with entire lack of conscious apprehension And how are we to interpret God's relation to the mystery of creativity, 'the "ultimate" of which He is the "primordial non-temporal accident"?' How if this primordial nature be wholly unconditioned can He be said to be 'in the grip' of creativity? Nor are the difficulties diminished when we consider the relation of God's primordial nature to His consequential nature, as immanent in the time-process of the universe? Is the consequential nature, though temporal, transcendent in its everlastingness of the particular finite experiences within that process? We recognize that the distinction is one "of reason" between abstract moments in the divine nature God, we are told, is "not before all creation, but with all creation" If Time be a feature of the created order this statement is consonant with traditional Christian speculation but would Dr Whitehead allow God's primordial nature to be in any sense ontologically prior to His consequential? How, again, is the

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goodness of the consequential nature compatible with its being determined, not free? Further, does God's consciousness develop in time as a characteristic of His consequential nature, *pari passu* with the historical emergence of consciousness in finite entities and the reception of *their* consciousness into His nature? Or is He *everlastingly* conscious? In the latter case the relativity of His consequential nature to the temporal process of nature seems to be seriously impaired by His consequential transcendence. These are some of the problems raised in the reader's mind by Dr. Whitehead's previous book. The impression given by the present lectures is that God's primordial nature has receded into the background and that we are left with a God who though not identical with the totality of the universe is wholly relative to its temporal history. 'There is an essential relevance between Deity and historic process' (142). An ambiguous sentence like this calls for further elucidation. Dr. Whitehead, as we have noted, has no patience with the Hellenic legacy echoed by Descartes of a God who exists in self-contained perfection above time and change (92-93, 164). He seems to think such a being to be incapable of activity or life. But what of the Aristotelean concept of *ἐντελεχεία ἀκίνητος*? Was Plato after all so inconsistent in ascribing life and motion to the Forms? In Spinoza's system the Attributes constituting the essence of God are active powers generating by timeless causal energy the world of *natura naturata*. Christian orthodoxy too recognizes diversity and process within the aseity of the divine Unity. Moreover it secures by its doctrine of Creation the reality of the spatio-temporal process. Nor is the religious demand for a God in whom there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning, to be accounted for solely or mainly in terms of the Greek mathematical tradition. As Dr. Whitehead himself has reminded us the familiar hymn 'Abide with me fast falls the eventide' expresses a deep-rooted desire in human nature and one that has its sources in those primitive insights which are the basis of our knowledge of reality. While he recognizes the need of a permanent amid change, he leaves us uncertain as to the manner in which this need is met by his philosophy. If again, as Dr. Whitehead holds, the historic process is as necessary to God as God is to it, he would surely find it hard to come to terms with the religious consciousness. It would be interesting too to learn what meaning Dr. Whitehead, who has touched so often and with such insight upon Christianity, would ascribe to the doctrine of the Incarnation which marks the line of separation between Christianity and all other religions. Such are some of the problems in regard to which these lectures still leave the reader in perplexity. It may well be that we have failed in understanding. It is no easy task to follow Dr. Whitehead either in his thought or in its verbal presentation. And he has given us so much in this book that is illuminating that it seems churlish to voice any feelings of dissatisfaction. But he has said so much on this last mentioned subject that he can scarcely be excused from saying more. We close therefore by entreating him with all respect to develop yet further his metaphysical theology and to set forth, in sufficient detail to enable the judicious reader to appreciate their self-evidence, what he judges to be the essentials of a reasonable theistic faith.

W. G. DE BURGH

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

IN No 34 of *Philosophy* (April 1934) I drew attention to an important publishing enterprise in Italy—the task namely, undertaken by R Mondolfo, of translating and bringing up to date Edward Zeller's *Philosophy of the Greeks*.* The second volume of the work is now published, comprising the philosophy of the Ionians and the Pythagoreans. It is enough to note that two chapters alone of Zeller's history have been extended into a volume of more than 700 pages to be convinced that Mondolfo's commentary and modernization far exceed in bulk the original text. The undertaking is really unique of its kind. Mondolfo takes Zeller's edition as his starting point for a critical exposition of all the questions that succeeding writers down to the present time have debated concerning Greek thought and on these questions he formulates his own considered judgment. There is no monograph of importance published within the last fifty years in Europe and America that Mondolfo has not analysed and discussed, so that the student has before him the most complete bibliographical inventory he could desire, together with the clearest and most authoritative guide in his own research.

Naturally at a distance of more than half a century from the last editions issued by Zeller the orientation of studies on Greek philosophy has considerably changed and this movement is so accentuated in the book that at times the two authors seem to have been collocated more for antithesis than for any likeness. But since Mondolfo is careful to indicate through the intermediate literature the gradual stages of the transition from Zeller's reconstruction to that of the present day, the very antithesis is comprehended in the view of a unified development. With regard to the pre-Socratic schools the progress from one position to the other is effected by several converging routes: (a) by means of a more positive valuation of the influences of oriental thought, which Zeller had excluded on principle; (b) by the use of sources of romance and mystery (Robde, Joel etc.), revealing a closer adherence of the first philosophers to the popular Greek soul and religious feeling; (c) by according greater importance to the scientific significance (Tannery, Burnet, etc.) of some doctrines which dogographical tradition through misunderstanding of their ancient interpreters rendered too superficial and extrinsic; (d) by an ever-wider exploration of sources and more frequent comparative analyses of them, so as to illustrate and clarify them reciprocally.

Mondolfo has not only been able to give us, through his additional matter, the measure of the efficiency with which contemporary critical thought has worked along these ways, but he has succeeded also in showing their final convergence, which has sometimes escaped the observation of those who were moving in them, because they were not in a position to follow the movements of others from their own restricted viewpoint. Thus, for example, at first sight the emphasis on the mystical romantic elements may seem to be in opposition to that on the scientific themes of pre-Socratic philosophy, so that they tend to neutralize one another. On the contrary, they tend to com-

* Zeller Mondolfo: *La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico*. Vol. 2, *Ionici e Pitagorici*. La Nuova Italia Editrice, Firenze, 1933, pp. 746.

plete one another. In fact, as Mondolfo points out "the spiritual needs of an age in the first ardour of expansion, pervaded by the related exigencies of knowledge and power, respond with one accord to the same impulse of life. Hence, in the unity of the activating spirit they do not suppress or inhibit one another nor can they remain separate in themselves and in the various forms of intellectual activity and practice to which they give rise but they are determined and stimulated and fertilized by one another. The ages of intense exuberance of development and of the vigorous effervescence of new life are as pre Socratic Greece and Western Europe at the time of the Renaissance afford eloquent proof ages of active enthusiasms in the fields of practice as of theory of exploration commerce industry and technics as of the disinterested disciplines of the fine arts and pure speculation. These active enthusiasms naturally assume mystical hues and shapes which, however do not fetter them, or choke out of them the ampler air of scientific activity, but add fuel and spiritual fervour to their unfolding" (p. 45).

With this criterion Mondolfo is able among other things to solve the vexed question of the coexistence in the most ancient Pythagoreanism of an ethical mystic with a scientific mathematical direction. As is well known this coexistence has been denied in recent times by many scholars who wished to reduce the primitive school of Pythagoras to a religious sect to which any kind of scientific activity was still foreign. Now it is certain that the denial or affirmation of such activity should depend in the last instance on historical and philological documentary evidence. But it is also certain that the orientation of research in one direction or the other in view of the obscurity and scarcity of the sources depends principally on the manner in which the two orders of interest religious and scientific are understood whether they are taken to be antithetical or concurrent. In consequence Mondolfo is able to confront the excessively narrow supporters of the negative thesis effectively with the assertion that the true problem of the historical comprehension of Pythagoreanism eludes whoever posits the originally separate existence of a purely religious aspect: it is the problem of the initial unity of the two aspects whereby the religious spirit has been able to inspire and fecundate scientific activity (p. 682).

A more detailed examination of the unnumerable questions debated in this most copious volume would of course fall outside the scope and intention of the present notice. It must suffice to call the attention of students to it as an indispensable instrument of their labours.

Many monographs on Pico della Mirandola have been published in Italy in the last few years and I have already introduced one of them written by Anagnone to the readers of *Philosophy*. But the latest to appear by E. Garin,¹ is the best of them all and gives an analysis balanced as a whole, and penetrating in detail of the whole philosophical religious activity of this suggestive thinker of the Italian Renaissance. From this monograph it appears ever more clearly how greatly European philosophy in general in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was indebted to the so-called Platonic Academy of Florence.

Garin in his study vindicates Pico's independence of Ficino in face of the common tendency to make of him a mere follower of Ficino's thought. In fact not only did Pico energetically maintain, against the exclusive predominance of the Platonic tradition, the rights of Aristotelianism and of the Arabic and Jewish interpretations of it but he also collected in his syncretism other elements, magical and cabalistic which confer a certain exotic note on

¹ E. Garin, *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Vita e dottrina*. Le Monnier, Firenze, 1937, pp. 238.

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his mental individuality, differentiating it clearly from Ficino's. However, the expression "syncretism," by which it is customary to characterize Pico's philosophy seems to Garin inappropriate. Rather than a patchwork of incongruous elements, he sees in it a synthetic principle which the philosopher's premature death at the age of thirty two prevented him from realizing in all its completeness. Thus, in studying the cabalistic sources of Pico's thought Garin shows that he was not a mere passive and uncritical collector of them, and therefore he confutes 'the equivocal interpretation of those who made him out to be a convinced and faithful follower of the grossest forms of cabalistic mysticism which in reality included a cast iron astrological determinism. On the contrary Pico who in every way sought to gather out of the Cabala its deepest speculative contents found in it above all a method of scriptural exegesis and at the same time accepted the assertion that the universe is the book wherein God has written His own thoughts in mathematical symbols. This Pythagorean thesis which the genius of Galileo was to make his own was effectively expressed by Pico in the last of the cabalistic theses, in which opposing the true astrology—astronomy—to judicial astrology he asserted *Sicut vera astrologia docet nos legere in libro Dei, ita Cabala docet nos legere in libro Legis*. Hence when Pico composed the *Conclusiones* and the *Oratio*, just as he refuted astrological determinism in his praise of the dignity of man, so already, however vaguely, he outlined those theories that the *Disputationes in astrologiam* were to develop in full (pp 180-1).

In connection with these *Disputationes* I was pleased to find in Garin's book a confirmation and a development of my argument in *Rinascimento Riforma e Controriforma*, to the effect that contrary to the general opinion of the interpreters there is no contradiction but full agreement between Pico's confutation of astrology and his profession of magic. It is customary to take astrology and magic as expressions of a single current of thought, and thus may perhaps be true in the oriental and Hellenistic traditions. But the strong humanistic feeling that the Renaissance brings with it implies at least in the more conscious thinkers a discrimination between the two teachings that is an acceptance of magic as the expression of the active power of man to dominate the forces of nature by magical formulas, and a refutation of astrology as the expression of the dependence of man on astral determinism. This discrimination is the work of Pico and foreshadows, though in a form that is still fantastic the gradual transformation of magic into science, and of its formulas into scientific laws, which will have in reality that power to enchain and control the forces of nature of which magic was the obscure presentiment and which will give to man that Baconian power that he had already fancifully attributed to himself by means of the magic art.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO

(Translated from the Italian by Constance M. Allen)

NEW BOOKS

A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason By A. C. EWING
M.A. Litt.D. (Cantab.) M.A. D.Phil. (Oxon.) (London: Methuen
1938 Pp. viii + 278 Price 8s. 6d. net.)

The distinctive feature of this new commentary on the *Critique of Pure Reason* is that it is written principally with the idea of making the work plain to ordinary honours students in universities especially those who study it as a set book. It thus aims not so much at detailed exegesis of the text as at giving an adequate presentation of the general argument and indicating (and in some cases attempting to solve) the chief difficulties about it. No one is likely to deny the author's claim that a book of this sort has been long needed in English and there are few who will not think in view of his earlier work on Kant that Dr. Ewing was a very good person to write it. Here as before Kant's arguments are presented sympathetically and lucidly and here as before the comment on them is pointed and stimulating. The result is that the *Short Commentary* should prove a most useful addition to English philosophical literature. Its value however does not lie in its utility alone. Dr. Ewing himself thinks that his interpretation of Kant is sufficiently original to make his book a contribution to Kantian scholarship and of interest to professional philosophers and this claim is I think a just one. In what follows I shall try to indicate the most striking features as well as the general quality of the work.

The two things which I found most interesting in Dr. Ewing's introduction were the statement of Kant's general problem and the discussion of a *priori* synthesis. (i) The *Critique* is said to have two main aims: to provide a philosophical basis for physical science and to 'deny knowledge in order to make room for faith' in Kant's special sense of faith. The two aims are connected and the latter was to Kant the more important but that does not mean that we can't be interested in the first without having much sympathy for the second. This is true but rather perfunctory. It might have been shown how both problems arise out of the question of the competence of the intellect to attain knowledge *a priori* which itself interests Kant because of his preoccupation with the respective claims of theoretical and practical reason. (This last point is mentioned but not so prominently as it should be.) The whole section could have been lengthened and perhaps illustrated by reference to Leibniz and Hume with profit. (ii) The question whether synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible is again (cf. the author's *Idealism* pp. 67 ff.) identified by Dr. Ewing with the problem of significant inference and an interesting discussion of it is given. The matter is complicated because many philosophers say that propositions which cannot be denied without self-contradiction cannot give new knowledge. Therefore they say significant inference resulting in *synthetic a priori* propositions reached by thinking is impossible. But this argument cannot hold according to Dr. Ewing since the proposition "what cannot be denied without self-contradiction gives no new knowledge" is itself *a priori* and synthetic. A conclusion then like Kant's that the only valid synthetic *a priori* propositions are those which can be justified by a peculiar sort of reference to experience or by appeal to 'pure intuition' is false. And it may be granted

that Kant would have great difficulty in answering the question "How are the synthetic *a priori* propositions of philosophy possible?" But whether this in itself invalidates his account of non philosophical synthetic *a priori* propositions is another matter. It would have been interesting to have had explicit statements from him both about significant inference and about philosophical propositions.

Dr Ewing's comment on the Aesthetic is distinctly good, and his treatment of the "Transcendental Exposition" of space is perhaps the most original thing in the book. He asks whether modern developments in geometry have put out of court Kant's arguments from the requirements of Euclidean geometry to the necessity of regarding space as a pure (subjective) intuition. In answering this he says we must distinguish between Euclid's axioms and the inferences from them. Kant's account of the latter is almost certainly wrong, but there does seem to be some plausibility in the suggestion that the axioms of Euclidean geometry are true, either factually or logically, of perceptual space. Now I suppose, if we could say that there was some necessary connection between Euclid's axioms and perceptual space, Kant's argument (B 41 cf A 24) from our consciousness of their necessity to the subjectivity of (perceptual) space might still hold. The difficulty is to know whether there is such a connection and Dr Ewing does not seem able to make up his mind about it. But in any case Kant's other argument, from the necessary applicability of Euclidean geometry to everything in the physical world to space's subjectivity, will not be valid unless we can show that physical as well as perceptual space is necessarily Euclidean, or else that there is no distinction (or no distinction of kind) between the two, and this, though perhaps not impossible is certainly more difficult to establish.

In dealing with the Analytic, Dr Ewing takes the Transcendental deduction first a procedure which makes Kant's argument more intelligible than it is in the *Critique* (What is needed to set the Analytic going is an exposition of the view that there are *a priori* elements in understanding and a preliminary sketch of their part in knowledge and this is very hard to get out of the Metaphysical deduction.) Dr Ewing gives first a general statement of the argument of the deduction, and then a discussion of the main difficulties. The general statement is clear and helpful, though I confess to feeling doubt about the saying (p. 83) that the unity of apperception and the unity of objects entail each other. I should have thought it truer to say that consciousness of the unitary character of the self depended on our synthesizing the given manifold and being, at least potentially, aware of it but that unity derived not from the manifold but from the self. But perhaps this is what Dr Ewing means too and the dispute is about words. Apart from this as I say the general summary is admirable and so are the discussions of detailed points—particularly those on the "multiple" theory of the composition of the *Critique* the relation between understanding and imagination and the controversy over the noumenal/phenomenal character of the synthesis. The remarks about affinity are interesting too though they might have been developed by reference to the appendix to the Dialectic and the two introductions to the *Critique of Judgment*. Altogether Dr Ewing (like Kant) is inclined to say too little about the possibility that the nature of the manifold may make the deduction impossible.

I can only comment on two points in the treatment of the rest of the Analytic. First, one of the stages in Dr Ewing's summary of the Metaphysical deduction is that "a judgment must be defined as the bringing of data under the objective unity of apperception." But, as Vleeschauwer and others have

¹ *La deduction transcendendale*, t. II, 45, 131 ff., III, 142 ff.

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pointed out, this seems to be just the view of judgment which is *not* presupposed in the Metaphysical deduction, and this it is which makes the argument so difficult to state plausibly. My other point concerns the very interesting treatment of the different Refutations of Idealism. Dr Ewing holds that despite what he says in the second edition Refutation Kant never means to assert the existence of physical objects in any sense which could not be reduced to propositions about what human beings experience or would experience under certain conditions (pp 180-1). This is to transform the permanent Kant speaks of into something like Mill's permanent possibility and perhaps it truly describes Kant's view though I confess I still feel puzzled about his sharply distinguishing (B 275) *things* from *representations* after virtually holding that things are in some sense groups of representations (Perhaps the real difficulty is about the status of representations.) Statements like that of A 98 that all our representations as modifications of the mind belong to inner sense are very hard to swallow if they mean that they are all subjective images. Yet Dr Ewing sometimes accepts this as Kant's view (e.g. p. 60). Presumably it is not the view of the Cambridge philosophers whom he compares with Kant on this point.

I have left myself very little space to deal with the Dialectic of which the discussion is short but fairly adequate. There ought surely to have been something about the difficult opening section (and about the nature of theoretical reason generally) and there ought to have been a mention at least of the Hegelian treatment of the Antinomies. To compensate for the lack of these there is an interesting half chapter on the ideas of reason and a valuable discussion of freedom. A corresponding section on moral theology would have been welcome.

On p. 268 n. the reference should read *Logik Einleitung* IV (not p. 4). There is something wrong with the reference on p. 2 n. 2 though I can't discover what it should be. The title of the *Dissertation* on the same page should be *On the Form and Principles* etc. There are a few other misprints, but none serious.

W. H. WALSH

The Problem of Historical Knowledge: An Answer to Relativism. By MAURICE MANDELBAUM. (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1938. Pp. xii, 340. Price \$3.50.)

This book fills a gap, and fills it admirably. I do not know of any other monograph of any recency in English (translations excluded) devoted to the systematic study of the philosophical problems raised by the fact, methods and content of historical inquiry. This is a subject of which we are excessively shy, presumably because whenever we think of the philosophy of history as a possibility we remember Hegel and recoil. But historical science has at least as much title to philosophical attention, whether critical or constructive as any other science, and it has a particularly direct interest for those who pursue or make use of the history of philosophy.

Dr Mandelbaum's chief concern is to refute the charge that objectivity cannot belong to historical knowledge. Croce, Dilthey and Karl Mannheim are selected as relativists and their theories briefly expounded and criticized. As opponents of historical relativism Sumner, Rickert, Scheler and Troeltsch are examined and found to be unsuccessful. From his survey of these seven thinkers the author analyses out what he regards as the two basic grounds of relativism, namely that the content of an historian's knowledge is determined on the one hand by the sociological conditions of his own thinking

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on the other hand by his own valuational viewpoint, or, more generally, that whatever structure historical events may have intrinsically, the structure they are given in historical knowledge is contributed by the historian's mind. Such a separation of the connections of knowledge from the connections of fact is encouraged not only by epistemologists like Hume and Kant but also by those writers of treatises and textbooks on the methods of historical investigation who treat the establishment of particular events and the synthesis of these as two distinct processes or even provinces of historical inquiry. That in practice they are not and could not be distinct, except at a fairly high level of synthesis, the author is easily able to show, the internal and external criticism of source material being impossible without a background of already synthesized historical knowledge. Dr Mandelbaum's most general reply to the relativists is, then, that events do not in fact come before us atomically but are apprehended from the start in a context of other events. But is the context thoroughly objective? Obviously, Dr Mandelbaum could not settle this question without swelling and running his book by entering into the labyrinth of general epistemology. He rightly confines himself to the specific objections against historical objectivity, to what he has called the two basic grounds of historical relativism. To the first—that an historical statement is what it is because of the factual conditions under which it was made—he replies that the question whether an historical statement is true or no is distinct from the question what led to its enunciation because they cannot both be answered by an appeal to the same set of facts, and he notes the relativist's *petitio principii*, that the sociological conditions of the historian's statement can themselves be objectively known. To the second ground of relativism—that the historian's statements are shaped by his valuations—he also gives an uncompromising denial. The fact that much alleged history is propaganda is deservedly disposed of with the remark that in so far as its content is determined by its motive it just is not history, and the obvious influence of valuation in broad philosophical syntheses is similarly set aside as falling outside the properly historical province. Still, the most empirical historian always selects, and the principle of his selection is valuational in part, he studies what he conceives to be worth while or important. This fact, however, is irrelevant, for the events selected are thenceforward investigated causally by the usual empirical methods. Of course, unconscious evaluations sometimes find links where there is insufficient objective evidence but the nature of historical investigation is not to be defined by admitted lapses from the ideal. The unassailable point is that in practice as in propriety any historical statement of alleged fact or linkage of fact is tested not by examining the character of the historian's values but by reference to the field of fact itself. With this position the need of each generation to rewrite history is entirely compatible, for the need may arise through factors belonging to the strictly historical field such as the discovery of new documents or the falsity of familiar ones or the causal repercussions of certain types of fact (e.g. economic) formerly understressed.

With objectivity in Kant's weakened sense of the term Dr Mandelbaum is not content, but has room only to declare not to elaborate, his reasons. It is sufficient for his purpose to argue that historical science can hopefully aim at an objectivity comparable with that attained by the natural sciences of matter.

There are many interesting pages on historical relevance as a category, not of logic but of fact, as synonymous with causal relation and on the nature of this relation. They cannot be cogently summarized in a few lines. I can only say that they leave me with misgivings. An important consequence which

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Dr Mandelbaum believes to follow from his analysis of these and the preceding matters is what he calls *historical pluralism*—the denial that the entire field of historical events can be regarded as a single system—whether causal or teleological. If there were a single organic system, he urges, we should be in the difficulty, set by a coherence of truth of not being able to begin at all without a prior knowledge of the system. If we tried to explain everything by national character, we should be elevating an observed typical way of behaving into a principle, besides supposing to be constant what is demonstrably changeful. Anyhow, there are many nations, each with its own character, so that such a version of history would leave it pluralistic, and so too would the explanation of all the events of an epoch by reference to an epochal spirit (*Zeitgeist*) for such a procedure would tend to make each epoch largely self-contained. Nor can any teleological monism be worked out, except speciously through large scale surveys which either rule out the incompatible small scale episodes—which is tantamount to pluralism—or simply postulate in these concealed concordant purposes. Hegel, for example, effected his synthesis by ignoring primitive times, and Comte by considering little more than the peoples of Europe. History is to be conceived then, as an aggregate of interpenetrating but partly independent causal patterns, and this is the warrant for the growth and relative autonomy of such divisions of the field as the history of a nation, of politics, of economics of art, and so forth.

The best tribute I can pay to the book is that neither in content nor in tone does it invite any trivial criticisms: the examination it demands would concern fundamentals and would go beyond the scope of a review. The argument is developed carefully and unaggressively, without rhetorical emphasis or any other sort of display, and is informed throughout by relevant knowledge. There are incidental insights of real penetration such as the remarks on historical periods on pp. 280–283 and 313f. Those who have never grappled with the philosophy of history are fortunate to have available so competent and level-headed an introduction. A very useful bibliography is added.

T. E. JESSOP

The Clue to History. By JOHN MACMURRAY (London: Student Christian Movement Press. Pp. xii + 237. Price 7s. 6d.)

Professor Macmurray warns his readers that this book is 'hard to understand and easy to misunderstand'. The difficulty is due to the fact that "the traditional habits of life upon which our civilization is based give rise to habits of thought and reflection which prevent us from understanding Christianity. And since Christianity is the motive-force behind the development of our civilization, the future of civilization depends upon such understanding. For this we have to create in ourselves that religious comprehension of reality which is the historic achievement of the Hebrew race, and which reached its mature expression in Jesus. In a limited review I shall perhaps be least likely to do injustice to the book by going to the heart of the matter in an attempt to understand at its centre the conception of history it proposes to work out."

'The discovery which Jesus made, we are told, was the discovery that human life is personal, and the special significance of this is the self-discovery of his own essence as a human being, and, therefore, of the essence of humanity. Further, the fundamental postulate of religious rationality' is that the purpose of God must inevitably be achieved.' Combining these

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principles it is concluded that past history is explained by them and the end to which human history is, in fact, moving is defined 'The intention of God for man is then—the kingdom of heaven which is to be established on earth' The achievement of this end, however, depends upon the co-operation of man For a 'dualist consciousness' this suggests that the end may be frustrated But for the religious consciousness with the 'totalitarian' religious view this is impossible "Man must and will co-operate since the end must inevitably be achieved" The problem of evil, it is admitted, is not thus disposed of but it is "transformed" If man refuses the "intention" which is involved in his own existence he is inevitably divided against himself "Every such effort will in the course of its history defeat itself," until the intention which belongs to the reality of the human essence is adopted Thus, the law of future history is defined At the same time the problem of human freedom (as freedom of the will) would apparently disappear because to do the Divine Will is our real nature We are not ourselves when we do otherwise The difficulty of seeing that the Divine purpose is accomplished or that history is the 'continued Act of God' (page 93) in face of actual history would be overcome as the general argument of the book seems to indicate, by a transition from the individual event to the course of history in the long run beyond our vision Since it is axiomatic that the end must be achieved we may look confidently to future history Here it should perhaps be noted that the "clue to history" does not apparently apply to all history, at least the illustrations only concern the Christian era including its immediate prelude in the Roman system and the history of the Jews This is the more noticeable because of the employment of the notion of the dialectic transition between opposites which in theory, should have a universal reference, and which is especially regarded as belonging to the discovery of Jesus, as expressed in the saying "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it" Professor Macmurray speaks of this as the working of the practical law of contradiction "This is verified by the whole course of European history down to our own day The will to power necessarily frustrates itself 'It creates an intention which negates its own reality' This is especially seen in the way in which the will to freedom and equality of the individual self, necessarily achieves its own destruction and the establishment of its opposite, collectivism and the collective mind Whether Christ's words with their deeply personal quality can be made to stand for a universal historic law, affecting relations of Empires to subject races and classes to each other in the industrial age, and whether the notion of a collective mind can be extracted from any of His teachings is not a question that can be discussed here But was the collapse of the Roman Empire due to the negation of the will to power in the governing class and its opposite the desire of the 'common people' for freedom and equality?—or does this law explain the conflicts between spiritual and secular powers within the Holy Roman Empire? The close association in the historic survey of the dialectic law of opposites with the Christian purpose and intention which is throughout towards "freedom, equality, and community," is a source of difficulty For the logical law should operate with indifference to human values, whilst the Christian law can only work in one direction towards higher value In this respect it might seem that actual history is a less negative though highly inexact illustration of the dialectic law than of the Christian From Professor Macmurray's standpoint the best illustration, of a combination of both is in the development which he thinks inevitable from the industrial capitalist society to a communism which recognizes and does not reject the real Christianity which is its true basis

By the Christian purpose we are to understand essentially the Jewish The

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intention which defines Christianity has its source completely within the experience of the Jewish people. The universalism of Christianity, totally inconsistent with the Jewish religious racial idea of the Chosen People, is the true completion of Judaism though rejected by it.

The supreme place of the Jewish genius in Christian history in Professor Macmurray's view is primarily due to its complete religious interpretation of life—the superiority to dualism, i.e. to the distinction between action and reflection, this world and another, material and spiritual, ideal and actual.

God is a worker—not an aristocrat. 'Leisure is not the goal of human life. The Greeks on the other hand, whose contribution to real Christianity is disavowed and their contribution to culture only allowed in the aesthetic realm to which their philosophy also is assigned exalt contemplation. The meaning of their view of the changeless divine contemplation is that 'God is the opposite of a worker.' Professor Macmurray's special depreciation of Stoicism as the refuge of the contemplative consciousness makes him ignore its significance as precursor of Christianity in the unlimited ideal of citizenship of the world and human brotherhood. He would seem also not to estimate as real work the development of law and equity by the great Stoic Jurists, though he makes a slight reference to it. A similar point of view determines the interpretation of Descartes who 'prescribes the universal form of modern philosophy.' His *cogito ergo sum* implies individual freedom in reflection, but conceals the negative of freedom in action. He does not claim freedom to act but only freedom to think. *Cogito ergo sum* is in fact equivalent to 'I will not be a worker.' Professor Macmurray must certainly be seeking in the depths of Descartes unconscious! This identification of the self with mind—is simply the reflective expression of the character of modern society. We are curiously reminded in the association of a ruling class with intellect and a working class with emotion and action of the class divisions of Plato's Republic. The explanation of Kant's Practical Philosophy has a like root. Its dualism results from membership of an individualist society in which the individual needs a world bound by determinate laws in order that he may freely enjoy his own reflection. It may be observed that this standpoint is illustrated in modern Russia where it appears the pursuit of truth if divorced from immediate practical results is usually frowned upon.¹ The key to the interpretation of philosophy may be found in the concepts that

the substance of any society is the workers—and that social dualism determines philosophic thought, so that those who are not engaged in physical work must in their thinking be in opposition to the workers, and to the spirit of Christianity. As regards the question what is the substance of a society it may be observed that this will be differently answered according as we are referring to the component membership of which the greater proportion will be (in a political society) physical workers or to the qualities which have given the society its special place in history. These will in general though not always be found in all classes. What if we are referring to population for instance—constitutes the substance of Soviet Russia? In one sense the mass of industrial workers and the peasants—the great majority of whom did not (as many who know them well have testified) desire revolution as such but individual possession of the land. In another sense Lenin's band of professional revolutionaries² and their successors in the Bolshevik party.

Another aspect of dualism is found in a contrast between the emotionalism of the Eastern Church in Russia regarded as favourable to revolution and socialism, and the intellectual character of German socialism to which it is

¹ Cf. Sidney and Beatrice Webb *Social Communism*.

² Cf. E. Borkman *The Communist International*.

argued its failure was largely due. The fact that the greatest influence of the Orthodox Church was amongst the peasants who were not the most distinguished by revolutionary enthusiasm, seems to be overlooked. The bitter hostility of Soviet Communism to Christianity which, according to the argument it ought to recognize as the force which freely brought it forth, as a close approach to fulfilment of the Jewish (Christian) purpose, is explained as opposition to official Christianity and its frequent alliance in history with the ruling class. A still deeper source of opposition—namely, to the Christian principle of love, if not also to that freedom and humanity which are declared to be the purpose and intent of history—is not noticed. But in a remarkable chapter Professor Macmurray observes though not in this connection hatred is love frustrated by fear.

In a brilliant passage Hitler's antipathy to the Jews is explained as dependent upon the fact that he has taken over for the German race the narrow Jewish principle of the Chosen People, whilst he dreads the universal principle hostile to all racial exclusiveness which is maintained in Christianity, is the true culmination of the Jewish faith. Thus Hitler's racialism will achieve the triumph of the Jewish consciousness in the German. The idea expressed in the notion of the Chosen People has of course profoundly affected other races as for instance, notably the Japanese.

Some at least of the difficulties raised by Professor Macmurray's interpretation of history might disappear if one could correct one's habits of thought so far as to accept the rigorous totalitarian conception as he understands it involving that man is really co-operating in the achievement of the Christian purpose whatever he seems to intend. But since Professor Macmurray evidently does hold the view that he has found the clue not merely as a *List der Vernunft* or an overruling Providence but as experientially verifiable probabilities as to his success must arise at least from the standpoint of a philosophical interpretation of history. Such doubts are chiefly due to the partly unworked *a priori* method in which only those aspects of the infinitely complex process which are capable of apparent exemplification of certain principles are allowed to stand out. History will not suffer the *a priori* or the imposition upon its course of necessary laws whether the Hegelian doctrine of the union of (or logical transition to) opposites, or an ethical principle of inevitable progress to a certain end. It does not work according to schedule (page 92). Laws applied will fail to correspond to the endless novelty and individuality of the development and the contingency of the events which interrupt and carry the stream far beyond reach of the supposed laws. In the case of Professor Macmurray's interpretation there is an immense simplification. Abstract concepts as for instance the idea of *Lebenskampf* as a kind of psycho-analytic process in society which brings the suppressed emotional unconscious into consciousness, take the place of analysis of all the individual factors in the emergence of any new historic development. The fact that according to the principles adduced much might have happened in Christian history which has not happened is not a difficulty for Professor Macmurray since as he observes, the end is not yet. The end never is yet, in history.

As regards the original warning concerning the difficulty of understanding Christianity and the importance of returning to its ethical principles truly understood, it appears to me that Professor Macmurray is in the main right. But the attempt to combine these principles with a modified form of dialectic law working in history seems to distort the interpretation and lead to some strange paradoxes, in respect to the Christian core of modern developments. The book however certainly wins respect and arrests attention by the

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earnestness and conviction with which the argument is presented and is an interesting treatment of one of the greatest problems

H D OAKELEY

The Will to Civilization an Inquiry into the Principles of Historic Change
By JOHN KATZ (London Secker & Warburg 1938 Pp vii + 346
Price 12s 6d net)

This book does not only offer a philosophy of history (and of much else besides) it is also a tract for the times. In form it is an attempt to work out a theory of human development and then to apply this to the actual historical process but throughout Mr Katz has his eye on our present discontents and he concludes with some explicit suggestions as to how they may be met. In spite of a fairly definite structure his argument does not admit of brief summarization and many of his most interesting contentions cannot be mentioned here. But his general thesis can be roughly outlined as follows. According to his view the problem of civilization is to reconcile the principles of creativity and unity and we in modern times have been so creative that we have failed to attain unity and indeed are unlikely to attain it short of a world community. But at the same time we appear to be in danger of losing our creative powers. For his chief remedy is that we should recover as he thinks the Bolsheviks and even the Nazis in a way have done the faith in civilization which he regards as the essence and justification of religion. We must avoid the religion of the churches which sacrifice creativity to unity and seek by rationalizing them to console mankind for failures in civilization and still more must we avoid mysticism and metaphysics which perform these functions for individuals whose spiritual and intellectual demands are more complex than those of common men. Instead we must accept the empirical in the way that creative religion demands and become more fully conscious of our relationship to the historical process. If we do that we shall heal the wounds in our own souls and increase our chances of realizing the universal community.

In a work of this kind it is obviously impossible to expect a high standard of accuracy everywhere, and Mr Katz seems to disclaim any pretensions to scholarship by eschewing such things as quotations references and footnotes. But it is difficult not to feel that many of his generalizations are hardly compatible with one another or with the acceptance of the empirical which he desires to inculcate in his readers. Moreover his statements are often obviously questionable. At the same time it is natural to admire the courage of a work which not only takes all knowledge for its province but bases confident practical recommendations upon its theoretical conclusions. Even readers with specialized knowledge of the many matters with which it deals will welcome its bold handling of its main theses and can hardly fail to be stimulated by many of its discussions.

O DE SELINCOURT

Background to Modern Science Ten Lectures at Cambridge arranged by the History of Science Committee Edited by JOSEPH NEEDHAM and WALTER PAGEL (London Cambridge University Press 1938 Pp xii + 243 Price 7s 6d)

The growing realization of the mutual interaction between scientific and other cultural ideas has led to an increased interest in the history of science

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London University has for many years led the way by instituting a department of the History and Philosophy of Science, and now there is hope that such enlightenment will spread to Cambridge

These lectures commence with two very valuable essays on the pre-Newtonian era, from the Greeks to Galileo, by P. M. Cornford and Sir W. C. Dampier. They form a background for the description of the last forty years or so of science by experts who have themselves contributed largely to the advances made. The late Lord Rutherford gives a fascinating and characteristic account of the development of ideas on atomic structure, and his successor in the Cavendish Chair of Physics, W. L. Bragg brings out the increasing importance of the methods of crystal structure analysis. Chapters of equal interest on Atomic Theory by F. W. Aston and Astronomy by Sir Arthur Eddington complete the non-biological series.

In "Physiology and Pathology" J. A. Ryle concentrates on gastric physiology, describing the work of Beaumont Pavlov and some more recent workers. The advances in Parasitology and Tropical Medicine are exemplified by the discussion of malaria and yellow fever by the late B. H. F. Nuttall, and the changes which have occurred in the theory of evolution are traced by R. C. Punnett.

J. B. S. Haldane concludes with "Forty Years of Genetics" and sums up the present situation as follows: "In spite of the biometricians Mendelism is accepted by a vast majority of biologists, but if we want to discover whether a particular Mendelian hypothesis will explain a set of facts we are forced to use the mathematical criteria invented by Pearson."

It is to be hoped that the editors will be encouraged to publish a further series of these interesting and stimulating lectures on a rather neglected subject.

G. BURNISTON BROWN

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science By A. CORNELIUS BENJAMIN, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago (New York: Macmillan & Co. 1937. Pp. xvi + 469. Price 16s. net.)

It is well known that recent discoveries in physics have forced attention upon the philosophy of science. For instance, in the journal *Science Abstracts* there is now a heading "Philosophy of Science" and every month appears a number of abstracts of papers which are definitely of a philosophical nature. This would have been unthinkable not many years ago. Granted then the growing importance of such studies, it is clear that there is need of a textbook from which the student may obtain an introduction to the subject as a whole and which will supply references to the works of individual writers. To produce such a book has been the aim of the author, and he has achieved a large measure of success.

After an introduction on "The Field of Philosophy" there are three parts: (1) Problems in the Logic of Science; (2) Problems in the Analysis of the Concepts of Science; and (3) Speculative Problems. It is evident that as a textbook comparing different philosophical views it is essential to have a well-defined set of terms. In this respect the author chooses the term *event* as the "most adequate name for the basic entity of science." Knowledge then becomes "the awareness of the realm of events." Symbols are also events and their meaning is found in Ogden's "sign situation." They have two very important types of relationship: (1) Reference to events not themselves normally symbols; and (2) reference to other symbols. Few scientists

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will wish to find fault with this approach but it is unfortunate that two important words constantly in use—"fact" and "real"—should have evaded definition, this as always leads to obscurity

In analysing the concepts of science, in particular Space, Time, Force, and Probability, the author is not quite so convincing and admits that several concepts have not yet been clearly analysed. In view, however, of the very great difficulty of the subject, the author is to be congratulated on having produced a good and valuable textbook

G BURNISTON BROWN

The Riddle of Life A Survey of Theories By WILLIAM McDUGALL M B,
F R S (London Methuen & Co Ltd 1938 8vo Pp xv + 279 Price
7s 6d net)

Professor McDougall's latest work consists of a critical exposition of all the more important theories purporting to explain the phenomena of life. He examines in turn the mechanistic and materialistic the vitalistic the holistic and organismic and the monadistic hypotheses and the evidence, or lack of evidence upon which these hypotheses are based. On the whole they are impartially stated and generally though not always exactly expounded. This criticism is aimed for instance at the author's treatment of the teaching of Aristotle with regard to the nature of the *psyche* and in respect of his doctrine of causality. It is aimed also at the inclusion of the hypotheses of the Gestalt psychologists among other supports for mechanical biology. The Gestalt psychologists themselves would certainly protest against their views being classified under that head. Indeed, 'the tendency of every Gestalt to maintain and restore a dynamic equilibrium' is as McDougall says, a dynamic principle and it has teleological implications rather than mechanistic ones. Other criticisms might be offered also but they need not be stressed in a review of a non technical work written for the general reader. The author states in his preface that he has no hypothesis of his own to offer but in fact he does present one. His predilection becomes increasingly obvious as one proceeds from chapter to chapter until finally he embraces a monadic theory of the living organism in these terms: 'nevertheless the purely psychological study of human subjects would inevitably suggest and compel us to formulate a monadic theory of the constitution of man'. He goes even further in supporting the view that the monads are hierarchically organized and brings forward telepathy in support of his contention accepting the results of J B Rhine's experiments on extra sensory perception as good evidence for its occurrence. McDougall is first and foremost a psychologist and insists upon the necessity of taking mental events into account in any discussion of vital processes. Purpose memory (the basis of which he holds to be immaterial), and teleological behaviour must be given due weight in any attack upon the problem of life. His criticisms, especially of the mechanistic biologies are trenchant but he seems to be unduly willing to accord hospitality to questionable evidence where his own hypotheses are concerned.

F AVELING

Human Needs in Modern Society By B T REYNOLDS and R G COULSON
(London Jonathan Cape 1938 Pp 274 Price 10s 6d net)

The authors of this interesting book, which acknowledges inspiration from the Institute, have written it, not because they have anything new to reveal

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about human nature or modern society, but because they think they have discovered a way out of the unhappiness which is now so prevalent. They have used Psychology, "the science which throws most light on human well-being," as guide in their experiments and test of their conclusions. In Part I reasons are given, justly, as many will think, for preferring McDougall's system to all others. Having very clearly outlined his famous doctrine of Instincts and Sentiments, from it is derived a handy five-fold criterion of "the essentials of human well-being." By the aid of these the reader is shown in Part II the meaning of the stresses set up in human personalities as society evolved through the Industrial Revolution to the Class War and the World War, leading on to our "Brave New World." The sickness of society to-day, with its classes and masses and its increasing bureaucracy, is diagnosed in Part III. Not forgetting Primitive Needs, Self-regard arrested at the predatory stage, and starved Other-regard, are leading features of its malady. The authors claim to have found a cure, apparently commonplace but effective, in experiments with small discussion groups of unemployed and others. To drop all defensive barriers (that is the secret) till the ground of a common humanity is reached lifts all who share in such an experience out of the prison of narrow Self-regard and satisfies very profound human needs. The masses and the classes both need each other and if they practised together in small groups this communion by discussion it would ultimately lead to a new kind of society. The Church should be the great agency for bringing to pass this "next great step of mankind in the ascent towards the Kingdom of God," but, as one of the authors concludes in Chapter II, she is perhaps too much preoccupied with unessentials to rise to the height of her great opportunity. A religious element is necessary in the ideal development of both Self-regard and Other-regard and new ways of providing this will have to be found if the Church does not play the part she should.

Readers of this book may perhaps think the plan it suggests impracticable, but they can hardly fail to salute its noble plea for the widespread application of sweet reasonableness to the problems of a world made nervous by constant threats of force.

A. E. ELDER

The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought By PETER ANTHONY BERTUCCI, with a foreword by Frederick Robert Tennant (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1938. Pp. xi + 311. Price \$3.50.)

The empirical argument for God, the author tells us at the outset (3) is a generic name given to arguments which seek to show that the most reasonable interpretation of presumptive knowledge drawn from the various realms of human experience leads to belief in God. Logical Rationalism with its reliance on the *a priori*, on the one hand, and Naturalism, with its exclusion of all evidence that is not sensibly verifiable on the other, are ruled out of consideration from the outset, though whether any form of empiricism can wholly dispense with the *a priori* is, as even Mr. Russell has recently admitted, more than doubtful. Nor does Mr. Bertucci discuss the objection that will be urged against his essay on grounds of principle by the very able group of empiricist thinkers who contend that all so-called propositions about God are meaningless and therefore are not propositions at all. He confines himself, as he is well within his rights in doing, to one line of empirical theology, represented in modern British thought by Martineau,

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Pringle Pattison, James Ward Sorley and Dr F R Tennant How far the first four of these thinkers would have relished being classified as empiricists is open to question, all of them however lay great stress on the evidence of teleology and of moral experience Their respective arguments to theism are expounded and criticized in the main body of the book (chapters II-VI), and both the exposition and the criticism bear witness to the scholarship sound judgment and speculative acumen of the author His lucid and equitable summary of their doctrines and the penetrating strictures to which he subjects them will assuredly be of service to examination candidates in theology and to readers who lack the leisure or the opportunity to study the five writers in detail In each case exposition and criticism are accompanied as is fitting by a progressive unfolding of Mr Bertucci's own argument He is out to present—and this constitutes the original contribution of his essay—the empirical argument to Theism in a more adequate form (see especially chapters V and VI in connexion with Sorley and Tennant and the final chapter (VII) entitled *An Empirical View of the Goodness of God* where he deals expressly with the problem of evil) None of the five thinkers aforementioned—not even his own teacher Dr Tennant whom he regards as by far the most satisfactory of the group—can be wholly acquitted of disloyalty to empiricism His views of the noumenal ego the nature of moral obligation the eternity of God non temporal creation and ultimate reality are insufficiently empirical and inadequate interpretations of the data (256) At the close the author turns for consolation to Professor Edgar S Brightman claiming that the history of the world we know is the ascertained course of the evolutionary process up to date inclusive of the ideals which are systematized inductions from human experience warrants the belief in a 'cosmic Alh' who is temporal and creates the world in time (though his time space be much greater and his tempo different from ours) who loves mankind and whose purpose is ethically good though realized in face of a retarding factor refractory to God's will an ultimate, irrational constituent element of God's nature, which is uncreated and as eternal as God himself (276) The order and values discernible in the world we know indicate that this Given as Brightman terms it is controlled by God although it does delay the realization of his purpose (277) The known facts of evil force upon us this admission

It is very interesting to find a writer of Mr Bertucci's ability and sincerity who is prepared to propose a God thus limited as the object of religious worship Yet what more could he do with the restrictions imposed upon his method from the outset? Even the conclusions he reached are purchased by a sacrifice of empiricism Only by drawing blank cheques upon the future can any faith in God's goodness be grounded on the chequered record of past happenings whether in cosmic or in human history What security does the record offer of a temporal millennium? To say nothing of the tragic story of human and infra human suffering the second law of thermo-dynamics hangs like a pall over the far off event Mr Bertucci deserves praise for facing the problem of evil in his last chapter but his handling of it goes a very little way to support his theism The real source of the failure of his argument, as also of Dr Tennant's failure in *Philosophical Theology*, is the ruling out of the evidence of religious experience If we are to take into account 'the various realms of human experience,' why is this particular realm regarded as irrelevant? It is just as though in arguing to the value of art we were to exclude aesthetic experience from consideration, pending the establishment of our case on evidence drawn from non aesthetic sources The essay before us gives abundant proof of Mr Bertucci's competence to

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discuss the philosophy of religion, we can only hope that his talents will some day be exercised in an inquiry on more fruitful lines

W G DE BURGH

A Basis of Opinion By ADRIAN COATES, M.A. (London Macmillan & Co., Ltd 1938 Pp xvii + 461 Price, 16s net)

This is, I think as vigorous and provocative a piece of philosophical writing as has appeared in English for some time Its *genre* is that of the *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik* its claim is to have established a 'basis for an anti-metaphysical philosophy'—a basis of opinion for those like the author, who have cast loose from the anchorage of religion and traditional belief and find no satisfaction in any of the contemporary philosophies, popular or academic' (p. 9) Its position may be roughly described as a variant of personalist pluralism It has affinities, not necessarily conscious with some modern variants of pragmatism The author's thesis presents a front of consistence and clarity nevertheless, on close consideration I find it hard to be sure just where the argument (as distinguished from asseveration) begins how it develops and hangs together, and what it concludes This may be my fault

Philosophy, Mr Coates holds, aims not at Truth, which is the peculiar *ignis fatuus* of the philosopher, but at a "reasonable Point of View" to be arrived at by criticism of common beliefs and opinions As to both end and means this is unoriginal enough So too if more modish, is the qualification of this criticism as concerned fundamentally with the use and meaning of words The reasonable point of view is that which is linguistically consistent Such consistency, however, is not that of a 'mathematical Logic' (another *ignis fatuus*) but that of 'language-thought' which "embodies the whole range of human thought feeling and activity" (p. 30) I fail to find any illumination, however, on the problems of language and meaning in this hyphen nor do I see ground for believing that the 'reasonable' can be pursued once truth is repudiated

Philosophy as a 'Point of View' is sharply distinguished from metaphysics—by which he ostensibly means any and every kind of transcendence, every kind of realism (except his own which like the schoolboy seeking protection by crossing his fingers he supposes saved by his use of the words 'exist and actual instead of 'real'), every form of hypostatization, every assertion of a supernatural Order, a Universe or Cosmos In fact, I have concluded he means by "metaphysics" philosophy which he does not like, and by "philosophy" metaphysics which he does like

This violent anti-metaphysicism runs—a veritable *écrasez l'infâme*—through the whole work and like all such bellicosities it leads to odd misperceptions and extremes It is astonishing, he writes, "that . . . men of the highest intellectual attainments cannot see what should be plain to anyone with a trained critical intelligence, that the whole structure of metaphysics is built up by the method of ambiguity, that ambiguity is to metaphysics, as mathematics is to the physical sciences" (p. 111) Two further *obiter dicta* present-day educated opinion . . . rejects equally the claims of revealed religion and metaphysical philosophy . . . " (p. 451), and "the tendency of the bulk of present-day philosophy in England seems to be to support orthodoxy in politics and religion rather than to attack it" (p. 15) From these taken together, we may validly draw the interesting conclusion that most contemporary English philosophers are (or seem) uneducated

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Mr Coates's philosophy may be set forth for brevity, in a few citations.

Against all such metaphysical aberration let us make our stand firmly on this twofold foundation of sound opinion: first, that *self-consciousness is focal to thought and reality*; second, that *self-consciousness means and can only properly mean the self-consciousness of individual selves or persons* (p. 218).

'Personal existence is not a department of reality, but rather reality is a department of personal existence' (p. 229). Ultimately the space-time continuum is nothing else than the public or universal form of our perceptual experience. (p. 275) 'The unity of the real is made to depend

upon the unity and publicity of our sensible experience' (p. 196). That we share a common universe of experience depends on our sharing for all practical purposes the same here and the same type of mind and senses.

'The independent existence of other people we take for granted. And if we take as our fundamental datum this mutual intercourse of independently existing selves or persons, willing, thinking and feeling, creating and sharing together a public world of history and reality, then we shall be able to relate in terms of it reality to history and history to actuality. Reality is its common, public, spatial-temporal logical aspect; actuality its aspect of individual experience and consciousness and history combines and comprehends these two opposite categories' (p. 397).

Concerning all of this Mr Coates says: 'But this Point of View will not be metaphysical inasmuch as no objective validity will be claimed for it but only a logical validity: that is it will be claimed to be reasonable inasmuch as it avoids ambiguity, equivocation and other logical errors' (p. 38).

A few comments and questions only: (i) Does the author only claim linguistic consistence for the above propositions about independently existing persons and their mutual intercourse? It seems to me quite incredible. His metaphysical disclaimers, if taken seriously, would undercut them all. (ii) Does the author in these (and other) passages avoid the verbal tricks—the vaguities and ambiguities—of the metaphysician? What of the phrases (several times repeated) *is focal to*, *a department of*? (iii) By what right does Mr Coates speak of the unity and publicity of *our* sensible experience? We do not strictly have sensible experience. I have it and you act as though you had it or as I should if I had it. In short, under the neat phrases unity and publicity is he not burying the whole crucial and complex issue concerning the *private* and the *public*? Is he not side-stepping the really hard question: How do I pass from sensitive experience to a common world and a community of persons? Mr Coates seems to me to take for granted precisely those points which most evidently need establishment. (iv) Has he appreciated the difficulties provoked by his being *also a body*? (v) What warrant have we in our knowledge of Descartes to describe him as of a 'servile temperament' (p. 134)? Can it be doubted that Hume realized how far reaching was his scepticism? Is it not a bad case of the so-called intellectual fallacy to expect by clearing up a few points of politics, metaphysics and theology 'the envious passions of men to wither and lose strength' (p. 393)?

Notwithstanding the many points on which it seems to me that Mr Coates fails, I have no doubt that his work is worth reading. His concluding discussion of history and parts of his treatment of causality, seem to me instructive.

RALPH E. STEDMAN

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The Philosophy of Whitehead By RASAHARY DAS, M A, Ph D (James Clarke & Co, Ltd Pp 200 Price, 6s net)

Mr Das has written an able exposition of certain leading ideas in Whitehead's philosophy of organism. It is a baffling task to compress into an essay of 200 pages the gist of the elaborate and sometimes diffuse discussions of two books such as *Process and Reality* and *Adventures of Ideas*. In some chapters notably those on "Propositions," "Feelings," "God," where Mr Das gives us mainly compression, and that largely in Whitehead's own words with the minimum of elucidation, it is doubtful whether much is gained except that he provides a readable summary for those already familiar with Whitehead's work. In other chapters, however, such as those on "Perception and The Extensive Continuum," he has been more successful in bringing out the salient points which Whitehead is making. He reserves his own criticisms and difficulties for a short chapter at the end of the book. My own wish is that the points here raised, which are well taken, had been given much fuller discussion and perhaps made into the main section of the book. Such difficulties concern what Whitehead means by creativity, and his attempt to combine an atomic view of actual entities with universal relativism through his conception of objective immortality. Possibly the difficulties Mr Das finds in seeing how a subject which is a 'process of experience' can constitute itself out of its own feelings would be somewhat mitigated if he had given more attention to Whitehead's view of "subjective aim", and also had considered Whitehead's view of the becoming of an actual entity as its achievement of definiteness" in the light of analogies from aesthetics rather than from science. The indications are that it is such analogies which have been the dominant consideration in Whitehead's mind during his later work.

Mr Das concentrates on certain points in Whitehead's systematic metaphysic and (no doubt from exigency of space) takes no note of any of the *obiter dicta*, in the wit and insight of which Whitehead's deeper influence on contemporary thought is likely to lie. But students of his metaphysic will find a number of useful suggestions especially in the last two chapters of this little book.

DOROTHY M. ENNET

Social Thought from Lore to Science By HARRY ELMER BARNES and HOWARD BECKER with the assistance of Émile Benoit Smullyan and others
Vol I A History and Interpretation of Man's Ideas about Life with His Fellows pp xxiv + 790 + lxxxiv Vol II Sociological Trends Throughout the World pp viii + 387 (numbered 791-1178) + lxxvii
(Boston New York and London, 1938 D C Heath & Co (Social Science Series) Price Vol I, 5 dollars, Vol II 4 dollars 50)

This large work was conceived and begun by Mr Barnes and finished and seen through the press by Mr Becker with the help of a numerous staff of collaborators. The table of contents indicates the authorship of its various sections and subsections. Between them its two volumes offer a comprehensive picture of the social thought of all times and places, and a certain unity is provided for them by this fact and by the extensive dependence of the second volume upon the first. But, as their titles indicate they differ considerably in method and in subject matter. The first volume proceeds chronologically, and offers a sketch of the development of social thought of all kinds, beginning with the notions implicit in the customs and institutions

of preliterate man (of which it is naturally necessary to offer an 'interpretation' rather than a 'history') and carrying the narrative down to the most elaborate and recondite notions of present-day sociologists and philosophic historians. The second volume, confining itself to social thought in the more restricted sense appropriate to writers of these kinds, divides its subject matter by place rather than by time and attempts to depict the recent development and present condition of sociological thought in different parts of the world.

The authors and their collaborators are to be congratulated on the accomplishment of what must have been a Herculean task. And many students will undoubtedly welcome the results of their labours both as offering in one place a conspectus of the whole of man's thinking about society and also as enabling the reader to refresh his memory of particular thinkers or to envisage such thinkers in their historical contexts. But the chief value of the book is probably that it provides an introduction to important writers in many different times and places who have understood their business differently from most of the better known figures in the history of social thought (and often in a way more similar to that of the modern sociologist) and are therefore likely to be unfamiliar to the ordinary student. Some of them like Ibn Khaldūn (in whom our authors seem to be specially interested) are unfamiliar for special reasons of time and place and language but there are no less valuable discussions of writers like Ferguson and Fargot who are much nearer to us in these respects. We can also welcome the information which the second volume provides about the sociological thinking done in countries and languages with which we are not normally acquainted but our authors seem to have discovered less of interest here than in their studies of the past.

Certain defects are of course inevitable in a work of this kind and are by no means to be laid at the door of the authors. To make such a work complete it is desirable to pay an apparently disproportionate attention to thinkers of little or no intrinsic importance and to make it readable it is desirable to have some kind of unifying conception which cannot be adopted without neglecting such writers and in other ways giving an undue emphasis to certain parts of the material at the expense of others. Nor have our authors avoided these difficulties. It is very natural to feel about many of the writers whom they discuss what they say *à propos* of one of them that explanation of the respectful attention such absurd thinking attracted remains both difficult and fruitless (p. 1071) and there is little obvious unity in either of their two volumes still less (as we have seen) in their work as a whole. At the same time it is difficult to resist the impression that the book would have had a greater appearance of unity and that some of the apparently irrelevant and uninteresting writers might have been excluded if the authors had possessed a more definite conception of the nature and aims of sociology and other kinds of social thought. It is true that they often discuss the question and show a distinct preference for modern ways of envisaging the subject. But this preference does not prevent them from being well aware that much modern work is wrongly conceived if not actually absurd and their frequent discussions of the question do not seem to have enabled them to make up their minds about it at all clearly.

What is perhaps more serious (though this may again be inevitable in a work of such comprehensiveness) is the presence of some inaccuracies. Professor Ginsberg for example is implied to have been the author of *Dialogues on Metaphysics* (p. 813) and Adam Smith (p. 954) to have been Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh. The reader who finds such errors in matters with which he is acquainted is likely to feel less trustful in reading those parts of the book (and for most readers they will probably be numerous).

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which deal with matters with which he is not acquainted. It must finally be added that the value of the book as a work of reference is considerably impaired by the fact that the very numerous notes are printed at the end of each volume and that both in the main text and in the section devoted to the notes the chapter numbers, which to facilitate consultation should be on every page, appear only at the beginnings of chapters

O. DE SELINCOURT

Fashion and Philosophy By H. J. PATON, White's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford (Oxford at the Clarendon Press 1937 Pp. 23 Price 2s.)

In this stimulating address Professor Paton gives us something like a survey of the various trends in present-day English moral philosophy. Starting from the observation that changes in our philosophical outlook are often due to other factors than those connected with the requirements of philosophy in its narrower sense at a certain stage of its development, he suggests that the tendency of contemporary thought is unmistakably towards a realistic conception of things and 'away from the old idealism which had its origin in Germany and received new life in this country by the work of men like Green and Wallace and Caird and Bradley' (p. 5). This 'reaction against the romanticism of the nineteenth century' he considers in the main to be salutary. If, however, it tends to manifest itself, as it often does, in mere analysis for its own sake, then Professor Paton thinks it necessary to remind us that after all the business of philosophy is to be synoptic, to see things in their togetherness, to fit our different experiences and our different theories, as far as may be, into a consistent whole (p. 6).

Passing, then, over to the sciences to which moral philosophy for some time to come is still likely to be indebted for material for reflection, Professor Paton warns us that it would not be wise for a philosopher to place too much confidence in the findings of the scientists as regards the issue of determinism versus indeterminism, since so his task would appear to be not much more than an attempt to settle down in those gaps of knowledge which science has so far left unfilled. He for himself acknowledges that 'the thinking which discovers causal law cannot itself be governed only by causal law' (p. 13) and that 'obedience to the laws of thought, which is itself a kind of freedom, is necessary if the causal laws discovered by science are to be valid' (p. 13 sq.), nor does he fear that these conclusions could be overturned by some such psychology as that of Freud or some such sociology as that of Marx, however useful it may be for us occasionally to be reminded how much of our thoughts and ways of feeling is the direct result of our psychological make-up and of our position in organized human society.

But probably the most interesting part of this address is the last one, where Professor Paton speaks of the influence on moral philosophy by moral practice, and where he urges that the philosopher in these days should strive to get in closer touch with the realities of life. I trust that every reader of *Philosophy* will wholeheartedly concur with him when he concludes his essay with the following sentence: 'My final suggestion is that the time may be ripe for a new fashion in philosophy, that philosophy may have to give up the cold detachment which I have described as its present character, that it may be compelled, without abandoning the rigour of its present thinking, to face again the ultimate problems of man's position in the universe and on this disturbed and perishable planet, even that it may be led once more

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to become what it has always been in the persons of its greatest exponents certainly a criticism, and perhaps even a way, of life' (p. 23)

H. GAUSS

Perception and Aesthetic Value By H. N. LEE (New York: Prentice Hall Inc. 1938. Pp. xii + 271. Price \$3.50.)

Judging from the fact that this is the second American book on aesthetics from the axiological standpoint that has come my way in the last six months axiology must be as much the vogue in America as is the Lambeth Walk in London. The value of such works cannot always be measured by their concern for value, but Mr. Lee's contribution to the subject is one I can heartily recommend to serious students of aesthetics.

He gets a really first rate start that promises steady progress along the right lines: go to experience, he says, sounding a warning against the paraphernalia of philosophical presuppositions, and in Appendix A excellently describes the proper relationship between aesthetics and metaphysics. For experience gives us the subject matter of all aesthetic inquiries: aesthetics is a philosophical study of the data furnished by the common experience of this type of worth, and cannot therefore be narrowed down either to a philosophy of beauty or to a philosophy of art. Here is an interesting definition: "Aesthetics is the intellectual study of the experience of aesthetic value."

Now value in general, according to Perry, is a relation arising from conative interest between an individual and his environment, and any specific variety of value—economic, moral, religious, aesthetic, etc.—is found by analysing the terms of the particular relation. It follows that subject and object are equally indispensable to aesthetic experience. Such is the lay-out of the book. The essence of the author's conclusions is that what distinguishes aesthetic experience and value from every other known kind of experience and value is *its preoccupation with perception as an end in itself*. The aesthetic experience, he writes, is fundamentally the experience of perceptual grasp, or, in another passage, "aesthetic value means perceptual value."

Now the value attributed to the aesthetic object perceived can be either positive or negative, pleasant or unpleasant, beautiful or ugly; it is not equivalent either to beauty or pleasure taken alone, for these are parts only of a larger whole. And as perception is also apperception, our appreciation can be reinforced by the logical and emotional significance the derived value, we add unconsciously and spontaneously to whatever we see or hear.

An ingenious doctrine this, and not devoid of psychological insight, but how much subtler the psychological analysis would have been had the author realized the whole difference between the empathy of Vernon Lee and the *Einfühlung* of Volkelt and Lipps. I venture to draw his attention to the chapter on the theory of "Einfühlung" in my *Critical History of Modern Aesthetics*.

I imagine aestheticians would agree that aesthetic experience transpires for the most part at the perceptual level. What really matters is surely the singling out of the aesthetic differentia in the act of perception, and here, I'm afraid, the author fails us. For the perceptual activity *per se* is just as aesthetically indifferent as the act of digestion or circulation: it is a psychological function, no more akin to aesthetic experience than sensation or cognition. What lends a barren act of perception aesthetic value is the formal or emotional significance of the object perceived. A minor point I cannot accept is the selection of "pleasure" as the criterion of worth, for surely a

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waltz of Strauss is far pleasanter than *Hamlet* or *Lear*? I am strongly inclined to think that this interesting psychological study of the aesthetic field would have benefited if Santayana had been supplemented by Volkelt and Dessoir instead of or as well as, by Croce and Carritt

LISTOWEL.

The Education of the Emotions—Through Sentiment Development By MARGARET PHILLIPS, M A (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd 1937 Pp 318 Price 8s 6d)

The doctrine of the sentiments as it has taken shape in the writings of Shand and McDougall has had a considerable vogue among British psychologists and it is strange that until recently it has occurred to no one to ascertain the actual facts concerning the nature and development of particular sentiments in particular cases. This is what Miss Phillips set herself to do. By a very simple and direct procedure she has attempted to discover the origin and the course of development of some representative sentiments and interests in a group of her students, colleagues, and friends. Her method was to ask some two hundred and seventy five subjects to give in writing a life history of any developed sentiment, passion, or interest of their own, showing the stages of its development, the sources from which it derived, and the nature of the satisfaction obtained from it. Quite wisely no attempt was made to submit the data so obtained to any elaborate statistical treatment. The author prefers rather to indicate the general impressions and tentative generalizations which emerge from an attentive, impartial, and reflective survey of the data. Copious extracts from the subjects' own records are given to enable the reader in some measure to judge for himself the justice of the author's conclusions.

Broadly, Miss Phillips's thesis is that the purposive striving underlying sentiment formation focuses first of all on those persons and things in the child's immediate environment which are most significant for early needs and that it extends progressively to persons and things more remote. Sentiments for persons have their origin naturally in attachments to parents, and sentiments for other persons Miss Phillips holds—in common with Freudian psychologists—are in considerable measure sentiments for "parent substitutes." But on this as on many other points, the author is critical of psycho-analytic views. The interesting suggestion is put forward that the wider social sentiments have a dual origin: in the family and in membership of adolescent gangs, and that whilst the former source is conducive later to allegiance to an authoritarian system, the latter fosters devotion to organizations of an equalitarian type.

A dual origin is also assigned to the sentiments for things. Some arise directly from immediate contact with impersonal features in the child's early environment (and in this connection Miss Phillips has several very sensible and pertinent things to say about ribbon development, urban aggregates, and the importance of preserving some parts of the earth's surface simple and unobscured). Other sentiments for things come into existence through sentiments for persons, a sentiment for a person being in effect and in part a sentiment for that person's world. This explanation is offered as an alternative to explanation in terms of suggestion and sympathetic induction, but it might with equal force be regarded as an amplification of an account of how suggestion actually works.

In the working out of a general theory along these lines particular interest attaches to the sentiment for oneself. Since development is thus from the

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centre outwards,' Miss Phillips writes, the self necessarily forms the point of departure. If this means the first sentiment is *for* the self the argument is an obvious *non sequitur*. But this is probably not what is meant since the remark is followed up by the suggestions that a sentiment for the self arises (a) when some obstruction prevents the normal attachments to others and (b) in consequence of attachment to others. This second mechanism is a special case of a sentiment for another person engendering an interest in that other person's world.

It is a pity that Miss Phillips did not go into this in a little more detail as there is much that is queer and obscure about the self regarding sentiment. She excuses herself from doing so on the ground that satisfactory emotional development depends much more upon sentiments for 'the not self'. In fact Miss Phillips does not appear to endorse the approval which other psychologists have accorded to the sentiment for one's self. In this connection she expresses some unorthodox views concerning the moral and educational importance of team games. On the evidence she adduces it certainly looks as if the central object of a sentiment for games is the self as successful and not the game itself nor the team nor the larger society which the team represents. In a quiet way many distinctly challenging assertions are set out in this volume. In short, the author may fairly be said to have written a very controversial and provoking book and it is sincerely to be hoped that its modest and disarming style will not obscure this fact. It deserves to be widely read and to have its findings either confirmed or refuted by further research.

C. A. MACE

Mental Conflicts and Personality By MANDEL SHERMAN, M.D., Ph.D. (London Longmans Green & Co 1938 Pp viii + 319 Price 12s 6d)

In the present century the study of abnormal psychology has made notable contributions to the understanding of human nature among the fruitful concepts introduced by this study that of mental conflict has an important place. The significance of this concept has hardly been fully developed and the author of *Mental Conflicts and Personality* places before us an excellent survey of its far reaching possibilities. The opening chapters of the book are necessarily expository the author avoids the restraints of rigid definition while indicating clearly those aspects of a living human being which are involved in the idea of conflict. He gives us a survey of current theories as to the drives or instinctive desires this is sound but has the usual quality of a baffling attempt to define the undefinable. The dynamic forces thus envisaged may be in conflict among themselves or with forces from the environment without. Personality is presented in a conceptual connotation and its characteristics are shown to be derived through conflict as a means of adjustment and a way of maintaining individual integrity. This difficult part of the subject is treated with admirable simplicity and the reader is left with a clear picture of the purpose of the author. The emphasis on conflict as an essential accompaniment of growth and an ever present condition in the human psyche is much needed. The introductory matter concludes by drawing attention to the existence of inborn differences of constitution which influence individual reactions to similar environmental stimuli. An interesting chapter follows on the origin of personal attitudes. These are presented to us as the basic framework of behaviour and a means of avoiding continual minor conflict. The author shows how these attitudes may be the

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outcome of deep emotional conflicts, and further, that any significant change of attitude is accompanied by conflict. He relates these ideas to the stages of human growth. In this connection we are rightly warned of the difficulty of any objective determination of personal attitudes.

The rest of the book is a descriptive classification of varieties of conflicts under various simple heads. Those conflicts due to culture, inferiority, and sex receive detailed attention and may be considered as applicable to all human life. A logical sequence of thought leads to the last two chapters, which show the rôle of conflict in the genesis of neuroses and asocial behaviour. The difference between ordinary conflict and neurotic conflict is clearly defined, but the nature of endo psychic conflict perhaps receives less attention than its importance warrants. A useful distinction is made between asocial conduct due to accessible conflict and that due to dissociation.

It is perhaps inevitable that the tendency of the book is to show the undesirable effects of conflict on human personality, and it is to be regretted that the author did not enlarge on his hint of the creative possibilities of conflict. The emphasis on prestige as a source of conflict is an interesting comment on a culture which claims to be essentially democratic. It is clear that differences of culture will tend to place the burden of conflict in accordance with the characteristics of that culture. The arguments of the book are reinforced with examples which are admirably chosen to illustrate the points at issue and the author has used them skilfully and with moderation. The book does not lay claim to originality, but has many provocative ideas and is an excellent exposition of the subject envisaged.

GRACE NICOLLE

A Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy from Francis Hutcheson to Lord Balfour By T. E. JESSOP (London and Hull: A. Brown & Sons, Ltd. 1938. Pp. xiv + 201. Price 21s. net.)

Professor Jessop has done for Hume and Scottish Philosophy what he did for Berkeley some years ago. The present work consists of two sections. The first deals with Hume alone, giving the latter's writings, the various editions, translations, articles, and books on Hume and on his writings. The second deals with Scottish Philosophy from Francis Hutcheson, though he includes the latter's teacher and also the Chevalier Ramsay, to Lord Balfour. Professor Jessop seeks to confine the list as far as possible to philosophy and to those who were in the native tradition—a condition which excludes Scotsmen who wrote on philosophy under other influences. There is a short but interesting preface and at the end a list of Gifford Lecturers and a valuable index of names.

The work, involving a prodigious labour, is as far as the present reviewer is competent to judge, carried out with great thoroughness and completeness, and will be very helpful to students not merely of Hume and of Scottish Philosophy but of the wider international field. If any omissions occur they must be quite minor in character or else result from the conditions imposed by Professor Jessop on himself. Within the body of the work itself two points might be noted. On page 38, under 'other literary activities', a date 1785 is given—is this a misprint for 1758? On page 155 (Macintosh) under *Miscellaneous Works* 1846, there is *Trans—* 1829 *Mélanges philosophiques*, if the latter is a translation of the former, the dates seem to constitute a difficulty.

B. M. LAING

NEW BOOKS

General and Social Psychology By ROBERT H. THOULESS (Second Edition, Revised and Extended London University Tutorial Press, 1937 Pp. xii + 522 Price 8s. 6d.)

This well known text book has been so thoroughly revised, and so usefully enlarged, that it has become a new and better book. It is now an introduction to general psychology centred upon social phenomena. The author is undoubtedly right in maintaining that students of the social sciences need a full psychological background, rather than a selection of topics too specifically directed to their other studies. There is no real distinction between individual and social psychology, and it is best to avoid suggesting one. So he is amply justified in dealing with intelligence tests and for this reason alone (though there are others) it was necessary to introduce the elements of statistical methods. He is over-cautious in suggesting in the preface that the reader may omit these chapters without great loss, for they are much more profitable parts of social psychology than much of the speculative discussion we too often meet in this field. The book is obviously intended for the serious student, and is compact, clear and well organized. It will be found useful and stimulating especially by those who enjoy competent teaching.

For Dr. Thouless has obtained an unusual comprehensiveness by a brevity which frequently leads to statements so disconcertingly sudden that the beginner may not always appreciate their importance. In particular his own admirable critical arguments would be improved by fuller statement and the chapters on Social Grouping and Scientific and Religious Developments (which the student cannot easily supplement) could have been expanded profitably. But this criticism only implies a wish that the book had been longer, to enable the reader to digest more readily the wealth of information supplied. As we should expect from this writer the work is firmly scientific in tone, balancing free analysis with appeal to experimental data. It should enjoy even greater popularity than in its earlier form.

A. W. WOLTERS

Psychology: The Changing Outlook By FRANCIS AVELING (London: Watts & Co., 1937 Pp. vii + 152 Price 2s. 6d.)

This small book can be praised without reserve. Professor Aveling has given in this short space a lucid and satisfying account of the chief schools of psychology, described the most important fields of application and indicated future lines of development. He achieves this by great economy of words and precision of statement, and the result is a most readable book, which can be recommended to the lay reader while it must stimulate the professional psychologist. It is closely packed with information selected for its importance, and admirably organized. It is remarkable for an impartiality so complete that the reader cannot detect which way the author's sympathies lean, except that he stresses the importance of a wise eclecticism which shall lead to a future synthesis of the rival theories. He holds that the progress made by researches inspired by theories which seem at the moment to be sharply opposed indicates that each has seized some aspect of the final truth. But he is no indiscriminating eclectic, and ventures to suggest the points at which reconciliation can occur. These selections of the book deserve the full consideration of all psychologists. It is encouraging to meet a book which stands so well above the battle, not ignoring it but showing the way to peace and alliance.

A. W. WOLTERS

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Human Affairs An Exposition of What Science Can Do for Man By Various Authors Edited by R B CATTELL, J COHEN, and R M W TRAVERS (London Macmillan & Co, Ltd 1937 Pp xi + 360 Price 10s 6d net)

Human Affairs is a collection of essays on social and political problems written by fifteen distinguished representatives of the social and biological sciences. It is the outcome of a project to establish a periodical which would deal with current matters of social interest from a scientific point of view, and, as the Preface states, "It is as an attempt to pave the way for this periodical and to measure the extent of public support awaiting it that the present volume has been launched." This book is to be welcomed in that it presents in a simple and very readable manner the contributions that the sciences which deal with life have to make to the art of actual living, and the names of those who have contributed to its pages are a sufficient guarantee of its scientific standard. Should a journal planned on these lines and maintaining this standard come to be established its editors would have a right to expect success for it

F AVELING

The Modern Mind By MICHAEL ROBERTS (London Faber & Faber, Ltd 1937 Pp 284 Price 8s 6d net)

This is, in the best sense, a popular book. It is written for a wider public than that of the universities—where, however, it might be not unprofitably perused (I have myself recommended it as general reading for second year students). Mr Roberts is a poet and critic of poetry, and he brings a fresh note into a theme which might have been very dull and ordinary. His work may roughly be described as an analysis of the forces productive of the modern mind, and it is a merit that he casts back into the Middle Ages instead of making his start with Descartes, the so-called Father of Modern Philosophy.

While the author puts forward no claim to be a first hand student of the many men and movements he is compelled to consider, his reading has been wide and discriminating, his judgment too, where I am at all competent to pass upon it, is just. His principal aim is to follow up the changing senses of certain key words in the language, such e.g. as *reason* and *imagination*, and to show how this shift affected (and was affected by) shifts in the dominant mental attitude. His chief complaint concerning the modern world is that it is unpoetic, that it has turned its back upon imagination as upon mere fancies or fictions. Hobbes is one of the true parents of the modern mind, and against him. The real the crucial charge is not that he was an atheist but that he was blind to poetry. (It is, I fear, no answer to this charge to remind Mr Roberts of Hobbes's versions of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, nor even of his charming *Vita Carmine Expressa*.) Thus, deprived of all but the categories of mechanism and material effect, Reason dwindled to that pale and unfructifying light which glimmers in the rational theology of the eighteenth century.

"Rational theology, the author writes, makes use of certain feelings, instincts, or needs in man in order to show that religion is necessary. Those feelings can be called up by a suitable use of language: they exist, the Christian believes, in all men, they are recognized and acknowledged by the reader, and the deduction, the necessity of faith and worship, follow. But that appeal and argument cannot be made if we are restricted to the evidence of the senses (more especially the evidence of the sense of sight) and to the language appropriate to the discussion of that evidence" (p. 201).

The situation of religion in the modern mind is for him something of a test-case, though his argument is of wider scope. This citation, therefore, should

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suggest the general line he takes as well as the sort of difficulties in which his case, if fully argued might become embroiled. Mr. Roberts's thesis is admirably developed and documented, and I have found it very suggestive indeed, even (perhaps particularly) where it seems to me least conclusive. It deserves to be read.

RALPH C. STEEDMAN

The Māndūkyaopaniṣad with Gaudapada's Kārikā and Śaṅkara's Commentary
Translated and annotated by SWAMI NIKHILANANDA With a Foreword
by V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER Sri Ramakrishna Centenary Publication
(Mysore Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama 1936 Pp. xliii + 361 Price
Rs. 2 8)

The Māndūkya Upaniṣad is the latest of the well known Ten Upaniṣads and it is also the shortest consisting as it does of only a dozen small prose paragraphs engaged in the symbolism of the sacred syllable *ōm*. The latter is said to comprise in its three quarters (*a-u-m*) the whole universe viz. the three states of existence (waking dreaming deep sleep) while pointing with its (imaginary) fourth quarter to that which is beyond threefold time. The difference of the soul abiding in its third and fourth state respectively is that of the omniscient inner ruler (world soul) and the Absolute.

This Upaniṣad has given rise to a metrical paraphrase in 29 stanzas and a purely philosophical elaboration of the subject in three chapters called respectively Vaitathya (Falseness, Illusion, 38 stanzas) Advaita (Non-duality 48 stanzas) and Alātaśanti (Quenching of the Fire brand 100 stanzas) and this whole work has become known from the colophons to its four chapters as the Gaudapādīya Kārikā, i.e. the Manual of Gaudapada. The work is of very great interest as it is the first attempt to place the idealistic Vedānta on a strictly philosophical basis. The result is an adaptation to the Vedānta of both the spiritual monism (*vijñāna vāda*) and the so-called nihilism (*śūnya vāda*) of Buddhist philosophy with surprising contacts as pointed out by Deussen with the method and thought of Parmenides.

The commentary on this unique work is attributed to the famous Śaṅkarācārya—wrongly in our opinion though tradition may be right in regarding Gaudapada (about whom nothing more is known) as the teacher's teacher of the great Vedāntin. The commentary is useful and the only one we possess.

The neatly printed book before us contains in Sanskrit and English the Upaniṣad and the Kārikā and in English only the commentary on the latter. The translator has made use of the earlier translation of the same three texts by Mammal L. Dvivedi (published in Bombay in 1909 for the Theosophical Publication Fund) and succeeded in improving upon it, mainly by a large number of well-conceived and for the most part, very necessary notes. His long and interesting Preface (i.e. introduction) is largely occupied with his objections to the difference of opinion believed to exist by Professor Das Gupta (and other scholars) between Gaudapada and Śaṅkarācārya. The Foreword is by V. Subrahmanya Iyer (Reader in Philosophy to H.H. the Maharaja of Mysore), who wants us to recognize that Māndūkya deals exclusively with *Philosophy* as defined by the most modern authorities (see page preceding Foreword).

F. OTTO SCHRADER

* The same scholar has availed himself of the 'unique method' of the Upaniṣad in his original contribution to the volume, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, see our review in *Philosophy*, vol. xii, No. 47, April 1937.

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The Hryapaksha of Yoga, or Towards a Constructive Synthesis of Psychological Material in Indian Philosophy By P V PATHAK, M.A.
(Lahore The Punjab Sanskrit Book Depot 1932 Pp xii + 294
Price Rs 7 8)

Mr Pathak is of those who have yielded to the lure of seeing a student's degree thesis appealing in book form to a vaguely greater number of readers than his examiners. In such a volume there may be vivid freshness here and there in point of view—thus it is worth while to get into print. But there will be also immaturity in perspective and synthesis which the years subsequent to hyperconcentrative study can alone bring. This makes us senior folk head shakers over a rush into print, and the author is modestly self-critical herein. There is this lack of perspective and symmetrical grasp in the essay. It might just as well have been written with order inverted. At the same time it is full of promise, so much so that I regret it should only have come up for review in the fifth year after its appearance, and unknown by me when I was rewriting and expanding two years ago the little manual of psychology from Pali sources which is so frequently and aptly quoted in it.

In any ripe edition Mr Pathak must come out from his cramped position as student of an Indian academy and place himself in view of cosmopolitan needs. The reader must find a historical placing in literature of so unfamiliar a term as is borne by the title, a far more important desideratum than is shown in the apparently hasty way in which the work has been prepared for and passed through press. Nor must he remain content with the shallow generalization of the Preface that whereas the Western ideal is "complete power over nature" the Indian ideal is to approach and realize the innermost Self in which that power already lies. For the former tradition the "know thyself" is by no means limited as he suggests, to Socrates. The crucial difference perhaps lies in what is the self that is in both traditions to be known.

C A F RHYS DAVIDS

Facts and Theories of Psycho-analysis By IVES HENDRICK, M.D. (London Kegan Paul, Trench, Truhner & Co., Ltd. 1934 Pp xi + 308 + xii
Price os 6d)

"Until some genius can give another equally rational explanation of the universal phenomenon that adults remember much of their lives after five years, and very few experiences of earlier years, the discovery of Freud that the human race forgets the events of infancy because infancy is a period when sexuality and rivalry are taboo and yet is unconsciously influenced by them in adult life will mark an epoch in the understanding of human nature and its problems."

These are the concluding words of Dr Hendrick's volume. They indicate the tenor of the whole volume. Fortunately it is possible to assure the perspective reader that the style and lucidity of the book are not to be judged by this extract. Indeed the author has written a most readable book setting forth in a simple way the main outline of Freudian theory and illustrating the theory with appropriate and often striking examples. Furthermore, if such a comment be permitted the author writes English of an excellence that is not always associated with the subject of Psycho-analysis. Naturally the critical reader encounters the usual difficulties—e.g. the study of instinct from the psychological aspect alone the "scientific" and "controlled" qualities of a process that is centred on an affective transference, and so on.

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But these are not peculiarities of the book, they are inherent in the subject
Dr Hendrick's volume is, of its kind, excellent

H CRICHTON MILLER

Art and Understanding By MARGARET A BULLEY (London B T Batsford
Ltd 1937 Pp xix + 292 Price 15s)

The second half of Miss Bulley's book consists of illustrations and a commentary thereon. These illustrations are delightful in themselves, and they are selected in such a way as to prove highly instructive: a photographic likeness is placed next a painting of a similar scene, a picture postcard next a portrait of the same subject, modern departures in furniture and decoration next specimens from the Victorian era. But however pleasing the reproductions from ancient and modern masters, they cannot wholly atone for the conspicuous absence of any real knowledge of aesthetics exhibited by the first and theoretical half of the volume. Miss Bulley develops her Platonic hypothesis in the language as well as in the spirit of the mystics, and even denies the possibility of scientific analysis as applied to mind or art. The book is an interesting example of the not infrequent divorce between genuine artistic sensibility coupled with an acute sense of the value of beauty and that cool detachment of mind from which true knowledge proceeds.

LISTOWEL

Modern Man in Search of a Soul By C G JUNG Translated by DELL and
BAYNES (London Hegan Paul Trubner & Co Ltd 1933 Pp ix + 282
Price 10s 6d)

This consists of a series of lectures which have been brought together in book form. The lectures give, however, a connected exposition of the views of the author, the central theme linking them up being Jung's belief in the spiritual part of man. His attitude is that man is now turning from material things to spiritual things. This can best be accomplished by man acquiring a greater knowledge of the laws governing his psyche, and a more intimate acquaintance with the workings of his own mind. Such topics are discussed as dream analysis, problems and aims of psychotherapy, a psychological theory of types, the stages of life, and a comparison of the beliefs of the author with those of Freud. Chapters are also devoted to archaic man, psychology, and literature, the basic postulates of analytical psychology, and the spiritual problems of modern man—the final chapter being reserved for a discussion of whether treatment in certain cases should be the prerogative of the psychotherapist or the clergy.

The lectures have all been written with a practical bias, and as such are of very great importance. Each also embodies a discussion of Jung's own standpoint, sometimes in contrast with that of Freud or Adler. The book will serve to clarify some of Jung's views for the reader, as well as give what is almost a résumé of his principles and his tenets. It is full of interest, and is written in an easy style, very pleasing to read. It is a useful book for the academic psychologist, and at the same time is of value to all interested in modern scientific problems.

M COLLINS

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A Hundred Years of Psychology By J C FLUGEL (London, Duckworth & Co 1933 Pp 384 Price 15s net)

The Preface of this book begins "Such a book as this is almost inevitably bad" This method of disarming criticism, however ingenious it may be, is not quite fair, and in the present case is quite unnecessary The author has produced a really excellent book It is comprehensive, yet concise and coherent As for the perspective, placed as we are so near the event, it is very difficult for us to find fault with it, whatever may be the verdict a hundred years hence

Starting with Herbart's conception of psychology as a science, at the beginning of his period the author shows how this has been realized during the century, though perhaps hardly along the lines which Herbart himself would have laid down, and how psychology faces the next hundred years with a definite place achieved in the 'hierarchy of sciences' It is astonishing how much has been got into the book, which is not only a good one, apart from some slight and pardonable inaccuracies, but also a timely one

J DREVER

The Evolution of Physics The Growth of Ideas from the Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta By ALBERT EINSTEIN and LEOPOLD INFELD (Cambridge at the University Press, 1938 Pp x + 319 Price 8s 6d)

In presenting the historical approach to the theory of relativity and the quantum theory Einstein and his collaborator have attempted to sketch in broad outline the attempts of the human mind to find a connection between the world of ideas and the world of phenomena "They have adopted the best method available—that of making frequent quotations from the actual writings of the pioneers themselves They trace the rise of the mechanical theory and then show how it seemed incapable of explaining the results of certain optical and electromagnetic experiments The introduction of the idea that some disturbance must take place in the space between bodies, leading to the concept of a 'field' of force (which is due essentially to Faraday) is excellently done and problems arising out of this view lead to the relativity postulate The present position of the quantum theory is discussed in the final section

From a scientific point of view this is an important book and just because it is authoritative and ambitious in its scope, it is not easy reading and calls for considerable powers of concentration From the philosophical point of view however, it is very disappointing and it seems that no attempt has been made to deal with the really difficult questions No doubt the answer would be that the book is already difficult enough Nevertheless, philosophers will want to know what Einstein means when he calls the highly abstract electromagnetic field a *reality*, and they are bound to protest when the Gothic myth energy is called a weightless *substance* and is equated indiscriminately to matter or mass, none of these terms being defined except the last

G BURNISTON BROWN

The Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile By P ROMANELLI (New York S F Vanni Inc 1938 Pp xi + 191 Price 2 dollars)

This will be useful for those who feel the need of an outline of Gentile's doctrines and of the historical situation out of which they arose It is a short

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book, divided into four chapters, the first sketching the origins of the new idealism in Italy the second expounding Gentile's general philosophy of experience, the third indicating its application to the spheres of science art, and religion and the last giving the author's estimate. A fairly full bibliography is appended. It is the second member of a series of Italian studies issued by the Casa Italiana of Columbia University. Poorly printed and poorly bound its price is relatively high.

The book is too unpretentious to call for detailed treatment. It is well written and competent and keeps in the forefront Gentile's dominant motives—his dislike of any form of realism intellectualism abstractionism and pluralism. I do not think however that Gentile lends himself well to summary exposition with so uncompromising and pontifical a thinker, what we need is less summary and more explanation. After a hundred years of idealism we naturally expect some of its extreme affirmations to be modified and are therefore disconcerted when Gentile declares that knowing is not contemplation but always creation and that there is but a single knower a transcendental or cosmic self. Since he is too learned an historical scholar not to be aware of the intense criticism which such doctrines have brought upon themselves what we want to know is why he feels able at this time of day to revive Fichte and Hegel on their extremest sides. In his concluding chapter Dr. Romanelli assumes a critical attitude arguing that Gentile's actualism is the most consistent form of subjectivism and therefore the perfect historical example of idealism. This disparaging identification of idealism with subjectivism perhaps betrays the influence of W. P. Montague, to whom the book is dedicated.

T. E. JESSOP

Modern Man and Religion. By T. G. MASARYK (Preface by V. K. Škrach. Tr. by A. Bibra and V. Beneš. Tr. revised by H. E. Kennedy.) (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1938. Pp. 328. Price 7s. 6d.)

The death of President Masaryk a year ago removed from Europe one of her most remarkable personalities. This book serves as a reminder of another of the varied aspects of his genius. Masaryk fulfilled the Platonic ideal of the philosopher who was ruler. Dr. Škrach, who was his literary secretary, contributes a short but illuminating preface which reveals the chief influences and convictions of Masaryk's life: an introduction which explains much of what is written in this book. Masaryk was a deeply religious man of Catholic upbringing and with many Protestant sympathies: a man who stood outside any particular creed and yet believed in God and in man, which is to say in man's need of God. In the post-war world he saw that only a restoration of the idea of God to its rightful significance could give a centre around which to rebuild the world. He begins this book with a section entitled 'Modern Suicide. Worned Souls' in which he sketches the disillusionment and consequent weariness of the world. He then passes to the philosophers and their attitude to religion in particular to Hume, Kant, Comte, Spencer and a man much less known in this country, Augustin Šmetana. The last section deals with 'Modern Titanism, or the Superman idea as literature reveals it.' It will be understood that this book was not a product of Masaryk's recent activities. It belongs to the 'nineties' and yet it deals with essentially the same problems which we face to-day and perhaps is the more valuable because it has been written long enough to see its views tested by time. As originally it grew out of a series of articles it lacks something of the continuity of thought that a book written as a whole would possess, but the depth of insight it

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displays and the brilliant vigour of exposition are more than compensation for this. There is a delightful freshness of style. Witness the following example: "Sometimes I like to take a look at Hume's face as it is pictured in an old woodcut and more than all I always notice how Hume, despite his scepticism put on weight—a nice double chin and an irreproachable pigtail and wig strangely adorn the mighty rationalist." Masaryk had the happy art of being light without being trivial. If one is asked what exactly is the chief contention of this book, the reply will be that atheism and agnosticism, even in the hands of their chosen champions, reveal their insufficiency. They are ways in which men think but not ways by which men live. If man and society are to remain integrated, it will be only by means of a religious conception of life. The religious question is an eternal question, says Masaryk, and he finds it inexplicable that anyone can doubt this. Scepticism is not enough. The real question is why men fight against religion and what is the content of the seemingly irreligious life. This is a remarkable book by a remarkable man and the very fact of Masaryk's position as administrator and statesman makes it the more significant. He had learnt the philosophy of religion in the lecture room, but it was in the State that he saw afresh what the practice of religion meant to the life of men and nations. Here is the measured judgment of a man who has every right to speak, and it is one to which we should all listen.

E. S. WATERHOUSE

T. E. Hulme By MICHAEL ROBERTS (London: Faber & Faber 1938 Pp 310 Price 10s 6d)

Henri Bergson wrote of T. E. Hulme, the subject of Mr. Michael Roberts's new book, that he was "un esprit d'une grande valeur. Il apporte, à l'étude des questions philosophiques, de rares qualités de finesse, de vigueur, et de pénétration. Ou je me trompe beaucoup ou il est destiné à produire des œuvres intéressantes et importantes dans le domaine de la philosophie en général et plus particulièrement peut-être dans celui de la philosophie de l'art." Hulme returned these compliments by translating Bergson's *Introduction à la Métaphysique*, and also the *Réflexions sur la Violence* of that "Bergsonian Marxist," Georges Sorel. He was killed during the War before he completed the large works of his own which he had planned, and the only writings of his that have hitherto appeared in book form is a series of fragments collected and edited by Herbert Read under the title of *Speculations* and published in the International Library of Psychology and Philosophy. One of the signal services which Mr. Roberts has performed in his *T. E. Hulme* is that of bringing further material before us, including new poems and extracts from his articles written against Russell and others in defence of militarism during the Great War.

As in the case of Pascal and Sorel, Hulme's influence has been far less in academic circles than among the "literary intelligentsia," but here it has been a very profound influence indeed. Few individuals have been more definitely responsible for the discrediting in these circles of the optimistic and "scientific" philosophy of such writers as H. G. Wells and its replacement for good or ill by the much less cheerful and expansive viewpoint of men like T. S. Eliot. And if he criticized Russell's pacifism, he did much to make literary men aware of the realistic pluralism of Russell and Moore in England, and of the phenomenologists on the Continent, and the reaction of both movements against the idealistic monism and pantheism of Hegel. In Hulme's mind the attack on monism in philosophy was essentially bound up with

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an attack on romanticism in poetry and art. He was a vigorous and convincing protagonist of philosophical trends which from the viewpoint of the Hegelian tradition were "atavistic," and of art such as that of his friend Epstein which "romantic tastes and notions of beauty lead people to regard in the same light. He believed that the age of 'expansiveness' which began with the Renaissance was inevitably drawing to a close, and welcomed the change to a more stern and sober view of life.

ARTHUR N. PRIOR

Honesty By RICHARD C. CABOT (New York & London Macmillan & Co 1938
Pp 326 Price 10s 6d)

This is an interesting and valuable popular not academic discussion of one of the most difficult problems for the moralist. Is it right to tell a lie under any circumstances? or, Is the obligation of telling the truth absolute without any exception? Most writers on ethics concede if reluctantly that the obligation is not absolute as there may be circumstances in which a lie may be morally justified. This is the issue with which this book is concerned. The author who teaches ethics but whose illustrations are mainly drawn from a long and wide experience of medical practice challenges this conclusion and for the most part insists on the absoluteness of the duty of honesty without any exceptions. Nevertheless he admits that some kinds of deception are excusable in war although he condemns any lying propaganda and in the end of the book *One Word More* he concedes all I should contend for when he says it is paradoxical but true that we can think a person heroic for telling a lie and yet condemn all lies as I do. We are almost ashamed of ourselves for admitting that Desdemona's words are false. We admire her far more than if she had not said them. We know that her lie was vastly nobler than our truth. And yet we do not believe in lies. How is this possible? Because we can distinguish between the motive and the means. A heroic person snatches up for a noble purpose a harmful tool (p 320). He extends this concession to war as I should. War is bad. Many fighters are heroic we honour them and hate their trade (p 321). I should probably admit more exceptions than the author would cordial as is my agreement with him generally in his contention against the too prevalent practice and the too lenient judgment of lying. The arrangement of the matter is good but the argument tends to be discursive and the style diffuse. There are abundant practical illustrations. There is an occasional Americanism unfamiliar to English readers. I have read the book with intense interest and sincere appreciation.

In the first Part *Definitions* he defines honesty as a Life-Preserver "the King of the virtues and the life saver of men" (p 6), but he is careful to distinguish veracity from infallibility exact conveyance from accurate apprehension of truth, he admits the legitimacy of *feints and fictions* as a sport or art when no deception is intended he allows for reserve in speech qualifying frankness and discusses the limitations of the claims of privacy and the duty of secrecy he lays stress on the danger of self-deceit as the root of deception of others and distinguishes prevarication equivocation and evasion. "Other people's secrets we are not free to pass along and should do our best (short of lying) to preserve. But the best people that I have known had the fewest secrets of their own" (p 45). The better people become, the more transparent can they afford to be.

The second Part offers a discussion of *Selected Problems on Honesty and Dishonesty* in War and Crime, Government Industry, Science, Education,

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Medicine, Social Work, and Confidential References, Art, Social and Polite Exchanges, and in Religion, he ends with a close scrutiny of "types and techniques of self-deceit." Into details it is impossible here to enter. One conclusion may be stated: he does seem to me to prove that prevalent practice does fall far short of what is not only desirable, but practicable. The chapter dealing with Medicine is specially valuable as coming from a medical man.

The third Part attempts to deal with the *Philosophy of Honesty*. First he shows how by resolve and habit honesty should be made automatic, excluding indecision and debate. Next he argues the right of men to experience, and, therefore, the duty to practice veracity, for in the long run reality defends itself and us in conveying it truthfully, then the root of honesty to others is traced to internal honesty, veracity to sincerity (self-knowledge in self-reverence) and thus internal honesty has its support in the *habit of living on facts*. The title of the last chapter, *Certain Honesty*, is too narrow to express the contents and may be thus expanded: live freely and fully yourself, and help others to live freely and fully also, so that you and they may grow and to do this live honestly and expect and assist others to live honestly.

It is in his philosophy I should join issue with the author. Honesty is for him the ultimate moral principle. He denies that "kindness is more fundamental than honesty" (p. 253), yet he associates with honesty courage and good will, as "always needed in the endless journey of growth, because all three are parts of the same effort" (p. 254). The dynamic view here suggested should have led him beyond the *means to the end*. In the Christian principle of love—esteem for others, interest in others, effort for others—as well as self the end is given, and by this end—full personality in full community—all practice must be determined.

A. E. GARVIE

The Aesthetic Object By E. JORDAN (Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press, London: Williams & Norgate, 1938. Pp. xii + 275. Price 15s.)

This study of aesthetic experience belongs to the body of American axiology best exemplified in the works of Urban and Perry. It aims at distinguishing the judgment of aesthetic value from ordinary judgments of fact, and does so by an analysis of the aesthetic object which reveals the concepts or categories implied in all appreciative propositions about art.

"Thus the judgment of existence depends upon the familiar system of scientific and philosophical categories of space, time, cause, quantity, etc., while the value categories are, in spite of the enormous amount of writing done about aesthetics, ethics, religion, etc., still awaiting their deduction. It will be our hypothesis that the most elementary formulation of these value categories will be the aesthetic."

The concepts in question are given as appropriateness, ambiguity, analogy, cumulation, colour, tone, colour-tone, rhythm, line, mass, form, design, and when an object is determined by the foregoing principles it becomes an aesthetic object, and has the quality of beauty.

The main species of the genus beautiful are the ugly, the sublime, the tragic, the comic, and the grotesque.

The attempt to fit aesthetic experience into a pigeon-hole in a logical or philosophical system is, in my opinion, foredoomed to produce results not even remotely corresponding to an impartial analysis of the facts relating to this sphere, and to base aesthetic judgments on general ideas or concepts of any description whatever seems to remove at one blow any claim they may have to rank as judgments of value.

LJSTOWZL.

NEW BOOKS

In the Spirit of William James By R B PERRY (New Haven Yale University Press London Oxford University Press, H Milford 1938 Pp xii + 211 Price \$2 9s net)

It is only three years since Mr Perry's great book on William James appeared but these five Powell lectures at the University of Indiana are as fresh as their author is indefatigable. The last two of them are the most accurately described by the book's title for the fourth lecture 'A Militant Liberal,' discusses how one might react to Fascism in the spirit of William James and the last although very general is an attempt to extend and simplify a characteristically Jamesian position. The second and third lectures on the other hand are in the main, straight expositions of James's philosophy. They attempt however to contrast James's radical empiricism with the more belligerent forms of present-day positivism—in Mr Perry's opinion a new cult which touches human thought at all points and threatens a profound and epochal change in the intellectual life of the Western world. The first lecture comparing James with Royce is an exercise in the modern biographical style.

I liked the fourth lecture best although in a way it seemed to be the least successful. It was able to say how a Liberal should deal with illiberalism in a Liberal country but not how a Liberal should behave in an illiberal country. The reason for the failure is that there is probably no answer to the last question but the exordium of the lecture and the courage of its analysis seemed to me to be of a very high order. The last lecture I found rather disappointing. Its whole argument seems to depend upon a doubtful analysis of 'belief'. There may be a right to act or to be confident where the evidence fails and if this condition of active confidence is to be called belief there is no problem. In any ordinary sense of language however while we often believe upon insufficient evidence we have surely no right so to believe since nothing but evidence can justify belief. There is no peculiar sanctity about such a statement. Unevidenced hopes may be very good hopes but an unevidenced legitimate belief would seem to be just an absurdity.

The second and third lectures are admirable expositions of very difficult themes. I think, however that the distinction in the second lecture between what is given and what is revealed is unfortunate. Most revelations are 'given'. The third lecture seems to me to exhibit very clearly how good a psychologist and how admirable a phenomenologist James was. It also seems to me to show that neither psychology nor phenomenology can be a meta-physics. On the last point I dare say Mr Perry would not agree but the exceptional clarity of his exposition makes a decision on the question as easy as it could be.

JOHN LARSEN

Explanation and Reality in the Philosophy of Émile Meyerson By T R KELLY (Princeton U.S.A. Princeton University Press London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1937 Pp vii + 133 Price 9s net)

The writings of the late Émile Meyerson provide a striking example of the philosophical value which can come from the work of a man of science who is sufficiently interested in the nature of his technical studies to view his subject in historical perspective. This book gives a careful and complete account of Meyerson's philosophical publications. It is frankly written, and brings out the radical inconsistency in his contrast between Explanation and Reality. Nevertheless (and perhaps because of this), it also demonstrates

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its value Professor Kelly succeeds in giving a living picture of the development of Meyerson's thought

In short, this is a useful and well-documented treatment I am not sure that the attempt at synthesis of the difficulties is very convincing but the book will be most valuable to students for its careful account, and for its comprehensive bibliography both of Meyerson's works and of commentaries upon them

A. E. HEATH

Psychology and Religion By CARL GUSTAV JUNG (London Humpfrey Milford
Oxford University Press New Haven Yale University Press 1938
Pp 131 Price 9s 2 dollars)

It is strange to find Jung amongst the prophets but, judging by this book, he bids fair to enter their company There is certainly a wide difference between this estimate of religion and Jung's earlier words "the gods are libido" The title is rather too general accurately to describe the contents of the book It is divided into three chapters—The Autonomy of the Unconscious Mind—Dogma and Natural Symbols—The History and Psychology of a Natural Symbol All are of interest and importance but only a few aspects of the psychology of religion can possibly be represented in this scheme Jung adheres to the empirical and phenomenological position in psychology, but adds that experience is not even possible without reflection "Psychology, he insists, must deal with mental facts in the same manner as zoology deals with various species—an elephant is true because it exists" Religion is described as a peculiar attitude of the human mind a careful consideration and observation of certain dynamic factors, understood to be 'powers,' spirits, demons, gods, laws, ideals or whatever name man has given to such factors as he has found in his world powerful, helpful or dangerous enough to be taken into careful consideration or grand, beautiful and meaningful enough to be devoutly adored and loved No definition of religion is fully satisfactory, but this at least serves to make clear what Jung considers religion to be and embraces some of the chief points The human psyche, he insists is not a personal affair, a statement which he supports by reference to the fact that mobs and madmen are moved by non personal and overwhelming forces Jung reveals a pragmatic attitude when he states that he is convinced only by what he knows and all else is hypothesis Therefore, he explains, that he supports the hypothesis of the practising Catholic so long as it works for him On the other hand, he describes atheism as a "stupid error" "Is there," he asks, 'as a matter of fact any better truth about ultimate things than the one that helps you to live?' He recognizes the place of projection in religion yet states that Consciousness can hardly exist in a state of complete projection He speaks of the error of "psychologism" which assumes God is an illusion begotten of fear or the will to power or repressed sexuality, an evident thrust at Freud 'The idea of God represents an important, even overwhelming psychical intensity' The man who rejects this belief re-creates it in some other form Nietzsche was no atheist, but his god was dead So God once dismissed, disappears only to return as Wotan or 'State' or 'something ending with ism'

A good deal of the book is occupied with analyses of dreams and with symbolism Incidental passages such as those quoted show whither Jung is wending Probably the journey is not yet complete, for this book has many signs of being a half way house Yet it continues what was begun in *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* and is a welcome sign that maturer reflection has once more, as with so many other men shown Jung that the religious attitude

NEW BOOKS

to life is one of the fundamental verities. The closing words of the book deserves to be fully quoted. They are entirely significant of what Jung has been led to think. "Nobody can know what the ultimate things are. We must, therefore, take them as we experience them. And if such experience helps to make your life healthier, more beautiful, more complete and more satisfactory to yourself and to those you love you may safely say 'This was the Grace of God'."

E. S. WATERHOUSE

To Become or Not to Become (That is the Question?) Episodes in the History of an Indian Word By MRS RHYNS DAVIDS D Litt MA (London Luzac & Co 1937 Pp xi + 164 Price 1s 9d)

It is well known that Mrs Rhys Davids has for the last ten years or more been dissatisfied alike with her former interpretations of Buddhism and those of other scholars. She is convinced that the modern orthodox Buddhism is a caricature of the teaching of Gotama. It is certainly true that it is difficult to connect modern Buddhism with universe of thought that prevailed in India in the sixth century B.C. But Mrs Davids brings more to bear on the subject than such general considerations. Here she patiently and inductively follows out the meanings of two verbs *bhū* (become) and *as* (be). She tracks down all the *bhū* forms in the Suttas and considers them relatively to their context. She also examines the noun *bhava* (becoming) and the kindred verb *bhavaṃ*. Whilst only a Pali scholar can fully appreciate the finer points implied, there is little doubt that Mrs Rhys Davids makes out a signally strong case for distinguishing *as* and *bhū*. She argues with a wealth of examples that *bhavaṃ* is not a mere alternative for *atthi* (present indicative of *as*) but expresses a misrepresented and misunderstood aspect of Buddhism's original message, namely the idea of striving becoming seeking transcending passing on from what is to what is to be. This little book offers strong presumptive evidence for Mrs Rhys Davids's contention: not merely subjective evidence but evidence based on close study of shades of meaning of the original texts. None is better fitted to estimate such evidence than Mrs Rhys Davids whose services to Pali have had a large share in restoring that rapidly lapsing tongue into the position of a living if not a spoken language. It is becoming more clear that Mrs Rhys Davids is establishing her case and increasing recognition of that fact amongst scholars of repute leads one to hope that she will live to see what she has so patiently and carefully explored recognized generally.

E. S. WATERHOUSE

A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology Prepared by WILLIS D. ELLIS Assistant Professor of Psychology University of Arizona (London Kegan Paul Trench Trubner & Co 1938 8vo Pp xiv + 403 Price 21s net)

This 'Source Book' is a very valuable and opportune exposition in English of the development of the holistic view in psychology. It consists of admirably abridged translations from the German of a number of original contributions towards the construction of what has come to be known as Gestalt psychology. Beginning with Wertheimer's address to the Kant Society in 1924 by which time the theory could be presented as a coherent whole it deals firstly with the general problems of psychology towards a solution of which the Gestalt hypothesis was proposed. It then passes on to a presentation of the manner in which special problems, such as those of visual perception, per-

ception and movement, perception and touch, have been attacked. There follows an interesting account of experiments on the behaviour of animals, notably those of Köhler with chimpanzees and of Hertz with birds. A third group of problems has to do with the thought processes, and a fourth, consisting of the speculations of Lewin and the experimental work of Zeigarnik with volition. The last section treats of pathological phenomena, including the famous case of figural (cortical) blindness reported by Gelb and Goldstein and the studies of Fuchs on vision. The volume ends with three replies to criticisms of the Gestalt theory: the first by Koffka in answer to that of Vittorio Benussi; the second and third by Köhler in respect of those of G. E. Müller and Eugenio Rignano. *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology* presents to English readers for the first time a compact account of the development of Gestalt thinking from 1915 to 1929. Though the original thirty-four articles and one book from which it is compiled constitute a material some ten times as long as the present work, the gist of the sources has certainly, as Professor Ellis says in his Preface that he hopes it has, been consistently retained throughout. This is a book which all psychologists who have not access to the original voluminous literature should read, and it will be of interest also to the philosopher and indeed to a large circle of those who are concerned with the movements of contemporary thought.

F. AVELING

The Science of Society: An Introduction to Sociology. By J. RUMNEY (London: Duckworth, 1938. Pp. 125. Price 3s. 6d.)

Dr Rumney opens with a plea for sociology as an indispensable aid to the understanding of society as it is and as a necessary part of the education of everyone who hopes to contribute to the solution of our social problems. He supports this view by pointing out how incomplete are the findings of any single social science, whether it be economics, psychology, biology, or human geography. This point is well made. The complete, realistic view he continues cannot be obtained by a mechanical synthesis of these various specialisms. There must be a science which concerns itself with the totality of human relations. Sociology is a synoptic science in that it studies a complex thing in its totality. It does not merely analyse or dissect a thing into its parts and then synthesize or build up the parts together as a whole. This is of course a more difficult point to establish and he has no space to treat it adequately. Instead he gives us an excellent account of the development of sociology, and of its methods of research, and a rather less excellent account of some of its conclusions.

The weakest part of the book is that in which the author surveys the evolution of property, the family, the State, and the social classes. Perhaps he was unwise to attempt not merely to show what these institutions are in essence but also to summarize their history and present character. It is hardly possible to do this in brief without giving the impression of superficiality, which is exactly what sociology most needs to avoid. The reader may feel that sociology is telling him no more about property and class than he could hear any day from a popular left-wing orator.

Not the least valuable part of the book is the bibliography, giving references for each chapter, supplemented by a list of periodicals and a table with dates of some outstanding contributions to social theory since Machiavelli.

T. H. MARSHALL

NEW BOOKS

Bradley and Bergson A Comparative Study By RAM MURTI LOOMBA, M A
With a Foreword by NARENDRA N S GUPTA M A, Ph D (Lucknow)
The Upper India Publishing House Ltd 1937 Pp xi + 187 Price
Rs 2 8 net }

Mr Loomba contends ably that Bergson's mystical intuitionism or some thing very much like it is the sort of view to which Bradley's last minute and despairing retreat from reason to an immediacy analogous to that of feeling should lead. Bradley's underlying scepticism however prevented him from realizing what he appeared to recognize. Thus while Bergson's is a philosophical mysticism Bradley's is a mysticism in spite of philosophy. There is no doubt a good deal to be said for this contention. The author interpolates some interesting parallels drawn from Indian systems.

R E STEDMAN

Books received also —

C H PALMER *Oriental Mysticism A Treatise on the Sufistic and Unitarian Theosophy of the Persians* London Luzac & Co 1938 (2nd Edition) Pp iv + 84 5s

T M P MAHADEVAN M A Ph D *The Philosophy of Ad alsa* London Luzac & Co 1938 Pp 284 7s 6d

VARIOUS AUTHORS *Five Essays The Meaning of the Humanities* London Humphrey Milford Princeton University Press 1938 Pp vii + 178 11s

D D KANGA *Where Theosophy and Science Meet Part II From Atom to Man* Madras The Adyar Library Association London Theosophical Publishing House 1938 Pp xxxi + 168 Rs 1 14 3s 6d

B O SMITH *Logical Aspects of Educational Measurement* London Humphrey Milford New York Columbia University Press 1938 Pp 182 12s

J MACMURRAY A T M WILSON R NOBLE and F G CROOKSHANK *A Philosopher looks at Psychotherapy* (Individual Psychology Medical Pamphlets—No 20) London The C W Daniel Co Ltd 1938 Pp 70 2s 6d

K BRITTON *Communication A Philosophical Study of Language* London The International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method 1939 Pp xvi + 285 12s 6d

VARIOUS AUTHORS *The Aristotelian Society Action Perception and Measurement* London Harrison & Sons Ltd 1938 Pp 194 15s

The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1937-38 London Harrison & Sons Ltd 1938 Pp 327 25s

VARIOUS AUTHORS (Ed by O K Buros) *Research and Statistical Methodology Books and Reviews 1933-38* New Brunswick Rutgers University Press 1938 Pp vi + 100 \$1 25

The Yoga Upanisads (Tr by T R Srinivasa Ayyangar Ed by S Subrahmanya Sastri) Madras The Adyar Library 1938 Pp xxxviii + 502

G H THOMSON *The Factorial Analysis of Human Ability* London The University of London Press 1939 Pp xv + 326 16s

J A McWILLIAMS *Cosmology A Text for Colleges* New York and London The Macmillan Company 1938 Pp 243 9s

E NAGEL *Principles of the Theory of Probability* (International Encyclopedia of Unified Science Vol I No 6) Chicago The University of Chicago Press London Cambridge University Press 1939 Pp 80 4s 6d

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- G W HOWGATE *George Santayana* Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania Press London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1938 Pp viii + 363 16s
- P LEON *The Philosophy of Courage, or The Oxford Group Way* London George Allen & Unwin, Ltd 1939 Pp 222 6s
- H C LINK *The Rediscovery of Man* London Macmillan & Co 1939 Pp ix + 257 7s 6d
- Samuel Alexander *From the Proceedings of the British Academy* Vol xxv. 1938 London The Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford Pp 20 1s 6d
- W BROWN *Psychological Methods of Healing An Introduction to Psychotherapy* London The University of London Press, Ltd 1939 Pp vi + 224 7s 6d
- H GOMPERZ *Limits of Cognition and Exigencies of Action* London Cambridge University Press Berkeley University of California Press 1939 Pp 70 1s 3d
- G IVES *Obstacles to Human Progress* London George Allen & Unwin, Ltd 1939 Pp 283 10s 6d
- D M GOODFELLOW *Principles of Economic Sociology* London George Routledge & Sons Ltd 1939 Pp xx + 289 12s 6d
- E THOMAS *A View of All Existence* London Watts & Co 1939 Pp 233 1s 6d (Cheap edition)
- L ARNAUD REID *Preface to Faith* London George Allen & Unwin, Ltd 1939 Pp 214 6s
- S RADHAKRISHNAN *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* Oxford Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp xiii + 394 15s
- N K BRAHMA *Causality and Science* London George Allen & Unwin, Ltd 1939 Pp 120 6s
- F LEANDER *The Philosophy of John Dewey, A Critical Study* Goteborg Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag 1939 Pp 155
- M OAKESHOTT (Foreword by E Barker) *The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe* Cambridge at the University Press 1939 Pp xxiii + 224 10s 6d
- J L STOCKS (Ed by D M Emmet) *Reason and Intuition and Other Essays* London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp xxii + 259 12s 6d
- C KOVCZEWSKI *La Pensée Préconsciente* Paris F Alcan 1938 Pp xvi + 273 Frs 40
- A BURLAUD *Principes d'une Psychologie des Tendances* Paris F Alcan 1938 Pp 426 Frs 60
- J URBAN *L'Eptithymologie (La Dialectologie)* Paris F Alcan 1938 Pp 356 Frs 50
- Collection, *Philosophes* André Cresson *Pascal, Marc Aurèle, Platon* E Dhurout *Claude Bernard* Paris F Alcan 1939 Pp each 130 Frs 12
- M VILLER, S J *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* fascicule viii Paris Gabriel Beauchesne et ses fils 1938 Pp 242 49s
- E SOURIAU *Avoir une âme* Paris Société d'édition Les Belles Lettres 1938 Pp 141
- VARIÉS *L'Intention Discussions* Paris F Alcan 1938 Pp 213 Fr 25
- F VENTURI *Jeunesse de Diderot (1713-53)* (Tr par J Bertrand) Paris A Skira 1939 Pp 417
- H DINGLER *Die Methode der Physik* München Ernst Reinhardt 1938 Pp 422

NEW BOOKS

- R JUNGE *System der Lebensphilosophie* Berlin Junker und Dunnhaupt Verlag 1937 2 Vols Pp 142 + 478
- E LILJEGVIST *Studier Tillägnade* Lund Aktiebolaget Skanska Centraltryckeriet 1930 2 Vols Pp xiii + 586, and xi + 503 For bada banden tillsammans 55 kronor
- V NORSTRÖM *Brev 1889-1916* (I urval utgivna av E Akesson) Stockholm C E Fritzes Bokforhages 1923 Pp 458 10 kronor
- V NORSTRÖM *Religion und Gedanke* Lund Aktiebolaget Skanska Centraltryckeriet 1923 Pp xi + 324 12 kronor
- E AKESSON *Norströmsiana* Stockholm Sveriges Kristliga Studentreligions Förlag 1924 Pp 203 4 kronor
- E CASSIRER *Axel Hagerström Eine Studie zur Schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart* Göteborg Wettergren & Kerbers Förlag 1939 Pp 119 6 kronor
- P CARABELLESE *L Idealismo Italiano* Naples Luigi Alfredo 1938 Pp 379 Lire 20
- A GLIZZO *Sic Vos Non Vobis Vol 1* Napoli Luigi Loffredo 1939 Pp vi + 302
- E A CHAVEZ *Notas y Reflexiones sobres Importantes Problemas Filosóficos* Considerados en el IX Congreso Internacional Celebrado en Paris y en el I Nacional de las Sociedades Francesas de Filosofia Mexico Luminar 1938 Pp 112

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

While of course, I accept unreservedly Professor Harsihorne's restatement of his own principles in your January issue I regret that I still fail to find these clearly presented in *Beyond Humanism*. This however, will add materially to the interest of his *Vision of God*.

I am sorry too that he feels my comments to be "dogmatic", but this is due purely to review limitations so that I still believe his arguments to be "weighty," though not conclusive. Nor do I think it useful to count heads with regard to Determinism however eminent they may be. But since one may cite, against those he names Einstein and Planck, Rutherford and Lodge it is perfectly obvious that the issue will long remain open so that all one can do is to risk being wrong in excellent company.

Yours faithfully,
J E TURNER

THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL
February 7 1939

THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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INSTITUTE NOTES

During the past term Mr A C Ewing MA, Litt D (Lecturer in the University of Cambridge), has delivered an interesting course of lectures on Theories of Ethics

The Addresses at the Evening Meetings have been as follows. The Present Relations of Science and Religion, by Professor C D Broad. The Permanent Significance of Hume's Philosophy by Professor H H Price. Ethics and the Supernatural by The Very Rev W R Matthews KCVO, DD DLitt Dean of St Paul's

SPECIAL LECTURE IN THE SUMMER TERM

A Lecture entitled The Nature of Truth will be given by Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (Professor of Philosophy Central Hindu College Benares, King George V Professor of Mental and Moral Science Calcutta University Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics in the University of Oxford) at University College Gower Street London WC1 on Wednesday, June 7 1939 at 5.45 p.m.

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THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Appeal for New Members and Donations

THE Council appeals to members to do all in their power to introduce new members in order to extend the benefits of the Institute and to increase its revenue.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres as well as the conduct of the JOURNAL, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from subscriptions of £1 1s per annum. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

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FREEDOM AND PERSONALITY

PROFESSOR A E TAYLOR

'Moral science if it is a science at all must be a science of a higher order than simply positive sciences are. Its subject being human choice or liberty, the world immediately before its view is not the world of that which is but of that which *may be* and its task is to find in this that which *should be*. —J Grote

Is it possible to say anything on the well worn theme of human freedom or unfreedom which has not been already better said by someone else before us? It may be doubted, yet it is always worth while to see whether we cannot at least set what is perhaps 'already familiar to us in a fresh light and so come to a clearer comprehension of our own meaning. This, at any rate, is all that will be attempted in these pages, I have spoken in an earlier essay of the "practical situation" in which we find ourselves whenever we have to make a decision as involving *indetermination*, and my purpose is simply to make it plainer to myself, and so incidentally perhaps to a reader, what I mean by such an expression. I shall start then by adopting what we may perhaps agree to call a phenomenological attitude to the subject, that is, I will try to describe the facts in a way which anyone who recalls occasions when he has been driven to take a decision will recognize as faithful to his experience, without imparting into the description any element of explanatory speculative hypothesis. The description is meant to be one which will be admitted to be true to the "appearances," independently of any theory about the "freedom of the will"—to describe correctly that which it is the object of all such theories to explain.

Let us take for the purpose of our argument an actual historical example of such a practical situation involving a decision. We can

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hardly do better than select a particularly momentous instance "The governor answered and said unto them, Whether of the twain will ye that I release unto you? They said, Barabbas." If we examine the situation described in these words in an "unsophisticated" spirit, as it presents itself not to a reader trying to fit it into the pre-determinal scheme of some metaphysical interpretation of things but to the parties who are actually living through it in its concreteness, the first thing that would strike us is that both parties, the "governor" on the one side, and the populace on the other, are assuming that the pattern of the event which is to issue is not yet made. I do not mean merely that the event is still in the future, and cannot therefore be already certainly known beforehand. This would be equally true if the question were, for example, *Will it rain before noon to-day, or will it not?* or *Will this electric lamp, if left lighted, continue to burn for another six⁹ hours* though in these cases, at least as we commonly think, all the conditions on which the still future event depends may be already present. In our case the pattern of the future event is still unmade in a deeper sense; it may take either of two forms, and which form it will take depends on the decision of the multitude, which decision is itself not yet taken. It is not merely that they have already a preference, though neither they nor the "governor" can say which it is, they are now to *make* a choice. Pilate calls on them, not to find out how their minds have been already made up, but to *make up* their minds. And this is the situation which is daily confronting every one of us whenever he is called to exercise a choice. A believer in rigid scientific determinism has, in practice, to accept this situation on the same terms as everyone else. He may hold theoretically that, his "character" and his "circumstances" being what they are, there is only one course ever open to him, and that all he really does when he is said to choose is to find out what that one course is. But in actual life, when he is not theorizing about the nature of choice but choosing, he in fact always acts on the assumption that it is still open to him to do A or not to do A, and that the option will remain open until he closes down one of the alternative "routes" of action by the decision which is still to be made. Hence the paradox which I have heard formulated in the phrase that the "determinist" never applies to his own action the deterministic theory which he treats as valid for that of everyone else. He may persuade himself that all the apparent "decisions" of his fellow-men are no more than "conditioned reflexes," the like of which he could produce by "laboratory" methods which would preclude all possibility of genuine choosing on the part of his "subjects." But he does not think of his own imagined procedure in instituting his laboratory experiments on his subjects as a "conditioned reflex." That he regards as throughout controlled, not by

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"antecedent conditions," but, in a wholly different way, by a final cause, or purpose, his intelligent purpose to conduct a series of experiments which will establish his theories, and to conduct them on lines not prescribed for him by anything but their relevance to the conclusion which is to be established. On his own theory, there must be at least one being in a universe of "robots" who is not a "robot"—the experimenter in his laboratory. It follows that even the "scientific" determinist habitually admits the real existence of one "free" agent—himself when he is acting in his capacity as experimenter. If he will not concede this, it must follow that he is not really "free" in selecting the experiments to be performed on the "subject", he performs those which he does perform, rather than any others, merely because, being built as he is, he can do nothing else. And he is equally 'unfree' in drawing the conclusion that these experiments have, or have not, established his case. Being built as he is, he inevitably thinks that the experiments have proved his case, but that he thinks it proved is no more evidence that it really is proved than the fact that his "unscientific" neighbour being built as he is, equally inevitably thinks the experiments entirely inconclusive is proof to the contrary. Each of us, if we are to push the "determinist" theory to its logical conclusion, thinks what he does think, and that is all there is to be said on the matter, which of us thinks *truly* is a question which, even if it has an intelligible meaning, is, and eternally must remain without an answer. Thus, as has been well said by Professor Karl Schmidt,¹ the "determinism" which we are asked to accept because it is said to be scientifically proved (and what is proved by science must be true) ends in pronouncing science and scientific proof themselves to be pure illusions.

But if—under the general assumption that there is such a thing as scientific truth—there must be at least one class of acts which are not "conditioned reflexes," those of the man of science in his laboratory selecting² the experiments which he will perform, there is no reason why the decisions taken by the man of science when he comes out of his laboratory and mingles in the general business of the world, or those of the rest of us who are not men of science, should be "conditioned reflexes." Whether I am deciding which of two experiments it will be more to my purpose to perform, which

¹ *The Creative I and the Divine* chapter ix.

² Though the use of the word selecting is really an understatement often enough the investigator has quite literally to invent his crucial experiment, it is a proceeding which has never been tried before and has not even entered into the heart of man. He is like a man who has to open a curiously locked safe and must first forge the key he needs not like one who has no more to do than to try one key after another out of an already constructed stock until he finds the one which fits. Hence the indispensability in the really great scientific experimenter of the right kind of imagination.

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of two investments it will be more prudent to prefer, to which of two schools it will be wiser to send my son, the process of deciding is recognizably the same in all cases. All the considerations which show that the physicist in his laboratory, when he decides to perform this experiment rather than another, is really intervening to make the subsequent course of events (as far as what happens in his laboratory is concerned) different from what it would have been without his decision, equally prove the same thing of all the interventions made in the course of things by the commonest fellow of us all in the conduct of his daily affairs. They too are genuinely things *à faire*, not merely events to be noted and described.

I dwell on this rather obvious consideration because, as it seems to me, it is of itself enough to prove that wherever choice intervenes in shaping the course of events, there must necessarily have been an antecedent state of *indetermination*, or, if you prefer the milder expression, incomplete determination. Too many writers on ethical subjects a generation ago were still, for some reason, afraid of the word *indetermination*, and I am not sure that the prejudice is even yet wholly extinct. One might almost suppose, from the shame-faced way in which the fact was commonly wrapped up in circumlocution and euphemism, that the incompleteness of determination characteristic of all situations where choice and decision are possible were a *partie honteuse* of the creation which decency forbids us to call by its plain name. Serious moralists like Green, and at a later date Rashdall, found it indispensable to their whole conception of moral action to insist on the point that when we make up our minds to a course of action we really are "determining" to do something, and so determining what the sequence of events shall be. But when it came to the recognition of the manifest implication that until we intervene the sequence is as yet not determined, both Green and Rashdall—to mention no other names—apparently felt as uncomfortable as an early Victorian driven to mention his trousers in "mixed company." The contemporary of Thackeray or Dickens was afraid that the word "trousers" would affront *la pudeur des dames*, Green or Rashdall that the mention of indetermination might shock the sensitive delicacy of the men of science. We have long ago learned that female modesty is not the fragile plant our grandfathers imagined it to be, and that we do not really "bring a blush to the cheek of the young person" by naming our trousers, it is high time that *la science* too should have done with affected prudery and accustom her ears to listen to the mention of indetermination without taking alarm. Our virtuous ladies are allowed to read Shakespeare and Fielding unexpurgated, they may, if they like, enjoy the humour of Chaucer. Why then need we beat about the bush if we want to direct the attention of "science" to the good

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sense and plain speaking of an admirable passage like the following from Richard Price?

"As far as it is true of a being that he *acts*, so far he must *himself* be the cause of the action, and therefore not necessarily determined to act. Let anyone try to put a sense in the expressions *I will, I act*, which is consistent with supposing that the volition or action does not proceed from myself. Virtue supposes determination, and determination supposes a determiner, and a determiner that determines not himself is a palpable contradiction. Determination requires an efficient cause. If this cause is the being himself, I plead for no more. If not, then it is no longer *his* determination, that is, *he* is no longer the determiner, but the motive, or whatever else anyone will say to be the cause of the determination. To ask what effects the cause of *our* determination is the very same thing with asking who did an action after being informed that such a one did it."¹

I choose this particular passage for citation, of course, precisely because the last two sentences so effectually dispose of the subterfuge by which writers like Green and Rashdall try to avoid shocking the sensitive ears of "science". Both of them talk often enough of 'self-determination', but both try to take the supposed indecency out of their language by the suggestion that there is all the time behind the supposedly self-determining agent something in the background which determines *him*, and so they take away with the left hand all they seem to be giving us with the right. At bottom they are both falling into the error which Price meant to exclude by his denial that a "motive" is an "efficient cause", they talk as though the "motive" *determined* the agent in the very same sense in which the agent *determined* what he would do—that is they virtually make the "motive" itself into an agent behind the scenes. They will not see, as Price said, that, to use Kant's language, if there is really such a thing as an *agent*, then, whenever the agent acts, he is not only the cause but, in a real sense, the *first* cause of the act he does. Indeed, Rashdall at least is righteously indignant with Kant for the frankness with which he had stated the disconcerting fact. Even where one cannot avoid recognizing the fact of indetermination, one is expected apparently to veil the shocking fact under an 'hypocoristic' name.

But in moral philosophy, as well as elsewhere, it is commonly the wiser part to act on the maxim, *quand la chose est, dites le mot*, not to do so is merely to accumulate subsequent trouble for yourself. And in the case of the making of a conscious choice, there ought to be no doubt that *la chose est* since, as Price saw so clearly, when I determine to do or not to do an act, there is no invisible agent who "determines" how I shall determine. As the very statement that I

¹ *Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*, pp. 305-6

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terminate certain proceedings by taking such and such a step implies that they were not terminated until the step was taken, so the statement that I determine to do *A* presupposes that before I have made my choice it is *not* determined whether *A* shall be done or not. And to take refuge, as Rashdall for example does, behind the allegation that what I shall determine is settled for me in advance by something called my "character" (which, it is assumed, when confronted with a set of circumstances, can only react in one way), is to commit a double error. There is first the error of principle exposed by Price, when he contends that a "motive" is not an "efficient cause," the error of imagining that it is "motives" which act, and not persons who act in virtue of their "motives." And there is the manifest error of fact involved in the assumption that my "character" is something there, definitely made on a certain pattern, before I make the choices which actually fashion my character. To revert to the historical illustration with which we began these observations, when the mob shouted "Barabbas" they did not simply lay open to inspection a moral character which they already possessed before the choice was made. If the act was a real choice, in shouting "Barabbas" they made their characters into something different from what they would have been if they had cried "Jesus who is called Christ." Pilate, again, when he shirked the duty incumbent on him in virtue of his office, to give judgment in accord with the law and equity of the case, by leaving the multitude to decide an issue which he ought to have decided himself, was not merely revealing himself as an evader of his responsibilities, he was making himself one, it is *conceivable* that he had never been in the past the sort of man he showed himself to be at that moment. The plain fact is that, so far as we can tell, no man's character is a thing finally made and fully determinate while the life remains in him, and being itself not completely determinate cannot be the source of complete determination in anything else.

This is precisely why the very mention of free choice or free will sounded in the ears of the "scientific" philosophers of the nineteenth century as an obscenity. If you set out with the notion that the only methods available for the attaining of truth in all matters must be those of the experimental man of science in his laboratory, you will be forced to add not merely that all truths must be established by "induction" from observed facts, but that the observed facts must be "laboratory" facts, facts of the kind which lend themselves to the purposes of the man of science. And the only facts which are suitable to his purpose are facts which are not merely determinate, but quantitatively determinate in all their features, records of minute and precise measurements. Once admit about any fact whatever that it in any respect eludes the possibility of such measurement, and

you have rendered it unavailable for the purposes of the laboratory (Or, at best, what you can extract from it for those purposes is not the full fact, but a mutilated aspect of it which excludes the features in it not amenable to measurement) And for this simple reason no concrete fact of life is a "laboratory" fact at all, and can only be made to appear as one by the most unscrupulous "editing" You cannot make the facts about life and living beings full, amenable to what a naturalistic metaphysic regards as the only legitimate method for the attainment of truth without the suppression of life itself, you *must* "murder to dissect" So long as you are dealing with a subject which is alive, you are throughout in the presence of facts about its behaviour which cannot be fully and exhaustively subjected to the precise measurement involved in the scientific ideal You get nearer to something like your ideal of what a scientific fact should be as you go further and further down the scale of living organisms in the direction of rudimentary simplicity When you wish to deal with the behaviour of an organism which is less rudimentary, to get anything like the sort of "scientific facts" you are in quest of, you have to reduce it to a more or less death-like condition, to inhibit the action of the "highest centres" by drugs or actually to remove those centres themselves (as in the case of the 'headless frogs' of our scientific text books) Even then you do not succeed completely You know with a great deal of probability how a 'headless frog' will respond to a certain precisely measured stimulus, but even here alternatives are apparently not completely excluded But *just* how a frog left as God made him will respond to your stimulus is something which you cannot "know as a scientific fact" And how an intelligent being like a man will respond to it you know still less And that for the soundest of reasons the man has actually, by his intelligence, to *make* his character for himself as his life goes on in a way in which the frog does not and cannot make its character The whole notion that the man, or even the frog, has *ab initio* a fully made "character," which has merely to be played upon by varying circumstances to respond to each set of conditions with one definite prepared "reaction," is the purest metaphysical mythology, it is tantamount to denying what is really the most patent 'fact' about both of them—though it is, to be sure, not a 'laboratory' fact—the fact that both are *alive*

We know, of course, that this fact of being alive is just the one fact of all others which is most disconcerting to the thoroughgoing "naturalist" We know how obstinately, in spite of discouraging prospects, he clings to the hope of some day being able to manufacture a living organism in his laboratory, apparently in the hope that if he could do so he would have got rid of the inconvenient fact of life itself, and have shown that there is no real difference in

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principle between being alive and being lifeless. But what is too often forgotten is that even if the experiment were to succeed, it would do nothing to prove what it was really intended to prove. Probably not even the most sanguine of "naturalists" expects that the man of science will ever be able to rival Moses by transforming a stick into a serpent. But even if the man of science should some day succeed in doing this, the fact would remain that he himself, the producer of the laboratory-made serpent, was not made in a laboratory. The transformation of the lifeless into the living would only have been effected by the action of an already living being. If we like to indulge in a still more extravagant flight of fancy, and to imagine a distant future when our scientific workers will themselves be artificially constructed in laboratories—not that I would accuse the most naturalistic of "naturalists" of really entertaining the notion—even so, it would be true that the factory-made men of science would have been, in the last resort, made by precursors who were not themselves made in any factory, and we should be as far as ever from having got rid of the very unscientific fact of life and its significance.

Meanwhile the "subjects" with whose behaviour we have to deal in certain situations of the moral life are ourselves and the members of our various "social groups," and we at least have not been put together in laboratories—we are *geniti non facti*. We really and truly grow. Now the plain truth about anything which is growing is that it is *not* fully determined in its reactions to the various situations in which it is placed, in the sense in which the experimentalist wedded to the methods of the laboratory uses the word "determined." How it will respond to a situation is not definitely and once for all settled by its antecedent nature, 'a plan already embodied in its structure,' the very fact that it is growing, and if it should further be in any degree intelligent, is learning by experiment and success or failure, means that it is steadily modifying its own patterns of action, and thus modifying its "nature," by the very responses which it makes. And what is thus really modifiable is obviously, so far as modifiable, not yet "determined." It is thus only because there is indeterminateness as well as determination in the scheme of things that there is an opening for choice to influence the course of events as we all know that it does. And it is idle to evade the issue by the retort that choices are not made in pure caprice but are "determined by motives." For all that such a phrase really means is that a responsible agent, when he chooses his line of action, has what he regards as intelligible justificatory reasons for choosing as he does and not otherwise. His "motive" is neither an agent nor a "driving force," nor an "antecedent event"; it is just the character of significance in the choice which he is making.

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A man has often been said, for example, to do certain acts, to choose certain alternatives rather than others "from the love of God." But this does not mean that his present act or choice is one event, and that the love of God is another distinct thing or event which somehow makes the first named event happen. It means only that the *man* in making the choice or doing the act in question is showing that he loves God. If we care to call his love of God a "determinant" of his choice, we must add that it is a determinant intrinsic to the act of choice itself, whereas the whole point of the theory called determinism is that it regards the determinant as invariably extrinsic to that which is determined by it. This is why I feel bound to regard any moralist who talks of self-determination as a sub-species of determination, and hopes to make his peace on those terms with the "scientific man," as an unconscious traitor to the cause he is undertaking to defend. The whole point of "determinism" is that you never do and never can determine yourself, you are always determined to take the line you are now taking by something external to the present act of choosing. And if any "scientific man" so far forgets this as to concede that choosing itself is a genuine feat, he is, in his turn, a traitor to the determinism he supposes himself to be asserting.

The simple fact is that *intentionality* is inseparable from personal activity, where there is no intention there is properly speaking, no act, but only the happening of an event. And intention is just that which a consistent scientific determinism cannot possibly recognize, to be consistent, determinism must reduce the universe to a scene in which there are *events* which "take place," and perhaps, though less certainly *things* in which the events take place, but no *acts* which are done or *persons* who do them. A good illustration is afforded by some sentences of an address delivered a few years ago by Professor Hogben to the British Association in Capetown.¹ "The modern mechanist," says the Professor, "does not say that thought and love and heroism do not exist: he says show me behaviour to which you apply the adjectives thoughtful or loving or heroic, and we will, one fine day endeavour to arrive at predictable conclusions with reference to it by following the only method of inquiry which we have learned by experience to trust."

Now there are several points in this pronouncement which might fairly call for comment. A sceptical critic might perhaps commend the caution of the speaker in postponing his demonstration to "one fine day"—in other words, to the "Greek Calends"—and still more in undertaking, when that "fine day" arrives, not to prove his point, but only to "endeavour" to do so (with the possible result of

¹ July 25 1929. I quote from the report of the Address published by the *Cape Times* as revised by the author.

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complete failure) But I take it Mr Hogben really means that the "fine day" will yet arrive, and that the "endeavour" will be successful And his language also shows two further things The "only method we have learned by experience to trust" had been previously described as consisting in the analysis of all human conduct into "conditioned reflexes", we had also been told that this analysis is being undertaken by a "new school of psychologists"—incidentally one would like to know something more about their claim to speak with authority in psychology—and its "express object" had been said to be that of "relieving Man . . . of his burden of soul" Clearly this can only be done if you "relieve Man" of intentionality Reflexes can be measured exactly in the laboratory, intentions cannot be observed there at all Man is to be "relieved" of the "burden" of a soul—in other words discharged from the responsibility for his conduct—by *proving* that he never acts with an intention Now what manner of proof is such a thesis susceptible of? I can just conceive that the experimentalist might somehow produce by experiment a number of *cretins* who would, when subjected to a particular stimulus, go through the motions of mounting the scaffold and placing their necks under the axe of the guillotine So much, then, might be "predictable"—that is, in pure abstract theory—for in actual fact it is safe to assume that the very complicated "mechanisms" presupposed by such a performance would be liable to break down in a variety of unforeseeable ways But how does this bring us nearer to the predictability "of acts of *heroism*"? The *heroism* does not consist simply in placing one's neck, or other members, in a situation of peril, if it did, the absent-minded or careless pedestrian who crosses the street at a dangerous point would be a "hero", what makes the performance "heroic" is that the agent exposes himself to the extreme peril with full consciousness of what he is doing, and because he judges the facing of it to be called for by honour or patriotism or religion

And no laboratory method will enable Professor Hogben or anyone else to "predict" that a man's devotion to ideals like these will or will not fail To make the "act of heroism" predictable by the "only method" which the "modern mechanist" has "learned by experience to trust," you must first take out of it everything which makes it other "heroic" or, in any true sense of the word, "active", you must reduce it to no more than that which it has in common with the behaviour of an hypnotic subject or a somnambulist—so much muscular movement "These," as a better psychologist than Mr. Hogben long ago remarked, "are the absurdities which even men of capacity run into, when they have occasion to belie their nature, and will perversely disclaim that image of God which was originally

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stamped upon it, the traces of which, however faint, are plainly discernible upon the mind of man "

It is not that the moralist is in any way called upon to deny the important part played in human life by "conditioned reflexes" and *la machine*, he ought in the course of his own studies to have learned the lesson of their importance sufficiently from such relatively unmodern thinkers as Pascal and Leibniz. But in fully accountable and responsible human action the part of the "machine" is always subservient to something which is not "mechanical," to an intention which is that of the agent himself. A machine, too, exhibits *intentionality*, but the intentions subserved by its functioning are not its own, they are those of the maker and the user of it. As the same noble thinker whom we have just quoted said, briefly but sufficiently "there is indeed a difference . . . too important an one ever to be overlooked. A machine is inanimate and passive but we are agents. Our constitution is put in our own power. We are charged with it, and therefore are accountable for any disorder or violation of it "1

Yes, it may be said—and there precisely is the "rub"—What is the 'we' which can be so sharply distinguished from "our constitution" that Butler can speak of that constitution as put in "our power"? If 'I,' as distinguished from my 'constitution,' have no determinate character at all, has the statement that this constitution is placed in "my power" any definite meaning, and how does that meaning differ from the meaning of the statement that my "constitution" is at the mercy of my natal star or of the 'genius to whom I have been allotted'? If this 'I' has a determinate character, are

¹ This is also I take it the real meaning of the familiar scholastic expression that the same man is *dominus sui*, lord of himself. The phrase is not meant primarily to exalt us with a sense of our own importance—the sarcastic gloss of the poet 'Lord of himself—that heritage of woe' misrepresents the thought. To understand it rightly we need to have in our minds the position of the "serf" or the vassal. They have some other person who is their *dominus*, and accordingly as long as they are acting strictly in fulfilment of the directions given them by this 'lord' or superior it is he and not they, who in fairness is to be held to account for what they do. As Trimalchio says in Petronius in excuse of some of his own earlier misdeeds, *neq. turpe est quod dominus iubet*. (The same thing is true equally of a military man who is simply carrying out the instructions of his superior, e.g. in furnishing the firing party for an execution if the sentence was iniquitous, the iniquity is not that of the officer charged with putting it into effect.) But the man who is *dominus sui* has no "superior" by whose direction he is bound to act, and therefore the accountability for his act cannot be devolved upon anyone else. He cannot honestly put in the plea of 'no official responsibility.' It was just because Hobbes held that none of us except the 'sovereign,' is in the "civil state" *dominus sui* that he confidently argued that a "subject" is morally obliged to commit a sin if ordered to do so by the 'prince.' The "prince" is the *dominus* and the sin is therefore his and not mine.

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you not saying that "my constitution" is controlled entirely by a constitution "of a higher order," and thus committing yourself at once to an "indefinite regress" as well as to the very "determinism" you are so pertinaciously trying to avoid? To give any intelligible meaning to your distinction between "me" and "my constitution" you must ascribe some definite character to the "me," and the moment you do this the distinction between "me" and "my constitution" seems to be obliterated, and obliterated by yourself. Does not this sufficiently justify a writer like Rashdall for deciding to come down in the end on the determinist side of the fence?

Well, no, I honestly believe that it does not, but if we are not simply to lose our heads over the *abyssus humanae conscientiae*, it behoves us to keep all our wits about us as we contemplate its depths. We must note, therefore, in the first place, that the indetermination necessarily implied as antecedent to an act of genuine choice is not an absolute indeterminateness in every conceivable respect, but only an absence of complete determination. That my will may be free it is not requisite that I shall be at every moment able to will any and every conceivable course of action. It is perfectly consistent with any freedom requisite for moral action that it should always have been beyond my power to will certain things effectively from deficiency in natural aptitudes, and that it should now be out of my power to will others in consequence of the way in which my past willing has been directed. It has never been in the power of a tone-deaf man to will to be a musician, or of a colour-blind man to will to distinguish himself as a painter. It is equally possible that from lack of special native capacity it should never have been in my power to will to attain eminence as a mathematician or a linguist, from my birth I may have been all through life incapable of more than wishing that I could have been either. And again, even if I once had the natural capacity by cultivation of which I might have become a first-rate linguist or musician, it may well be, if my activities have been directed to very different ends, that I can now will neither of these kinds of distinction, I may have lost what was once a genuine capacity by want of use, as Darwin, by his own account, lost in mature life the capacity to enjoy literature. But limitations of this sort, whether native or acquired, have nothing to do with the freedom which is in question in moral philosophy. The question there is simply one of freedom to do my duty or to neglect the doing of it, and if I had never the special aptitudes demanded for eminence in, say, mathematics, it never has been my duty to be an eminent mathematician, if I once had the capacity, let us say, to produce poetry, but have lost it by devoting my energies to civil administration, it cannot now be my duty to write a poem. The real question for us as moralists is only this: if it is now my known duty

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to do *A* and I am accountable for the discharge or neglect of this duty, must it not be true that until I decide the issue by willing to do *A*, it remains *undetermined* whether *A* will be done or not? Can it be true consistently with the genuineness of moral accountability that it is already *predetermined* (by my character and the situation in conjunction) which event will ensue?

(Of course when I actually will to do *A*, it is now definitely determined what direction my willing takes, and we may say, if we please, that this is determined by my character reacting to the situation. But if we use this language, we must carefully note (1) that the phraseology is inexact, since it is not "my character" but *I* who am the *agent* making the decision, though I make it in the way I do in virtue of possessing the character I do possess. (2) that "my character," if the statement is to be more than a *petitio principii*, must mean the character I possess in the moment of willing to do *A* and exhibit by that volition, not my character as it was *antecedently* to the choice in question, 'up to date,' as the phrase goes. By willing the doing of *A* rather than the leaving of *A* undone I show what I am at this moment, not what I was at some earlier moment. The formula, rightly interpreted, thus throws no light on the question—if it is really a proper question—what *makes* me now of a character which shows itself by my choice to do *A*.)

Further the question we are really concerned to answer is not that of the "predictability" of our voluntary decisions. In practice, I take it, none of us, not even the "modern mechanist," ever expects to be able to predict his own voluntary actions and those of others with anything more than probability, and he only expects his anticipations to possess high probability when they are founded on an intimate personal 'acquaintance' and influenced by all those 'imponderables' of which 'scientific method' can take no account. His forecasts are rather divinations for which he could not himself set out convincing reasons than predictions. "I am sure *X* will refuse that offer." But only "because he is the sort of man I know him to be." That is about as far as we are ever prepared to go. And often we are not prepared to go so far, we have to say "I do not know how he will meet the situation, only I am sure that, whatever he does, he will act like a wise man and a man of honour." The predictability of which we found Professor Hogben speaking would only be possible if we were dealing, not with men and women shaping their course through the situations of life in the real world, but with doctored laboratory "subjects" in artificially simplified situations contrived for them by the experimenter. From the dallings of such puppets in circumstances artificially prepared for them there is no inference to the bearing of undoped men and women in situations which are largely of their own contriving. Granting, then, the patent

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fact that an intimate acquaintance with *X* will enable us very often to divine how *X* will bear himself, or would bear himself, in this or that situation, we are still no nearer answering the questions we had put to ourselves. What is the *I* in whose "charge," in the phraseology of Butler, "our constitution is put," and how does it differ from the "constitution" which is said to be put in its charge?

Perhaps the answer to this question is already supplied in principle when we remind ourselves of a truism which some of our scientific investigators seem in danger of forgetting, that a man is a *rational animal*. There is plainly a sense in which the possession of rationality involves absence of complete determination. The path of a particle of inanimate matter (so we commonly think, rightly or not) is quite definitely marked out for it by the magnitude and direction of the "forces acting upon it." Or if this expression be found too old-fashioned, its path through a magnetic field, we may perhaps be allowed to say, is marked out by the nature of the field. There is just this one path open to it, and there is no other. So in a creature which is merely sensitive and "irritable," we can at least conceive that given certain perfectly definite stimuli, the precise character of the organism's response to these stimuli is exactly determined. (I do not, of course, assert that in point of fact any organism is such a piece of clockwork as this, but we can at any rate conceive that it may be so.) But a rational creature, just in the degree to which it is rational, is always only imperfectly amenable to suggestion. It responds to the suggestions of the environment by assent or by the performance of an action or meets them with dissent or refusal to act, "according as it sees reason." And the more rational it is, the more thoroughly does it look into the "reason" on both sides of the alternative before it commits itself in theory or in practice. Now it could not do this unless it were strictly true that until it has "seen reason" it remains undetermined in respect of the suggestion which is yet to be accepted or rejected. If it is to make up its mind according as it "sees reason," there must be a preliminary stage in which a suggestion is there, but acceptance or rejection is not yet determined. In our possession of reason we are thus provided with an internal source of indetermination within ourselves.

The curious thing is that the "scientific determinist" himself accepts this account of the facts when it is a question of belief or disbelief, though he insists on rejecting it when the question is to act or not to act. He always assumes that his own belief in determinism is based upon and justified by the reasons which he produces for its truth, it is not, as the rival beliefs of his fellows may be, a baseless superstition or prejudice. But he is only entitled to claim as much as this if he is prepared to say that he has considered those reasons with an "open mind", in other words, that there was a time

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when he was undetermined between the alternatives of determinism and indeterminism. It would be fatal to his whole case for the truth of determinism to admit that his acceptance of it was already predetermined for him in advance by his peculiar hereditary temperament and his past history. For he will have to admit that, in that case, he is in exactly the same predicament as the opponent whose views he rejects, both are victims of inevitable prejudice, and there can be no sense in asking on which side the truth lies. Yet the same man persistently refuses to admit that one can come to the practical question whether to do *A* or to leave it undone with an "open mind," undetermined to either alternative until one has judged that one course is better than the other. Here, according to the consistent determinist, we are all of us and always at the mercy of the prejudices due to native bias and past history. Yet if the "open mind" is really ever possible towards a speculative problem, what ground can there be for holding that it is never possible in relation to action?

Reason or intelligence is in its very nature a principle of indetermination in each of us.

The suggestion may sound paradoxical. Is not what is fully known or understood known also as fully determinate? Where I cannot say of the object before me whether it has a certain characteristic or not, or in what degree it has it, I do not really know or understand, the uncertainty or indefiniteness is in me, not in the object, and in me it is a defect of understanding or a want of relevant information. True enough, and if I had an "angelic understanding," what I knew at all I should know with perfect definiteness and certainty in all its particulars. Conceivably there would be things which fell wholly outside the range of my contemplations, but within the range of my apprehension there would be no penumbra of doubt and uncertainty. But "such is not our condition", we find ourselves in a world of which to begin with, we have no understanding at all, and have to make our way to comprehension of it slowly and step by step. In beings like ourselves it is the very prerogative of our rationality that we are not tied to acceptance of the scene presented to us on a "face view." We can and must ask ourselves whether the grounds for acceptance of the immediate suggestions conveyed by such a view are in reason sufficient, we must go out of our way to test the suggestions of the "appearances" in all sorts of subtle ways if ever we are to arrive at truth. And to do this at all, as Descartes understood so well, we must be capable of intellectual detachment, we must be able to entertain a thesis for scrutiny without being intellectually determined either to accept or to reject it. It may often be hard to attain this detachment from "prejudices," but if, in dealing with any subject-matter, it is not only hard but impossible, there knowledge must be eternally

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beyond us; even if the proposition we "inevitably" assert should in point of fact be a true one, we are unable to know that it is true, just as, if we had no sense but that of sight and no organs for manipulating anything, we could never know whether the partially immersed stick really is bent or only looks to be so

It stands no otherwise with action and "practice" My native temperament and my past habits provide endless more or less powerful suggestions of action to be done in the various situations in which I find myself, endless "solicitations," as T H Green was accustomed to say But being a rational being, I can ask whether the action to which I am thus "solicited" is good or right, exactly as I can ask about a belief suggested to me by the first look of things whether it is true Both questions are questions which I not merely can ask, but, if I am to live up to the standard imposed on me by my rationality, ought to ask And the very asking of the question about good or right implies, as a precondition of its answerability, that while it is still unanswered I can hold myself in a moral detachment between compliance with a "solicitation" and non compliance, a detachment in which my will is as yet "undetermined" If I cannot do this, if there is no such condition of indetermination of the will, then there is in truth no such being as an "I," or reasonable person, and what I mistake for my self is no more than an empty stage on which conflicting impulses and "urges" fight out their quarrels If the "modern mechanist" honestly recognizes this as a true and adequate description of his own mental life, I for one cannot undertake to confute him, and shall be content to remark that, except in external configuration, he must be of a different species from myself and the men and women with whom I find myself concerned in my daily life But he should in consistency add that the species to which he and his congeners belong is one to which morality is unmeaning There can be no "ought" where there is no person to be obliged, but only a medley of impulses, each of them inevitably just the impulse it is, with the particular strength it has Reasonable will, just because it is reasonable, cannot be a conatus towards this or the other precise and determinate "gratification," nor a resultant of any combination of such conatus, it is a conatus not towards a determinate *τὸδε τι* but towards "what I shall, on consideration, pronounce to be good, or to be right" (The difference is like that between the contentment enjoined by the Anglican Church with "that station to which it shall please God to call me," and a contentment which the Church has been disingenuously charged with inculcating with that station in which I happen at the moment to find myself)

To put the point in what is perhaps a still more general way reason "in its speculative use" has its appropriate correlated object, but that object is not *A's theorem* or *B's theorem* or *end*, but *truth*;

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and *A*'s or *B*'s theorem only secondarily and *because* they are true; the concern of "reason" with them is *sub specie veri*. In other words, speculative reason is the *potentia* or "faculty" of cognition of truth, not further determined as this or that particular truth. Similarly, the appropriate object of "reason in its practical use" is not this or that determinate "good," but *good* or *right* not further determined, this or that only becomes an object to it in so far as, and *because* good or right, *sub specie boni*. The pursuit of good as good demands, if it is to be possible at all, freedom from absolute determination towards this or that particular "good," exactly as the pursuit of truth as truth demands freedom from absolute determination to acquiescence in this or that particular "truth."

That intelligence, or rationality, is a principle of indetermination within us is, in fact, only another way of saying that it is the *universal* in us, in virtue of which each of us transcends his own particularity. Just as there could be no science if we could never say 'this is manifestly true,' but only 'I, John Smith, being John Smith, cannot help believing this,' so there could be no morality unless we could get behind 'I, John Smith, being John Smith, cannot help choosing this' to 'this is what ought to be chosen.' The rock on which a writer like Rashdall is bound to come to grief is just his determination to say both things at once. When he talks determinism to please the scientific men he is treating human personality, as the scientific man is only too apt to do, as a 'bare particular', when he says 'ought,' he is recognizing its true character as a universal. But nothing can be at once a universal and a bare particular.

We shall say, then, by way of answer to the question which has been occupying us so long, that the 'me' in whose 'charge' our constitution is put is the universal within us, our rationality, the 'constitution' put in its charge is the particular, the temperament, aptitudes, idiosyncrasies which vary indefinitely from man to man, our character is what we make out of this material by exercising or neglecting to exercise 'reason in its practical use.' This may indeed seem at first a very unsatisfactory solution of the problem. It is natural to ask why then it is sometimes easy but more often difficult to exercise the 'practical reason'? Why are we so often remiss? Why do not all of us actually bring all suggested courses of action "before the bar of conscience" before we close with them? But we must remember, as is too often forgotten in discussions of the question, that *precisely the same difficulty may be raised about the "speculative use of reason."* Why do we ever fall into error? Why do we not always wait until we have 'clearly and evidently' discerned the truth of a proposition before we affirm it, as we sometimes have the discretion to do? If it be objected to the champion of free will that he cannot explain why a free will is not impeccable, it

may be justly objected to the "free" thinker that he cannot explain why free thought is not inerrant. Yet though he is well aware of the besetting tendencies to assent or dissent on insufficient evidence and to allow our prejudices or wishes to decide what we shall accept as true, he does not deny that evidence is sometimes properly weighed, or regard the conclusions which are reached after such a weighing of the evidence as dictated by anything but their own seen reasonableness. Nor does he hesitate to assume that we can and ought to foster in ourselves the practice of such impartial weighing of evidence and to discourage the opposing tendency to let our beliefs be decided for us by temperamental bias or acquired prejudice. If I have been brought up in the traditions of Scottish Presbyterianism, it will probably be no easy matter for me to achieve anything like "objectivity" in my beliefs about the actions and characters of Claverhouse and Archbishop Sharp. If my attachments are strongly on the side of Romanism or Anglicanism, I shall find it no less hard to be "objective" in my version of the life of Knox, or, let us say, the Marquis of Argyle. Yet no one doubts that I ought to strive after such "objectivity" if I think about Scottish history in the seventeenth century, and that if I do not achieve it I have no business to come forward as a writer on that period of history at all. I ought in that case to follow the example of Scott, who refused to write the life of Mary Stuart on the ground that he knew himself unable to do it with the requisite impartiality, rather than that of Macaulay or Froude. So whenever I have to decide what it is right or wrong for me to do, it is my business to aim at reaching a judgment not dictated to me by temperament, or wishes, or habit. I shall not always succeed, and where I am unsuccessful my decision will not be truly free, any more than my judgment is free when I cannot weigh evidence in a balance undistorted by prejudice, but I ought to make the attempt, and the very knowledge that I ought to make it is the proof that I can try to make it.

It may follow that our fully free decisions are rare, as convictions based on evidence undistorted by prejudice are also probably rare. And it may therefore be that it is only on comparatively rare occasions that the whole responsibility for our decisions falls upon ourselves without shadow of excuse. But what then? It is not I who am asked to sit on the "great white throne" and pronounce the final judgment on my neighbours, or even on myself. That business is happily in other hands than mine. But at least I know that I ought in all my decisions to aim at freedom from "personal bias," exactly as I ought to aim at the same thing in all my judgments about "fact." And however rarely the ideal is achieved, when it is achieved there is no more reason to doubt the freedom of the will in the one case than to doubt the freedom of the judgment of true or false in

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the other. We have to educate ourselves into moral freedom of choice as we have to educate ourselves into impartial examination of scientific or historical *propositions propounded for our acceptance*. Neither process would be possible if it were already prescribed for us by a "ready made" constitution just what we shall choose as good, or just what we shall believe to be true.

If you say that *for any man there may be temptations to do wrong* which are to him with his particular temperament insuperable, it may be said that there is just as much or as little reason to hold that there are also for him, with his temperament, prepossessions which make unbiased estimation of evidence as to fact impossible. It is just as true to say of a given man that he, being the man he is, "cannot help" fuddling himself when there are a bottle, a glass, and a corkscrew at hand, although he knows it to be wrong, as it is to say that, being the man he is, he "cannot help" believing in the "Popish Plot," or in the passage of Russian troops through this country in 1914, though he knows the evidence to be worthless. No man can know that any temptation to do wrong is "insuperable" for him, or that he "cannot help" thinking the wrong act to be a right one. "You never can tell" until you make the attempt, and even if you make it and fail you cannot tell. You do not know that you would not have overcome the temptation or have seen the path of right more clearly, if you had only tried harder. "But," says the scientific determinist, "*you could not have tried harder*." It is sufficient reply to ask him how he knows that. In fact, he does not know it at all. All that he really knows is that if it is ever true to say of you that you could have made an effort which you did not make, you must be a being of a different kind from any that he is accustomed to manipulate in his laboratory. And so, in fact, you are a *person*, the peer not of the experimenter's "subjects," but of the experimenter. You do not "stay put", the "subjects" must. It is really preposterous that proposals to clear society of such "medieval rubbish" as morality and religion should be gravely laid before us by "men of science" so simple-minded that it has not occurred to them that there is a difference which is not merely one of complexity between a person and a thing, or even between a person and a string of events. It will be time to consider their claims to be taken seriously as advisers on the conduct of life when they have made that elementary discovery. Meanwhile moralists who are trustful enough to repeat the deterministic *credo* because they have heard it from the men of science *qui errare non possunt* (like the Medieval Church) may be invited to ponder an old saying: "If the blind lead the blind, they shall both fall into the ditch."

So much, then by way of defence of the conception of our "constitution" as a "machine" which has been "put in our own

charge " But I should like also to remark that even the analogy here assumed, like most analogies, is an imperfect one and may mislead, unless we remark the point where it becomes inadequate When a man is put in charge of a machine, the machine is already made before he is set to control it He may tend it carefully, use it rightly, and get the maximum of work out of it, or he may neglect it, use it for the wrong purposes, or get much less out of it in the way of work than he might have done A man may, for example, in a few minutes run a razor-blade which would have done the proper work of a razor-blade for years, if he tries to whittle chips with it Or, again, he may merely leave it to corrode unused But what is the proper work which the machine will execute, how much of this work it will do, and at what expense of wear and tear is determined initially before the implement comes into the hands of the user by its material and construction

The razor blade, to take a particularly simple example, if kept properly ground and stropped, is equal to yielding a certain number of "clean shaves" and no more before it is worn out If improperly used, it will be worn out before it has completed the tale, but however properly handled, it will not exceed the tale But there is no ground whatever for supposing that "our constitution" resembles a machine in this important respect Who in his senses would suggest, for example, that the active generosity which is part of the "constitution" of the magnanimous man is just equal to forgiving his offending brother "unto seventy times" seven, but must collapse under the strain of a four hundred and ninety first occasion for pardon, or that the ingenuity and resource of the great classical scholar is equal to making, let us say, three hundred admirable corrections of depraved texts, but unable to stand the strain of making one more?

It is not merely—though this is a point of some importance—that the yield in work of intellectual and moral endowments cannot, like that of a machine, be properly estimated by any numerical formula What is more, the "constitution" of which we are "put in charge" is not something ready made and complete before we are charged with it, we actually make it, for better and for worse—of course, always within limit—in the process of "using" There is a wealth of meaning not, I think, always fully appreciated by the commentators, in the words of the "prophet" of Plato's myth of Er: "Virtue has no master over her, and each shall have more or less of her as he honours her or does her despite" It is just because these words are so exactly true that "virtue" can be no part and no product of *la machine* A machine neither honours the work to which

* ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδόλοπον, ἣν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμῶν πλείον καὶ ἑλαττον αὐτῇ; ἕκαστος ἔχει (Rep 617a) The rendering is Professor Storey's

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it is set nor does despite to it, it merely executes the task to which it is set. And, as I have just said, the "machine" which we have to employ in the moral shaping of our lives, the whole complex of our habitual tendencies of thought, speech, and deed, is one which we have to fashion for ourselves in the act of using it

If we are to have an analogy from the mechanical arts at all, the work of developing a moral character is less like that of operating a machine already made than like that of building a house or a road with tools and engines which we have first to construct for ourselves. Clearly there would be a very serious limitation to our engineering operations if the human hand, like one of our machines, were only capable of executing one or other, according to circumstances, of a comparatively few exactly determined movements, and if it further depended on the character of the stimulus of the moment which of these movements should be performed. Our skill as technicians, our power to forge just the instruments we need for our indefinitely numerous purposes, is due to the indeterminate variety of the movements that human hand can execute and our ability to select from this indeterminate variety just those which are relevant to the purpose before us. Similarly, our ability to mould a character for ourselves is due to the indeterminate variety of the responses which we can make to a given situation and our power of selecting from all this variety that which answers to our conception of the right and good. In a word, we can make ourselves a character, for good or evil, only because intelligent purposive action is *not* an affair of "conditioned reflexes," but something wholly different in kind. What our situation (including under that head our own "past") determines for us is at most an indefinitely numerous aggregate of possible responses in action, $r_1, r_2, r_3, \dots, r_n$ from which the appropriate r_p has to be selected, the agent in the selection, the *facultas electiva*, or, to speak less mythologically, the person who makes the selection, determines that r_p in particular shall be the response made, but there is no one and nothing behind the scenes to determine that the agent shall make that determination and no other, if there were, the agent would not be an agent, but the instrument of another.

I do not mean in repeating this statement to deny by a mere *ipse dixit* the reality of such things as the "divine persuasion" of which Plato speaks, providence, *prevenient grace* putting into our hearts good desires, or even of diabolical seduction putting into them evil desires. I would only remark that when we come in sight of such conceptions we have left the 'scientific' field of human life behind us and are commencing theologians of some kind. It is therefore to the point to remember that no theologian (and the theologians presumably know their own business) has supposed that

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"grace" does violence to human nature or that diabolical instigation is irresistible.

"Grace," it was said, does not overpower nature but "co operates with" it, though the rationale of such co-operation is a mystery to us. Is it, however, in kind more of a mystery than the undeniable "influence" of another man's personality, or even of external "nature" on my own character and action? Are not these also inexplicable mysteries, or rather patent impossibilities, on the principles of the thoroughgoing and consistent determinism which reduces morally significant action to "conditioned reflexes"?

It is because it seems to me that a really consistent determinism must make this reduction, and must therefore leave no place in human life for either real science or real morality, that, for all my disagreement with the "modern mechanists" approved of by Professor Hogben, I am cordially grateful to them, and to him as their prophet, for the candour with which they exhibit their picture of "our nature as agents" without disguise or trappings. Only I confess that the effect is, on myself, like that produced in a peculiarly revolting episode of the *Faerie Queene* by the despoiling of Duessa,

Such then (said Una) as she seemeth here,
Such is the face of falshood such the sight
Of fowle Duessa, when her borrowed light
Is laid away, and counterfesaunce known

And I cannot help thinking that the proper way for a moralist to treat determinism is to imitate Spenser's knights of whom we are told

When they had the watch disrobed quight
They let her goe at will, and wander waies unknowne

PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION

W. G. MACLAGAN, M.A.

I

THERE are many difficulties connected with the notion of punishment, but perhaps it is not disputed that it is at least a deliberate infliction of pain of one kind or another. Of course, that is not an adequate description of its nature, but so far as it goes it seems to be a true one.¹ And the idea that it could be morally right deliberately to inflict pain on another, unlike, for example, the idea that it is morally right to tell the truth, is so manifestly intolerable unless we look beyond the infliction of pain itself that we are tempted to leap forward to the question, "What is the justification of such action?" before making quite explicit to ourselves what it is, over and above its being the deliberate infliction of pain, that constitutes the action punishment at all. The questions "Why hurt?" and "Why punish?" are confused with one another. No doubt some distinction between them is present vaguely in everyone's mind and the confusion may not be in fact serious, but anyhow it is a defect and should be remedied.

It is immediately obvious on reflection that punishment consists not simply in the deliberate infliction of pain but in pain deliberately inflicted as a retort to some wrongful act done by the person on whom it is inflicted. This, of course, is what alone renders a retributive theory of the justification of punishment possible. The infliction of pain on any other occasion could, clearly, be justified only by reference to results, to the goodness of the consequences of its infliction, as, for example (to take an obvious case), where a surgeon was obliged to operate without anaesthetic.

But does the backward reference of punishment merely make possible, or perhaps plausible, the retributive theory of its justification? Is it not rather the case that only such retributive infliction of pain is punishment? It is admitted that the infliction of pain may be justified on utilitarian grounds where the sufferer has done no wrong. If only these utilitarian considerations are operative even where a wrong has been committed is not that as much as to say that the wrong done is irrelevant to our present action, and is it not plain that in that case our action cannot be a punishing? It seems then that it is legitimate to ask whether the retributive infliction of

¹ See, however, the concluding section of this discussion.

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pain can be justified, or again whether punishment can be justified, and these will be simply two forms of the same question, but to ask whether punishment can be justified on retributive grounds is as absurd as to ask whether the reason lead weighs more than linseed is that it is heavier

Yet whatever warrant from reason the retributive infliction of pain may possess, there seems no doubt that it remains strongly repugnant to our feelings, while at the same time common sense is offended at the suggestion that it is never right to punish. Will it help to propose a compromise, according to which the wrong done is relevant to our action as supplying the *occasion* of the infliction of pain while the *justification* of it resides simply in its consequences—whether deterrent or reformative or both need not here concern us? The nature and amount of the pain will also, of course, be determined by utilitarian considerations

I am not sure that any one of those who have attempted to combine retributive with non retributive elements in punishment has attempted the combination precisely in this form. But it is a conceivable one and one not clearly repudiated in such attempts, so that it is as well to mention it. It need not, however, delay us, for it is clear that it does not describe punishment in a way other than would serve equally well to describe the work of the surgeon and so has not really advanced us beyond the position already recognized as inadequate. The bodily state that the surgical operation is to alter is not without its causal conditions. There, too, the past provides the occasion for the present action and there too one answer to the question, "Why operate?" will accordingly be given by reference to a situation that has arisen while another will be given by reference to a situation that, it is hoped, will result. (Strictly speaking, of course, the question "Why operate?" is analysable into two questions corresponding to these two answers. The questions may be expressed in the forms, "What *need* is there to operate?" and "What *good* is there in operating?" respectively.) Obviously where the issue is that of the moral justification of the surgeon's conduct, the second of these aspects will be the one stressed. And if in the case of punishment the first also is made explicit, as it is not in the case of the surgical operation, the reason is precisely that when we punish we treat what we have been calling the occasion of the punishment as really also a *justification* of it.

In fact, the view we have been considering would be more precisely described as maintaining that while the wrongful act is what *justifies* the infliction of pain on the wrongdoer, the nature and amount of the pain will be determined by reference to consequences. This, I suppose, is what is always intended and sometimes expressly stated by those who assert a combination of retributive and non-

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retributive elements in punishment. Such a combination view does not, naturally, require that consequences should be the only determinant of the nature and amount of the punishment, nor is it so stated, for example, by Bradley.¹ It must take this form only in the case of those whose objection is really to the retributive element altogether. But whichever form it takes it is surely absurd, just as it would be absurd to say that when one man buys something from another the fact that he ought to pay for it is involved in the fact that the other man is transferring some property to him, but the amount of the payment is not to be determined by reference to what is being transferred but by reference to the good that will be done by paying this sum rather than that. If the offence constitutes the reason for punishing, the nature of the offence must also determine the nature of the punishment, that is, must determine the "how" and "what" of the infliction of pain so far as that pain is punishment. There may, of course, be other reasons not having to do with punishment for adding to or subtracting from that pain, and this admission is all that is really meant by the modification of the retributive theory in the popular view that Bradley was describing. But however lacking in practical importance the point may be, it is necessary for philosophy to insist that such "modification" gives us for result not the complex nature of a single action, but a relationship of co-operation or exclusion, as the case may be between two actions only one of which is a punishing.²

Thus I see no reason for retracting the view that the retributive infliction of pain and only the retributive infliction of pain constitutes punishment. The questions that now confront us are two. First (which we have already raised) is punishment, i.e. pure retribution, justified? And second, can we throw any light on the objection that is apparently felt to facing the first question, over and above pointing out, as we have already done, that what is objected to is the necessity of having to answer either that retribution is justified or that punishment is not?

II

These questions will best be considered in the reverse order, and as regards the latter of them it may be conceded that there is a certain reasonableness and not simply the force of blind feeling on the side of the objection to the form of the first question. For, on the one hand, it is the case, though this is far from being immediately clear, that the retributive infliction of pain is not justified, we shall explain this later. And, on the other hand, we undoubtedly find it

¹ *Ethical Studies* second edition p. 27.

² Dr Ewing in his book *The Morality of Punishment*, does not seem to me to recognize this.

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natural to apply the term "punishment" to a certain type of action that is justified but is also not really retributive

Taking this second point first, what we have to notice is that there are two sorts of context in which the notion of punishment is held to be applicable corresponding to two conceptions of wrongdoing. For wrongdoing may be viewed either as the breach of some rule of sound conduct without reference to the motives from which the wrongdoer acted, or as a moral failure on the part of the agent, a sinning against his own standards, without reference to the question whether or not these standards do, in fact, constitute a rule of sound conduct.¹

There can be no question that the infliction of pain on the wrongdoer in the first of these senses of wrongdoing is in principle justified. If it were not, if the State (for instance) had no right to take steps which to be effective might even amount to the infliction of pain in order to secure conformity with rules other than those that each individual might accept for himself, then in an imperfect world the State could not exist at all and would have no reason for existing. And if such infliction of pain is really, as usage leads us to suppose it is, punishment, then punishment is justified. Yet the justification does not seem to lie here in the performance of any retributive function, it must, therefore, lie in the fact that only by such action is it possible to preclude social chaos, injustice, and maleficence, and thus it looks not to the past but to the future. That it does not lie in the performance of a retributive function can perhaps be seen if we reflect that retribution has desert on the side of the patient as its correlative. For surely we should not say that a person who acted morally, that is, conformably to his own standards and because they were his standards, *deserved* the pain that the law annexed to his action? We should, I suppose, even feel a certain repugnance to the infliction of the penalty where we were convinced that the situation was of such a sort—perhaps the treason of Sir Roger Casement would be generally regarded as an instance of this. We should feel a repugnance that would not be felt if we could honestly say, "This is what he deserves," though some repugnance might be felt even then. And yet we should not regard this repugnance as a sufficient ground, or as evidence that there was a sufficient ground, for the non-infliction of the penalty. Considerations of desert, then, would not be what determined us to inflict or to abstain from inflicting it, or, in other words, the infliction would not be retributive.

¹ It will hardly be denied that action of the first sort is in some sense wrongdoing. But it may be objected that nobody would, in fact, regard an action that was a wrongdoing only in that sense as a case for punishment. Even if that objection is valid against the wording of the present paragraph, it will, I think, be met by the modification of this disjunction on p. 287.

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To say this is, I admit, to over simplify. The term "desert" is used, undoubtedly, as a correlate of "moral guilt", but its use is not confined to that context. I state the fact, and am not concerned here to explain it. It seems clear to me that we might say of a person performing an action, whatever his motive, in the knowledge that there was a penalty annexed to it (or even without that knowledge if the fact that there was such a penalty had been "sufficiently" published), that he "deserved" the penalty. "He must pay for it," we might say, treating the case as though it were one of purchase by the wrongdoer. But perhaps, so far as this goes, Captain Oates "deserved" to lose his life, and certainly the victim of blackmail "deserves" to lose his fortune as the price of silence. Yet surely no one would justify blackmail by this consideration, and correspondingly "desert" simply in this sense (even granting it to be a proper sense) would not justify punishment. It has been suggested indeed that it is precisely in this sense of "desert" that punishment *can* be said to be deserved. But, though it is true (if not actually tautological) that, when a sentence is being passed, the judge as such is not concerned with any other use of "desert," a judge as such is an abstraction and not a moral agent at all, and accordingly, for a moral justification of our action we must look beyond that function in terms of which he is defined. But when I step outside the standpoint of the judge as such I find it, I must confess, quite incredible that the publication, by whatever authority, that such-and-such a penalty will be visited on such-and-such an act does, simply by itself, morally justify the infliction of that penalty. When it is inflicted the victim may, indeed have no "right" to be surprised, but it does not at all follow that he has no right to protest.

If this is clear, we can reiterate our previous conclusion that though punishment in such cases is justified it is in a non retributive sense—only, I am committed to saying it is then not really punishment. But it may be asked, "Who are you to decide that the ordinary use of a word is wrong? And how if it is wrong, do you account for the error?"

In a sense, of course, the ordinary use of a word cannot be wrong, and to say that any given application of it is wrong is really only to say that it is not in conformity with ordinary use. But in order to maintain this position without qualification we have to assume that the ordinary use is self-consistent and unambiguous, and that is far from being always the case. When the use is not self-consistent we can say that even a popular application of a term is wrong if it contradicts what seems to be a yet more fundamental intention of popular usage. Now common sense does, I am sure, demand that not merely the occasion but the justification of what it would call punishment is to be found by looking to the past. Consequently it

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is inconsistent with itself and contradicts what, in my view, is the more fundamental of its affirmations when it describes as punishment those penalties whose justification as conditions of social order and the "good life" we have admitted. In this sense, then, the term "punishment" is misapplied in ordinary speech and the error arises precisely because in our ordinary thought we read into the penalties so described a backward reference that is not really there. This happens, I suggest, in two co-operating ways.

In the first place, the penalties in question are only *indirectly* forward-looking. Directly, the ground for penalizing is simply that a right has been infringed, and not (as in the case of a surgical operation) that such and such a state of affairs will result from this particular penalty. It is only when we ask why, in general, we penalize infringements of rights that we get the forward reference to the hoped-for state of affairs in which rights shall be, or shall continue to be, generally respected. We need to look beyond the particular context of our penalty to find its true justification, since (in so far as the question is one of maintaining rights) the penalty manifestly cannot be said to maintain the particular right that has been infringed,¹ and (in so far as we are concerned with the production of good) the great good involved is that which is mediated by the order and general security of society, in respect, e.g. of property, and this precludes us from allowing our action, in a case of theft, to be determined simply by the answer to the question whether the thief will make better use of the property than the legal owner. So, then, the real justification of our action is to be found in this indirect reference to the future, but though this is so, yet in the particular case we react directly to the infringement of the rule as such, and as it is natural not to carry our mind beyond this, it is natural to suppose that the ultimate justification of the penalty lies simply in the infringement of the rule.²

¹ Of course as the Provost of Oriel has suggested (*The Right and the Good* pp. 63-4) it may *inter alia* be the fulfilment of a promise "to the injured person and his friends, and to society" to which a *particular* right on the side of the injured person, etc. corresponds. But though (on an intuitionist view of the obligation to keep promises) the justification of the penalty will be found *pro tanto* really and not merely apparently by reference to the past, that in the past to which reference is made will be a promise-making and not a wrongdoing and the penalty will accordingly also be *pro tanto* not a punishment but the keeping of a promise. Perhaps the legalistic retributive view just mentioned, which is Mr. Mabbott's (*Mind*, April 1939), confuses punishment with such a promise-keeping, though in this case the promise would be rather to the criminal himself than to society.

² No doubt the illusion is assisted by the use of the term "desert" mentioned on p. 285, as well as by the second consideration about to be discussed. Indeed, that use of 'desert' may perhaps be regarded as a bridge between the two considerations here put forward.

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The second reason for which, I suggest, we come to think of the penalties inflicted by the State, and which are really forward-looking, as being in the strict sense punishment, is that we tend to interpret the act that constitutes an infringement of rights, the conduct that is, in fact, unsound, as also resulting from a bad motive. This is quite natural since so far as the right is recognized as a right the violation of it could only result from such a motive, and the recognition of it as a right by society in general is presupposed wherever a sanction is attached, with general approval, to the breach of it. Of course, on reflection we admit that the wrongdoer need not himself be viewing his act as the violation of a right (we are not, of course, talking of *legal* rights as such) but the natural unreflective presumption is that he shares the outlook of society in general. If this presumption were not natural we should not continually pass the moral judgments on one another that we do pass despite all our "cool hour" recognition that at least the heart of man is not a sense-datum. And this presumption imports into the situation the supposition that the wrongdoer in the first of our senses of wrongdoing is as such a wrongdoer also in the second sense (i.e. morally guilty), and therefore *deserves* the penalty in a strict sense of "desert", for, *prima facie*, moral guilt does deserve retribution. What we have, as a result, however, is no clear theory of a relation between these two sorts of wrongdoing. What we have is only an inarticulate conflation of them, with a corresponding conflation of the conceptions of the appropriate retort to them, the notion of punishment that really does appear appropriate to the one case being extended to the other with which it has strictly nothing to do.

III

We can now at length turn to the question whether even where moral guilt is involved the retributive infliction of pain that is properly called punishment can be justified. This, of course, is not the same as to ask whether the State or any human individual is entitled to perform this punitive function, to that question, which I propose to ignore, we might answer "No," and yet hold that it is morally fitting that there should be, if possible, punishment by some agent or other.¹ But when I ask whether this is morally fitting I

¹ I cannot see that the conclusion that the essence of punishment is not retribution for moral guilt follows from the assertion (even if it be true) that no one in fact possesses the status that would entitle him to inflict such retribution. It might simply be the case that the word "punishment" names a kind of act no one could be right in performing or if the notion of punishment is supposed to include that of its practicability, that the word is a "vox nihili" in the same sense in which "square triangle" is.

find myself confronted with what, at first sight, seems to be an antinomy

I shall state the difficulty in terms appropriate to my own general ethical position, though as will appear almost immediately it is not peculiar to such a standpoint, and the two sides of it may be put as follows. On the one hand, I am not at all inclined to deny the essential connection of obligation with value. It does not seem possible that I should be under an obligation to act in a way acting in which contributes nothing, or is not thought to contribute anything, valuable to the world ("contribution of value" covering here the elimination of evils). Nor does it seem possible that the value in question can be that of the frame of mind in which, or the motive from which, I act, for the reasons convincingly put forward in *The Right and the Good*.¹ But if this is so we are shut up to a forward-looking justification of all our actions, whether or not to such a forward-looking justification as would naturally be termed "utilitarian." On the other hand, punishment understood in the strict sense already explained excludes by its very nature any justification of this sort. Are we then to deny the propriety, in principle, of punishment in that strict sense of the word? This, I must repeat, is quite different from the denial that it falls to any human individual or institution to apply the principle. Are we to deny that moral guilt simply as such and without reference to consequences following from its treatment *deserves* treatment other than that deserved by innocence and virtue? Even if that is, in fact, the case, I cannot immediately see it to be so. And there is my dilemma.

Of course the difficulty is an unreal one on either of two suppositions. It is unreal if it is not true that what we are under obligation to do is invariably to set ourselves to bring about what is, or what we consider to be, the best state of affairs possible in the circumstances, and if, at the same time, the case of punishment is one of the cases in which we see the rightness of the act independently of any reference to the quality of its consequences. And, again, the problem is unreal for anyone who does not have the least feeling that guilt and innocence merit different treatments. I recognize that many people may resolve the whole issue in one or other of these ways. But I am assuming, in conformity with my own convictions, that neither mode of resolution is legitimate. If I deliberately wronged another person and he knew it, I should judge that he was failing in his duty if he took account of that wrong otherwise than as part of the conditions under which he was, so far as possible, to bring good into the world, but at the same time I should feel that I did not deserve that the wrong should be responded to only in that way.

Actually, though in my original statement of the dilemma one

¹ Pp 4-6

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side of it is the hypothesis of the value basis of all obligation, the problem, as the italicized phrase in the previous paragraph indicates, does not require this. And this is important, for certainly even if what I may perhaps be permitted to call an "agathistic" interpretation of the treatment appropriate to guilt can be sustained, it would need a great deal more argument to show, if it can be shown at all, that such an interpretation can be given of all our particular duties. But the present problem remains even for those who are not in general 'agathistic' so long as they shrink from offering a non-agathistic solution in this instance. Thus the Provost of Oriel himself¹ is not prepared to say either that guilt deserves the same treatment as innocence or that the justification for the infliction of pain on the guilty is to be found simply in the fact that their guilt deserves that pain. He accepts and applies in this connection Professor Moore's doctrine of organic unities and holds that the justification of punishment lies in the fact that a crime-punishment complex taken as a unity is *better* apart from any consequences than the crime left to itself.² This particular theory is a peculiarly tempting one since it appears to effect a happy synthesis (though that, of course, was not the Provost's objective) between "agathism" and a serious regard for the concept of desert. But I find myself unable to adopt it. It is not that I have a quarrel with the doctrine of organic unities as such, but in this particular case I seem for once to be more 'intuitionist' than the Provost. When I attend to an instance of punishment and think away all the good consequences that may result as after-effects of the guilty person's being punished, I have to confess that I cannot see any good left unless it be something that might be called by some such name as "fittingness." And to say that I can see that what justifies punishment is a 'fittingness' inherent in the state of affairs constituted by the guilt and the punishment together seems really only to amount to saying that what I intuit is just that it is proper to punish.

There seems then to be no way of combining as principles governing conduct in the face of moral guilt, the principle of retribution and the principle of production of good.³ But if at the same time neither principle is merely the expression of a prejudice, how can either give place to the other and, though rational, yet have no claim

¹ *The Right and the Good* pp. 57-8.

² Naturally I here leave out of account the Provost's discussion of the considerations governing the State-action that is called punishment.

³ Dr. Ewing's theory of the sense in which punishment can be an end-in-itself (*The Morality of Punishment* pp. 107 sqq.) is, as he himself says, not strictly a retributive one. Rather he seems to me to be doing in one way what the two following sections of this paper are doing in another. But I do not find his view very clear or convincing.

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to be taken account of in our action? The only possible solution is to hold that, in the case of one of the two, though a rational intuition is indeed involved the expression given to it mistranslates its nature, and that when it is correctly expressed we see how, rational intuition though it is, it does not determine our conduct. The principle that requires this reinterpretation is the retributive principle. I wish first to insist that this principle is impossible of application, and then to show how, properly understood, it claims no application.

IV

The retributive principle is impossible of application unless in the act of retribution it is possible to secure an equivalence of guilt and punishment, and that is not the case. I do not mean by this simply that *we* are not in fact in a position to bring about an equivalence of which we can none the less form an idea, nor even that *we* are not in fact in a position to form a precise idea of an equivalence that is none the less in principle possible. I mean that the very notion of such an equivalence is an impossible one. The two things that are to be measured against each other are in their very nature incommensurable. In saying this I am, of course, only repeating what others have said,¹ but the repetition does not yet seem superfluous. Those who think that the difficulty is not one of principle but only of the practical application of a principle are, I suppose, using as the standard of measurement of the guilt the actual thing done. Certainly it seems in principle possible to weigh the gravity of one actual thing done (the crime) against that of another (the punishment). But we are no longer considering crime in the sense of the actual thing done, irrespective of motive, we are concerned now only with moral guilt which alone appears, I have argued, to deserve retribution, and the actual thing done by the guilty person is not the measure of this guilt and stands in no definite relation to it. The equivalence that retribution implies can be found, if at all, only for the overt act of the guilty person and not for the guilt to which it properly refers. And, I may add, though the determination of the point is not essential to my argument, that while nobody would suppose that the operation of a retributive principle would involve one and the same penalty in every case, but every one would, on the contrary, suppose that the problem is one of affixing varying penalties to varying degrees of guilt, yet when I think of guilt in the strict sense of moral failure I find the idea of its having degrees at all a very puzzling (though I certainly cannot say an obviously absurd) one.

Of all the suggestions for determining the punishment that is

¹ E.g. Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i, p. 289.

appropriate to guilt, the most hopeful-looking is, I think, the view that "remorse is the penalty that fits the crime,"¹ for moral guilt and remorse at least belong to the same order of things as moral guilt and the old time picking of oakum do not. On this view the act that is called 'punishing' will deserve that name just so far as it is directed to generating remorse. And, of course, it will not lose its right to that name, however gentle and kindly it may appear when viewed in abstraction from this intention, the definition must certainly cover the activity known as "heaping coals of fire" on another's head. No doubt it will be practically exceedingly difficult to decide how one should act in order to stimulate remorse in another, but the difficulty now will be only a practical one and not one of principle.

Apart from practical difficulties, however, even this suggestion will not do. For one thing if we take guilt in the strict sense of moral failure, it is at least problematic whether it could ever not be accompanied by remorse.² The point cannot be fully considered here,³ but suppose that the guilt is by a necessity inherent in human nature, attended with remorse, it follows that the theory we are considering ceases to have any value as a guide to action. Nature will always have forestalled our retributive zeal and all that will be left for us to do will be complacently to contemplate her operations. This will not matter to anyone who, like myself, does not suppose that the "retributive intuition" is in fact a guide to action and whose only interest is in the correct analysis of its nature. But in the theory under consideration it is certainly intended to provide a basis for some of our conduct.

In any case I cannot persuade myself that remorse really is the penalty that fits the crime. If it were, I ought in reason to feel not only (as I do) that it is proper that I should be remorseful but also (as I do not) that, when I am remorseful I and the "moral order" are once more 'quits'. I am sure that my failure to think the latter is not due to any inadequate conception of the painfulness of remorse, as though I supposed remorse to be as perfunctory as a merely formal apology. But no doubt the acute painfulness of remorse is just what makes it seem to those who hold the view here criticized to be "as much as a man deserves", and so I shall complete my criticism by suggesting that this painfulness is not simply not enough, but is not

¹ Carr-Saunders *The Theory of Morals* p. 110.

² On this view it seems that the more hardened a criminal is the less is he guilty. The position is not free from paradox but neither is the denial of it.

³ The act must of course, be attended by the consciousness that it is wrong and I do not think that that consciousness can be other than in some degree painful. But is that enough to constitute remorse? Cf. *infra*, the distinction of 'rational' and 'pathological' remorse. Certainly the act cannot be accompanied and need not be followed by a renewal of moral resolution.

really relevant to the matter at all. For, if we consider remorse just in respect of its painfulness, is it in that respect after all *in pari materia* with the guilt it is alleged to punish? Yet it is only as being *in pari materia* with guilt that it has any claim over, for instance, the picking of oakum to be considered punishment at all. I would go further and suggest, with much hesitation, that we must draw a distinction between "rational" and "pathological" remorse, analogous to Kant's distinction between "rational" and "pathological" love. If we take a moral agony of what we may perhaps term "Augustinian" quality, do we not really think that these tears and groans and the like are, however inevitable they may be by psychological law, accidental and not essential to the situation in its moral significance? They are pathological accompaniments, the presence of which in a certain degree might even be deprecated as liable to hinder our moral development, and the absence of which would not, so far as I can judge, lead us to suppose that all was not morally well, except as we took it to indicate the absence also of "rational" remorse. How precisely to describe this 'rational' remorse I do not know; but I suppose that it is at least on the one side a judgment of one's contemptibility and on the other a renewal of moral resolution. Now, supposing there is such a distinction between "rational" and "pathological" remorse as I have suggested, may it not be that the notion that in remorse we have the penalty that fits the crime exists by a confusion of the two? "Rational" remorse, belonging to the same order of things as moral guilt, will appear to satisfy the postulate that crime and its punishment be commensurable; only a purely rational remorse would never strike anybody as being penalty enough, supposing indeed, it could be regarded as penalty at all. "Pathological" remorse, on the other hand, though it can perhaps provide the appearance of an adequate punishment, is, being only "pathological," no more appropriate really as a retort to moral guilt, no more genuinely punishment, than would be a pain produced by any other means.

The foregoing discussion may be summed up as follows. If the principle of retribution is to have any claim to govern our action there must be meaning in the notion of an equivalence between guilt and penalty. But the notion is, in fact, meaningless since there is no penalty that is commensurable with guilt. The appearance of a meaning is greatest when the penalty is described as being: the guilty person's remorse, but this appearance is due only to a confusion between "rational" and "pathological" remorse. Thus there can be no meaning in saying that we ought to act retributively; it must be true that in any infliction of pain—in the case of the guilty no less than of the innocent, and as a matter of principle and not simply of practical necessity—we ought to be governed wholly by

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forward-looking considerations. What we have now to see is how this can be true without the admission that what I have called the "retributive intuition" is a sheer prejudice.

V

What appears to deserve punishment is a wrongful act, but not a wrongful act simply as such. It is not ordinarily thought that a wrongful act merits punishment except in so far as it constitutes an infringement of the rights of other persons, and I shall not question this general belief. Now what we mean by a wrongful act if the notion of desert is taken seriously is, I have argued, always a moral failure. But a moral failure cannot in itself ever be an infringement of anyone's specific rights. Just as to say that a man has done his duty, or has acted dutifully (whether or not these are two distinct facts), is never to say what precisely he has done, so to say that a man has failed in his duty or has acted undutifully is never to say what precisely he has done. Consequently we are left in the dark as to whether or not what he has done is a violation of any particular right. But about one thing we are not left in the dark. Whatever else he did he has at least violated the *general* right (if it is properly called a right) to "consideration", or, in other words, he has exemplified an *indifference to all particular rights*. Moreover this indifference is exemplified just as much in a moral failure that has no overt expression as in one that has, so that there is no difficulty in understanding the guilty person's own sense that he deserves punishment even in the former case. The essential condition of his sense of ill desert is not a consciousness of having actually harmed others, but a consciousness merely of having been prepared to do so for his own satisfaction. A moral failure is precisely the subordination in practice of the principle of 'I ought' to the principle of 'I want,' and to act on the principle of 'I want' is to ignore the claims of other persons which, whether wholly or in part, determine what it is I ought to do. It is to repudiate the rule of 'Do as you would be done by' in its categorical sense, the rule that we should treat others as ends also and not as means only, by acting on which we behave as members in a realm of ends. To deny this rule in our practice, which is what all moral failure in so far as it has social relevance does, is to behave not as members in such a realm but as inhabitants of a Hobbesian state of nature *homo homini lupus* the guilty towards us and we towards him. That is to say, the guilty person's principle implies that he is living in an order in which he cannot protest or appeal to the Caesar of Justice against *anything* that we might in retort do to him. What appears as the "retributive intuition" that he deserves punishment is really the intuition that he does not

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fall under the essentially protective operation of a principle of desert at all. If we insist on applying the moral concept of desert to relationships in such a non-moral world, we can only do so in the form that "he deserves what's coming to him—*no matter what that may be*"¹

Now if our intuition is really as I have stated it to be, it is at once obvious how it can be both a rational insight (as I think it is) and inoperative in respect of our conduct. For if we attempt to extract from it a rule for the practice of justice, what form will that rule take? To treat the guilty person in the manner to which the logic of his position exposes him would be to degrade ourselves to "wolves" so far as our relations with him were concerned, to treat him as a means only, and we can hardly have a moral obligation to act towards anyone as though there were no moral obligations. The so-called "retributive intuition" is rational as the recognition of how a guilty person would, without injustice, be treated in a world subject to the principle on which he himself has acted, but it is without moral authority since the very existence of a moral agent is the denial of such a world. And it is accordingly not merely practically but morally necessary to ignore the guilt except in so far as it is relevant, like any other fact, to our judgment of what conduct will now be for the best. For justice, unless justice means simply the satisfaction of the rights that are correlative to all our duties, there is here no place. There is place only for mercy, but (we must understand) mercy not as a splendid largess but as a difficult duty. Thus, then, is the resolution of my apparent antinomy. Let me repeat a remark I made earlier: "If I deliberately wronged another person and he knew it I should judge that he was failing in his duty if he took account of that wrong otherwise than as part of the conditions under which he was, so far as possible, to bring good into the world—but at the same time I should feel that I did not deserve that the wrong should be responded to only in that way." Except that the word *deserve* here is open to question, we can now see how the attitude of mind expressed in both these statements is justified.

It is, of course, oddly incongruous with our immediate convictions to maintain, as I am doing, that there is in a sense no limit to the

¹ In regard to the foregoing argument it may be noted that some who would accept the view that it is only in virtue of its social reference that a moral failure breeds the sense that punishment is deserved would deny that a reference to a *natural* society is involved in all cases where this sense is felt. It is then inferred that certainly in some cases and perhaps in all, the essential condition of the sense that punishment is deserved is an awareness—however obscure—of a relationship with God. Whether this is so cannot here be discussed—but even if the point were conceded it would constitute a development and not a contradiction of what I have said.

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evil that could without injustice be done to any guilty person, no question of *degrees* of penalty for *degrees* of guilt.¹ Such an incongruity is fatal to a theory unless it can be shown that the immediate convictions are a confusion of thought. Naturally, I suppose that they are, and the sources of the confusion have to a large extent been indicated earlier in this paper, but I had better make them clear even at the cost of some repetition.

There is a social code that must be respected by the members of society in the general interest. To secure respect for this code penalties are attached to the breach of it, and these penalties will naturally vary according to the importance of this or that rule in the code and the difficulty of securing its observance. No doubt, we must add, since man is not wholly a rational creature, the determination of this scale of penalties may be affected also by purely emotional dislikes and repugnances felt by people in general towards this or that type of act. It cannot be denied that some (not always and for everyone the same) sorts of behaviour shock and disgust in a way that rational reflection cannot approve and that we need to and can habituate ourselves to be shocked or disgusted "according to reason." Now in order that we should suppose that what is truly guilt deserves penalties varying in degree, it is only required that the application of the scale of penalties we have just described should be thought of as a retort to guilt proper or (put otherwise) that it corresponds to what is properly speaking desert on the part of the person penalized. Three factors co-operate to make us think this. First, our habit of taking for granted that unless there is striking abnormality in the criminal the breach of the code was in point of fact accompanied by moral guilt and our consequent failure to draw a clear distinction between the two. Second, the affinity between the rational "retributive intuition" and emotional reactions of the revengeful type, so that the degrees that characterize the latter are transferred to the object of the former. That there is this affinity is manifest from the plausibility of the ordinary and shallow attack on the concept of retribution. And thirdly, the fact that once a code with its penalties has been propounded, there is a sense in which the various breaches of the code *can* be said to deserve the varying penalties, namely, that the penalty is the stated "price" of the breach, though this is not at all the moral use of the term "desert" that is the correlate of the moral concept of retribution. If these factors are sufficient to explain why, to the extent that we do, we think that penalties of different severity are morally appropriate to different wrongful acts, then the view I have put forward

¹ It is however perfectly in keeping with the New Testament teaching that "whosoever shall keep the whole law and yet stumble in one point, he is become guilty of all" (James II, 10)

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may stand. If not, I confess I do not at the moment see how either to justify it or to relinquish it.

VI

In conclusion, a word or two may be said on four special points on which any theory of punishment should have something to say. The first point is this. I have spoken throughout as though it were obvious that a punishment must be a certain sort of infliction of pain. But why pain and not just generally evil? Surely the answer is not to be found simply in a latent ethical hedonism? Possibly the explanation is that pain alone has utility, as (say) a deterrent. It is only as perceived by the victim, it may be said, and therefore only as painful that his being put in an evil condition can control his behaviour as a conscious agent. But pain is not the only sort of evil in one's condition that can be perceived, so the real point must be that it is only as it is painful that the perception enters as an element into the constitution of our motives. And then we seem committed to psychological hedonism. An alternative suggestion might be that the only morally neutral element in a man's evil condition is pain, so that if we inflict pain, but only if we inflict pain and not any other sort of evil, do we avoid the charge that we are making the individual on whom it is inflicted a worse individual. Whatever truth there may be in either of these suggestions, it is clear that they only render rational the restriction of punishment to the infliction of that sort of evil that is pain on the hypothesis that punishment is not purely retributive. On a retributive view of punishment, in order to defend the restriction it would be necessary to maintain either that pain is the only evil there is, or that, though other things are evil, pain is the whole nature of "a man's evil," just as though there are other goods than pleasure, pleasure or satisfaction is what we mean by "so-and-so's good."

Secondly, I wish to make quite clear the relation of the view taken in this paper to the doctrine of the "correlation of rights and duties." One aspect of this doctrine is that where A has a duty to B, B has a right against A, and conversely, and the view taken in the paper might easily be misunderstood as involving the denial of this. For I have said (it may be urged) that we have a duty not to act retributively towards the guilty person, and yet he has no right to protest against our so acting. But the solution lies in the ambiguous status of the guilty person. He lives, in fact (and nothing that he or anybody else can do can change this) in a moral order, but, on the other hand, if the principle on which he acted were the law of the order

* Cf. Mr. Carr-Saunders' British Academy lecture (1937), "An Ambiguity of the Word 'Good'."

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in which he lives, it would not be a moral order. It is therefore inconsistent to treat the principle of the guilty action as a law of conduct and at the same time to judge that retributive action is unjustified, and that is the sense in which the guilty person has no right to protest against retribution. None the less in the moral order in which he in fact, lives he has a perfect right to protest, corresponding precisely with our duty to refrain from such action.

In the third place, a word must be said about forgiveness. If forgiveness meant as it does not, taking the line of "It doesn't matter about guilt it could never be right. On the other hand, it is always right, quite irrespective of the guilty person's frame of mind, if it means treating him with the consideration that is owed to all and not allowing his guilt to deflect us in the least degree from the application of that non retributive principle. Of course the obligation so to treat the guilty person rests on each of us whether the guilty act was a wrong done to him or not, but naturally it possesses the character of forgiveness only as it is fulfilled by someone who has been wronged. There is, I think a sense in which any guilty act is a wrong done to all but even if that is true I doubt if it can be maintained that all are wronged equally and that the person we ordinarily think of as wronged is not still wronged in a special and additional way. Precisely how the admission that there are degrees of being wronged consists with the earlier suggestion that there are no degrees of guilt would of course, require further discussion.

But if in the sense defined forgiveness is always and unconditionally obligatory what are we to say of the view that it depends on the guilty person's repentance? Is that sheer error? I cannot think so. But perhaps when we maintain that view, what we really have in mind is this. Though we must always act on the principle of consideration the acts appropriate to express that consideration will vary according as the guilty person did or did not exhibit a renewed resolution to act morally. Being considerate is not being soft and it is not humbug to speak of being cruel in order to be kind. And moreover, we recognize that, on the side of the guilty person, the *experience* of forgiveness is conditioned by his own frame of mind. What is or should be, there for the asking is not by that fact alone also appropriated. But we need not here pursue further the question of the nature and conditions of that experience.

Finally, what of reward? It is natural to suppose that a theory of reward will be precisely parallel to a theory of punishment, and I see no reason to deny the parallelism. Thus when some good or other is promised to the person who performs such and such an act, the performer may be said to deserve that good which, as deserved, may be called a reward. This corresponds to the sense in which a wrongdoer deserves to pay the price that has been fixed for the

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luxury of his wrongdoing But it is not true in the case of "reward" any more than in that of "punishment" that the promise itself is made on the principle of desert In each case it is made for utilitarian reasons It does not follow, and it does not, in fact, seem to be true, that the detail of the system of "reward" should precisely parallel the detail of the system of penalties The parallelism is in respect of the principle that is being applied, not of the forms of its application, and the principle itself determines any divergences from correspondence in the application When we turn from the overt act to the moral quality of the agent in doing it, the parallelism between the theories of reward and of punishment still holds We ask whether all morally worthy actions deserve reward, or some, or none And we answer in the first place that it must be either all or none It cannot be true that in respect of their moral worth some deserve it and some do not For to be morally worthy at all they must be dutiful, and how can there be degrees of dutifulness, as there surely must be if some dutiful actions as dutiful deserve reward and some do not? In fact, in order to maintain the answer "some" we must also hold that there really are duties of supererogation, that is, duties that we are not with the absolute stringency bound to perform, and this contradicts itself, since a duty is by its nature as duty categorically binding Are we then to say that all morally worthy actions deserve reward or that none do? We must say none For we cannot as moral agents do more to produce good for an individual than can be justified on the principle of impartial beneficence towards all, and equally we cannot do less (as we have seen) even towards the morally guilty, but if we treat the morally evil and the morally good on the same principle, it is absurd to describe the act however agreeable to the patient it may be, as a reward It is, of course, compatible with this that the act appropriate to the case of the morally good is more likely to be agreeable to him than the act appropriate in the other case is to be agreeable to the morally evil On the other hand, we said that the status of the guilty person is an ambiguous one, and that though as a member of a moral order he, in fact, deserves to be treated on the same principle as applies to the good the principle on which he himself has acted would, if it were the law of the order in which he lives, exclude that desert Consequently there is a sense in which he does not deserve the beneficent treatment that he should receive, and there is, correspondingly, a sense in which only the good deserve such treatment This is the truth that is distorted into the false doctrine that virtue ought not to be left to be "its own reward." The same treatment relatively to the evil is one of mercy and relatively to the good is only what he merits, but that does not alter the fact that there is an absolute obligation to accord it to both alike

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DR RUDOLF METZ

IN my book, *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy*,¹ in connection with Cook Wilson and his Oxford followers I briefly mentioned a new line of ethical research that has made its mark within the last decade. Its representatives are differently labelled, as "Oxford Moralists," "Intuitionists," "Neo-Intuitionists," "Objectivists," and with other names as well. But I could not give more than a few very insufficient hints about the new school: a fuller treatment would have exceeded the compass of my book, and, further, at the time the book was written things were not settled enough to be made the subject of a historical review. Even now the time has hardly come for a final appreciation. Nevertheless the discussion is so far advanced that it may be worth while to take stock of it in order to exhibit not only the new tendency itself, but also the various cross-currents which have been called forth by its appearance. Such an attempt is greatly furthered by the fact that some preliminary work has already been done in this direction by writers who have taken part in the discussion.

It may serve to put the movement in its historical perspective if we remind ourselves that its chief representatives (Prichard, Ross, and Joseph) belonged to John Cook Wilson's circle in Oxford, and have been strongly influenced by that thinker. But Cook Wilson was not primarily interested in Ethics: his admirable energy being chiefly spent in logical discussions. It was different with G. E. Moore, whose name frequently occurs in the course of the discussion, and whose two books on ethics² are often quoted. In both thinkers, Cook Wilson as well as Moore, the direction of the new thought is negatively determined by the fact that it entered on the scene as a reaction against idealist ethics: while in its further course it has been characterized by a certain dialectical tension arising from both internal differences and the intervention of writers belonging to a different school. But it is with its positive results that we are chiefly concerned.

By way of introduction the following may be said. In calling the view, as is frequently done, "intuitionist," we have not said much about it. For the term "intuitionism" conveys little, unless it is clearly stated what is meant by it, especially in ethics, as may be seen from the fact that it is applied to thinkers of very different

¹ 1935. English edition, 1938, p. 527 ff.

² *Principia Ethica* (1903) and *Ethics* (1912).

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affinities. Among English moralists it is used of Cudworth, Clarke, Wollaston, Butler, Hutcheson, Hume, Adam Smith, Price, Martineau, Sidgwick, and Rashdall. Even Kant himself is frequently considered to be an intuitionist. As a matter of fact, the peculiarity of this movement seems to consist just in its not being committed to any definite standpoint, for it is not so much concerned with the inclusion of ethics within the framework of any philosophical system, as with plain and sober research into the problems and phenomena of the moral life as such. Its chief business is the clarification of moral concepts and the analysis of moral situations. So far as it is so, the movement (not throughout, it is true, but in many respects) signifies a return to the classical British moral philosophy of the eighteenth century, and represents a reaction against the ethics of idealism as the New Realism does against its epistemology.

Let me first emphasize a few general and ever-recurring features of the discussion. It is primarily analytic, and occupied with the dissection of situations. Occasionally it loses itself in ingenious subtleties, but, when applied in the careful and masterly way of the leading writers, it achieves much excellent work in clarifying the facts by keeping in close contact with experience, avoiding speculative flights and leaving no room for moralizing. Even the problem of the freedom of the will, so fundamental in most ethical systems, is hardly ever touched upon—presumably because the solution would involve metaphysical considerations and a wide departure from the analytic method.

Of the concepts submitted to analysis, two play the chief role, those of the Good and the Right. For the first time these two may be said to have been sharply and definitely opposed to each other, leading directly to the question, which of them possesses the stronger ethical relevance, which is more fundamental for judging moral actions. What emerges is that, in contrast to the prevalent view, the centre of gravity has been definitely shifted from the good to the right. There are even efforts to banish the idea of good altogether from the inner circle of ethics.

The question then arises, whether the "moral" (thus identified almost exclusively with the "right") is something original, ultimate, not further deducible from anything else, but on the contrary immediately apprehended. This question is answered in the affirmative. One of the main theses of the representatives of this movement is that the rightness of an action is based on the act itself, and is not dependent either on its motives or on its consequences or on any other factors. Right is right and that is all there is about it. This attempt to narrow to the utmost limit the basis of "moral" action is sufficient to bring into prominence some of the main questions which occupy the discussions which follow. In what does our "duty" really consist?

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Does it consist in attaining a definite result by actually producing an intended situation, or is it sufficient to do all that is likely to bring a situation about? Can intermediary actions of other agents, that slip in between what has been intended by us and what is really achieved, be put to our account or not? What is decisive for the morality of a deed? Is it the success or the intention, the deed itself or its motives or its consequences?

Beyond these lies the question of value and the attempt is made to determine the nature of the moral, as distinguished from the other forms of value, involving the setting up of a scale of these and the possibility of conflict among the several kinds. Finally there is the question whether ethics is a discipline *sui generis*, whether it stands on its own bottom and can solve its own problems, or whether there are certain problems which transcend its powers. After what has been said it is clear that the movement tends to consider ethics to be a closely limited field to be explored by means of analysis and description, and to be competent to solve its own problems without committing itself to the uncertainties of metaphysical speculation.

Turning now to individual thinkers, the fundamental question was set by H. A. Prichard in the title of an article 'Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?' To put the question is to answer it in the affirmative, and the writer goes on to show wherein the mistake consists, namely in overlooking the sense of obligation as fundamental in all moral action and as something entirely immediate and undervivable—just in the same way as the sense of the truth of a simple mathematical or logical proposition is so. This means that we do not recognize an obligation on account of any rational arguments, or as the result of a more or less complicated process of thinking. The sentiment that we act rightly in a given case, e.g. in keeping a promise or returning a kindness, does not rest on a reflexion about the possible consequences of our acting, nor on its being determined by a moral standard or by the idea of good. It is true that we are led by certain motives, but we do not act with a view to a definite object. From this follows a sharp distinction between morality and virtue as two species of goodness which are independent of each other. A virtuous action is one that is done willingly and with pleasure from a motive which is intrinsically good, but not from a sense of obligation. An obligation can be as little based on a virtue or be deduced from it, as can a virtue be based on an obligation.

This argument is in full agreement with that of Cook Wilson with regard to the basis of knowledge. What Prichard has done is nothing else than to transfer it to the moral sphere. Applied to ethics, it means that the obligation we feel to perform a moral deed springs from a

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consciousness uncontrolled by any reflexion. It is an activity of moral thinking that is immediately called forth by the concrete situations with which we are confronted. Should we, however, doubt whether an obligation is really obligatory and not illusory, in that case we should want a proof, and such a proof could only be furnished by a rational deliberation, essentially different from that infallible and unreflected original consciousness. But moral philosophy cannot satisfy such a demand, and every attempt at satisfying it is bound to fail from the very beginning, seeing that we cannot prove by rational means what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking. Ethics is dominated from first to last by intuitive allogical judgments of the form "this is right" or "this concrete situation obliges us to this or to that way of acting."

Though Prichard's article may be said to have the same significance for Ethics as Moore's famous "Refutation of Idealism"¹ had for Epistemology, it remained at the time almost unnoticed. Only after a new advance in the same direction had been made in his Inaugural Lecture on *Duty and Interest* in 1928 did the discussion start on its course. We may deal more shortly with the moral theory of E. F. Carrutt,² a writer immediately inspired by Prichard, seeing that it is (in spite of a curious disclaimer on the part of his master) in essential agreement with the latter's doctrines, though differing in single points. Even more sharply than Prichard, Carrutt takes to task earlier theories—hedonist, evolutionist, utilitarian, Kantian and idealist alike, as all deluded by that "ignis fatuus of moral philosophy"—the idea of a *summum bonum*. As against all these he asserts, like Prichard, the ultimacy of moral obligation and its utter irreducibility to a conception or standard lying outside itself, and the absolute impossibility of proving to anybody that he should fulfil his duty or that he has any duties to fulfil. That duties exist is just as self-evident as that beautiful things and true judgments exist. He further draws a sharp division between "right" as applying to acts and "good" as applying to states or events, and between the "rightness" and the "morality" of an act—the latter applying to it only so far as the agent believes it to be right and does it because of this belief. Finally he insists that the consequences of an action are accidental to its moral worth, though not its motives.

Of more weight than Carrutt's book and at the same time more original is W. D. Ross's *The Right and the Good* (1930), which immediately on its appearance attracted wide attention. To-day the author passes as the most prominent representative of neo-intuitionist moral philosophy. In his teaching the influence of Prichard (and therefore of Cook Wilson) and of Moore unite—a union from which there results a rejection of idealist and teleological admixtures.

¹ Published in *Mind* 1903.

² *The Theory of Morals* (1928).

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though this rejection is more latent than openly expressed (perhaps owing to the influence of Aristotle, to whom Ross has devoted so much fine research work.) It is further characteristic of him that, though, like the remaining thinkers of this group, he carefully avoids in his ethical discussions all excursions into metaphysics, he refuses to draw any sharp line of demarcation between the two disciplines.

In his discussion of the nature of "right" and its relation to the "good," there are three points of importance (1) the sharp distinction between the two concepts, leading to an almost entire separation, (2) the greater ethical relevance of the "right", and (3) resulting from this its primacy over the "good." As to the first point, he holds that neither right nor good is capable of further definition or derivation. As to the second, that "right" is synonymous with 'what is my duty' or "What I ought to do," and thus lies at the very centre of ethics. As to the third that "good" as a moral predicate stands in a rather loose connection with "right," owing to the circumstance that what it is our duty to do depends only to a certain extent on the goodness of the things we bring about by our actions.

After distinguishing between 'act' as the change originated by my acting and 'action' as the doing which originates a change, and which is always the result of a definite motive, Ross explains that "right" always refers to the act, i.e. to the thing done, whereas "morally good" always refers to the action as motivated, and that "A motive never forms part of the content of our duty if anything is certain about morals, that, I think, is certain." Whence then does the obligation arise to perform any act (for instance to fulfil a promise)? The answer can only be as follows: from the nature of the act itself the fulfilment, e.g. of a promise springs from no other reason than the fact that a promise has been given and that a promise is a promise. It is this that constitutes the 'intrinsic rightness' of an act. From this follows a consequence which is logically unavoidable, but ethically very contestable (and has often been contested), namely that right acting (performance of duty) may be a morally bad action, wrong acting (neglect of duty) a morally good one. Ross goes even so far as to assert that 'nothing that ought to be done is ever morally good.'

If the motive does not constitute a criterion for right acting, in what does this criterion consist? Ross answers: merely in the success (or failure) of my action. "Success and failure are the only test of the performance of duty." Does this not mean that the consequences of an action are after all decisive for its valuation as right or wrong? On his own premise of the "intrinsicness" of rightness Ross is bound to deny this, and he finds his way out of the dilemma by refusing to separate success and act from each other (as the representatives of the consequential theory do) on the ground that an act

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does not consist in merely *aiming at a change* in the state of affairs, but in bringing about the *change de facto*. The consequences are thus drawn, or rather smuggled into the act, and only by this *legerdemain* does he succeed in making them the criterion of right acting. Is the consequential theory refuted by this? I do not think so. Ross only circumvents it by a logical artifice, instead of facing it with new moral insight.

A similar difficulty attaches to the intuitional factor in Ross's doctrine. If I fulfil a given promise and in doing so perform my duty, I do something which appears to me right at first sight. But this does not mean that there is, as the older intuitionism assumed, something like an inborn moral sense on the strength of which we recognize certain moral axioms as evident in themselves, but merely that we find these axioms evident without any further proof, provided we have reached a certain moral maturity. Such propositions are not susceptible of rational proof, nor do they stand in need of it. They are just as self-evident as mathematical axioms or logical inferences, and are reached not by logical deduction but by intuitive induction. "The moral order expressed in these propositions is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic." This moral self-evidence, however, does not extend to all right acts or duties, but only to those which Ross calls "*prima facie* right," i.e. general as contrasted with particular duties. The former are self-evident, and therefore known with absolute certainty, whilst the latter, as far as they occur in concrete situations, have only probable knowledge-value, they are a matter of mere opinion. But even in the case of *prima facie* duties, there may be a conflict, in which case there is no general principle by which we can decide which of the conflicting duties is the more obligatory. Our duty consists in choosing the one which seems to be more "urgent."

In a long discussion of the problem of Value Ross agrees with Moore in holding that value is a simple quality that cannot be further analysed, but that it differs from those qualities which inhere in substances inasmuch as it inheres in "objectives"—entities of a much more complex character than substances—as good in themselves. Ross here aligns himself against all subjectivism. Coming to the question what things are thus intrinsically or by themselves good, Ross holds that there are only four things to which this character belongs, i.e. (1) virtue, (2) pleasure, (3) the right apportionment of pleasure with regard to virtue, and (4) knowledge (and in a minor degree also right opinion). All the other goods are reducible to these four or to some combination of them. If looked at more closely, they do not prove intrinsic, but purely instrumental, as for instance the value which inheres in material things.

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We now leave what we might call the inner circle of the discussion. With Prichard, Carritt and Ross, British ethics entered a new phase of its development, connected, it is true, by many a link with the traditional British moral philosophy, but standing out clearly against anything in the past as something independent and original. From them, ethics has certainly received a new impulse, calling forth vigorous reactions which are likely to continue in spite of the internal instability of the whole position. In what follows we leave the inner circle of the school and deal with some attempts that have come to light in the course of a critical examination of neo intuitionist ethics, without pretending to exhaust them.

To the counter movement belongs, first of all, H. W. B. Joseph in his book *Some Problems in Ethics* (1931) which, however, is not so much a blow dealt to the new intuitionism from without as an explosion of it from within, seeing that Joseph belongs to Cook Wilson's school of thought, an allegiance that betrays itself even when he passes beyond the position of his master and goes his own way. This leads in an idealistic direction, and to the explicit demand for a metaphysical foundation, involving refutation of all naturalistic as well as utilitarian theories of morals, including Moore's 'ideal utilitarianism'. In this way he restores once more the close connection between the ideas of rightness and goodness, re-establishing against Ross the value-character of the "right," as founded ultimately on the idea of the "good," and thus bringing the two ideas once more into organic relations. The synthetic character of Joseph's thinking thus breaks through in contrast with the analytical dissection which characterizes the new movement. The same may be seen in the way he discusses the relation between act and motive. If you detach the act from the motive, nothing remains that is ethically relevant. You leave nothing but a physical relation between the act and all that has gone before. If we want to find out the reason of an obligation, we can neither stop at the act itself nor can we look for it in its consequences. Goodness lies beyond the particular act in the general form of life, as it manifests itself in some community, or, as Joseph puts it, in a system or 'structural whole' that is good. The good is an element in such an organic whole, it is not a quality of an act, but a system or a member of a system. As against Moore's thesis that goodness is a simple, undefinable quality, Joseph tries to show that it is the realization of the very nature of the thing to which this predicate is attached. In this way moral theory approaches once more the idea of self realization expounded by Green and Bradley as the ultimate standard of moral judgment—the very idea against which the whole force of the new movement had been chiefly directed.

Intermediate between Joseph and the fifth writer whose contri-

bution to this symposium took book-form, several others took part in it in articles contributed to various journals and from various points of view. In a series of articles "On Right and Good,"¹ W. G. de Burgh maintained a view strongly reminiscent both of Kant and Bradley while making certain concessions to intuitionism. His blow differs from Joseph's in coming definitely from outside the movement. Yet in the emphasis de Burgh places on the ideas of "right" and "duty," as more fundamental than that of "good," he approaches the position of the intuitionists, as is further shown by his readiness to declare with Kant the autonomy of the moral life. To the question why we ought to do what we ought to do, we can answer only "because we ought to do it." We are guided throughout by a self-evident intuition, altogether apart from rational reflection. In support of this view, de Burgh is ready further to appeal to Richard Price, the eighteenth-century moralist, who is considered one of the earliest representatives of intuitionist ethics. As regards the "good," while it is theoretically sharply distinguished from the right, it does not become clear whether it is ethically as relevant as the right, nor even whether it belongs to the ethical sphere at all. We hear little or nothing of good actions, but only of those that are conducive to good. According to this view goodness does not inhere in the act itself, but is only an attendant or consequential phenomenon of acting—the subject of a *post facto* judgment. "The judgment of moral goodness," we are told "is passed from the standpoint not of the man acting, but of himself theoretically reviewing the action, as an impartial spectator after the event. The strict and concrete moral judgment is that of right."

But this is only one side of de Burgh's theory. We are drawn beyond it by the tension between what we really do (and necessarily do imperfectly) and the ideal claim of what we ought to do and what it would be the really right to do. This tension grows out of the antagonism between the pure form of rightness and its material fulfilment in a particular concrete situation. We know, it is true, that, under any circumstances, it is right to do what we intuitively conceive to be right. But moral life moves in a continual sense of the gulf between the ideal claim of the moral law and what it is possible to fulfil, between the "ought" and the "is." We thus become entangled in an antinomy which morality itself cannot solve, and recourse has to be had to metaphysics and religion as is indicated by the title of de Burgh's Gifford Lectures.² His standpoint thus approaches that of A. E. Taylor as developed in his book *The Faith of a Moralist*, with which de Burgh has declared himself in substantial agreement.³

¹ Published in *Philosophy*, vols. v and vi (1930 and 1931).

² Recently published *From Morality to Religion* (1938), which appeared too late for me to make use of it.

³ Vide *Philosophy*, vol. vi, p. 232.

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But is not this to throw intuitionism overboard? For if that which we intuitively recognize to be right is yet not ultimately right, what becomes of our intuitions? This departure is further confirmed by the aim throughout, which is a synthesis of the factors into which analysis has resolved the concrete whole to which in the end we must return, and shows that the writer's concessions to the new movement are merely apparent, and that he is separated from it by his own idealist position.

W. A. Pickard Cambridge's contribution entitled "Two Problems about Duty" is of wholly different tenor. He calls his standpoint "ideal Utilitarianism" and expounds it in sharp contrast to the new doctrines, suggesting the intention of going back to the point in Moore's position at which it parts company with them. So far his attack is from within, but just this circumstance increases the interest of his contribution. From the side of method, with Pickard Cambridge analysis reaches its high water mark and exhausts its last possibilities. He himself strikingly characterizes his procedure as "microscopic analysis." Everything is here looked at as through a magnifying glass so that things become visible which remain concealed to the normal eye. Fortunately, we are concerned with no complex or problematic matters, but with the simplest things of daily life, for instance, the question of returning a borrowed book. Nevertheless, the writer is very skilful in complicating by microscopy so apparently simple a matter, splitting up this single action into so many partial actions of calculation, execution, and reflexion that in the end one hardly knows whether and how far the agent has done (or neglected) his duty in returning the book. We have here in fact a new form of the utilitarian calculus with a new ethical algebra to correspond, for which Moore's method of dissection has clearly stood sponsor. It is further clear that such a method, if strictly carried out, is bound to come into conflict with the principle of intuition. With the intuitionists, too, analysis plays by no means a small part, but in them the incompatibility of the two elements has not openly broken out. With Pickard Cambridge intuition is overgrown by analysis and almost stifled.

Coming to the contents of the theory, duty is identified with right action, but the problem of the relation between "right" and "good" does not become acute. The two notions stand from the very beginning in the definite connexion prescribed by the ideal utilitarian view: the performance of duty being taken as synonymous with the promotion of the highest good, which thus comes to be the criterion for right acting. The tables are turned, the standard of moral value being shifted from rightness to goodness. In the place of Ross's "unprincipled intuition," directing our judgment in a given situation,

* Published in *Mind*, vol. 41 (1932)

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Pickard-Cambridge sets up a general and constant moral principle by which every action can be judged. This is the principle, "that we ought always to do what is reasonably calculated to do the most good." Seeing, however, that we are not masters of the success of our actions, it can never be our duty to produce a definite result. All we can do is to intend with all our power to bring something about. The case, frequent enough in ordinary practice, of effecting immediately what we intend to effect, has little interest for this writer, and is treated as an exception. He is only interested in cases where there is the tension between right action and the prospective situation at which the action aims. Thus the following curious situation arises. I do this or that. Whether something good or something bad will come of it lies beyond me and cannot be put to my account. The outcome may, as matters stand, be so far separated from my act that I cannot be made responsible for it. The goal pursued may even not be reached at all owing to the interactions of other agents. What, then, we ask is ethically relevant? Pickard-Cambridge would answer: neither the right act, nor the consequences, but merely the careful review of all the circumstances and, founded thereon, the reasonable expectation of realizing the good intended. But is this a broad enough basis for moral judgment? Is the theory in agreement with common sense or with ordinary moral experience, as the author would like to make us believe? Does it really concern the man who in a concrete situation is called upon to decide? I think we may answer all these questions in the negative. In active life where quick decisions have to be made this elaborate apparatus will only become effective in very rare cases. It is not even the procedure of the moral judgment, but at the most that of the analytical observer who examines what has been done with all its effects, dissects it into its parts and makes it the subject of a logical exercise. Ordinary moral experience of the agent as well as of the judge has nothing to do with it. Surely Ross's intuitionist theory reveals a keener ethical insight and stands in closer agreement with ordinary experience.

Space forbids me to do more than mention the contributions to the discussion of J. Gallie in an article on "Oxford Moralists",¹ and P. Leon in one on "Rightness and Goodness,"² both of whom, without committing themselves to metaphysical theory, seek to reassert the organic connection between good and right and through it between motive and conduct, and, so far as they do so, definitely break with the new intuitionism.

G. C. Field, in an article on "Kant's Moral Principle,"³ makes the question of the nature of rightness and its relation to the good the

¹ *Philosophy*, vol. vii (1932).

² *Mind*, vol. 42 (1933).

³ *Mind*, vol. 41 (1932).

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sole object of study, connecting it with Ross's doctrine of "*prima facie* rightness." An action is not right or wrong because it is this particular, unique, individual action, but because it is the expression of a universal moral law by which the quality of rightness is bestowed on it. Thus universality is so essential a feature of right acting that we may say all right actions are capable of universalization, and, *vice versa*, all actions capable of universalization are right. Only when I can wish that somebody else should do the same in similar circumstances do I call the action right. In other words. To the intuitionist point of view Field opposes Kant's idealist one, as it has found expression in the so called "principle of pure practical reason": "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This means that an action is not something wholly isolated, or something entirely self dependent, but that *qua* action it must be placed from the very beginning in a wider context. In his polemic against Ross the author points out that nothing is explained by conceiving *prima facie* rightness as an ultimate original datum of our moral experience. The real problem only begins where Ross considers it to be already solved. We cannot simply accept this ultimate datum as a matter of faith, we must show whence the moral quality claimed for the act comes. Because it cannot inhere in the action as such, and because the consequences of an action cannot be taken as the test of its rightness, Field argues that the real bearer of the moral quality is the general state of mind of man as a self-conscious being. He tries to show that certain states of mind from which actions arise are under all circumstances and necessarily good, others, on the contrary, bad, thus establishing a natural relation between good and right. *Prima facie* rightness is a derivative from the goodness of that state of mind from which the action we call right immediately issues. But we are not told wherein this state of mind positively consists. We are merely told that "motive" is too narrow a term for it. "Character" seems to be meant, but oddly enough Field does not say so and even if he had said so, the problem would not seem to be finally solved. For character is a highly complex and (because of its complexity) a highly problematic structure, that cannot be claimed without further proof, and certainly not *in toto*, as the source of the moral quality. This notion, no less than Ross's *prima facie* rightness, calls for further explanation. Yet it brings us much nearer the real meaning of the "moral" than does the placing of it simply in the action itself (with the intuitionists) or in the consequences (with utilitarians and others). So far as it goes, it allies Field with Joseph rather than with Ross. The inspiration comes from the side of idealism.

The same may be said of J. H. Murhead, with whom this account of the chief contributors to the controversy may be brought to a

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close In his book *Rule and End in Morals* (1932) Мурhead subjects the whole movement to an acute critical examination from his own idealist point of view But his criticism is combined, it may be said at once, with a very sympathetic understanding of the intuitionist contentions He takes the movement as a reaction against idealist ethics, and the various attacks upon the movement as the counter reaction coming from that quarter He regards the counter-movement as "a cautious return to the spirit, if not to the letter, of the idealist tradition" The support it has met with from several of the writers already mentioned clearly shows that the report of the death of British idealism has been very much exaggerated It shows further that idealism, so far as it is alive, has not degenerated into barren dogmatism, but that it is ready to make concessions and to assimilate modern trends of thought, without abandoning its true character Of this tendency Мурhead's attitude is perhaps the best example With certain reservations he is willing "to recognize with Prichard and those who have followed him the 'self-evidence' and the 'immediate apprehension' of our obligations" He is very well aware that in difficult situations we cannot appeal to moral philosophy to prove by rational means what we ought to do in order to fulfil our duty In such cases we must follow our moral instinct So far the intuitive factor in ethics is certainly justified Furthermore, he is ready—again with certain provisos—to accept Ross's idea of "*prima facie* rightness," nor does he shut his eyes to the significance of several of the numerous distinctions and clarifications brought to light by microscopic analysis After all these and other concessions to intuitionism, however, the "great but" is forthcoming This is the necessity of a revision of the intuitionist position on the basis of an ethics that is rooted in a teleological metaphysics, and that has grown out of the unity of a philosophical system What is the use of all these minute distinctions, oppositions, comparisons, etc., if "their ends hang so to speak loose," and are not fastened together in a tight knot? Ethics is too serious a business to be satisfied with loose ends Instead of or besides analysis and description we want unity and system, instead of forgoing all consideration of value we want a general theory of values The ultimate tearing asunder of good and right would be the end of ethics altogether We must seek the missing link by which these two fundamental notions are organically connected and welded together into unity It would be just as absurd to break off the idea of right from its roots in a general system of objective values as to separate truth from the objective reality to which it refers Ethics cannot get on without metaphysics, and frequently enough it will also have to appeal to religion Whenever we dig deeper, we come up against more comprehensive systematic relationships, of which account has to be

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taken if our analysis is to lead anywhere but to mere confusion. Is it not surprising that the problem of the freedom of the will, for instance, has never been seriously grappled with by the new theories?

Thus Muirhead's revision tends in the direction of a universal theory of values or a comprehensive axiology, from which alone an answer may be expected to those numerous questions which intuitionist moralists have raised, but not solved. And with this all the great problems of ethics, which *philosophia perennis* has placed before the world in the systems of Plato and Aristotle, of Kant and Hegel, of Green and Bradley, come anew into sight and will press ever hardly upon us, however different the solutions may be which they will find in the present or in future time.

The necessity of some such conclusion to the whole discussion may be further illustrated from the aftermath of it, as represented by a paper, published three years after the appearance of the last-mentioned contribution, by C. A. Campbell under the title "Moral and non-Moral Values".¹ Among thinkers of the new movement the problem of value had been dealt with chiefly by Moore and Ross, and it is these with whom Campbell enters into direct controversy. He distinguishes two main doctrines in recent theories of value—the objectivist and the subjectivist. According to the former, which may be said to have been started by Moore, value (i.e. goodness) is determined as a simple, unanalysable and undefinable quality that inheres in the things we call valuable, according to the latter value consists in a relation between valuable things and a mind recognizing them to be so. Campbell then proceeds to distinguish two groups of values—moral values, the leading member of which appears to be virtue, and the entire group of the non-moral values such as truth, beauty, friendship, health, pleasure. He tries in some detail to show that our reactions to the specifically moral value of virtue is quite different from our reactions to the others, inasmuch as it alone is unrelated to interest or liking, and from this difference he derives his main thesis, namely that the subjectivist conception is valid for the whole domain of the non-moral values, but fails as regards the moral sphere of values. This not only does not represent a higher rank in a general order but belongs to an altogether different category from all the others. However great the measure of truth or knowledge that may be attained, it cannot be set against the smallest measure of virtue—an opinion the truth of which may justly be doubted—seeing that it is impossible thus to split up the realm of values into two parts severed by an impassable gulf from each other. The realm of values, however we define it, must constitute a continuous whole. However different may be the character of the separate

¹ *Mind*, vol. 44 (1935)

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members, they are one and all dominated by a single synthetic principle in virtue of which they are what they are. No value can step out of this order without losing its value-character: moral value least of all, if, as I think we must, we are to continue to assign to it the highest rank. Failing, as it does, of such a synthesis, Campbell's theory remains, to say the least, incomplete and merely again illustrates the necessity of returning to the highway of the idealist tradition and reorientating our ethical theory in the direction to which more and more clearly this tradition is seen to point.

KANT'S CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICS¹—I

W H WALSH, M A

WHAT is the *Critique of Pure Reason* about? The terminology of the work is so perplexing, its argument so obscurely expressed, that the ordinary reader may be forgiven if he puts it down at the end very much in the dark as to what it all means. He will have seen that in it Kant has attempted to establish certain conclusions: the subjectivity of space and time, the existence and objective validity of a number of *a priori* concepts or categories, the falsity of the arguments used to defend the metaphysical system most widely favoured in German learned circles in the eighteenth century, but though he has grasped all this he may yet have failed to make sense of the work as a whole. It is the old story of not seeing the wood for trees, and in this case the fault is more excusable than in most, for the individual trees each demand so much attention and are so difficult to get round that it is all too easy to forget the very existence of the wood. At the worst, one may think that there is no wood at all, only a miscellaneous aggregate of individual trees which have nothing to do with each other.

Yet this conclusion, if true, would be a strange one, contradicting not only common expectation (for it is reasonable to expect that a work on which its author spent so much trouble would have a unitary theme), but also the implications of explicit statements of Kant himself. The *Critique of Pure Reason* is presumably itself a product of pure reason, and pure reason, as Kant is constantly telling us,² is a unity, or again, the *Critique* is a piece of (immanent) metaphysics,³ and metaphysics, as Kant understands it, is nothing if not *systematic*. It is true that Kant says that the *Critique* is not itself the system of reformed metaphysics which his philosophy is to make possible,⁴ but there is little doubt that the contents of the first part of the latter (the metaphysic of nature as opposed to the metaphysic of morals) would, if it had ever been written, have

¹ The present paper only deals with Kant's views as expressed in the inaugural *Dissertation* and the first half of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is hoped to follow it with discussions of the *Dialectic* and the relevant parts of the other two *Critiques*. The writer is much indebted to Professor Paton for help over points of detail.

² E.g. B xxiii, B 766 = A 738.

³ Cf. letter to Herz later than May 11, 1781 (Berlin edition, X, 252), where the *Critique* is said to contain the 'metaphysic of metaphysics' (reference in Vleeschauwer, *La déduction transcendentale*, I, 62).

⁴ B 869 = A 814.

consisted of little but the conclusions established in its so-called "propaedeutic"¹

It is the least we can do, then, to assume that the *Critique* is the answer to a single question or set of questions. The problem next arises: what is this question to which Kant's work is the answer? Kant himself says in a passage in the second edition Introduction (B 19) "The proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question: how are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?" In the first edition Preface (A xvii) he says "The chief question is always simply this: what and how much can understanding and reason know apart from all experience?" These two statements are not quite alternative formulations of the same problem. The second puts a general question, which the first particularizes, and the particularization is at the same time a beginning of a solution of the difficulty. The general question concerns the extent of our *a priori* knowledge: it asks what knowledge human beings can acquire independently of sense-experience or introspection.² Many philosophers, and particularly in the eighteenth century, have believed that there are certain propositions which we can know to be true independently of the evidence of the senses: the propositions of mathematics and many metaphysical propositions were alleged to be of this type. Clearly it is important for any philosopher who accepts this general position (as Kant does) to ask after the extent and nature of our knowledge of these propositions. It is this problem which Kant has before him throughout the *Critique*, and if we go through the work with some such formula in our minds as "What can we know by simply thinking?" or better, "What can we know by other means than sense-experience?" we should be able to see what it is about. But we shall find that Kant himself is more apt to use the other formula, "How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?"³ and this should be explained. In the famous passage in the Introduction to the *Critique* (B 10 = A 6 ff.) Kant distinguishes between two types of judgment, analytic and synthetic. Analytic judgments are all *a priori*, they are what we can conclude from the judgments we know already by analysing their subject-concepts in accordance with the principle of contradiction. No analytic judgment, therefore, gives us new or what might be called "positive" knowledge. "Positive" knowledge is always expressed in synthetic judgments. Now it is clear that the sort of knowledge acquired

¹ Compare the handbook of metaphysics outlined in the letter to Jacob, September 11 (?), 1787 (X, 471). Of course there would also have been analyses setting out derivative concepts in such a system (cf. B 107 = A 82, B 249 = A 204), but the general framework would have been set by the results of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

² In the rest of this paper the term "sense-experience" must be taken to include introspection.

³ E.g. in *Prolegomena* § 5.

independently of sense experience which interests Kant is that expressed in synthetic judgments; so that for him the question whether we know anything independently of sense-experience is simply the question whether we know any true synthetic *a priori* propositions, since *a priori* means acquired independently of sense-experience. Kant believes that the answer to this question is "yes", that we know propositions of this sort in mathematics and even in physics, the fundamental presuppositions of which are not drawn, as are the propositions making up the body of the science, from sense-experience, and that metaphysicians claim to know propositions of this nature also. He therefore proposes to set about answering his general question, "What can we know independently of sense-experience?" by asking another question, "What are the conditions of our knowing synthetic *a priori* propositions?" For it seems to him clear (and it is surely not an unreasonable position) that an investigation of the synthetic *a priori* knowledge we undoubtedly have will throw light on the nature and extent of synthetic *a priori* knowledge in general.

From all this it should be clear that the subject of the *Critique* is the same as that of so many other philosophical treatises: an investigation of the sources of knowledge open to human beings. Only Kant is particularly interested in the suggestion that reason or intelligence is a source of propositions which are both true and "positive", and his main aim is to estimate the value of this suggestion. That is why his work is a "critique of pure reason"—a critical estimation of the powers of pure reason, i.e. of the intellect by itself. The object is to say what pure reason both can and cannot do. The existence of certain propositions whose apriority, synthetic character, and objective validity are all regarded as certain by Kant shows that reason (in a wide, non-technical sense) has some powers, the existence of metaphysics shows that some philosophers claimed other, apparently more significant, powers for it. As a result of the *Critique*, Kant will be in a position to pronounce on the claim. And indeed it is to make this pronouncement that the whole inquiry is undertaken: the object of the work is to determine the possibility of metaphysics, a science the very concept of which, as we are told in the *Prolegomena* (§ 1), implies that its sources cannot be empirical. Metaphysical knowledge, if such a thing is possible, is the supreme example of non-empirical knowledge: is there any metaphysical knowledge?

This question of the possibility of metaphysics is one which had a particularly strong interest for Kant. It interested him both as a technical philosopher and as an ordinary man. In technical philosophy his chief aim, from the 'sixties onwards, seems to have been to determine whether metaphysics in the traditional sense is pos-

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sible, and, if not, what sort of metaphysics could be legitimate. Again and again he discussed points connected with this subject, treating of it particularly in the *Traume* and the inaugural *Dissertation*. His pronouncements in the *Critique* and the *Prolegomena* show that he thought that metaphysics occupied a quite peculiar position among the sciences. It was a science which "could never cease to be in demand,"¹ a science which responded to a natural want in human beings. To eliminate metaphysics altogether would be impossible; the most that could be done would be to abolish certain illegitimate types of metaphysics, making room for a new "scientific" doctrine. Is not the aim of the celebrated "Copernican" revolution in philosophy declared to be the setting of metaphysics on the sure path of science?² For a philosopher holding these views the question of the possibility of metaphysics could not help but be important. But quite apart from this professional interest, Kant felt as an ordinary man an interest in the fate of metaphysics. He was convinced that there were certain truths or dogmas which it was important to maintain: the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will. Now these dogmas were traditionally thought to be the proper province of metaphysics, and in it reason, in its capacity as speculative, brought forward arguments for or against them. In neither case did it do much good to the dogmas in question. Quite apart from the positive opposition of materialist philosophies, the support lent them by rationalist systems of the Leibnizian type was of dubious benefit. For the rationalists were never able to confute their opponents completely, and by claiming as they did that our acceptance of the propositions argued for depended on the maintenance of their positions they tended to cast doubt on our confidence in the truth of those propositions. If, as the traditional metaphysics claimed, these matters were within the competence of the theoretical intellect, then it was difficult to maintain without fear of contradiction the existence of God and the remaining dogmas. It remained, then, for anyone convinced of the truth of the dogmas to argue that their acceptance did not stand or fall with the success of the intellect in defending them. And to maintain this point is the aim of Kant's philosophy as a whole. For Kant's philosophy, in its exaltation of the moral over the

¹ *Prolegomena* Introduction, cf. B 24.

² In all this Kant seems to be speaking rather loosely. What we are all interested in are the questions which metaphysics traditionally asks about the existence of God, the soul, and so forth. But the reformed metaphysics which the critical philosophy is to make possible does not treat of such subjects: to speak roughly, it is the sum of our synthetic *a priori* knowledge so far as that is not mathematical. Its only mention of the traditional topics is to show that they involve questions which from the state of our intellectual make-up we are unable to answer.

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intellectual nature of man, is a philosophy which claims spiritual worth for all human beings. Because of this, and because Kant thinks that our moral nature is such that we can see that it necessitates our belief in the dogmas in question (for practical purposes they are unquestionably true), pretensions to knowledge in this sphere must be rejected and room be left for a faith we can all share. But in order that this position may be established, metaphysics in its traditional form, as a science claiming to give us knowledge of an intelligible world, must be shown to be bogus, and not until that has been effected can we rest secure in the possession of our dogmas. Hence the interest to the plain man of the result, if not the details of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The *Critique* is really a vindication of the plain man: as Kant says, the schools have to recognize that "they can lay no claim to higher and fuller insight in a matter of universal human concern than that which is equally within the reach of the great mass of men (ever to be held by us in the highest esteem)."¹

That the determination of the possibility of metaphysics is the principal object of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is made plain enough in the prefaces to the first two editions, but it is not so obvious how this is so when we move on to the main body of the text. In the *Analytic* especially the argument is so difficult that one tends to lose sight of its connection with the rest of the book, and this tendency is increased by the interest of the doctrine of the *Analytic* in itself. Thus Kant's attempt to establish the synthetic *a priori* character of the general law of causality is treated by most philosophers as a possible refutation of Hume, yet though this aspect of his doctrine was plain enough to Kant himself it is only an incidental thing about it. From the point of view of the whole work the main thing Kant has to say about the general law of causality is something over which he is in agreement with Hume: that it is only valid in the co-ordination of sense-data,² and that therefore the concept of cause could not be applied to the determination of objects in general, as it was by the traditional metaphysics. Again, in the *Transcendental Deduction*, the working out of the argument from the unitary character of the self to the necessary applicability of the categories distracts attention from the all-important conclusion which Kant is seeking to establish: that the categories,

¹ B xxxiii. Kant's position is obviously closely analogous to that of theologians and Christian philosophers who have sought to discredit intellectual proofs of the dogmas of religion so that they may fall back on the (intellectually impregnable) evidence of revelation to maintain them. But no one would claim that Kant's is a religious philosophy except in a very wide sense.
Cf. Hume, *Treatise*, p. 212 (Selby Bigge).

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though objectively valid, i.e. related to an object, are related only to a *phenomenal* object and are valid solely in reference to sense-experience. It would of course be wrong to say that Kant does not emphasize this conclusion,¹ but one is apt, in one's concentration on the details of the argument, to lose sight of it, or at least to assign to it less importance than it deserves.

For these reasons it seems worth while to re-state the doctrine of the Aesthetic and Analytic from the point of view of the work as a whole, keeping in mind Kant's preoccupation with the problem of the possibility of metaphysics. A re-statement of this kind should be of interest not only historically (from the point of view of Kantian exegesis) but also (more important) philosophically. For Kant's theory is one which philosophers must at least take seriously; and the question of the possibility of metaphysics remains a living issue in philosophy, as recent discussions have shown. A good case can be made out for the view that Kant's position over the synthetic *a priori* propositions of "pure physics" is a sounder one than that adopted by contemporary positivists, though it is possible to accept it without rejecting the positivist view of "transcendent" metaphysics, provided that, in addition to accepting Kant's contentions in the Analytic, we are in general agreement with his conclusions in the Dialectic and over the nature of the implications of moral experience.² But even if we differ from Kant here and argue for the existence of a faculty of reason which can legitimately metaphysicize, as Hegel does, the results of the Analytic, showing that understanding at least is not a metaphysical faculty, will none the less be important.

Perhaps the best means of approach to the *Critique* is to see it as at once an elaboration of and contrast with the inaugural *Dissertation* "on the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world" of 1770.³ The *Dissertation* is particularly instructive if we see in the *Critique* an examination of the possibility of metaphysics in the sense of a science professing to give us information about a reality not knowable in sense-experience, since the possibility of a metaphysics of this kind is explicitly argued for in it. Moreover, the main argument used to support this position is that we are undoubtedly

¹ E.g. B 178 = A 139.

² Provided, that is, that we do not interpret moral and religious experience as a source of metaphysical knowledge.

³ A letter of Kant's to Herz, May 1, 1781 (X, 249), announces the impending publication of the *Critique* and says that it brings to completion the series of meditations undertaken in common since the defence of the *Dissertation* (reference in Vleeschauer, *op. cit.*, I, 154).

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in possession of certain *a priori* concepts, and these are just the later categories. When we remember that the main point of the *Analytic* is to show that these concepts, though without question *a priori* and in our possession, nevertheless are only concepts of a (phenomenal) "object in general" and are without meaning except in reference to sense experience, we are not likely to under-estimate the importance of the *Dissertation*.

In the *Dissertation* Kant combines the view that the senses only give us knowledge of appearances (since what we know through the senses is characterized by the form(s) of time (and space), and time and space are subjective ways of our perceiving,¹ with the contention that metaphysics, in the traditional sense, is possible. Thus we have in the *Dissertation* an assertion of what was later to be the substance of the *Aesthetic*, but there is nothing directly corresponding to the *Analytic* and *Dialectic*, or rather, though there are passages from which these sections plainly developed, their content is strikingly different from the parallel chapters in the *Critique*. Yet Kant is already convinced of two points which were to be fundamental in the later work: (i) that metaphysics, if there is such a thing, is a non-empirical science,² and (ii) that the only world with which we can be *directly* acquainted (which we can "intuit") is that we know through the senses.³ In the *Critique* itself these propositions are combined with one other—that *all* knowledge contains a sense element (an element of "intuition")—to demonstrate the impossibility of transcendent metaphysics, but in the *Dissertation* this third proposition is not accepted and the conclusion not drawn. The reason for this already referred to, is that we are in possession of certain purely *a priori* concepts,⁴ and by means of these we can have, not indeed an "intuition" of things intellectual but a "symbolic knowledge" of them.⁵ Hence we do have some means (though not the best we could wish for) of getting beyond the evidence of the senses, and metaphysics is, in principle at least, possible.

The position argued for here is one familiar enough in the history of philosophy. Its affinity with views like those of Plato, for example, is obvious, so much so that one commentator has seen in a study of Plato in the years immediately preceding 1770 the inspiration of the *Dissertation*.⁶ It amounts to a denial of empiricism on the ground that the first premise of empiricism is false. Not all our knowledge

¹ Cf. especially §§ 13 ff.

² § 8 "No empirical principles are to be found in metaphysics."

³ § 10 *init*.

⁴ § 8

⁵ § 10. Presumably the meaning is that though we cannot know an intelligible world (a world of things in themselves § 4) in its individual detail, we can know it through "universal concepts in the abstract," i.e. have insight into its general nature.

⁶ M. Wundt, *Kant als Metaphysiker*, quoted by Vleeschauwer, I, 66, 148.

is drawn from sense-experience besides the "way of the senses" there is a "way of the intellect," and the suggestion with Kant, as with other philosophers, is that the "way of the intellect" is the true road to knowledge (or rather, the road to true knowledge). Metaphysics gives us knowledge of a non-sensible world, its sole instrument being the intellect; and metaphysics is "queen of the sciences." This is surely a respectable position, even if we think it false, and its details should be worth investigation.

Unfortunately, the details as put forward by Kant in the *Dissertation* are disappointingly vague, and it is here that the superiority of the more carefully worked-out position of the *Critique* is most evident. Kant begins (§ 5) by remarking that the "intellect" has a twofold use: logical and real. The logical use of the intellect is concerned with the subordination and comparison of concepts and principles according to the law of contradiction. This is an activity common to all sciences. What seems to be referred to is (i) the formation of concepts, (ii) the grouping of subordinate and co-ordinate concepts, (iii) the grouping of principles. The result, at any rate in the sphere of phenomena, is that out of *apparentia* comes *experientia*, i.e. (presumably) an orderly world.² For these operations something given is a prerequisite, and the intellect operates on these data. But in its real use the intellect does not operate upon but itself *originates* concepts. There are in the intellect, according to this view, certain pure concepts of "things or relations" (§§ 5, 6, 23), and these the intellect can discover by reflection on its own operations on the occasion of experience (§ 8). Kant gives as instances of such concepts (*ibid.*) "possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause, etc., with their opposites or correlatives."

¹ *Intellectus*. This is the word equated by Baumgarten (*Met.*, § 402) with *Verstand*, whilst *ratio* is *Vernunft* (§ 640). But neither in Baumgarten nor in Kant's inaugural *Dissertation* is the critical distinction between the two faculties to be found. "Intellect" in the *Dissertation*, as in normal English, covers both *Verstand* and *Vernunft*.

² Vleeschauwer (*op. cit.*, I, 157, 204-6) agreeing with Rühl and Wundt, sees in the *usus logicus* of the intellect in the *Dissertation* the nucleus of the mature transcendental deduction. If this means that the procedure of the intellect so far as it operates logically is conceived in 1770 as analogous to that of the understanding as a "transcendental" faculty in the doctrine of the *Critique*, that does not seem to be true. The logical use of the intellect is nearer the logical use of understanding in 1781: something which holds good in all sciences (and therefore presumably in metaphysics itself). It is doubtful whether Vleeschauwer is right in saying (p. 157) that the concepts on which the intellect operates in its logical use are all drawn from the senses. Kant does not say this, but merely that all the concepts must be given, the source need not be specified. The *real* use of the intellect seems to be the source of the categories: but to all appearances Kant had not yet realized the need of a transcendental deduction of pure concepts.

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Now already in 1770 Kant had come to realize that to grant the existence of certain *a priori* concepts or (to use a more general word) representations did not necessarily mean that we have insight into an intelligible world. For non-empirical representations can fulfil one of two possible parts. They may give us genuine knowledge of a reality other than that we know in sense-experience or they may be merely *a priori* forms for the co-ordination of sense data. This second alternative is that which Kant adopted in the *Dissertation* over the *a priori* representations of time and space. Our knowledge of space and time in general (as opposed to our knowledge of particular spatial and temporal situations) is not drawn from experience, space and time are *a priori* representations with which we are endowed. But that does not mean that we possess in them a source of knowledge other than sense-experience. For space and time, though *a priori*, are only *a priori* forms of human sensibility, i.e. subjective ways of our perceiving. We group all phenomena in time and all the data of the outer senses in space, and in this operation time and space are presupposed. But they are only presupposed as subjective forms apart from data which must always come from the senses; they are empty. Thus neither time and space, nor the science of mathematics, which is 'about' time and space, have any metaphysical value.¹

There remain the purely intellectual concepts. In the *Dissertation* Kant unhesitatingly plumps for the view that these have what might be called, following Vleeschauwer, an "ontological function"—that is to say, that they are a source of knowledge other than sense-experience and in fact give us insight into an intelligible world of things in themselves. The pure intellectual concepts are declared (§ 9) to play a dual part. First they serve to expose the shortcomings of sensible concepts—they show that the senses only give us knowledge of appearances and thus prevent our making the sensible the measure of true reality. But they are only able to perform this *critical* function because of their other, *dogmatic* use. For, secondly, the pure intellectual concepts "issue in some pattern, which is conceivable only by the pure intellect and is the common measure of all things so far as real. This pattern—*perfectio noumenon*—is perfection either in the theoretical or in the practical sense. In the former case it is the supreme being, God, in the latter, moral

¹ The concept of number, the basis of arithmetic, is declared in *Dissertation* § 12 to be intellectual (though cf. § 23) but to demand for its actualization in the concrete the auxiliary notions of time and space (in the successive addition and juxtaposition of a plurality). "On the connection of time and arithmetic see Kemp Smith's commentary to the *Critique*, pp. 128-34. Kant does not mention algebra in the *Dissertation*. For his view of it in the *Critique* see Paton *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*, I, pp. 157-8.

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perfection" (§ 9) It is not altogether easy to say how much is meant by this (to us) curious language, but it must mean at least that our intellect gives us some sort of knowledge of what later philosophy would call an Absolute, and that this implies that the pure intellectual concepts constitute a source of knowledge distinct from sense experience The dogmatic use of the pure intellectual concepts is, presumably, metaphysics, though that science is defined (§ 8) as "that part of philosophy which contains the first principles of the use of the pure intellect." There is a science propaedeutic to this whose aim it is to bring out the distinction between sensible and intellectual knowledge, and Kant says that the *Dissertation* itself is a specimen of (rather, an essay in) that science (*ibid*)

If we ask what all this amounts to, the answer is quite simple We know in sense-experience a world which is investigated (a) as to its matter, in the empirical sciences, (b) as to its form, in mathematics But over and above this we are possessed of a distinct source of knowledge in certain intellectual concepts which are part of our mental equipment These give us insight into another world, a world not of appearances but of reality (§ 4), and because of this another science is possible This science is metaphysics, the culminating point of which is the attaining of a conception of God¹

Both the most interesting and the least satisfactory thing about the inaugural *Dissertation* is the doctrine of the real use of the intellect Two things about the work immediately strike readers familiar with the *Critique* the "ontological" function of the pure intellectual concepts, and the lack of anything to correspond to the critical distinction between understanding and reason The pure concepts cited in § 8 are all concepts of the understanding in the later sense, and unless Kant's saying that the intellect originates concepts of "things or relations" points to it, there seems to be no hint of the future faculty of reason² Again, unless the *usus logicus* of the intellect foreshadows it, there is no anticipation of the necessary co-operation of sense and thought in knowledge Instead of these doctrines we have simply a crude affirmation of the distinction between the senses and the intellect and a theory, by no means worked out in detail, of how the one gives us knowledge of appearances, the other of things in themselves

¹ We are also said to know moral concepts through the pure intellect (§ 7) The likeness of the general theory to the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas is striking

² "Vel rerum vel respectuum" (§ 5)
³ On the other hand, since the intellect of the *Dissertation* is essentially metaphysical it is precisely what reason pretends to be in the *Critique* As already said, 'intellect' covers both reason and understanding

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In the *Critique* all this is changed, and it is with the working out of one part of the change—that affecting the concepts of the understanding—that we are chiefly concerned at present. The teaching of the *Critique* is that the existence of *a priori* concepts cannot be used to prove the conclusions they are alleged to prove in the *Dissertation*, with the result that metaphysics must be declared to be impossible. Thus the *Critique* supplies, as it were, a commentary on and a refutation of the most striking contention of the *Dissertation*. But because of the all important distinction between understanding and reason, the overthrow of metaphysics in the *Critique* is accomplished in two parts: in the *Analytic*, where the concepts of the understanding are treated of, and in the *Dialectic*, where the ideas of reason are dealt with. As it turns out, the claims of reason to be a metaphysical faculty are thought by Kant to be greater than those of understanding, but there is always a suggestion, as the existence of the *Dissertation* shows, that the concepts of the understanding have metaphysical value.¹ Since at present our object is to trace the development of the discussion of the possibility of metaphysics in the first half of the *Critique*, consideration of the ideas will here be omitted.

It will not be necessary to spend any great time over the *Aesthetic*, since the arguments there used by Kant are virtually identical with those put forward in corresponding sections of the inaugural *Dissertation*. Once more we have a theory which asserts both the apriority and subjectivity of time and space. Space and time are *a priori* representations: they are the presuppositions of the sort of experience we have rather than something we learn from experience, but they are also forms of our sensibility, ways in which we necessarily perceive the data of the senses. It follows not only that space and time have no metaphysical value, but that anything connected with space and time cannot have metaphysical importance. For metaphysics, if there is such a thing, must be non-empirical, i.e. must have some other source than sense experience. We shall see that the point about the fatal nature of a connection with space and time is important in relation to Kant's doctrine of *a priori* concepts.

It must be confessed that the argument of the *Aesthetic* has only a minor philosophical importance nowadays. The doctrine of the subjectivity of space and time remains important, but the position that space and time might be both *a priori* and of metaphysical value can hardly be taken seriously. Thus so far as the *Aesthetic* argues against a metaphysical conception of space and time, it is

Cf. also e.g. B 87-8 = A 63 and *Prolegomena*, § 33

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not likely to be confuted. On the other hand, so far as in the Aesthetic Kant is concerned to put forward a philosophy of mathematics (as he does for geometry at least in the "transcendental exposition of the concept of space"), his theory is based on what seems to be an antiquated view of the nature of that science. Philosophical theories of the nature of mathematics which start, as Kant's does, from the view that the science has some special connection with space and time cannot be valid, since it is now reasonably clear that mathematics is not "about" space and time at all.

Nevertheless, there is a point about Kant's theory of mathematical propositions which remains instructive. Mathematics is held to concern itself with the "pure manifolds" of space and time. That is to say, mathematics describe the essential nature of space and time when abstraction is made from all concrete spatial and temporal situations. But because of this element of abstraction mathematical propositions do not say anything about the world of fact, even the sensible world of fact. They merely enunciate laws which anything which falls within that world must obey. They may therefore be described as propositions which prescribe to experience, apart from this reference to experience they are empty of real significance. It is true that the pure mathematician continues to be interested in them, but then he is not specially concerned, as a pure mathematician, with the question of whether mathematical propositions give us *knowledge*.

This theory of the prescriptive¹ character of mathematical propositions has a merit which raises it above the rest of the Aesthetic. It not only gives what seems to be a true account of the nature of mathematical propositions, but is also suggestive in connection with the rest of our synthetic *a priori* knowledge.² For it shows that a

¹ It must not be thought that the use of this word here and later implies agreement with Professor C. I. Lewis's view of the arbitrary character of *a priori* propositions.

² Of course it is widely held that mathematical propositions are not synthetic but analytic. The reason for this is that all the propositions of a given mathematical system can be deduced from a number of primary propositions together with the definitions of a number of primary concepts, by aid of the law of contradiction alone. But this does not prove that the primary propositions and definitions are not themselves synthetic, and if they are so is the body of the science. That they are seems to be a reasonable view, since otherwise it is hard to see what internal significance the system could have or what would differentiate it from any other similar system. It would be like a set of trucks without anything to set it in motion. Cf. Kant *Prolegomena*, § 2. "A synthetic proposition can indeed be comprehended according to the law of contradiction but only by presupposing another synthetic proposition from which it follows." Kant himself, of course believes that mathematical propositions are not only thus synthetic by derivation but also in their own right, but in this he seems to be mistaken.

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body of propositions which are both *a priori* and synthetic may nevertheless be only a body of prescriptive propositions, and thus, while not drawn from, may be in relation to, sense experience. Kant no doubt errs in thinking that there is a special connection between mathematics and space-time experience, i.e. in thinking that, in terminology which will be explained later, mathematical propositions are specially rather than generally prescriptive. Mathematics, in fact, does have some sort of metaphysical significance, since, in Leibniz's language, it is true for all possible worlds. But that does not mean that by itself mathematics is any adequate basis for metaphysics, you cannot say anything very significant about an intelligible world by knowing that mathematical propositions are true of it. All this, as we shall see, throws light on the metaphysical value of another set of prescriptive propositions.

(To be concluded)

PLATO'S PRESENTATION OF INTUITIVE MIND IN HIS PORTRAIT OF SOCRATES

K W WILD

It has been said that in Plato the intuitive mode of receiving knowledge is accepted implicitly, and that it is left to Aristotle to make a clear-cut distinction between Intuition and Reason

This may be true and yet leave Plato as the great classic exponent of an intuitional doctrine, since a clear-cut distinction must (as far as experience has yet taken us), be largely theoretical. Plato (outside politics) always, or nearly always, makes experience the foundation of his theories, and is willing to face its limitations, even though such an attitude puts clear cut distinctions beyond his reach

But that the distinction was not explicit in Plato's own mind I find hard to believe and I suggest that, in his portrait of Socrates, Plato deliberately attempts to show us a mind eminently reasonable, pre eminently noble, and fundamentally intuitive. He, it seems to me, does this partly because of the fascination that Socrates' mind had for him, partly because he himself was profoundly puzzled, and partly out of sympathetic fellow feeling

However we may understand the theories of the early dialogues as being those of Socrates as distinct from those of Plato, as showing the development of Plato's own views, as giving the various points of view of various philosophers and schools of philosophy, or even as isolated attacks on isolated problems, we must come away from a reading of them with our minds full of the personality of Socrates. When we arrive at the later dialogues and the Laws the case is different. We can see that their author is a man who can sympathize with his own Socrates and has points in common with him, but the Socratic personality disappears with the Socratic figure, and, perhaps, even a little before, and, along with it go the 'Ideas' and most of the emotion that gives a great part of their charm to the early dialogues, for, as Plato grows less and less intuitive so he gets less and less feeling into his writing, and, in the end (perhaps) less and less value from his pure reason

Socrates, then, may be regarded as an artistic creation whose inspiration may have been an actual living being, or, perhaps, a glimpse into the very essence of man's psyche, or a metaphysical puzzle, or, as in so many of the greater works of art, a union of the three. There is no doubt, however, that Plato meant his portrait

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of Socrates to be taken seriously, and, to my mind, little doubt that his work of art was used by Plato himself to portray a mind whose nature was intuitive and whose aspirations were rationalistic one, therefore logical enough to resent a mixture it could not understand and consequently could not acknowledge

It is, of course, a vexed question whether any mind is intuitive, as distinct from rational, and, in calling Socrates intuitive I do not mean to assume the solution of that problem, but rather to indicate the type of mind which has given rise to it. The most outstanding examples are the mystic and the artist, and Socrates is interesting in both these aspects. His inclusion among the great mystics of the world is superficially easy to justify by illustration though the psychological meaning of the term is difficult to explain. His attitude to art is far more controversial, but, perhaps, ultimately easier of understanding

First then. Is Socrates a mystic? And if so does he realize his own nature and accept, or approve of it? And what does Plato think on the matter?

There is no doubt at all that Socrates had many of the external signs common to mystics. Rationalists suggest that his 'daemon' was perhaps, just an exhibition of Socratic humour, a ruse adopted by him and understood by his friends when he wished to avoid an explanation or was unable to give one. This theory, however, seems to me quite untenable. His 'sign' is mentioned over and over again from the earliest to the latest of the Socratic dialogues in the *Euthydemus*, the *Euthyphro*, the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Apology* and the *Theaetetus*, and sometimes with the greatest seriousness, as in the last three cases and especially in the *Apology*, where Socrates explains the negative nature of the warning occasionally given to him, yet not given to him when he entered the judgment hall where he was to be condemned to death. "Hitherto the familiar oracle within me has constantly been in the habit of opposing me even about trifles, if I was going to make a slip or error about anything, and now as you see there has come upon me that which may be thought, and is generally believed to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no sign of opposition, either as I was leaving my house and going out in the morning, or when I was going up into this court, or while I was speaking, at anything I was going to say, and yet I have often been stopped in the middle of a speech, but now in nothing I either said or did touching this matter has the oracle opposed me. What do I take to be the explanation of this? I will

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tell you I regard this as a proof that what has happened to me is a good, and that those of us who think that death is an evil are in error. This is a great proof to me of what I am saying, for the customary sign would surely have opposed me had I been going to evil and not to good."¹

His irony does not, indeed, fail him during his trial: this, however, is not Socratic humour but Socratic earnestness.

Earlier in the *Apology* he describes his 'oracle' as a 'voice,' and his admission here of its habit of interference on trifling occasions adds to our conviction that he is speaking, to the best of his ability, with scientific accuracy, and that he is describing a psychological phenomenon emanating from imagery of the auditory type, occurring in a highly imaginative mind. Such sudden decisions that the whole conglomeration of circumstances renders any particular action undesirable often go by the name of intuition, whatever their real nature may be, and have a more or less miraculous aura to those who experience them, as well as to others.

Socrates was subject to trances, another common feature of mystical experience. It is true that only in the *Symposium* does Plato tell us this, but, on the other hand, this very fact seems to show us that Plato is deliberately drawing a portrait, for not only do the circumstances of the *Symposium* itself provide an actual example of a trance, but the fact is mentioned that Socrates' familiars are accustomed to them, and that they do not, as a rule, last long. The same dialogue records (through the mouth of Alcibiades) a more prolonged instance.

"One morning he was thinking about something which he could not resolve, and he would not give up, but continued thinking from early dawn until noon—there he stood fixed in thought, and at noon attention was drawn to him, and the rumour ran through the wondering crowd that Socrates had been standing and thinking about something ever since the break of day. At last, in the evening after supper, some Ionians out of curiosity (I should explain that this was not in winter but in summer) brought out their mats and slept in the open air that they might watch him and see whether he would stand all night. There he stood all night as well as all day and the following morning, and with the return of light he offered up a prayer to the sun and went his way."²

In neither of the cases recorded does Socrates' 'fit of abstraction' seem to be relevant to the matter in hand. In the first case it is not he but Eryximachus who suggests the subject of conversation after Socrates has come to himself, and, in the latter, the business in hand is a military campaign, not a philosophical discussion.

The abstraction, then, is not necessarily an attempt of the mind

Apol., 40a

² *Symp.*, 220c.

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to isolate itself while solving a mental or moral problem, though this is a possible explanation. It may, of course, be cataleptic in nature, but, whether or no, it is a typical mystical experience, deliberately recorded and vividly described by Plato in the dialogue which best of all, better even than the *Phaedo* or the *Crito* or the *Apology*, gives us our notion of Socrates.

It may even be surmised that Plato wrote the *Symposium* with the intention of emphasizing this mystical tendency in Socrates: the whole dialogue is less logical, more aesthetically and morally emotional in its appeal than the others. The person and wisdom of Diotima, the prophetess (Taylor thinks probably a real person), the reverence paid to her by Socrates, the mythical trend of nearly all the speeches on Love, and the gradual rise in their spiritual level, leading up, in spite of the artistic break made by the entrance of Alcibiades to the apotheosis of Socrates, give the impression that Plato, while maintaining and even amplifying the idea he has already given us of his master, deliberately designs once at least to emphasize this particular side of his character.

While noting the personal and physical ways and habits of Socrates it may be well to remember the kind of people with whom he liked to be and with whose ideas he was in sympathy. He tells us, as do his friends, over and over again, that it was the young and the fair that attracted him and were attracted by him and this seems true enough, though how seriously we must take his account of his emotion at the first sight of Charmides, that so beautiful boy, is questionable. It is more than possible that he is describing (as he frequently does) in his own person the emotions he observes in others. His kindly raillery of the foppish Phaedrus is obvious, but there is genuine emotion when his fingers linger in Phaedo's 'fair locks' ¹.

While attaching a certain value to these assertions, we must remember that twice he deliberately repudiates the idea that it is physical beauty that he admires. His rejection of the beautiful Alcibiades is amusing. "You have indeed an elevated aim if what you say is true, and if there really is in me any power by which you may become better, truly you must see in me (Mem. high-stomached, goggle-eyed, snub-nosed) some rare beauty of a kind infinitely higher than that I see in you. And if, seeing thus, you mean to share with me and to exchange beauty for beauty, you will have greatly the advantage of me, you will gain real beauty in exchange for appearance—gold in exchange for brass" ².

In the *Theaetetus*, presumably written many years later, Socrates is made to evaluate in the same style though from the opposite standpoint. "You are a beauty, Theaetetus, and not ugly as Theo-

¹ *Phaedo* 89b

² *Symp.*, 218d.

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dorus was saying, for he who utters the beautiful is himself beautiful and good "1

Plato was young himself when he walked and talked with Socrates, and himself experienced the kindness, generosity, and sympathy of the older man towards the young, and, probably, also remembered his own contemporaries in a manner not quite proportionate to their value in the eyes of Socrates, or to the time he spent on them. The names of the dialogues, however, indicate that Socrates found greater interest in men more nearly his own contemporaries or in his elders. Critias, Laches, Protagoras, Crito, Parmenides, and in those named after younger men the interest in the boys or their opinions is rarely prolonged but turns to some more mature philosopher, or to Socrates' own theories. In the *Theaetetus*, for example, where the youth in question is particularly noble and gifted, Theodorus, the elderly mathematician, takes as big a part in the actual conversation, and it is largely the theories of Protagoras and those of a still earlier generation of philosophers that are discussed.

I emphasize this not because I am blind to the charm of Socrates' connection with the "young and noble and fair," but because his connection with older men and their ideas brings out more clearly the mystical side of his nature. He seems to take particular pleasure in the company of the Pythagoreans, and to examine with respect and attraction their philosophy or the philosophy of those even distantly connected with them. Some of the younger men present at his death and who had, therefore, the privilege of his latest ideas and speculations, were Pythagoreans, he recounted myths or made up mythical stories in the Pythagorean style, his tendency to a belief in the transmigration of the soul—a Pythagorean doctrine—is obvious. Now Pythagoras was himself a mystical figure, and his school with its doctrines and initiations and strong religious bent, was highly mystical in character.

Then again, of nobody except Diotima the prophetess does Socrates speak with such reverence as he does of "Parmenides, venerable and awful . . . , him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him. I met him when he was an old man and I was a mere youth, and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind "2. Now Parmenides taught the reality of the absolute and the mere appearance of the particular, groping towards the 'One' while disregarding the 'Many.' Socrates, I think, never quite gave himself up to this view, but he revered Parmenides as he detested the materialists.

SOCRATES. Now, by the uninitiated I mean the people who believe in nothing but what they can hold fast in their hands and who

1 *Theaet.*, 185c

2 *Ibid.*, 183e

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will not allow that action and generation and all that is invisible can have any real existence

THEAETETUS Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very stubborn and repulsive mortals

SOCRATES Yes, my boy, outer barbarians¹

A longer passage in the *Sophist*² confirms this view as does the attack on the relativist philosophy of Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*, and Socrates' sympathetic description of the practical inability of the philosopher to make a material success of the world—a description twice given³

All these preferences emphasize rather than prove the mystical leanings of Socrates

The same is true of the many and various indications throughout the early dialogues of Socrates' interest in the apparently supernatural, at the one extreme and the purely spiritual at the other. The vision of the woman 'fair and comely'⁴ which appeared to him in a dream the night before his death, his trouble at the neglect of a dream that bade him 'make music',⁵ the 'gifts of prophecy'⁶ which he claims, and his own prophecies which Euclides noted, after his death as having been fulfilled,⁷ his claim to being a diviner, "though not a very good one",⁸ and, most important of all his practical (though not theoretical) certainty of the existence of a soul

All these clearly add to the claims of those who consider Socrates to be a typical mystic, and we may add quite a number of minor attributes as, for instance, his mistrust of the senses and the body generally,⁹ his feeling of having received a special call or mission, his conviction of his unworthiness and of the necessity for purification, his wavering vision, all of which are abundantly clear throughout the *Apology* where we may well compare him with one of the Hebrew prophets

Nevertheless, Socrates does not seem to me to be a mystic in any thorough sense of the term any more than is Spinoza. A mystic must surely have supreme faith in his revelation and hold the findings of reason in relative contempt. Though it is true, as the references above have made clear, that practically Socrates does sometimes give so great weight to his unreasoned convictions as to follow their counsel even when unsupported by reason, yet his life's work was to apply reason to the notions that men commonly accept unexamined and to teach his followers that only with the sanction of reason were they to be accepted. Indeed, this is what he

¹ *Theaet.* 155e

² *Gorgias*, 521-2 and *Theaet.*, 173d-175b

³ *Phaedo*, 61a

⁴ *Phaedrus*, 242c

⁵ *Ibid.*, 85b

⁶ *Republic*, Bk. II, 476. *Theaet.*, 155-8

⁷ *Sophist*, 246-8

⁸ *Crit.*, 44a

⁹ *Theaet.*, 142c

has taught the thinking world ever since. If he has a divine mission, it is to act as the gad-fly, reason, forcing men to clarify their ideas. This is clear throughout the *Republic* as well as the *Apology*. "Ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of the whole soul, to rule?"¹

Socrates, then, seems to have appeared to Plato as a thinker influenced to a quite extraordinary degree by non rational conviction, yet giving his personal devotion to reason. In one domain at least he seems conscious of the antagonism, revolts from it, and takes quite violent partisanship with reason against 'inspiration,' as he calls it, though 'intuition' is more customary to our ears.

That domain is art, and it is in his theories on knowledge as recollection, and on art that we have most clearly presented to us Plato's study of this interesting antagonism.

We will take the less important first—his doctrine of recollection. This appears in the *Euthydemus*, the *Phaedo*, the *Phaedrus*, and is most fully worked out in the *Meno*. In the first it is perhaps ridiculed, in the *Phaedo* it is mentioned, not by Socrates himself, but by Cebes as an additional justification of Socrates' belief in the soul's existence independent of the body. "Your favourite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we learnt that which we now recollect."² The reference in the *Phaedrus* is incidental and runs along the same lines, for Socrates finds that our ideas of justice, nobility, etc., are already in our minds—reminiscences. The conversation Socrates has with Meno illustrates the same theory, but this time much more fully. The famous scene between Socrates and Meno's slave boy who, in response to Socrates' skilful questioning 'recollects' that the square of the diagonal of a square is twice the square of the side, is less interesting than the remark which follows—less interesting because, first, it is doubtful, in spite of his protestations and Meno's agreement, whether Socrates does not actually tell as well as elicit, and secondly because, if Socrates is right and the boy really 'recollects,' then 'reasoning' becomes 'recollection' and there is no difference between reason and intuition.

The subsequent remark runs: "Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause, and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as has been already agreed by us. But when

¹ *Rep.* IV, 441e

² *Phaedo*, 72e

³ *Phaedrus*, 279a

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they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge, and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain."¹

This is exceedingly interesting. The tie of the cause¹ is recollection. True opinion may be the result of argument, reasoning, thought, but it remains 'opinion' and may 'run away,' and is 'not of much value' until, in addition to being reasonably deduced it is also 'recollected.' Surely this means that all knowledge is, in the last resort, intuited, and that intuition means not only absolute and unshakable fact, but that fact realized with equally absolute and unshakable conviction.

Socrates here reconciles three primary forms of intuition: a good many of our perceptions or mental interpretations of our sensations are received with this very conviction: we do see colour, smell odours, hear sounds.

The results of a good many of our reasoning processes bring conviction: the square of the diagonal is twice the square of the side, nothing will shake our conviction that this is and must be so.

On the other hand we are not firmly convinced of all that our perception tells us: we hear a scream and discover that it was a laugh, we see a sheet of water and discover it to be a mirage, and are not necessarily disbelieving: nor do we, in consequence, give up all hope of understanding reality. But add intuition, i.e. the realization (or, Socrates would say, recollection), that this perception corresponds with unalterable fact and we have knowledge indeed which nothing will shake, or which, once shaken, can give rise only to universal scepticism. He describes notably this form of intuition in the *Philebus* as² 'the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and emotion.'

And so with reasoning: the reasons which lead to solipsism, to determinism, to materialism, are cogent indeed, almost impossible to gainsay, and sometimes are convincing enough to alter men's outlook on life, and so even their actions. But nobody is surprised when they fail to bring conviction: many people who hold them would rather not, and seek a way by which, without forfeiting their intellectual honesty, they may avoid their conclusions. Something essential separates the reasoning which leads to our knowing that the square of the diagonal is twice the square of the side, and the reasoning that leads to solipsism. Socrates would say that the first is knowledge because it is not only reasoned out but recollected, i.e. understood to correspond with absolute truth, and the second merely reasoned and not (in addition) recollected and therefore 'not of much value.'

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The third kind of intuition is that which emanates from neither perception nor reason but comes as an independent conviction, and would seem not to be common to every type of mind, and to be unverifiable. In the *Philebus* Socrates (perhaps) calls it "a certain power of guessing, which is commonly called art and is brought to perfection by pains and practice."¹ I think that Socrates himself had such convictions and knew that others had them, but he resented the idea that anything could escape the tools of reasonable inquiry, and so, except when he was in great straits, he always strove to support such intuitive convictions by other methods. Such, I think, was his conviction of the soul and its (at least comparative) immortality, and such certainly was his conviction of the superiority of justice over injustice, for, he says, "the knowledge which is stable and pure and true and unalloyed is that which has to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or at least with that which is most akin to them."²

'Revelation' is a term that does not bring conviction to us nowadays, but 'correspondence with eternal realities' still means something to some of us, and must to all who have any intuitional faith, and, in this short but so pregnant passage Socrates does seem to shed light on a most confusing problem of human mentality.

The doctrine of recollection disappears from Plato with the personality of Socrates. Plato does not pursue it, or, perhaps, finds it not quite in harmony with his later views on ideas, or, possibly, grows less and less to have faith in any truth that is not eminently rational, but he depicts this, as he does so many other enlightening ideas, as dwelling with Socrates to his last day.

Then comes the fascinating problem of what Jowett calls 'Plato's quarrel with poetry,' and, although I do not think that Socrates had an intrinsic quarrel, it must be confessed that to those of us who come near Mathew Arnold's feeling that poetry is so close to the spiritual life as to be capable of taking the place of religion in men's minds, there is much sour reading in the *Republic*, and still more in the shorter dialogues.

Nevertheless, the truth of the matter seems to be that Socrates felt so deeply the aesthetic appeal of the sensible world that he feared for the supremacy of his darling Reason, and, while too fundamentally honest in his mind to deny its effect on him, was at least anxious to show its limitations and its dangers.

Any close examination (or so it seems to me) of the dialogues makes it clear not only that Socrates had no quarrel with the arts

¹ *Philebus*, 55c.

² *Ibid.*, 59c.

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except in words, but that they played quite as big a part in his life as did discursive thought

He was obviously familiar with Homer to such an extent that almost any subject of deep interest to him recalled a passage from the poet, a great deal more familiar than the modern man of culture is with his Shakespeare: a parallel with the Puritans and the Bible would be closer. Homer, maybe, was to the educated fourth century Greek what the Bible was to our forefathers, but I reckon that no less than seventeen different poets are referred to mostly by quotation and some of them over and over again, particularly Hesiod and Pindar, upon the former of whom Socrates makes the sharpest attacks in the *Republic*. Arithmetical proof is not applicable to matters of taste, but human nature does not seem to have altered fundamentally since Greek times, and we know that men and women do not quote poetry with readiness and delight unless they are aesthetically gifted to feel the power of artistic form.

And Socrates does more than show his familiarity with the poets by reference and quotation: he is very ready to enter into a critical examination of their works and of that of prose writers as to both meaning and form. Certainly he uses the dispute over a passage of Simonides for his own ends,¹ and perhaps without any vivid interest in the actual theme, but his very language and method of attack show how frequently he has assisted at such discussions. His understanding of Ion's views² with regard to Homer points to the same thing, and his destruction of a thesis by the admired Lysias,³ a critical ridiculing of its form as well as its matter, shows his knowledge and skill. Scholars tell us that his own rival discourse has a recognized rhetoric form.

The *Symposium* makes it clear that his love of conversation is not only a love of the food for thought it provides but an appreciation of the artistic form in which it can clothe itself, and when every other partaker of that famous feast of reason and beauty had succumbed to wine or fatigue, Socrates was still heard elaborating his views on the relationship of comedy and tragedy.

How deeply he felt on the subject of poetry may be judged by the inadvertent remark in the *Apology*, when after the death sentence, he is comforting himself with the thought of an after life: "What would a man not give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again." The names that spring to his mind are not Parmenides or Zeno, not even Pythagoras, but those of the poets.

Socrates himself was a great maker of myths as well as an appreciator of the allegories and tales of other philosophers, and this is

¹ *Protagoras* 339-47a

² *Phaedrus*

³ *Ion*

⁴ *Apol.*, 41a

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surely one of the most notable forms of poetic imagination. Neither must it be forgotten that his father was an image maker or that his last creative efforts after his condemnation were the putting of Aesop into verse and composing a hymn in honour of Apollo.

These concrete instances of Socrates' inclination towards and familiarity with the aesthetic world are not, however, so interesting as is his theoretical attitude. The condemnatory passages in the *Republic* are well known and there it is quite evident that (1) Socrates was disapproving of the matter of the poetry he wished, for the good of his citizens, to banish from the educational curriculum, because he found it, if taken literally, not to coincide with or help his own ethical teaching. It is quite equally evident that (2) he so fully realized the claims and power of poetry (in the larger as well as the narrower sense) as to dread its influence. Indirectly and practically he understood Shelley's defence of all real poetry from a moral standpoint: that its power to develop the imagination makes it one of the greatest of ethical forces, but he had not formulated the theory, and was, intellectually, paralysed by his conception of the arts as essentially mimetic on the one hand, and explanatory on the other, that is, imitative of the bad in man and god and so, especially in the latter instance, offering an evil example in an alluring form, at the same time interpreting the weakness and failure of men as the result of divine will. In short, often imitative of the bad and sometimes falsely interpretative of the good, or else again, that the poets were creators of what did not correspond with reality, and consequently lied.

As a result practice and theory were at war. He himself read the poets and loved them, but forbade them, except conditionally, to others.

Yet Socrates was obviously puzzled. This can be seen most clearly in the *Ion*. "God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers, as he also uses diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them may know that they speak not of themselves who utter those priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that God is the speaker, and that through them he is conversing with us."

This is certainly an intuitionist aesthetic theory in an extreme form. The poet has the vision, that is he sees the world, or part of the world, as beautiful, or at least as having aesthetic form, and, as Socrates points out, he also has the power of making other men, gifted in this direction, share his vision and be moved by it.

It is quite true that one can read the *Ion* as an example of Socrates' railery and come to the conclusion that he is mocking Ion and all men of aesthetic sensibility, for he begins with "but the truth is

* *Ion*, 534c

that you rhapsodes and actors, and the poets whose verses you sing are wise, and I am a common man who only speaks the truth"¹ and ends by offering Ion the choice between being dishonest and being inspired. And no doubt there is a good deal of mockery in the dialogue. But Socrates seldom holds converse without some definite end in view. Here it certainly was not an attempt to make Ion 'know himself' more thoroughly, for the self-satisfied rhapsode remains to the end quite unconscious that Socrates is speaking with anything but the utmost seriousness. I think that the aim of the discourse was to clear up a problem that was a problem to Socrates himself, or, at least to set it in order. He cannot understand the power of poetry over himself and others, he suspects the persuasions of any mental force but reason, and he mistrusts the emotions. Yet Homer moves him even to rapture. He has no difficulty whatever in understanding Ion's experiences though he has little enough respect for Ion himself. He tries to convince himself of the unworthiness of the poetic charm by showing up the necessary ignorance of the poet, who cannot be the specialist in whom alone Socrates has faith. But I think Socrates remains, and realizes that he remains, unconvinced. 'Inspired then' he says, perhaps with a sigh over yet another puzzle unsolved.

This idea is borne out by passages in a good many of the other dialogues.

In the *Euthydemus* considering 'the art of making speeches,' the same aesthetic puzzle confronts him, and he solves, or puts it aside, in the same way.

'Their art is a part of the great art of enchantment, and hardly, if at all, inferior to it and whereas the art of the enchanter is a mode of charming snakes and spiders and scorpions, and other monsters and pests, this art acts upon dicasts and ecclesiasts and bodies of men "²

In the *Lysis*, having failed to come to a satisfactory conclusion on the subject of Friendship, he refers his young hearers to the poets. "Let us proceed no further in this direction (for the road seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other in which the poets will be our guides, for they are to us, in a manner, the fathers and authors of wisdom."³ And, if he utters a verbal contradiction of this in the *Apology*, the meaning is the same. 'not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration, they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them "⁴

Talking to Phaedrus Socrates is more emphatic. "There is also a third kind of madness, which is a possession of the Muses, this

¹ *Ion*, 532d

² *Lysis*, 213c

³ *Euthyd.*, 290a

⁴ *Apol.*, 22b

enters into a delicate and virgin soul, and there inspiring frenzy, awakens lyric and all other numbers, with those adorning the mythical actions of ancient heroes for the instruction of posterity. But he who, not being inspired and having no touch of madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art—he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted, the same man is nowhere at all when he enters into rivalry with the madman.”

The distaste for the whole inexplicable business is as plain in these passages as the realization of the charm.

But in the *Symposium* it is the power and wisdom of the creative artist that are predominant in his mind. “All creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry or making, and the processes of all art are creative, and the masters of art are all poets,”¹ and with a touch of such aesthetic yearning as he expresses in the *Apology*—“Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? Who would not rather emulate them in the creation of Children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory?”²

In the *Republic* Socrates suggests a way of acknowledging the enchantment of the aesthetic world while yet despising it, and refers it to his intellectual scheme by distinguishing between concrete beautiful things and absolute beauty—in ‘idea’.

SOCRATES The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of fine tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or hearing absolute beauty . . . And he who, having a sense of beautiful things, has no sense of absolute beauty . . . of such a one I ask. Is he awake or in a dream only?

GLAUCON I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.

SOCRATES But take the case of the other who recognizes the existence of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the place of the objects—is he a dreamer or is he awake?

GLAUCON He is like everyone else, a dreamer.

Direct aesthetic inspiration is no surer sign of an intuitional mental mode than is a constant reference to an absolute; particu-

¹ *Phaedo* 245a

² *Ibid.* 205-g

¹ *Symp.* 203b

² *Rep.* V, 476b-d

PLATO'S PRESENTATION OF INTUITIVE MIND

larly if that absolute takes the form of what we should now call 'values'. The term was unknown to Plato, but Socrates' consciousness, as well as his often unconscious acceptance, of them is one of the most characteristic features of his mind.

It is hard to say how far general abstract notions at all were common to Greek thinkers before his day. The *Republic* shows clearly how difficult it was for even an intelligent young man to discriminate between 'justice' and just acts, as does the *Euthyphro* between 'piety' and pious deeds and the *Charmides* between 'Temperance' (sophrosyne) and instances or characteristics of the virtue, and the same difficulty comes when Theaetetus attempts to define 'knowledge'. Many scholars think that the Platonic 'idea' was not originated by either Plato or Socrates but, even if that be so, the constant harping on and hunting after such notions as 'beauty,' 'truth' the 'good' as well as the tacit acceptance of other values such as the holy the useful is obviously presented by Plato as characteristic of Socrates. He might be said to have an intuition for an ultimate value. 'The highest and noblest class of goods which he who is happy desires for their own sakes as well as for their results'.¹ Such an intuition combined with his forceful intellect to cause his life work to be the making explicit of what had always been implicitly accepted by his own mind and the minds of men generally.

It is evident that the matter was not even in the end, set out clearly and precisely in Socrates' own mind. He never seems quite to have distinguished between the Good the Beautiful and the True and the conscious seeking after or recognition of the value of any of them seems often to be called 'wisdom'. His method is sometimes to entrap his companion into an acknowledgment of one of the values, and to base his subsequent argument on that acknowledgment and the very fact that the plan was in the nature of a trap indicates that there was not a very widespread explicit knowledge of the idea of 'value'. Socrates follows this plan in the *Gorgias*, where the unwary and modest accept his preconceptions but the intelligent experienced, and bold Callicles questions them, and even then is involved.

The whole extended argument that runs through the *Protagoras* and the *Euthydemus* and the *Meno* as to whether virtue can be taught i.e. as to whether it is a branch of Knowledge, is an indication of the suspicion, almost the fear, Socrates had, lest after all it could not be taught and that, if evil were always ignorance, it was not always a remediable ignorance, but an ignorance of the soul, an inability to understand, a spiritual blindness to the 'values'. Socrates, I think, never acknowledged this, but he seems sometimes

¹ *Rep.* II, 358a

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to fear it. Such a suspicion would account for some of the myths where he depicts the soul as incapable of redemption and so suffering eternal torment.¹

When he raises the subject specifically in the *Protagoras* he raises it only to put it aside. "If, therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of anyone, but if not then, O my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game of chance."² The conclusion of the *Meno* is more definite. "Virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct accompanied by reason unless . . . ;"³ but even here Socrates will not accept the verdict as certain until he has thoroughly mastered the meaning of the problem. Before asking how virtue is given he inquires into the actual nature of virtue.⁴

By then deliberately and with circumstance, depicting Socrates as possessing a marked mystical tendency, marked aesthetic leanings, and a divine curiosity into the values, none of which is he able to reconcile with the pure exercise of reason, Plato has, I think, justified us in believing that he has set out to make the portrait, not only of a man he loved and honoured, but of a mind with a distinctively intuitive bent.

¹ *Phaedo*, 113e

² *Meno* 99e

³ *Protag.*, 313e

⁴ *Meno*, 99

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PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

THE works to be mentioned in the present survey are in the main concerned with problems of conduct, history and social theory. In some of them metaphysics and the theory of knowledge are not discussed at all and in the others the importance of these subjects is seen to emerge from topics seemingly remote from them. There is nothing to be surprised at in this direction of interest. In France there has of late years been a strong tendency for philosophy and sociology to be pursued together. When so much attention has been devoted to studying the methodology of the sciences of living and inanimate matter, a time was bound to come when the methods of history and the social sciences should receive a closer examination. It is only to be expected during our present times of political and social transformations that the minds of those who can still concern themselves with philosophy should be turned increasingly towards problems of social thinking. Nor again is it at all surprising that the first four books to be mentioned arise directly or indirectly out of discussions which we associate primarily with German thinkers. For a long time now Germany has been the intellectual as well as the political cockpit of European civilization and it is a good sign that French thinkers are taking notice of the struggles there. It is to be hoped that they will avoid contributing to the fog that is usually created in these German encounters.

Dr Raymond Aron's *Essay on the Theory of History in Contemporary Germany*¹ is an exposition and assessment of the theories about the methods and presuppositions of history advanced by Dilthey, Rickert, Simmel and Max Weber. Dr Aron holds that among the various discussions of these authors four main problems emerge. There is first the problem of what the principles are which govern the historian's choice from among a limitless body of facts of those which should find place in an historical work. There is next the problem of the kind of knowledge which the historian can achieve of the people, events and institutions with which he is concerned. This is closely connected with the philosophical problem of our knowledge of other minds. Thirdly there are questions concerned with the relations among the facts which the historian records. Can he claim to show objective connections among them? In what sense can it be shown that historical events are related causally? The fourth problem in Dr Aron's own words is concerned with "the historical character of the person who writes history. How can someone whose present experience is part of a process of becoming succeed in reaching an objective knowledge of the past? To these questions the philosophers under discussion gave different answers which Dr Aron discusses critically. He concludes that 'the method employed and the concepts used vary with the philosophies to which the historians adhere,' and agrees with Weber that the proper question to ask is not 'How can historical science be universally valid?' but rather 'What parts of historical science can be universally valid?'

¹ *Essai sur la Théorie de l'Histoire dans l'Allemagne Contemporaine*. Par Raymond Aron. Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin 1938.

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This question brings us to Dr Aron's second book, to which the first may be regarded as an introduction. In his *Introduction to the Philosophy of History: Essay on the limits of historical objectivity*,¹ Dr Aron undertakes an independent examination of the questions which were raised in the first. He holds that historical knowledge is different in kind from knowledge of physical events that the time which concerns the historian is not the time which enters into the calculations of the physicists and that history is for man, not something external to him, but the essence of his being. From this brief summary it will be seen that what commences as a study of the method of history concludes with observations on the nature of man and his destiny. We may see how this development and extension of the subject takes place by first considering an attitude of mind which a preoccupation with history and sociology has created and encouraged, particularly in Germany. The exponents of this view show how principles of conduct may vary from one period to another how moral codes depend upon social structures, and how political and social revolutions are associated with transformations of moral codes. They also show how philosophies vary in conjunction with the movements of history, and how the social circumstances and historical position of the historian inevitably determine the sort of history that he writes and knows. Hence they conclude that it is simple minded for the historian to judge other men and other epochs in terms of his own historically determined moral conceptions. They may even go so far as to say that since every present epoch writes history for itself it is chimerical to hope for or to attempt any objective history at all. The desire for objectivity belongs only to a particular type of man the man who preferring contemplation to action feels safe in his society. How does Dr Aron deal with this fashionable form of scepticism? It should be noted first that he does not meet the sceptics with an equally incredible dogmatism. In so far as I understand his position, he meets the moral arguments by agreeing that there is no fixed code of morals or ready-made set of duties and by holding that nevertheless men have real duties which depend upon their immediate circumstances and upon their historical situation. No rules and no codes can relieve the individual from the necessity of making his own decisions in the light of the situation as he sees it. This notion of personal decision is important also in the theoretical sphere. Dr Aron admits that each period must rewrite history for itself and he shows why. Events which at their occurrence might seem unimportant may later be seen because of the subsequent course of events, to be important. There is a subtle and instructive discussion of revaluations of this sort. The author concludes that all attempts to understand the past are necessarily bound up with what we will for the future. Once again the importance of decision is emphasized.

From the account here given it might be thought that Aron's work is only another form of historical and moral scepticism without the courage to confess itself for what it is. That would not be a fair description of the book. Aron tries to show that any history which is more than a record of unrelated facts² is linked up with a philosophy which in its turn looks to the future as well as the past and is a matter of the will as well as of the understanding. Finding himself dissatisfied with a naive and reactionary adherence to established ethical rules he also sees the practical and theoretical objections to moral and historical relativism. I tend to regard philosophical problems from a different angle and to use a different philosophical vocabulary from that of Dr Aron but I recognize the very great philosophical ability dis-

¹ *Introduction à la Philosophie de l'Histoire: Essai sur les limites de l'objectivité historique* Par Raymond Aron. Nouvelle Revue Française. Librairie Galimard Paris, 1953.

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played in this book, and am interested in an attempt which few contemporary philosophers make—to bring rational reflection to bear not upon the hypothetical duties of hypothetical and uncomplicated persons, but upon the duties of men in this unique and present juncture. It is to be hoped that Dr. Aron will pursue and elaborate the view of morality which, in this book, is suggested and hinted at but still remains fragmentary.

Dr. Marcel Weinreich's excellent book, *Max Weber: The Man and the Scholar*,¹ is also to be welcomed. Very little has been written in English about this important sociologist apart from some articles in the *Sociological Review*. This book, therefore, should be of great use in England as well as in France. Dr. Weinreich, I think, succeeds rather better than Dr. Aron in translating the formidable German terms into readily intelligible French. The book consists of a biography of Max Weber which succeeds admirably in displaying the qualities of the best type of German scholar of the last generation: an account of his views on the methods of sociology, and a summary of his direct contributions to history and sociology. The author concludes that Weber was "the last truly encyclopedic genius of our time." A good bibliography closes a clearly written and well arranged book.

A book which is of interest now that theories of racial superiority are so prominent is *The Philosophy of Race of the Comte de Gobineau and its Bearing To-day*,² by Dr. Andrée Combris. The author shows that privileged classes in France have defended their position by claiming to belong to a superior conquering race even as far back as the sixteenth century and that the famous Abbé Sieyès had to meet this argument during the French Revolution. Gobineau's argument in his *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines* was that with race mixture came race decline: that civilization was mainly the work of a superior Aryan race which was becoming obliterated through admixture with inferior peoples, and that therefore civilization was heading for an inevitable decline. Comparison is made between Gobineau's views and the theories of National Socialism. There is agreement on the effects of race mixture upon the superiority of the Aryan race and upon the value of a system of castes (although on this matter the author points out the leading National Socialists do not widely publish their opinion of the masses). But Gobineau did not think that the Germans were of particularly pure Aryan race—they were less Aryan than the English—he was not anti-Semitic, and he had not conceived of the notion introduced by H. S. Chamberlain of improving the racial composition of a nation. Gobineau was on terms of personal friendship with Wagner and some of his associates: his views clearly influenced Nietzsche and in 1894 a Gobineau Society was founded in Germany. Thus a view which originated in the brain of a French reactionary noble, and was not in its native form favourable to the racial claims of the German people nevertheless had its chief influence in Germany where it was turned to the service of pan-Germanism by the special pleading of H. S. Chamberlain. It may now be found, with an admixture of eugenics in the pages of *Mein Kampf*. Dr. Combris, although he exposes the weaknesses in Gobineau's arguments appears to be much impressed by the theories of Vacher de Lapouge, whose conclusions he considers scientific. There is no attempt to consider whether the conception of race is of value in interpreting historical events.

The invention of machines has brought men new benefits, but it has also brought new maladies and set new problems. Why did the Greeks with

¹ *Max Weber: L'Homme et le Savant. Étude sur ses idées directrices*. Par Marcel Weinreich. Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1938.

² *La Philosophie des Races du Comte de Gobineau et sa Portée Actuelle*. Par Andrée Combris. Félix Alcan, Paris, 1937.

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their knowledge of mathematics and mechanics, fail to make use of the possibilities of machines? When were the uses to which machines might be put first foreseen? What caused the development of modern machine production? When were the social dangers and difficulties inherent in machine production first enumerated, and what means of combating them have been suggested? These are some of the questions discussed in a somewhat summary fashion by Professor Pierre-Maxime Schuhl in his *Machinisme et Philosophie*,¹ a new volume in the useful series of works making up the *Nouvelle Encyclopédie Philosophique*. It is a book mainly to be read for the problems it raises and for the useful lists of books it provides. The discussion of the Greeks' failure to utilize machines is along lines already made familiar in this country by Professor Farrington's *Science in Antiquity*. The advantages of machines were not seen because, owing to the supply of slaves (called by Aristotle 'living tools'), there was no need to economize labour. The existence of slavery was also responsible for the scale of values, clearly expressed in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, according to which productive work was ignoble, and contemplation superior to activity. Hence the neglect of applied science. Leonardo, Bacon and Descartes saw the possibilities of deliberate invention, and various economic factors connected with the state of the market for certain goods hastened the progress of mechanical improvement. Leonardo refused to publish an invention for moving about under water 'because of the wickedness of men, who would use it for assassinating at the bottom of the sea making breaches in ships and sinking them with their crews'. But the classical economists were mainly impressed by the benefits of machines. Early in the nineteenth century, however, the despotism which might accompany the ownership of large factories and concentrations of capital was foreseen by some. Constantin Pecqueur argued that employers might be tempted to establish a form of industrial feudalism with distinct and fixed orders and ranks. To-day the possibility of using the machine to increase the leisure at the disposal of mankind is being apprehended and with it the other possibility that machines might desecrate the leisure which they themselves have created.

H. B. ACTON

¹ Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1935

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METAPHYSICS

We have confined our previous surveys to "Philosophy of Nature," "Philosophy of History," and "Theory of Value." If we head our remarks to-day 'Metaphysics' the possibility of our task may be disputed. If someone varying an eighteenth-century question should ask: 'What is the real progress made by metaphysics in Germany since the war?' he may feel inclined to answer: 'the proof that metaphysics are impossible.' But it is the same with metaphysics as with religion. You may prove a thousand times that religion is impossible, that it is based on a misconception and that it ought not to exist, but no spiritual or political dictator is able to suppress the religious need of human nature. And so with metaphysics. You can prove that certain problems are wrongly put, that other concepts are meaningless, etc. But you never can prevent the

reappearance of unresolved problems in new forms you never will be able to persuade man that language given to him as a means for communication and for knowledge is an end in itself and a real philosopher never can agree to a mere verbalistic standpoint. And even regarded from this standpoint it would be a question of the use of words. If we use the word 'metaphysics' as meaning the science of principles which underlie either any specific science or the system of sciences, or our knowledge there can be no doubt I think, that problems of this kind are necessary even if human solutions of it are condemned to be preliminary and one sided.

Devoting to-day a very few remarks to this wide theme I think we should start with a recommendation for the second number of the new *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* (ed. Jean Lameere, Université libre de Bruxelles). For it contains an unpublished paper of Husserl's 'The question of the origin of geometry',¹ the best Husserl bibliography yet published (by Jan Patočka) and quite a few interesting articles devoted to this thinker. If we say some words about Husserl's own contribution we wish also in this Journal to pay tribute to this man who, gifted with an extraordinary power of penetrating analysis, an astonishingly rich flow of reflection and very strong self-criticism devoted his life to basic philosophical problems. His real intention was to establish philosophy as an exact science, to develop a *scientia universalis* and to explore its basis in human consciousness. This alone accounts for his extraordinary influence in Germany where he started a philosophical movement. If he had scarcely any influence in the Anglo-Saxon world this is partly due to the fact that his most important work *Logische Untersuchungen* is not translated and because his problem is somewhat different from those treated in this country. The short unpublished paper written in 1936 as part of an intended *summa* of H's work and a continuation of another chapter published in Vol. I of Professor Liebert's *Philosophia* makes it clear enough.

German philosophers have been much more impressed than the English by the fact that life, art and science have lost their original meaning, that they become more and more meaningless. The whole of Husserl's philosophy is devoted to the problem of meaning, to the meaning of meaning, to the analysis of meaning, to the distinguishing of meanings, but above all to the origin of meaning and the principles of its constitution. In this paper H returns to his original subject, mathematics. He rightly sees in the fact that mathematics in its highly developed symbolic form becomes meaningless, an expression of to-day's crisis. His question is: how is it possible that mathematics although progressing in logical form and technical application, lost connection with their original meaning? He asks: what are the original materials and the basic evidences which constitute geometry? All human activities have the tendency to become mechanized and to lose their original organic significance. H demands that every science ought to maintain the connection with its original intentions. A real progress in science leading to true propositions is only possible if the basis of the deductive construction is founded in original evidence. Those people are right who say that H intended a new metaphysics and that he wished to give a new basis to philosophy. But here in any case he understands, following Neo-Kantian tradition, the metaphysical question in an epistemological manner. He asks: how is it possible that certain propositions formed by a subject become universally valid? What is the connection between subjectivity and what it creates? How is the meaning of these "objective" creations such as mathematical propositions constituted in consciousness? He contends that genetic and "epistemological" origin are identical and that in the original discovery of a geometrical proposition its meaning

¹ Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentionales historisches Problem.

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became evident. We must therefore go back to this original meaning if we wish to understand geometry even in its most abstract form.

H.'s problem is interesting and important. I am even inclined to think that his manner of going back to the source is noteworthy although I do not think he is right in identifying genetic and epistemological origin. But if we ask, what progress has metaphysics made in H.'s work, I think we must answer his fundamental principle is a variation of Descartes' *Cogito, sum*. He takes it (as, I think, it ought to be taken) as expressing a relation not between my thought and my existence but between thought and being in general. It is a methodic principle which makes consciousness and thought a presupposition to our knowledge of being. H.'s *cogito* differs from Descartes' *cogito* chiefly by including Brentano's 'intentionality'. Furthermore the object, the *cogitatum* is understood as 'meaning' the relation between *cogito* and *cogitatum* as an act of meaning. Therefore the chief problem is the constitution of meaning in the *cogito*, which again as in Descartes comprises the whole sphere of consciousness and includes especially a specific form of intuition. So H. continues the Continental Cartesian tradition which is unbroken in the idealistic trend of German philosophy, in Kant and all his followers, in Fichte and Hegel as well as in the Neo-Kantian school. Only one famous idealist declined to follow suit: Leibniz, who declared the *Cogito, sum* to be true but only as a *vérité de fait* not as a proposition following *ex terminis*, nor as an axiom, and therefore unable to be the principle of philosophy.

I think there can be no better method of understanding as well as criticizing any philosophy than to get down to the axioms or at least the most fundamental principles which are taken as evident. For every philosophy must start somewhere and take some propositions for granted. Opposed to the rationalist starting point the *Cogito, sum* the irrationalist philosophies protesting against the suppression of the non-rational sides in man and nature the so-called philosophies of life began with life and with the evidence *Vita, sum*. This movement represented by Nietzsche, Dilthey, Scheler, Bergson, Wildon Carr and others is interesting from different points of view. But we do not wish to speak here about it but about a new book, *System of Philosophy of Life* by R. Junge. The reviewer very much regrets not to be living in Leibniz's age, who was able to say 'yes' to all books he read. Yet there is one point where I am in complete agreement with the author. That is his sub-title, 'A comprehensive science as basis of all specific sciences of life'. This is identical with our idea first published in a paper *Vita sum* (*Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung* 1933). We meant by this that (as so often in the history of philosophy) the so-called philosophy of life is a kind of inexact anticipation of an exact 'science of life'. That is to say, if we review all those sciences concerned with life (i.e. biology, psychology, and history) it would be useful to ask: are there in the living units forming the subjects of those sciences identical modes of actions and reactions and therefore identical modes of behaviour, identical functions, identical orders and laws common to all these different spheres? The discovery of identical elements would enable us to develop a basic science of life which would (without encroaching on the diversity of the different regions) reveal the inner relation between them. I expected to find a development of this idea in the book. But the promise of the sub-title is not fulfilled. Its fulfilment would demand the abandonment of what the title promises: a philosophy of life and to transform it into a science of life. But the author is not content with the modest task of analysing the phenomena of life and the basis of the sciences of life; he desires to undertake the somewhat gigantic task of giving in seven volumes the basis of what he calls *die totale Kulturwende*, a phrase which cannot be

* *System der Lebensphilosophie*. Junge u. Dornbaum 1, Berlin, 1937. D.J. f. u. f.

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translated but means a total change of culture (and in the logical sense of the word could only mean the transformation of culture into non-culture) The author is filled with a great amount of philosophic enthusiasm and his thought is fresh But I am afraid his means are in no proportion to his aims and the result is a fantastic variation of the vitalistic theory of *entelechy* This book is mainly based on Driesch's vitalism But the author does not see that Driesch himself in the later editions of his *Philosophy of Organism* has deprived the *entelechy* of its metaphysical meaning, transforming it into a holistic concept and preferring the term "related to the whole" (*ganzheitliche* *zogen*) to the teleological characters contained in it Moreover this concept is one of those superfluous notions which do not explain anything but bar on the contrary, the way to a true inquiry into the phenomena The book reminds the reader of the pre-Kantian speculative philosophy of nature Scientific basis, clearness of thought and logical analysis are missing

But it would not be fair to take this book as standard of German philosophy of life which has produced works of an incomparably higher level Even then I think, there can be no doubt that the first axiom of this philosophy the *Vivo sum*, happens to be quite true but is an expression of a contingent fact It cannot be developed into a methodical principle (as the *Cogito sum*) and therefore does not lead very far

Yet German metaphysics of the last decades is not only characterized by having produced certain forms of rationalistic philosophies based ultimately on variations of the *Cogito sum* and strongly influenced by Kant and as an antithesis to this irrationalist philosophies of life founded on the *Vivo sum* but it has tried to overcome both in a synthesis the so-called "philosophy of existence" or in a shorter phrase "existentialism" (if it is allowed to introduce this word) This term existence is somewhat awkward It means in medieval philosophy the contingent being in time and space whereas essence designated necessary being But now this term comes back to philosophy from theology Its meaning is based on Kierkegaard's reaction to Hegel's philosophy What Kierkegaard resented most in Hegel's philosophy was the fact that in it the impersonal Logos embraced and dissolved all personal facts that the human soul was only a moment in an impersonal intellect In him protested the simple Christian soul which amidst its pains and sorrows was unwilling to accept the Logos as mediator between itself and God and which believed existence to be of more importance than objective thought Kierkegaard meant by existence the single finite irrational suffering sinful creature which is forced to make a decision to which consequently only ethical reality is real which cares more for happiness than for the abstract speculations of the philosophers As after the war K's influence on German theology and philosophy became stronger and stronger, strangely enough his religious opposition to philosophy became a philosophic antithesis to modern rationalism and positivism Thus K. Jaspers in his book *Reason and Existence*¹ starts from a comparison of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche He finds a similarity of views in them both see the problematic position of human reason both are suspicious of the scholar and of the philosophical system furthermore their existence and the mode of their self understanding are similar Here as later on in his *Nietzsche* (Cp *Philosophy* vol xiii No 49 p 89) he tries to interpret him as a kind of philosopher of existence But it must be remembered that Nietzsche neither knows the term in Jaspers's sense nor are his ideas compatible with it (Cp ed C G Naumann vol xiii 222 221 xi 74 vi 68 xi 74, iii 199)

To give a résumé of J's philosophy as contained in this book or in his *Philosophy of Existence*² is quite impossible because it wishes to avoid any

¹ *Erkenntnis und Existenz* J B Wolters Groningen, 1935

² *Existenzphilosophie* Walter de Gruyter & Co Berlin, 1934

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decision or to arrive at results it simply desires to awaken existence. It lives in the pure movement of reflection. If Heidegger gives the ontology of existence, so Jaspers gives the indefinite self-reflection of it. Therefore J cannot be judged by his results but only by his tendencies. He is always interesting if he is pursuing his original work, psychological or psychopathological analysis. He possesses a very fine philosophical sense. Moreover, his central problem, the problem of transcendence, is important. The nineteenth century has so wonderfully succeeded in restricting itself to mere immanence that this immanence itself became meaningless. "Existence," by meaning the hidden ground in man by which he is related to the Transcendent, is nothing else but a means to reopen the way to the Transcendent. Jaspers's philosophy tries to secure a new transcendence. If this task fails in its chief aim (not without giving much light to the human sphere) because the Transcendent itself remains unmoved, it is not Jaspers's fault but a consequence of the present crisis of man.

Whether the highest axiom of this philosophy *Existo, sum* is of any consequence remains to be seen. Paradoxically, just because it may be transformed into an analytic proposition, it may be more than a mere expression of a matter of fact. Perhaps this philosophy may be important in developing categories of the specific ways in which man exists and in giving means for a special analysis of this field. In other words, it may be an anticipation of a science of man, just as philosophy of life is an anticipation of a science of life. But I do not think that it is able to develop a new philosophy because existence remains contingent and an obstacle in the way to even that transcendence which it promises to make accessible.

But if we were to answer the question about the progress of metaphysics in Germany thus—there have been some philosophies based on the principle of rationality, others on that of life, others on that of existence, and all these are derivations from the principle of subjectivity—this would not be the whole story. For there is a tendency corresponding to Neo-Realism in this country, but very different from it, that attempts to reinstall real metaphysics, that is, ontology. The leader of this movement is Nicolai Hartmann, who has just published a new book about Possibility and Reality.¹

Hartmann's chief problem is man, being, knowing, and acting in this world. He thinks that if we really want to know something, this something must pre-exist. From his point of view, the relation of the knowing subject to the known object is a relation of being (surely a misunderstanding of the meaning of knowledge). But he not only presupposes the existence of the world, he believes that it is constructed in different layers which are ontologically differentiated. Correspondingly, being exists as real and as ideal being. The new book, which is a kind of sequel to his *On the Foundations of Ontology*, is concerned with the problem of modality, and its aim is to show that the categories of modality occupy a kind of central position in the sphere of ontology. Such a point of view is possible. It is, for instance, possible to give an analysis and description of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* by starting with the categories of modality. (We have done this in our thesis *The Structure of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and the Problem of Time*, Giessen, 1913.) For Kant presupposes from the beginning a specific concept of possibility which determines already his very questions. He says: "What is in accordance with the formal conditions of experience (regarding intuition and concepts) is possible." But this concept is epistemological, for it fixes the conditions under which knowledge is possible. Consequently, Kant does not develop metaphysics.

¹ *Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit*. Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1918.

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but epistemology. Yet in ontology (if there is any problem like this at all) the question is different.

H's book is very good from a technical point of view. It is the book of a philosopher who since his studies in the Marburg school of H. Cohen and P. Natorp is in closest touch with European tradition and with the problems. Good are the historical remarks interesting the "aporetic" method of developing the difficulties of a problem (which is influenced by Aristotle) and the method of analysing the categories (*Kategorialanalyse*). But the difficulties start with the declaration that it is impossible to define the modal concepts directly and that they must therefore be defined indirectly by relations existing between them. These relations are determined by a so called fundamental law of modality. Impossibility, possibility, and necessity are relative to reality and irrealität; therefore reality and irrealität are the basic modal concepts. Now this law formulated as it is, as a general law valid for all the regions, is surely wrong. For possibility depends not on reality though it is quite true that every new realization opens new possibilities. If I say something is possible, this statement is relative to a set of conditions which may be formulated in propositions, and if these propositions are taken in relation to the set of axioms on which they are based then we may say: 'A proposition *P* is possible in relation to this system of axioms *A* if the negation of *P* is not valid in relation to *A*'. Hartmann's fundamental mistake is that he does not start from the sphere of logic; that he does not see that a definition of the modal concepts is not only possible but necessary. If he had started from logic his research would have taken quite a different turn and probably he would never have written this book. Even if he wishes to reinstate ontology (what I think is a mistake) he should remember that the great ontologists of the past began with logic and then applied it to metaphysics. If H. admires Chr. Wolff, greater than Wolff was his master Leibniz. And Leibniz not only starts always from logic and then applies it to metaphysics but (though he chooses for this purpose the old Aristotelian logic and arrives at very paradoxical results the individual so to speak the integral of all the analytic propositions which may be pronounced about it) he nevertheless is the inaugurator of a new logic, namely symbolic logic which is of the highest importance to mathematics and logic itself. Therefore our new "ontologists" are put in a very awkward position. They can either overlook the existence of the new logic but then their own work is antiquated from the beginning, or they must try to refute the new logic or to apply it to their ontology both of which tasks seem to be impossible.

This neglect of logic is by no means a personal mistake of Hartmann's, but a general failure of German philosophy and therefore very instructive. It would not be unjust to speak of treason against the true spirit of Leibniz's philosophy (corresponding to the maltreatment of Leibniz by the early Berlin Academy of Science his creation, during the last few years of his life). For since Kant, all the great German philosophers (with a few exceptions like Bolzano) have tried to develop their own personal logic—e.g. Kant his "transcendental" and Hegel his "dialectic" logic. But neither is logic in the proper sense of the word, the first being epistemology and the second metaphysics. So the logic of Hartmann's teachers Cohen and Natorp was theory of science or of the logical foundations of mathematics and physics. These problems are necessary and important, but they are not the logic. Because every philosopher tried to develop his own logic, the problem of "the logic" was lost.

The future of philosophy does not depend on the application or non-application of an antiquated logic to a chimeric "ontology" but on the development of logic proper, as it has been done in our time by Russell, Whitehead, and Łukasiewicz.

F. H. HEINEMANN

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The Philosophy of Plato By RAPHAEL DEMOS (New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. Price \$3. Pp. xiv + 406.)

Before I attempt any critical remarks about this substantial and handsome volume let me call attention to a few matters that have escaped the proof reader and might be put right in an erratum slip. There is little actual citation of Greek throughout the book—in fact less than is pleasant to a reader who does not relish having to take down the volumes of Burnet's or Hermann's text for the purpose of checking Mr. Demos's references several times in the course of a page—but the printer (for one hopes it must be he) has contrived more than once to perpetrate horrors (*ἀποδίδειν φασκοῦν*) which are surprising in a volume written by a member of Harvard University. (The ungrammatical writing of *μή* in a phrase on p. 8, where Greek idiom demands *οὐ* is presumably an oversight of the author's own.) More serious (if less distressing to the eye) are two or three cases in which the writer's sense has been perverted by misprints that might deceive an unwary reader. (E.g. p. 236, 'the inspired poet knows *now* (*! not*) that he is writing' p. 278, 'the soul perceives the hardness of the hand (*! hard*) through touch' p. 383 'as though wickedness were *intoluntary* (*! voluntary*).') In general Mr. Demos prefers to give his quotations from Plato in English, and often abbreviated English. To this there can of course be no objection, but once or twice in my judgment, he relies for his interpretations on a corrupt text or a rendering of a sound text which is at the least dubious. Thus the turn given at p. 290 to the words quoted there from *Ep. VII* gives to *τὰ σὺζῆν* which obviously has its regular meaning of 'a companionate life' the impossible sense of 'intercourse with' the study of dialectic, and thus destroys Plato's point that the dialectical man is only to be developed by the *personal* intercourse and friction of one mind with another. The exegesis of *Rep.* 488 d-e given at p. 352-53 is based entirely on accepting Sidwick's conjectural change of the very idiomatic *οἰόμενοι* p. 488 ε 2 to *οἰόμενοι* a change that though unfortunately recently adopted by Shorey gives as Adam said a false sense to the whole passage. It may be true (p. 345) that among average men 'weakness of head is taken for kindness of heart' but Plato is not asserting this in the passage appealed to (*Rep.* 400e). He is merely saying that at the moment he is using the word *εὐφροία* in its etymological sense and not in that current in everyday speech in which it is a euphemism for silliness. To say (p. 372) that philosophy is *meditation* upon death involves serious misrendering of the well known phrase of the *Phaedo* in which *μελέτη* does not mean *meditation* but the actor's or public speaker's private *rehearsal* of his lines' (répétition in the French sense). The philosopher prepares himself against the great change not by eternally thinking about his dissolution, but by dying daily, training himself to deny the imperious lusts of the flesh. *πορεία* does not mean 'running in a course' (p. 293)—no poet ever used *πορεύεσθαι* in such a sense but *march* advance, and though the movement of the mind called *διαλεκτική πορεία* at *Rep.* 332b is as Plato explains, a movement 'up and down' this could never have been discovered from the use of the word *πορεία* to describe it. If Mr. Demos will consider the rendering

he gives at p. 287 of Plato's description of truly scientific astronomy, I think he will discover that it is a travesty of the simple and correct Platonic statement due, in this case, to the unfortunate whimsies of Adam. In the references to Plato's discussion (*Laws*, I) of convivial drinking there seems to be a quaint exaggeration of the meaning of the name he gives to it ($\mu\epsilon\theta\eta$) "By learning how to keep their heads *while drunk*, they will be trained to withstand the intoxicating effects of pleasure and glory in real life" (p. 357, cf. p. 229). Obviously a man can't both keep his head and "be drunk" at once, though he may be "drinking" and yet "keeping his head." Plato clearly means by $\mu\epsilon\theta\eta$ not being drunk, but being warmed with wine, "mellowed by the bottle." What his citizens are to learn is precisely how to be festive without letting themselves "get drunk" (they might, no doubt, be sometimes "over taken" while the lesson was being learned, and thus is why their drinking parties must always be presided over by a senior and sober man who takes care that they do not go too far, but the very thing they are to learn is how to "carry their liquor" without being "drunk"). At p. 117, and elsewhere there is an attempted exegesis of the well known passage of *Laws*, X (896e ff.), which amounts to accepting the thesis of Plutarch and Atticus of an evil world-soul. (It is even described on p. 99 as p. 116 in language which Plutarch would certainly have repudiated as the bad 'god'.) But as Mr. Demos's own citation shows, Plato says nothing at all about an evil world-soul (still less about an evil "god"). He says merely that since there are 'disorderly motions' as well as 'orderly' in things, all motions cannot be due to a single 'best soul'; there must be more souls involved than one, and one of them at least must be more or less "bad." (Even so traditional Christianity has ascribed certain visible effects in the world to Satan, an evil being, but no Christian ever supposed that Satan is either an evil *anima mundi* or an evil Deity.) The words taken at p. 80 from *Laws* 966a are a highly dubious rendering (R. G. Bury's) of a difficult text, and appear (I would invite Mr. Demos to re-examine Dr. England's discussion of the passage) to involve an erroneous grammatical 'construe.' How can there be a "motion" which "when developed into becoming" provides an ever flowing fount of being? The 'motion' is already a "becoming" and a "fount of being" and does not require to be developed into one.

These are however only incidental matters, and even on the most favourable supposition for myself—that my objections are one and all sound—they do not seriously affect the value of the author's book as a whole. I am not sure how far the same thing can be said about certain more general features of his method of exegesis. Anyone who sets himself the task of the systematic exposition of Plato's philosophy has notoriously several grave difficulties to confront. He has to decide for himself how far a view expounded in a Platonic dialogue by Socrates or another can be presumed to be wholly acceptable to Plato himself even at the date of writing. Whatever may be our view about the 'historicity' of the "Platonic Socrates" (or of the minor outstanding figures of the dialogues), it seems extravagant to ignore the strongly dramatic character of Plato's art, and the possibility that Socrates and other historical personages are made in Plato from time to time, to say things with which Plato may never have been in full sympathy because these things do faithfully reproduce the sentiments of the *dramatis persona*. (It may, for example, fairly be doubted whether the personal judgment of Plato on Athenian democracy can ever have been as harsh as that ascribed in the *Gorgias* and *Republic* to Socrates, a man of the Periclean age who had presumably shared the high hopes which find expression, for example, in the *Eumenides* and in well known passages of Herodotus, and had lived to see

them so cruelly disappointed) Then there is the much graver difficulty of being certain when we compare the latest with the earlier dialogues how far it is permissible to extract a single body of doctrine from all of them, and how far utterances of the later works must be understood as correcting or abandoning positions taken up in the earlier (Are we, for example at liberty to construct a social philosophy for Plato by trying to 'integrate'—a favourite word with Mr Demos—*Republic*, *Politicus*, and *Laus*, as though all three taught much the same thing?)

Mr Demos is, I think, a little insensitive to the first and less dangerous of these two sources of possible misinterpretation I remark that for instance he tends at times to set down to Plato remarks made in the *Republic* by Glaucon, or personal avowals put into the mouth of Socrates (Thus Plato is made to say of himself I am no poet, merely because Socrates says this of himself in the *Republic*, which may be as dangerous as it could be to infer that Shakespeare was a halting speaker because he made his Antony say—ironically by the way— I am no orator ' We need, in reading the disclaimers of Socrates never to forget that Socrates was an eminently 'ironical' man not to be understood by a dull literalist and still more that what Socrates says about himself is not evidence' about Plato In one place Mr Demos goes even further and speculates (p 381) on the possibility that Parmenides had been to Socrates all that Socrates was to Plato "for he called the latter 'father' This is of course a mere error as is immediately acknowledged in a footnote since it is not Socrates who is made to speak of "my father Parmenides" but an Eleatic visitor who also mentions that he had in boyhood been a personal disciple of Parmenides But the odd thing is that discovery of the oversight should not have induced Mr Demos to qualify the language of his text)

It is about the second source of possible misinterpretation that I feel more serious misgivings Mr Demos's interpretation of Plato's philosophy is based throughout on an elaborate exposition of the *Timæus* and *Philebus* But to make the interpretation work out it is essential to 'integrate' those dialogues with the account of the *lóga týgathōi* in the *Republic*, the account of "divine madness" in the *Phædrus* and the speech of Diotima in the *Symposium* And this raises the awkward question whether the *Symposium* and *Phædrus* can really without doing violence to their plain sense, be so satisfactorily "integrated" even with each other to say nothing of the two later dialogues On the assumption that the thing can be dooe you get a certain rendering of the Platonic philosophy which is no doubt interesting and suggestive but one may still harbour awkward doubts (which the Preface would suggest that Mr Demos himself at times feels) whether this Platonism after all is the Platonism of Plato

One is intrigued also by the unmistakable persistence throughout the exposition of the technical language of a later philosophy which is rightly held in high esteem at Harvard The principles of Platonic metaphysics in fact turn out to be down to details curiously identical with the principles of Professor Whitehead All the technicalities of Dr Whitehead's highly personal vocabulary, 'space time' 'ingredience' "'concrescence"' 'concern,' the 'lore of the ideal' the 'primordial nature' of God and the rest, are successively discovered to afford the key to the meaning of the Athenian (Of course one would expect striking analogies and coincidences since Whitehead's thought has assuredly been so deeply influenced by Plato but this all but complete identity has at least a considerable initial probability against it) The result is a book of high interest but analogous in a way to a certain type of musical composition When we are invited to listen to 'variations of

Brahms on a theme of Handel "we expect that though the theme may be Handel's, the development of it will be definitely characteristic of Brahms. If Handel had composed variations on his own theme they would have been a different set. What we are listening to is not Handel but Brahms inspired by Handel. I cannot help feeling that in reading Mr Demos I have similarly been hearing a kind of *fantasia* in the manner of Whitehead on Platonic themes. And this is a thing which any man may legitimately propose to give us but it is not quite the same thing as an exposition of Plato. The more so that the "themes" do not seem to be all wholly Platonic. Mr Demos's strain is crossed at times by reminiscences of Alexander's restlessness of space-time and Bergson's *élan vital* and even where these are absent there is a turn given to the conception of *εἶδη* as a realm of essences which seems to me to be Santayana rather than Plato. (The very selection of the word 'essence' to translate Plato's *οὐσία* is perhaps not quite happy: the English word comes to us so coloured by associations with the medieval discussions about *essentia* and *existentia* that the bald 'being' is probably a more desirable rendering from its very colourlessness.)

The result of all these influences is that Mr Demos has produced a highly interesting book full of matter which I could desire the fairly advanced student who already knows the text of Plato pretty well to ponder but I am not by any means equally sure that I should desire the beginner in Platonic studies to read the Platonic text for the first time with Mr Demos as his expositor and indeed I am not certain whether Mr Demos himself would wish him to do so since in his Preface he shows himself so fully aware that his own interpretations are so open to dispute. Of not a few of them I should myself have been tempted to say that they are not only disputable but mistaken if it were not for the generous disregard for rigid consistency which leads the writer after developing an interpretation fully on one page to set down something which seems a fatal objection to it fairly on the next. Mr Demos indeed resembles Plato as described by himself in the multiplicity and wealth of his 'insights' and of him I doubt as he himself doubts about Plato whether this variety of 'insights' is really brought into a harmony.

For one such insight I am profoundly thankful. Mr Demos is fully alive to the significance of Aristotle's reference to certain principles on which we (Platonists) lay even more stress than we do upon the *εἶδη*. The account of Platonic metaphysics (Part I *The Creative Factors*) upon which the whole of the rest of the work is built has little to say of the *εἶδη*—they come in in Parts II and III (Reality Appearance). I am quite at one with the pronouncement of the author in justification of this arrangement that in Plato the "forms" are, after all something secondary though it may have required some courage to say this so openly in the country of Professor Shorey. My chief personal difficulties with the exposition of the "Creative Factors" arise from doubts about the success of the author's integration of the *Philebus* quartet Unlimited Limit The Mixture The Cause of the Mixture with the triad taken from the *Timaeus* Demiurge Receptacle (*ὑποδοχή*), World. Mr Demos's reading of Plato requires him to identify the *ὑποδοχή* of the *Timaeus* (which seems to the mere reader of the text to be simply Euclidean space) with the *ἀειπαρ* of the *Philebus*. On the strength of this identification the *ὑποδοχή* is then declared to be really not space but space-time—in spite of the fact that in the *Timaeus*, where the *ὑποδοχή* is presupposed as eternally there, God is expressly described as *making* time—and so far as I can see, the "restlessness" which is ascribed by Plato to the incessantly shifting contents of this "receptacle" is then silently taken to be a character of the "receptacle" itself. It is a further development of this line of thinking that

it is then repeatedly assumed that the "receptacle" is a "creative factor not merely in sensible things but in *φύσις* and the presence of irrationality and evil in our souls is taken to be explained in the last resort by this presence in them of an element derived from the non rational "receptacle" I offer no opinion on the intrinsic merits of the speculation but as an exegesis of Plato it seems to me to depend on what is pretty clearly a misinterpretation of the difficult and perhaps corrupt statement of *Timaeus* 35a about the creation of the soul Mr Demos more than once shows that he takes the words to mean that the soul is a compound of the indivisible and the divisible, and therefore actually contains a bodily element in its own composition To me it appears fairly plain especially in the light of Mr Cornford's admirable discussion of the passage in a work to which Mr Demos makes more than one reference that what Plato says is something quite different, viz., that the being (*οὐσία*) of the soul is of a kind intermediate between the being which is indivisible and always self same and that which becomes and is divisible in bodies If this is the true verbal interpretation the words will not sufficiently bear the weight of the conclusion that the soul actually contains a bodily factor and, in view of the notorious obscurity of the whole passage and the variety of interpretations which we know to have been put upon it ever since Plato's own day I think Mr Demos should have at least offered some argument in defence of his own exegesis As it is all through the subsequent developments of his work I find the alleged presence of the "receptacle" in the composition of our minds themselves recurring to give me uncertainty and trouble It is true that as the *Timaeus* says there is too much of the "random" in our thinking and I should have had no difficulty with the statement that the effects of randomness—what the *Timaeus* calls the *πλανώμενη αἴτριά*—are discernible in human mental processes But where is the warrant for the implied identification of the *πλανώμενη αἴτριά* with the "receptacle" which Plato names as *χωρά*? I am I hope open to conviction on the matter but the presumption is I feel that the *Timaeus* is not quite so much like the cosmology of Alexander as it is here made to appear

I could wish equally that the integration of the *Timaeus* and *Philebus* with the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* had been undertaken more cautiously In more than one passage Mr Demos seems to me to end by making Plato more of a mystic and individualist than we have warrant to do, and perhaps than he himself really intended to do His language about the apprehension of the good by the philosopher kings would seem to mean if it means what it appears to do that the good is apprehended in a state of super rational *raptus* But all that the *Republic* entitles us to say about the matter is what Mr Demos also says that the knowledge of the good when it comes does not come as the conclusion of a train of deductive reasoning Obviously it does not if the good is a genuine first principle and precisely the same thing might be said about any novel idea which is a genuine ἀρχή in its αἰετός γένος, such as the conception of an electromagnetic field or the thought of the universality of gravitational attraction Newton's extension of gravitation to the solar system at large for example was not a deduction yet it would never have come to him without long and continuous practice of preliminary discursive thinking and when the idea came to him it was not in a state of quasi mystical *raptus* And so with the knowledge of "the good" expected of the philosopher kings It comes if not as a deduction from, yet as a consequence of several years of hard thinking given to the "synoptic" study of the several sciences and I do not think it too much to say that there is not a word in the *Republic* to suggest that the apprehension is "super rational"

In fact the evidence for such a view has to be got by reading into the

Republic things taken from the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, and hence there is an inevitable question about the legitimacy of such an "integration." From the *Symposium* it takes the reference to the speech of Diotima to the suddenness with which the vision of the supreme and universal beauty dawns upon the devotee who has hitherto followed the quest of beauty upwards through the ascending series of beautiful bodies, beautiful characters, beautiful laws and institutions. But apart from the consideration already mentioned, that the freshness and novelty of the crowning insight does not of itself prove its super-rational character, there is the further disquieting reflection that it may be quite unsafe to treat *Symposium* and *Republic* as being quite so much of one piece. It may be—of course I do not say that we know it to be so—but it is a possibility to be considered—that in Socrates, whose life presents us with marked examples of the temperament of the visionary, there really was a strain of what is commonly known as mysticism, which was foreign to his great successor. In that case it will be dramatically right that the path marked out by Diotima for the spiritual pilgrimage of Socrates should not be identical in all respects with the which Plato regards as typical of the philosopher-king.

The use of the *Phaedrus* is still more open to question. Mr. Demos throws a good deal of light on his reasons for calling the philosopher's vision of the good super-rational, when he remarks more than once that Plato regards the philosopher as a kind of madman, and appeals for proof of this to the doctrine of the good or right hand *μαρία* expounded in the great central myth of the *Phaedrus*. But must he not have forgotten that the various forms of the right hand *μαρία* are carefully listed for us in the *Phaedrus* itself: prophecy, the fine frenzy of the poet, the "inspiration" of the founders of initiations, the exaltation of the lover? Philosophy has no place in the list, and the deficiency cannot fairly be made up by quoting from other dialogues (e.g. the *Theaetetus*) passages which only say that in the judgment of the 'practical men of the world' the philosopher looks to be a fool.

Per contra, there is an excellent opportunity for an integration of the *Phaedo* with the later dialogues which seems to me to have been unduly neglected. In the interesting chapter of Part I on God, Mr. Demos does full justice to the central importance of the conception of God in Plato, but as the reader who has proceeded so far would expect, Plato's God turns out to be a little too remarkably like Whitehead's, if they are not the same being, they are at least plainly identical twins. And the result is I think to make Platonism a good deal more of an immanence philosophy than it really is. Admittedly Plato's God has not to the full what Christian theologians have meant by divine omnipotence (though it must be remembered that omnipotence has never meant to the greatest theologians what it perhaps means to the unthinking, ability to 'do any old thing'). Mr. Demos is well aware that there is another side to Plato's Theism; yet I can't but think that in respect of the divine omnipotence his anxiety to make Plato speak with Whitehead has led him to lower the key unduly. Since there is no doubt that Plato expressly says that evils can never vanish from the course of history, or that he habitually assumes eternal 'cyclical recurrence' as the scheme of the historical world, Mr. Demos tells us that God's fate is to be eternally defeated in his providential control of things by the inherent intractability of the 'receptacle.' Now to say nothing of the apparent clash between such a theory and the rhetoric with which *Laws*, II dwells on the impossibility of escape from the righteous order established by "our King," has not Mr. Demos forgotten that in the *Phaedo* at any rate 'eternal recurrence' is not the last word? The 'cycle of birth and death' may go on without end, and there may

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be no complete deliverance from evil for the souls who are unmerged in it. But the final destiny of the "saints" there is to escape from the "wheel of birth" and live for ever without bodies. This is never said again as far as I remember in any other dialogue but neither is it ever denied. It is at least possible that Plato's real thought is represented not by the later Neoplatonists like Proclus, but by Plotinus in his doctrine of the possibility of a final "ascent" of the soul to the 'intelligible' to be followed by no descent. If this should be Plato's thought, and especially if he cherished the hope of such a final 'salvation' for all souls, or all but a few 'incurables' the endlessness of the cycles will entail no defeat of the purpose of 'our King'. It may not be attained to speak with Plotinus here but it is fulfilled yonder."

I am conscious that I have only touched in these pages on a very few of the topics which are raised by Mr. Demos's book. I trust it will be understood that it is the very variety of his insights into fundamental Platonic themes which has necessarily compelled me to this unsatisfactory procedure. If I should hesitate to recommend his book as an introduction to Plato for the undergraduate I should desire all who have to teach Plato to undergraduates to read it and meditate it with care.

A. E. TAYLOR

George Santayana By G. W. HOWGATE (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford 1938. Pp. viii + 363. Price 16s.)

Here Santayana is paid the compliment while still alive of being made the subject of a full length study. The book is brilliantly written, tempting the reader to linger at almost every other paragraph to savour its fine thought and phrasing, but though it takes much reading it may be reviewed here briefly, since it is not intended for students of philosophy. It treats Santayana as a man of letters, and his many volumes provide almost an excess of beauty for such a study. Like all true men of letters he is a master of ideas as well as of style, but although his ideas are philosophical he produced no philosophy in the technical sense because he followed the logic not of the ideas themselves but of the moods they sprang from or evoked. The author admits that the lack of system, indeed of any interest in system, is what accounts for the relative neglect in technically philosophical circles of so indubitably talented a man. Santayana's works are a luxuriant medley of penetrating insights marvellously expressed. To attempt a technical exposition and evaluation of such a writer would be to murder him. Mr. Howgate has accordingly adopted the standpoint of a broad literary humanism in both appreciation and criticism.

It would have been convenient if the main facts of Santayana's life had been given less fugitively, for the biographical (as distinct from the psychological) interest could have been satisfied in a few bald pages. He was born in Madrid in 1863 of Spanish parents who emigrated to the States when he was nine years of age, old enough to have been deeply moulded unconsciously, by the most intimate influences of his native land, yet young enough to assimilate within those predetermined limits the culture of his new country. The result as Mr. Howgate shows was that he became neither a Spaniard nor an American. At nineteen he went to Harvard when Palmer Royce and James were teaching with immense power, spent two post graduate years in Germany, and in 1889 joined the staff of the Department of Philosophy in his own university. Mr. Howgate records that his courses 'tended gradually away from

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the centre of philosophy to the outskirts where philosophy borders on life and letters " For him teaching, however, was little more than a way of making a living and when at long last—in 1912—he became financially independent, he resigned, left America and has since lived in retirement in Europe in Oxford almost throughout the war and since then in Italy, where we gather he is likely to remain

He made his literary debut as a poet and turned to aesthetics and literary criticism before producing his chief work *The Life of Reason* (1905-6) five volumes in which a philosophical wilderness blossoms as the rose Of his numerous subsequent writings which whatever the subject are usually really in the form of essays (a novel excepted) only those in which he intervened in the post war dispute between idealists and realists have brought him any recognition in British philosophical circles—his chapter in *Essays in Critical Realism* (1920) and the two books *Scepticism and Animal Faith* (1923) and *The Realm of Essence* (1928) Mr Howgate treats him in successive chapters as poet, moral philosopher, critic and essayist and metaphysician and finally summarizes and examines his attitude to America always with a personal knowledge of the man as well as a close and competent knowledge of his writings There are some purely literary appendices and a list of writings on Santayana for a list of his own writings we are referred to his *Obiter Scripta* (1936)

Although the book neither was nor need have been written for philosophers, any strictly philosophical study of Santayana would be rash without a careful study of it It is the fullest document we have and is exquisitely sympathetic without any loss of critical independence Santayana is most obviously a thinker who has to be understood in the light of his temperament and character which means that the literary approach is the right one being the most concrete Otherwise his curious combination of Platonism and Naturalism, his vindication of the spiritual life against a background of materialistic metaphysics would be unintelligible His very face, as I remember it, invites that approach—a smooth imperturbable forehead and dark eyes that occasionally shared a faint half smile with his lips but for the rest a countenance that hid its owner He is a detached, often ironical, spectator of life, commenting on it with artistic vision and artistic genius of expression It is this unabashed aloofness that makes his undeniable insights and irresistible beauties remote, fragile and just a little sweet He has passions but so perfectly controlled that he can deny them any but literary expression When beneath the silliness of human life he detects a tragedy, he can feel it but only from afar as we feel the burden of Orestes or Electra or King Lear This is his Achilles' heel If the gods had endowed him with active sympathy, making him an eager teacher instead of a soloquist, and sending him to share joy and succour sorrow instead of merely limning it to perfection, he would almost certainly have been received into the pantheon of great men T E JESSOP

The Journals of Kierkegaard 1834-51 Translated and edited by ALEXANDER DRU (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford 1938 Pp. lxii + 603 Price 25s. net.)

Fear and Trembling By SØREN KIERKEGAARD Translated by Robert Payne (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp. xvi + 192 Price 7s. 6d. net.)

"Anyone who wishes to deal with Søren Kierkegaard's life must take care not to burn his fingers" says a contemporary in his recollections, and the

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reviewer of Kierkegaard's *Journals* is only too conscious of this danger. I have read them with alternating emotions of admiration and exasperation, and certainly do not feel competent to give any confident estimate of his thinking. If I try to do so, I at once find myself imagining some devastating witticism with which Kierkegaard would demolish such an "estimate"—particularly coming from a paid philosopher. For Kierkegaard, like Socrates, had a shrewd suspicion that those who teach philosophy or religion "for hire" do so at their peril, and much of his most biting satire is directed against what might be described as the philosophical and religious "civil service" (e.g. p. 70). "It seems as though the philosophers in their account of modern philosophy since Descartes have modelled themselves on the form sometimes found in fairy stories in which by always repeating everything that has gone before and adding a new bit, one finally has an interminable series of things: stick beat dog, dog bite cat, cat scratch man . . ." and (p. 39), "At every step philosophy sloughs a skin into which creep its worthless hangers on." His quarrel was, however, not with philosophy so much as with the pretentiousness of philosophy as represented in the contemporary Hegelianism of the academies of Germany and Denmark taught apparently authoritatively as a final form of thought. Here is an imaginary conversation between Socrates and Hegel (p. 148).

Socrates: Shall we begin by being in complete disagreement, or in agreement upon something which we will call an assumption?

Hegel: — — —

Socrates: "With what assumptions do you begin?"

Hegel: From none at all.

Socrates: That is quite possible, perhaps you do not begin at all."

Hegel: I not begin! I who have written twenty-one volumes?" (and so on).

Kierkegaard was not a philosopher or theologian: he was a poet and a satirist who took Christianity *au pied de la lettre*. Someone has said that he made a *reductio ad absurdum* of Christianity; I suspect that Kierkegaard would have agreed, but gone on to say that he accepted the absurdity. Consequently he hovers between profundity and morbidity. The morbid element is perhaps due to his strange upbringing—he was, he tells us, an old man as a child, and obsessed with a sense of a curse hanging over his family. His profundity came from his concentrating his whole nature—his natural melancholy, his wit, his eccentricity, his imagination, his dangerous knowledge that he was a trout among minnows (the fate of being a genius in a provincial town)—into his religious consciousness of submission to God. Yet in the end a jotting in the *Journals* is surely a piece of autobiography. A new book which needs to be written: *A Poet's Confession*. The cause of his suffering is that he wants to be religious and always goes the wrong way about it and remains a poet, consequently he is unhappily in love with God. Again—a most revealing remark—How many men have any idea how exhausting life is with a real relation to God? He suffered from isolation from others with whom his mind could really commune (what a small place friends take in the *Journals*!), from an abnormal family background, and from the drastic step of his broken engagement. Such a man can see a few things with a penetration not given to ordinary people who are naturally more extraverted—but heaven save us from taking his exceptional insights, won perhaps at the very cost of oneness, and making them into an exclusive philosophy or theology (after the manner of some of Kierkegaard's continental followers). At least we can be sure that Kierkegaard himself would have repudiated such an attempt.

Mr. Dru has certainly done a real service in making the *Journals* available to English readers. The edition is made the more valuable by an introduction and admirable index, which in effect does service as a table of contents, and

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is most necessary in using a large book consisting of disjointed jottings (One minor point Should not the date of Kierkegaard's examination be 1840, and not 1841 as in the footnote on p. 81?)

The little volume *Fear and Trembling* is a good sample of Kierkegaard's writings. It is a meditation on the meaning of faith and its distinction from resignation, illustrated from the story of Abraham and Isaac (Kierkegaard's idea is that it was not Abraham's being prepared to sacrifice Isaac which constituted faith—that could have been merely an act of heroic renunciation—but his faith lay in accepting the inspiration at the crucial moment which gave him the courage not to sacrifice Isaac.)

Whether the publishers are over bold in their claim that the *Journals* of Kierkegaard will command an interest as wide and as lasting as the *Confessions* of St. Augustine, the *Pensées* of Pascal and the *Apologia* of Newman, I hesitate to say. They certainly deserve a unique place among religious autobiographies, but do they reveal that maturity of growth as well as insight into sin and suffering which lifts the individual struggles of an Augustine, a Pascal, and a Newman into a universality which is the rare privilege of a few? Or have we rather, after all, the book which ought to be written—the confessions of a poet unhappily in love with God?

DOROTHY M. EMMET

La filosofia moderna. II. L'età dell'illuminismo. By GUIDO DE RUGGIERO
(Bari: Laterza & Figli, 1939. 2 vols. Pp. 277, 320. Price Lire 45.)

These are the ninth and tenth volumes of Professor de Ruggiero's *History of Philosophy*, which is likely to be the largest work of its kind outside Germany. Among its remarkable features are the lightness with which its erudition is conveyed and the felicity with which the minor names and movements are illuminatingly brought in. Its aim is well expressed in the preface to the two new volumes: 'I have tried to harmonize the close monographic study of the great philosophical personalities with a panoramic view of the great collective movements of ideas. The aim is being pursued with undiminished freshness, suggestiveness and lucidity.'

Professor de Ruggiero boldly extends the Age of Enlightenment by beginning with Hobbes. Since he defines the Age as that in which the levelling, decomposing and recomposing methods of the natural sciences were applied in the study of mental and social life, there is certainly a strong case for putting Hobbes at the head of it, despite his undoubted Cartesian affiliations. The drawback is that the Cambridge Platonists, falling chronologically within the period, are apparently brought also within the Age, but all periodization by characteristics meets with such exceptions. On the British side the story is carried down continuously to Reid; on the Continental side it is confined to the French Enlightenment except for a long preceding section on Leibniz (a reprint of the author's introduction to his Italian translation of the *Monadology*, 1937). This separation of Leibniz from the history of the German *Aufklärung* is defended on the ground that he was a European rather than a purely German figure. This is surely right, and one may add the further justification that to interpolate Leibniz between Locke and the French thinkers of the eighteenth century is a valuable correction of the usual view that these last owed everything to Locke. The account of the *Aufklärung*, and of the corresponding movement in Italy (beginning with Vico), is to occupy the eleventh volume.

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Since it is impossible to accompany the author step by step through this rich century and a quarter, I need only draw attention to some of the features of his treatment of the British line. When Hobbes is made the father of the Enlightenment, Locke suffers somewhat in status, even though he is given more space than the rest. He is handled with just criticism, chiefly in two respects—firstly his failure to divine the deeper meaning of the doctrine of innate ideas, secondly, his taking 'reflection' almost entirely as a sphere of ideas or products without any grasp of its possible significance as an activity. His analytic work is given less appreciation than is, I think, his due, we now find it tedious and confused but it was a great pioneer effort, as original in execution as Hobbes's brilliantly pawky epigrams. Professor de Ruggiero's interest is much more in Locke the rationalist than in "the easy and popular writer, simplifying and clarifying philosophical problems for the world at large whom tradition has portrayed for us" (p. 110), for him there was a real Locke much better than the historically influential one. Berkeley for a change is given as much space as Hume, but neither of them is found very exciting presumably they put the epistemological problem ineptly (a true judgment probably but not an historically minded one). Hume's ethical views which he himself valued most are regarded as of scant importance. It is very salutary to us to see our famous trio (they are too diverse to be called a triumvirate) re-expounded and re-valued by a mind detached from both our national pride and our innate respect for empiricism. Our usual picture of the philosophy of the eighteenth century puts these three so much in the foreground as to block our view of the rest. Professor de Ruggiero avoiding our epistemological bias gives ample room to the physicists, the deists and the moralists. Shaftesbury as is usual abroad is treated relatively fully but every line of the exposition is worth while. The confused and confusing literature of the deists which we nowadays tend to overlook, is well surveyed, though it is probably an error to make the younger Dodwell an opponent of deism (his work can be read as a piece of dissimulation characteristic of the deists), and to point to Methodism, which was a popular movement, as a reaction against deistic intellectualism.

T. E. JESSOP

Eastern Religions and Western Thought By Sir S. RADHAKRISHNAN (Oxford Clarendon Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp. xiii + 391 Price 15s.)

This is an important and beautiful book. It is written with earnest conviction and conspicuous ability. The author thinks that the cleavage between European and Eastern thought was not deep until the beginning of the modern period and that the present organization of the world under European influence is inconsistent with the *Zeitgeist* shining on the distant horizon and with the true spirit of religion. The supreme task of our generation is to give a soul to the growing world-consciousness which should knit together all human society in an international commonwealth. India has much to contribute to the realization of this ideal and England should be the interpreter of Asia to Europe. If Great Britain which represents the best of Europe and India which is the ultimate East, with their distinctive temperaments and traditions can live together in a political system whose keynote is equality and friendship, and not dominion or subjection, it will be the greatest achievement of history."

Humanism is now the religion of the educated European. Most of us are

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religious only by habit, sentiment, or inertia. Men have lost the old faith and have found nothing in its place except superstition in which the starved powers of the soul reassert their claims. The national State tends to absorb all energies and emotions, the national State, which is essentially a huge beast of prey. Nations have become fetishes but we all feel that we are hastening confusedly to unknown ends. We need a rational faith to sustain a new order of life.

The great periods of history are marked by fusions of two different cultures. The time has come for a fusion of European and Indian thought. We must return to a conception of religion as individual experience. Rites and ceremonies, authority and dogma are subordinate to the art of self-discovery which is also contact with God. To say that God exists means that spiritual experience is attainable. This is the fulfilment of man's life where every aspect of his being is raised to its highest point where the whole mind realizes in one quivering instant such things as cannot easily be expressed. This is the leaping spark of Plato's Seventh Epistle and the sudden illumination of Augustine's *Confessions*. To be spiritual is not to reject reason but to go beyond it. It is to think so hard that thinking becomes knowing or viewing. So philosophy and religion converge into a single realization.

Philosophically the foundation of Professor Radhakrishnan's teaching is the separation of the empirical person from the real self. There is an interior depth to the human soul which is uncreated, deathless and absolutely real. The spirit of man is different from the individual ego; it is the core of all being. As in Neoplatonism with which this philosophy has much in common the soul is the wanderer of the metaphysical world belonging essentially to a higher order, but fascinated by the finite. The meaning of life is found not in this world but in superhistorical reality. God and not the world of history is the true environment of our souls.

This position is also that of Keyserling's *Unsterblichkeit*, a youthful work which I think he has never surpassed. The self, not the self-conscious ego, is immortal. Post-Kantian philosophy and theology have greatly exaggerated the importance of the individual ego and have even maintained that the centrality of the self-conscious person is the discovery of Christianity though the profoundly significant saying of Christ that 'he who wishes to preserve his psyche shall lose it' is a sufficient refutation.

The soul that has found itself is no longer conscious of itself in its isolation. I live yet not I but Christ liveth in me. This individualism is rather world-loyalty, for it leaves no room for the disintegrating worship of one's own creed and group with the corollary that violence and injustice are the ways to win success for it. The coming struggle is between empires of material values, supported by organized religions and provincial patriotisms, and the sovereignty of spiritual ideals. A living faith in spiritual values is the great need of our age. We must choose not between Christianity and Hinduism, but between religion and self-satisfied humanism.

Eternal life is the life of the eternal part of us, of the light within us, of intelligence and love. The soul in solitude is the birthplace of religion. Moses on Sinai, Buddha under the *bodhi* tree, Jesus by the Jordan in the stillness of prayer, Paul in the desert of Arabia, Francis of Assisi in the remote crags of the highlands of Alverno found the strength and the assurance of the reality of God. Everything that is great in religion rises out of the depths of the soul in the quiet of prayer.

In common with all other philosophic mystics, our author teaches that the purification and ascent of the soul proceed *pari passu* with the knowledge

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of God and of the real world. Progress is by "a species of intuitive identification in which the individual becomes in very truth the partaker of the divine nature." The intellect is consecrated like the other faculties, but the intellect is *nous* not *dianoia*. Christian theology prefers the word *pneuma* to *nous*, but the meaning is the same.

The Churches, in the Professor's opinion, have wandered far from the religion which the Founder came to preach. But he is half persuaded by Loisy and others that Jesus at first contemplated a political revolution, and was divided between that project and the spiritual religion which belonged to his deeper self. I cannot believe that there was anything of the Mahdi in "the prophet of Nazareth in Galilee", but the matter cannot be discussed here. He wishes of course to recall the Churches to pure mysticism and wastes several pages in denouncing the obscurantist theology of Karl Barth who does not count for much in this country.

He protests most justifiably against the tendency of Western thinkers to regard the defects of European religion as peripheral, those of Hinduism as central. He thinks that the most spiritual elements of Western religion owe much to the direct influence of Indian thought, and supports this view with great learning. Like Brehier he finds strong Oriental influences in the system of Plotinus, and wishes to banish not only him but Plato from the tradition of Hellenism. Plato, we have been told, was from the Greek point of view, a heretic. But Plato is too big a man to cast out of the fold. Greece without Plato would be living Greece no more.

Can we acquit Indian philosophy of being world renouncing to an unacceptable degree? We may entirely agree with our author in dismissing with contempt the military power and technological discoveries of the West as irrelevant to this question. But does the benevolence of the Hindu sage reflect itself in the behaviour of the nation generally? In a country so religious as India the question is not unfair. A foreigner has said that if he were in a tight place he would like to have an Englishman near at hand. Has the Indian any disposition to run and help? Did he not tolerate complacently such customs as widow burning, child marriage and religious prostitution, which are justly repugnant to Europeans?

It has always seemed to me that the tendency of Indian thought is to deny all value to the passing show, and that in consequence the Indian heaven, of which the world is a moving image, is empty of contents. Between the unreal phantasmagoria of sense and the dreamless sleep of Nirvana the rich spiritual life of the Platonic intelligible world is in danger of disappearing. Do the Hindu sages realize that a journey through the unreal is an unreal journey?

The Professor would doubtless answer that the best Indians are not unpractical dreamers, and that the same danger of treating all earthly things as indifferent has been exemplified in the lives of many Christian saints. It is so, but the Christian maxim, 'thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,' has always been interpreted whether logically or not, in a peculiar way. Christian love is different from the benevolence of the religions of escape—Stoicism, Hinduism and Buddhism. Benevolence does not hurt, love often does. Buddha promises to make us invulnerable, so do Zeno and Seneca, Christ never does. The Christian can bear his own troubles stoically, but he will not leave the wounded man by the roadside: he will rejoice with those that rejoice, and weep with those that weep. This attitude towards the misfortunes of life, which contemplatives would persuade us are of no importance, is an integral part of the original Gospel. It forms a very valuable attachment, holding back some who would otherwise seek salvation in a cloistered

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sanctity Those who have experienced nothing are made no wiser or better by solitude There are some who think they are attracted by God when they are only repelled by man

A Christian may think that India has rather more to learn from his religion than our author quite realizes But he makes his main point, that we in Europe have much to learn, and more to unlearn from India We have neglected our opportunities during our long association with a civilization much older and more mature than our own It is not too late to remedy our fault

W R INGE

Reason and Intuition By J L Stocks Edited with an Introduction by Dorothy M Emmet (London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp xxii + 259 Price 12s 6d)

In this book Miss Emmet has collected fifteen papers published by the late Professor J L Stocks during the last six years of his life and one unfinished piece of work In the Introduction she gives a brief account of Stocks's position as a philosopher There is also a note by Sir David Ross on his contribution to studies in Greek philosophy It was characteristic of Stocks that he took pleasure in the minutiae of Greek scholarship though as a philosopher he was critical and constructive rather than interpretative or scholarly in the narrow sense If he was an Aristotelian in virtue of his linguistic studies so also was he in the more important sense that one of the guiding threads in all his thinking was a reinterpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of formal cause As Miss Emmet says he saw the world after the Aristotelian fashion as constituted by different levels of organization each level providing the materials which are both the opportunity for the exercise of formative activity at a higher level and the odds against which that activity must strive

It is possible that if Stocks had lived he would have produced a comprehensive and systematic philosophy but it is more likely that he would have continued much as he began with a preference for special studies of special subjects This kind of work certainly gave scope to what was perhaps Stocks's most outstanding merit his capacity for simple direct and lucid statement the kind of statement that steers clear of irrelevancies and clears up confusion His method of approach was empirical and phenomenological Philosophy for him was a secondary activity a commentary on the primary activities of man In his view however philosophy must take account of all primary activities scientific historical political artistic and religious This commentary should be not merely descriptive but critical and might within limits be constructive

The first few essays in this book provide a good illustration of his general attitude and method The first essay *Reason and Intuition* is an attack on the irrationalism which is fashionable at the present day It then goes on to state what should be meant by intuition, as that aspect of knowledge which is immediate and is of the individual and to consider how intuition is related to the process of reasoning In the third essay *Religious Belief*, Stocks introduces one of his apt and illuminating distinctions that between Total and Partial assertions Partial assertions are such statements as can 'be established separately and by themselves and can be relied on to hold good whatever else is discovered' as when we state a man's height, occupation, or family relationships all of which can be ascertained independently of one another But if we say he is a good man, that is a Total assertion, "Anything

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and everything in the man's life is potentially at least relevant further knowledge may at any time force a reconsideration and qualification of the judgment. Science consists entirely of Partial assertions, as does History, so far as it refrains from ethical or aesthetic judgments. Religion differs entirely from such studies in that it depends upon Total assertions to the effect that the whole world order is the expression of infinite Wisdom and Love. This conclusion as to religious belief is further elucidated with the help of the distinction between Desire and Affection, which Stocks worked out in an essay in his book, *The Limits of Purpose*.

Most of the other essays are concerned with ethical and political subjects. It must suffice here to mention a few of them, selected rather arbitrarily. Those on Locke's political theory and on Jeremy Bentham are interesting appreciations of two very different but characteristically English political thinkers. The essay on "The Empiricism of J. S. Mill" indicates the interest and sympathy with which Stocks regarded this thinker and makes one hope that his unfinished work on Mill may be completed and published. He criticizes Mill, not for being an empiricist but for taking a one-sided view of experience. The discussion of *The Philosophy of Democracy* is an attempt to answer a question seldom asked, but of practical importance now when there are many who despair of democracy altogether. The necessary condition for democracy is seen as fruitful interaction between rulers and ruled. Its natural temper is empirical or opportunist. 'It will with difficulty look very far ahead or undertake very drastic and ambitious schemes of reconstruction.' Not very warm praise but warm enough if the alternative is passive submission to an infallible leader.

A. D. RITCHIE

Paideia the Ideals of Greek Culture By WERNER JAEGER Translated by GILBERT HIGHET (Oxford Basil Blackwell 1939 Pp xxix + 420 Price 15s net)

This is the most important book of the century—indeed, of any century—on its subject. Published in German in 1933 it is now accessible in an English translation which reads like an original. It is an account of the greatest work of Ancient Greece—the creation of a human ideal which in itself is unsurpassed and without which the culture of the western world would never have existed. Other scholars have written histories of Greece or of Greek literature. This is a history of Greek culture (or rather *kultur*—a different thing) and Greek *kultur* is man's discovery of himself. Other nations made gods, kings, spirits, the Greeks alone made man. Professor Jaeger's thesis may be summed up in three sentences. Without Greek cultural ideals the culture of the western world would never have existed (p. xvii). 'the culture of the present . . . needs illumination and transformation by that ideal [the Greek form of culture], in order to establish its true meaning and direction' (p. xviii), by discovering man the Greeks realized the universal laws of human nature (p. xviii). Greek culture is a permanent standard to which European culture (and not only European) must continually recur for self-examination and inspiration.

One might say that the Greek achievement starts with the word *demon*, a peculiar Greek conception and perhaps the most fruitful of all moral ideas, the idea that everything is capable of an excellence, a perfection at which it should aim. The supreme task of man therefore is to discover what human "excellence" is and to achieve it, and the greatness of the Greeks is that they did both. *Paideia* traces the steps of the discovery, and the growing purifica-

tion and enrichment of the human ideal. To Homer it is heroic courage and prowess; to Tyrtaeus the devotion of these powers to the State (but surely this is implicit in Hector's *εἰς οὐανὸς ἄριστος, ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πατρὸς*?). The City State finds human *ἀρετή* in "Justice." Ionian thinkers place it in the "Wisdom" which creates justice and law, order and welfare. One by one the stars of the human firmament rise above the horizon—the Individualism and Science of Ionia, the Orphic conception of the soul, the aristocratic ideal of Pindar, the vision of civic justice in Solon, the wealth of political intellectual literary and individual life in fifth-century Athens, and a human ideal is revealed to which Christianity had something vital to add, but which Christianity itself cannot afford to ignore. All this rich picture is revealed with admirable insight, knowledge and philosophical depth in Professor Jaeger's book. The details are as good as the whole. The book is rich in acute judgments and brilliant characterization (I know for instance nothing better on their subjects than the pages on Sappho and on the *Bacchae*). There are indeed omissions. Herodotus is almost ignored. And justice is hardly done to the theological aspects of Greek *Paideia*. By the side of Protagoras's *παντὶ μέτρον ἄνθρωπον*, stands Plato's *θεὸς μέτρον*, and though the former represents Greece better than the latter, religion is a vital element in Aeschylus and not negligible in Pindar and Sophocles.

The book must have been as difficult to plan as to execute. Who were to be included—all great Greek writers? Or only those important to a history of Greek *kultur*? Sappho is a greater genius than Tyrtaeus or Hesiod or Solon, but she has little relevance to *παιδεία*. Is she to be admitted? Her admission perhaps marks a certain change in the design of the book, for while its earlier parts are definitely a history of the formation of a human ideal, it develops later into a series of studies of the personalities and ideas of the great Greek writers, though some of them contributed little to that ideal or even were destructive of it. We have a picture of successive Greek poets and thinkers rather than of the ideals of Greek *kultur*.

One result of this change of emphasis is that the second half of *Paideia* is free from a weakness which can be observed in the earlier chapters—the temptation to find conscious educational purpose where it is absent, to schematize the free mind of poetry. If Archilochus had been told that there was a hortatory element in his poetry and that it was born of the need of the free individual to see and solve the problem of human life outside the mythical content of epic poetry, he might have been provoked to an iambus on Professor Jaeger. And perhaps Homer would have been surprised at the judgment that the *Iliad* has an ethical design. Doubtless it has a deep ethical effect, but this is not from design. Homer is telling a story, not educating; his interest is in the heroism and tragedy of that story rather than in its morals. But because great literature is *μεγαλοφρονῆς ἀπὸ πηγῆς* and because all greatness is educational, he is a great ethical teacher without knowing or intending it. Between Tyrtaeus who does preach and Homer who does not, there is all the difference in mood—and in greatness. Hence the chapters on Homer, where Professor Jaeger has his eyes open for 'ethical design,' are the least satisfactory part of the book, while the chapters on the Sophists and on Thucydides (the latter a study of historical and political outlook rather than of *Paideia*) are among the best.

This criticism does not affect the importance of *Paideia*. It is a book for scholars, but also for students—not least because they are apt to read only the main Greek authors and therefore to see Hellenism as a series of high peaks and not as a connected landscape. *Paideia* will fill the gaps in their background. And it is a book for a wider public. There is no better way—if

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there is any way—of orientating ourselves in this chaotic world than by studying ancient Greece. There we can discern, as Professor Jaeger says, the true meaning and direction of our own culture, that "vast disorganized external apparatus for living." Apart from his learned work, Professor Jaeger's importance lies in what he has done to remind the world that ancient Greece should be regarded not only as a field for scholarship but as a living force in the spiritual and political life of the world. It is welcome news that this volume which ends with Thucydides will be followed by others dealing with the transformation of Greek civilization into a world wide empire and with its relations to Rome and to early Christianity.

R. W. LIVINGSTONE

Communication: A Philosophical Study of Language By KARL BRITTON
(London: International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and
Scientific Method. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1939. 17p. xvi
+ 285. Price 12s. 6d.)

It is notorious that in recent years many philosophers have been preoccupied with questions about the functions of the symbols of ordinary language and of artificial codes. Indeed the whole task of philosophy, according to some philosophers, lies in some form of linguistic inquiry. What are the sources and the motives of this tendency?

Until the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* no general distinction had been made between the procedure of philosophy and the procedures of the pure or of the inductive sciences. Indeed in England the very word 'scientist' was only invented a century ago when the standard word 'philosopher' was just beginning to appear equivocal. So the problems of the nature of the subject matter and of the methods of philosophical inquiry, as distinct from scientific inquiry, have only been attended to during the moderately recent past.

At first the delimitation of the sphere of philosophy seemed simple. The sciences have for their subject matter the physical world; philosophy has for its subject matter the mental world. The philosopher has to discover about Mind what Newton and Boyle had been discovering about Matter.

This simple solution, which at the start did much more good than harm, was torpedoed at about the turn of the century from two different sides. Empirical psychology showed signs of becoming a science, and logicians attending at last to the principles of mathematics saw that the rigour, precision, and timelessness of mathematical theorems and of logical rules were not derivative from anthropological inductions. Mind ceased to be the prerogative of philosophers, and the subject matter of a part of philosophy, namely logic, turned out not to have anything psychological about it. So for a short while a new solution was adopted. Philosophy was re-Platonized, and its subject matter was described as being some *Drücker Reich* of subsistent entities, real universals, objective propositions, possibilities, facts, or objects of a higher order.

But this multiplication both of numbers of entities and of grades of Being led to troubles. It seemed unpalatable to assert the existence of propositions, facts, and possibilities, underhand to assert the non actual existence of unicorns and golden mountains, and self-contradictory to assert the subsistence of round squares and of non subsistent round squares. Certain anti-septic precautions had to be taken.

(a) Among the first was a reconsideration of the notion of denotation. The

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expressions which can function as the nominatives of significant indicative sentences do not all denote in the same way, and in some senses of 'denote' certain of them do not denote at all. There are some expressions, which any grammarian would call 'names' corresponding to which there exist no things or persons for them to be the names of. There are other expressions, built just like designations or descriptions to which again the world supplies nothing to correspond. And yet the sentences containing these expressions (like Mr Pickwick, 'the Equator', 'the present King of France,' etc.) may be significant and even true. Logically proper names had to be distinguished from ordinary proper names which in turn had to be conflated with descriptions and different uses of descriptive expressions had to be distinguished. Philosophers learned to ask, not 'What sort of a thing is the Equator?' but 'What sort of an expression is "the Equator"?'

(b) Next the expansion of formal logic, which was required to render it capable of dealing with non-syllogistic and especially with arithmetical inferences led Frege and Russell not only to invent new code-symbols for the formulae of logic, but also to consider what were the essential properties of a good symbolism. Among these is the cardinal one of non-ambiguity. Formal differences must be registered by visibly different symbols or symbol patterns. And this at once made manifest by contrast that ordinary language is tolerant of any amount of ambiguity, not merely in containing equivocal words which engender puns but what matters more, in allowing similar sentence constructions to express propositions of different logical form and in allowing dissimilar sentence constructions to express propositions of the same logical form. There is no inference from the form of words in which we say something to the logical properties of what we are saying. Consequently, though I may know or have excellent scientific or common sense reasons for believing that something is the case, there still remains open the quite different question of what sort the fact or proposition is. This question is not one for science or common sense, and it may be one for which it is important to find the solution. In its general form the question would ask: What is the logically unambiguous way of formulating what this given sentence formulates in a logically ambiguous way?

(c) A third impulse in the same direction came from the following source. It is of course, closely linked to the other two. In the construction of a good code symbolism for formal logic, both for the sake of stenography and to prevent the distraction of attention by differences that make no difference, it is important to have code signs for any proposition elements of the same type. Thus the letter x in ' x is mortal' saves us from having to mention Socrates or the Duke of Wellington, and the letters ' p ', ' q ', and ' r ' in ' p implies q and q implies r , then p implies r ' save us from having to insert entire sentences before and after the verb 'implies'. Now for a code formula to symbolize the common form of a range of formally similar materially dissimilar propositions the element signs must be of the right type to go with each other in that formula. Otherwise the formula is nonsense i.e. the sentences resulting by implementing the variables with the corresponding ordinary expressions are absurd. 'Socrates implies Plato' and 'To-day's being Tuesday is mortal' are meaningless, though not ungrammatical. Now in most cases we can avoid nonsense by ordinary good sense. But there are cases where we are led unwittingly into nonsense. The puzzles of 'the Liar' and the Class of Classes which are not members of themselves are familiar cases of this. A theory of types then seems thus to be required as a part of logic and its function is to establish rules demarcating significant from nonsensical forms of words. So already, on these three counts it became clear that

anyhow the branch of philosophy that we call logic has a lot to do with the rules governing the rôles in signification of language elements

Meanwhile Moore was applying the same or a similar prescription to other philosophical problems. For the questions which he canvasses are not such questions as 'Is it true that there is a table before me?' which is a question decidable by common sense or scientific methods but such questions as 'What does it mean to say that there is a table before me?' or 'What is the correct analysis of the sentence 'I see a table'?' He does not I think generalize his procedure as a maxim for all philosophical inquiry, but his influence has been in this direction. In particular inquiries into the logic of affirmative existence propositions establishing as they did that they are synthetic and not provable by *reductio ad absurdum* arguments inoculated him and others against the superstition that philosophy discovers and describes any special existences. Philosophy is not a special science and not being like the sciences, informative it can only be in some fashion elucidatory of information acquired elsewhere than from philosophizing. Wittgenstein was I take it the first overtly to declare that all philosophical inquiries are semantic concerned, that is with elucidating the rules governing the significance and the possibilities of co-significance of language elements. Philosophical puzzles arise because we do not understand the syntax of our language. (But 'syntax' here does not mean what we ordinarily mean by it namely what makes English constructions like or unlike Latin ones.) He indicates sagaciously that just as previous philosophers had mistakenly supposed themselves to be dealing with the facts of empirical psychology so people will be tempted to construe philosophy on his account of it as dealing with the facts of philology—which, of course is just what has happened.

Mr Britton though he entitles his book *Communication a Philosophical Study of Language* does not unfortunately enter into any of the considerations which have made philosophers think that linguistic questions are important for or else the whole subject matter of philosophy. He launches out straight away into more or less specialist issues, so his book is of the nature of a Higher Criticism for the converted only. Those who wish to know why philosophy is more closely concerned with language than with football, or even what the cardinal philosophical problems about language are are not catered for.

He begins by accepting from Ogden and Richards the distinction between the informative and the emotive functions of language and uses this distinction as a principle for his subsequent elucidations of the functions of necessary propositions and of value propositions. In his chapters on Contingent Propositions the propositions namely which embody information or misinformation about what exists or occurs he tries to reformulate the Verifiability principle in a way not open to the ordinary charge that it entails solipsism. Statements of fact or alleged fact must be analysable into descriptions of what is directly observed or would in logically possible circumstances be observed by a normal observer, a normal observer being one whose reactions do or would agree with those of the great majority. Apparently it is an analytic proposition that lunatics constitute only a small minority of the population.

Statements about other people's experiences are not directly verifiable or falsifiable by me yet they can make sense to me, since the impossibility of my introspecting or remembering an experience belonging to another personal history is a causal and not a logical impossibility. My evidence that there are such experiences is that of analogy.

About physical objects the position of non solipsistic phenomenalism is

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adopted by Mr Britton " all propositions about physical objects are *most directly expressed* in sentences whose logical subjects are names (or gaps for names) of place-times and which predicate of these subjects sensible properties and relations " No difficulties apparently, are felt about the verification of law propositions

When he turns to necessary propositions of which he discerns several kinds Mr Britton uses as his key the notions of explicit and implicit tautology Necessary propositions give no information about the world but they do give jointly information about the prevalent uses of words and prescriptions about their proper uses It is a pity that he skirts so shyly round the thorny topic of the nature of mathematical propositions The world would like to know why arithmetic and algebra are so useful, when 'white swans are white' is so useless But even about the tautologous sentences that Mr Britton does describe there raises its head this surely fairly hackneyed question

Mr Fowler in his *Dictionary of Modern English Usage* is all the time both describing how words and phrases are commonly used and prescribing how they should be used Why are his assertions not necessary propositions if they fit as they seem to do Mr Britton's account of what constitutes a necessary proposition? Obviously they are in fact contingent historical records or descriptions of social customs and tastes and very likely some of them are false In what way then are Mr Britton's necessary propositions 'about actual or recommended usages if they are not so in Mr Fowler's way? We recognize the bracing unsentimentality of the doctrine that necessary propositions describe only language rules but it is nearly time that the message was expressed unambiguously—articulating for instance what is the difference between talking shockingly bad English and talking nonsense

In his account of the significance of value-propositions Mr Britton does not go all the way with the extremists He finds that many ordinary sorts of value-propositions contain a conjunction of an informative and an emotive element So far as they are informative they state that certain means conduce to certain ends so far as they are emotive they spur others to ensue those means The ultimate end is personal happiness which is not defined merely in terms of pleasure And when the question is faced How do moral rules state that certain steps would be means to the agent's happiness? we are reminded that it is often prudent to benefit one's society that we have social impulses and lastly that creeds codes and institutions tend to gull people into a readiness to do things which are not calculated to be felicitous to themselves This attempt to distil moral obligations out of self-interest sympathy and gullibility is lacking in novelty and truth but perhaps its prime object was to suggest a way in which verifiable factual assertions might enter into without exhausting the communicable content of value-propositions

Mr Britton virtually concludes his book with a long disquisition upon the significance of poetic expressions in which of course the emotive function outweighs without necessarily annulling the informative function

Mr Britton thus in his discussion of these points as well as of many other germane points tackles a number of the issues which are in the forefront of contemporary debates, and that his interests lie in these regions can be inferred also from the numbers of the references which he makes to the publications of Wittgenstein Carnap, Schlick Neurath Wisdom and others of the 'movement' And on each of the points which he discusses he has something fresh and relevant to say

And yet as a whole, the book must be described as disappointing For first of all, no trick of presentation is omitted which can serve to interrupt

the attention or weary the eye. On almost every page there are from half a dozen to a dozen or more words or phrases italicized, nearly half the pages have footnotes, and these disturbances are supplemented by a profusion of apparatus marks, bracketed asides, parentheses, deprecatory inverted commas, special index numbers referring to past formulae or examples and the like, and the terminology switches swiftly from the technical to the jaunty—so that the total effect is somewhat like *Science Abstracts* written in the feminine epistolary style. Not only to writers on Communication might the reminder be given that disciplined prose has a communicative efficacy.

And next Mr Britton is too doctrinaire and not sufficiently ratiocinative. Too many things are accepted as premisses or conclusions because they seem clear to the author. And when a general argument is required for what purports to be a philosophical view, it is at the least disquieting to find cited the dicta of anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, physiologists, and literary critics.

Finally, the book is too esoteric. To those who keep themselves in the swim by reading articles and discussions in contemporary philosophical journals and by attending philosophical symposia, most of the topics in the book will be familiar as pertaining to the contemporary debates of a fairly large and very active circle of philosophers. But without such an introduction an ordinary philosophical reader will be at a loss to see what is the drift or object of the book. What is the link between the rejection of solipsistic phenomenalism and the acceptance of egoistic eudaemonism, or between the tautology account of necessary propositions and the emotive account of poetry? What, in a word, is the philosophical problem of communication? And on pain of what theoretical troubles are we bound to accept Mr Britton's several special theories?

GILBERT RYLE

Logic: The Theory of Inquiry By JOHN DEWEY (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1939. Pp. viii + 346. Price 18s. net.)

In his Preface Dr Dewey says that this book is a development of the ideas about logic which he first presented some forty years ago, in his *Studies in Logical Theory*. It is in particular an attempt to show how those early ideas can be applied to the "interpretation of the forms and formal relations which constitute the standard material of logical tradition." The argument may be summarized as follows:

Philosophers of the rationalist school have erred in postulating a faculty of Pure Reason. The claim to intuition of *a priori* truths is merely a relic of supernaturalism. On the other hand the older empiricists erred when they tried to include logic within the scope of their subjectivist psychology. For there are no mental entities such as they supposed. We must consider man from the 'biological-cultural' point of view and study his operations in the course of inquiry. Logic is a naturalistic theory. We may say, if we like, that it is normative, but that can only mean that it tells us what ways of inquiry have been found to lead to success. The principles of logic 'state habits operative in every inference that tend to yield conclusions that are stable and productive in further inquiries' (p. 13). Unfortunately, most current textbooks of logic are based on an outworn Greek conception of science as the study of changeless species. What we really need is "a unified theory of inquiry through which the authentic pattern of experimental and operational inquiry of science shall become available for the regulation of the habitual

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methods by which inquiries in the field of common sense are carried on" (p. 98). In the course of inquiry into inquiry we discover various recurrent forms. But we must not assume that these have any absolute ontological status. The correct doctrine is that "logical forms accrue to subject-matter in virtue of subjection of the latter in inquiry to the conditions determined by its end—institution of a warranted conclusion" (p. 372). The main distinction among propositions in respect of their form is that between the existential and the universal. *Existential propositions* have to do with "observed data or facts," whereas *universal propositions* prescribe operations which when performed yield new data tending in the direction of a determinate existential situation" (p. 288). It is most important not to confuse universal propositions with generic propositions. "Once it is recognized that a universal proposition is a formula of a possible operation, the chief logical problem about such propositions concerns their relation with generic propositions: that is their relation with determination of the distinguishing traits which describe kinds. According to the view here stated, the relation is *conjugate*. Universals and generics bear the same relation to each other in inquiry that material and procedural means sustain to each other in institution of judgment. Propositions about kinds and singulars as of a specified kind provide the subject-matter that forms the logical *subject* of final judgment. Propositions about the operations to be undertaken in order to effect the transformation of problematic subject-matter into a unified continuous existential situation provide the predication subject-matter" (p. 274).

In making this summary of Dr. Dewey's work I have retained his terminology and quoted freely in order to convey some notion of his style. Of the argument itself I can only say that I do not think it will convert any philosophers who are critical of the older versions of pragmatism. The publishers are perhaps a little extravagant when they say on the dust-cover that Dr. Dewey's originality of thought, close reasoning, and relatively simple style combine to make this book the most important work in philosophy of our generation.

There are some curious slips scattered through the book. On page 89 "*gignoskai*" appears as the Greek for 'to know' and on page 201 the phrases "*to katholon*" and "*to hekaston*" [sic] are supposed to be Greek for 'generally' and 'severally'. On page 344 it is said that Plato did not formulate the Principle of Contradiction. On page 476 it is said that the mathematical theory of probability can derive from assumptions about equiprobability propositions about what will *necessarily* occur as a matter of frequency-distributions in an *indefinite* series of throws. In the index R. Poincaré gets the credit for Henri's views about mathematical induction.

W. KNEALE

Selected Mystical Writings of William Law. By STEPHEN HOBHOUSE. (London: The C. W. Daniel Company Ltd. Pp. 395. Price 8s. 6d.)

Mr. Stephen Hobhouse's selection from the mystical writings of William Law, published at a very moderate price, ought to be warmly welcomed. It is a reproach to English theology that some of the finest works of our greatest religious writer in the eighteenth century should be hard to procure. *The Serious Call* is well known and deserves its fame, but the treatises which Law wrote after 1734, when he became acquainted with the writings of Jacob Boehme, the "Teutonic philosopher," are really more valuable.

German histories of philosophy place Boehme in the main line of development in German thought which culminated in Schelling and Hegel, and also,

through his insistence on Will as the constitutive principle of the world, make him a precursor of Schopenhauer. Law does not follow him slavishly. He is most attracted by Böhme's polemic against the forensic doctrine of the Atonement, by his insistence that God is love, and wrath foreign to His nature by his Christ mysticism, and by his sacramental view of the visible world. These doctrines are expounded with a fiery eloquence, and in a pure and virile English style such as few of our religious teachers have had at their command.

The two most attractive of Law's works are *The Spirit of Prayer* and *The Spirit of Love*. The former is somewhat marred by extreme anti intellectualism, a reaction against the rationalism of Deists and anti Deists alike. He ignores the Platonists with whom he has really much in common. This is the more remarkable, since his own college, Emmanuel, was the nursery of Cambridge Platonism. Law seems to have known only Henry More in this group, and he disliked what he called "a jumble of learned rant" in More's books. He was separated from the Cambridge men by his High Churchmanship and by his prejudice against "rational theologians." But in John Smith he might have found a philosophy more learned and not less devout than his own, inspired not by the dreams of an illuminated cobbler, but by the thoughts of Plato and Plotinus.

Law was before his time in his dislike of the word supernatural. "The Christian religion is the only true religion of nature, it has nothing in it supernatural." "There is nothing supernatural in the mystery of our redemption, but the supernatural love and wisdom that brought it forth."

In the prosaic eighteenth century Law is almost a portent. In our time he appeals strongly to many who find the apologetics of Bishop Butler very unsatisfying. Baron von Hügel's testimony is worth quoting: "William Law, so far as I know, is the only spiritual thinker of the first rank among the English mystics of the post Reformation Church. His religious and literary importance are very great."

W. R. INGE

Reality By PAUL WEISS (Princeton The University Press, London Humphrey Milford 1938 Pp 314 Price, \$3.50)

MR WEISS has what is rare and refreshing in these days, a robust conviction of the soundness and of the adequacy of man's metaphysical powers. What is rarer still, he has acquired or retained this conviction after a long and not undistinguished apprenticeship in the ways of modern logic. He has produced a highly technical book in language that does not seem to be unduly technical, and therefore, even if what he says must be caviare to many experts as well as to the general, the fare he provides may not seem to be at all exotic. His competence is obvious and his enthusiasm is very likeable. He is very much at home in many mansions, and that is important since his ambitious design is to review epistemology as well as ontology, and to show the complementary character of the two.

For my self I must confess that I find the book disappointing. Unfortunately, however, there are so few pages in the book that do not exasperate me that I cannot give adequate reasons for my reaction to the book (if such reasons exist) except at inordinate length. In view of this the best thing I can do I think, is to assure the reader that I hope I am wrong, and to inform him that the presumption is against me, partly on account of the other work Mr Weiss has done, partly on account of the truth of the general statements I have made at the beginning of this review. I don't want to deter anyone

from reading Mr Weiss, but my personal attitude towards his book is unfavourable

One would expect a good logician to construct a road that plainly avoided the slush and the savannahs of metaphysics, but Mr Weiss seems to me to be hurried and rather cavalier right through his argument and to be far too reticent about the distinction between what is episodic and what is essential in his exposition. Again, he seems to me to make transitions where there are none by simply saying that the thing is so (His combination of a metaphysically demonstrable pluralism with an equally indefeasible monism, of a permanent Now with evanescent nows of abstract futures with something present of a substantial 'but merely' vicarious identity between knower and known seem to me to be instances) The surface of Mr Weiss's metaphysical highway seems treacherous to me even if the road is as well built as I hope but cannot see that it is

A minor point of difficulty concerns the language that Mr Weiss has chosen to employ. He is fond of coining unknown words such as a 'negate', an isolate, and he has composed some sentences that seem to me to be intolerable. Take the following for instance: 'We vary in the degree to which we can concretionalize that which we now privationally possess.' The meaning seems to be that some of us have better luck than others in getting what we want.

But I hope I am suffering from some contagion of peevishness, and that Mr Weiss's book is immensely better than I think it is. It discusses questions of great importance in both its parts, entitled respectively 'Knowledge and Ignorance' and 'Multiplicity and Process'. The chapters I personally found most interesting were those on Logic, on Persistence and on Teleology (called by the author 'Metontological Causation') but this preference may well be capricious and Mr Weiss is very well equipped for all his expeditions.

JOHN LAIRD

The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe By M OAKESHOTT
With a Foreword by Professor Ernest Barker (Cambridge at the
University Press 1939 Pp xxii + 224 Price 10s 6d)

In his valuable introduction to this collection of documents representative of the political theories of contemporary Europe Mr Oakeshott writes: 'The debt of modern authoritarian doctrines to Liberalism is impossible to conceal and anyone anxious to extract the true metal of the Liberal doctrine from the base ore from which it has never yet been successfully separated will look hopefully to modern authoritarianism for relevant and constructive criticisms. But he will look in vain.' His remark aptly expresses the disappointment which results from studying the texts which he has here with great judgment selected. As systems of political thought—and it is with ideas that Mr Oakeshott is concerned—the primary texts of the modern authoritarian creeds, more especially those of Fascism and National Socialism, fill the mind with wonder at the credulity of human beings. Without the historical backgrounds of national insecurity or humiliation at defeat in war without the hot demagogic breath of oratory to give them potency they appear jejune and empty when they are not palpably false.

By contrast the older authoritarian doctrine of Catholicism has dignity and coherence and the advocates of Representative Democracy the merit of seeking a complex answer to a complex problem the merit, at least, of disclaiming crude over simplification.

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The whole collection of extracts is admirably chosen and it is doubtful to anyone who has read that work whether, without very great expense of space, direct quotation from *Mein Kampf* could have improved on Mr Oakeshott's summary of its doctrine. With the assistance of Mr Oakeshott's restrained and highly pertinent introduction and of the documents themselves students of contemporary political thought are now provided with a most useful selection of texts to assist their study of the subject.

E J PASSANT

Books received also —

- E MOUSLEY *Man or Leviathan? A Twentieth Century Enquiry into War and Peace* London G Allen & Unwin Ltd 1939 Pp 470 15s
- W M WHEELER *Essays in Philosophical Biology* (Selected by G H Parker) Cambridge U.S.A. Harvard University Press, London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp xv + 261 3 dollars, 12s 6d
- V KRUSE (Tr by P T Federspiel) *Hume's Philosophy in his Principal Work "A Treatise of Human Nature and in his Essays"* London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp 67 6s
- S S SINGH *The Theory and Practice of Yoga or the Science of Self Advancement Material and Spiritual* (Obtainable from) S Singh, Sulakhan Abad Gujranwala India 1937 Pp 134 1 dollar, 4s
- I EDMAN *Philosopher's Holiday* London Constable & Co 1939 Pp xix + 284 10s
- VARIOUS AUTHORS *Reason* (University of California Publications in Philosophy Vol 21) Berkeley University of California Press, London Cambridge University Press 1939 Pp 228 11s 6d
- M GREGORY *Psychotherapy Scientific and Religious* London Macmillan & Co 1939 Pp xvii + 495 21s
- E GILSON *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* New York and London C Scribner's Sons, Ltd 1939 Pp 114 6s
- W McDUGALL *The Group Mind The Principles of Collective Psychology and their Application to the Interpretation of National Life and Character* (First cheap edition) London Cambridge University Press 1939 Pp 304 7s 6d
- W G DE BURGH *Knowledge of the Individual* (Ruddell Memorial Lectures) London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp 60 2s 6d
- M JRAEVKEL *Death is not enough Essays in Active Negation* London C W Daniel Co 1939 Pp 170 7s 6d
- S C CHATTERJEE *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge A Critical Study of some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics* The University of Calcutta 1939 Pp xix + 421
- VARIOUS AUTHORS *Causality in Current Philosophy* (Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association Vol XIV) Washington, D.C. Catholic University of America 1939 Pp 228
- A E AFFIFI *The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Dīn Ibnul 'Arabī* London Cambridge University Press 1939 Pp xxi + 213 12s 6d
- J MACMURRAY *The Boundaries of Science A Study in the Philosophy of Psychology* London Faber & Faber 1939 Pp 268 7s 6d
- C M PERRY *Toward a Dimensional Realism* Norman University of Oklahoma Press 1939 Pp ix + 180 2 dollars 50
- A D WINSPEAR and T SILVERBERG *Who was Socrates?* New York The Gordon Co 1939 Pp 96 1 dollar 25

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- H BHATTACHARYYA *The Foundations of Living Faiths An Introduction to Comparative Religion* 1st Vol University of Calcutta 1939 Pp xii + 526
- J B PRATT *Naturalism* New Haven Yale University Press London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp x + 180 2 dollars 9s
- J MARSHALL *Swords and Symbols The Technique of Sovereignty* New York and London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp 168 2 dollars 8s 6d
- C B GARNETT JUN *The Kantian Philosophy of Space* New York Columbia University Press London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp xi + 287 17s 6d
- E GRAHAM HOWE and L. LE MESURIER *The Open Way A Study in Acceptance* London Methuen & Co 1939 Pp xxvi + 201 8s
- C E VAUGHAN (Ed by A G Little) *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy before and after Rousseau* Manchester University Press Cheaper edition 1939 Vol I From Hobbes to Hume (with memoir) Pp xxix + 364 Vol II From Burke to Mazzini (with a list of the writings of Professor Vaughan by H B Charlton) Pp xxvi + 336 25s net
- M SCHLICK (Tr by D Rynin) *Problems of Ethics* New York Prentice Hall Inc 1939 Pp xv + 217 2 dollars
- A COBBAN *Dictatorship Its History and Theory* London J Cape 1939 Pp 352 12s 6d
- IMMANUEL KANT *Perpetual Peace* (Introduction by N Murray Butler) New York Columbia University Press London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp ix + 67 5s
- International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* University of Chicago Press London Cambridge University Press 1939 Vol I No 3 R Carnap 'Foundations of Logic and Mathematics' Pp viii + 71 5s Vol I No 4 L Bloomfield 'Linguistic Aspects of Science' Pp viii + 59 5s
- VARIOUS AUTHORS *University of Oxford Committee for Advanced Studies Abstracts of Dissertations for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy* Oxford Clarendon Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp v + 306 3s
- R SIMETERRE *La Théorie Socratique de la Vertu Science selon les Mémoires de Xénophon* Paris P Tequi 1938 Pp 79 Fr 17 70
- Institut de France Annuaire pour 1939* Paris Imprimerie Nationale 1939 Pp 433
- E AUGIER *La Mémoire et la Vie Essai de Défense du Mécanisme Psychologique* Paris F Alcan 1939 Pp 251 Fr 30
- P LAMY *Claude Bernard et le Matérialisme* Paris F Alcan 1939 Pp 102 Fr 15
- R FARNEY *Le Nous et le Moi Essai de Synthèse Sociale* Paris Aubier, Editions Montaigne Pp 251 Fr 20
- V SOLOVIEV *La Justification du Bien Essai de Philosophie Morale (Traduit de russe par T D M)* Paris Aubier 1939 Pp xxii + 509 Fr 75
- J BOYER *Essai d'une Définition de la Vie* Paris F Alcan 1939 Pp 143 Fr 20
- J PAOLI *Défilé entre la Bruyère et Bergson* Göteborg Wettergren & Kerbers Forlag 1939 Pp 58 Kr 3
- L BRUNSHVIGG *La Raison et la Religion* Paris F Alcan 1939 Pp 267 Fr 30
- V SOURIAU *L'Instauration Philosophique* Paris F Alcan 1939 Pp 412 Fr 60

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- L VIVANTE *Indétermination et Création. L'indéterminisme dans ses rapports avec l'imagination créatrice et l'activité morale.* (Traduit par L. E. Lanza) Paris F Sorlot 1939 Pp. 270 Fr. 30.
- A N. WHITEHEAD (Traduit et Préfacé par P. Devaux). *Le Devenir de la Religion* Paris Aubier. 1939 Pp 192 Fr 18
- G W F HEGEL (Traduit par J Hyppolite) *La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit* Paris Aubier. 1939 Tome I Pp vii + 358 Fr 60.
- Actualités Scientifiques et Industrielles*
- I É Brehier "Les Études de Philosophie Antique" Pp 55
- II C Baudouin "La Psychanalyse" Pp 150
- III le P M D Chenu "Les Études de Philosophie Médiévale" Pp 83
- Paris Hermann et Cie 1939
- M BECK *Psychologie Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Seele* Leiden A W Sythoff 1938 Pp 271 Fl 6 50
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- I LICHTIG *Die Entstehung des Lebens durch stetige Schöpfung* Amsterdam Noord Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatsch 1938 Pp 371 Fl 6
- J J POORTMAN *Drei Vorträge über Philosophie und Parapsychologie* Leiden A W Sythoff 1939 Pp 76 Fl 1 80
- H RICKERT *Unmittelbarkeit und Sinnbedeutung Ansätze zur Ausgestaltung des Systems der Philosophie* Tübingen J C B Mohr 1939 Pp 185 M 8
- H SCHMALENBACH *Geist und Sein* Basel Haus zum Falken 1939 Pp 328 Geb Fr 18
- G SIEWERTH *Der Thomismus als Identitätssystem* Frankfurt a M G Schulte-Bulmke 1939 Pp 208 M 8
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- P ALBERTELLI *Gli Eleati Testimonianze e Frammenti* Bari G Laterza & Figli 1939 Pp 250 Lire 30
- C ASTRADA *La Ética Formal y los Valores ensayo de una revaloración existencial de la moral Kantiana orientado en el problema de la libertad* La Plata, Argentina Biblioteca Humanidades 1938 Pp x + 142
- M T GILLIO Tos *Il Pensiero di Giovanni Dewey* Napoli L Loffredo 1938 Pp xxi + 350 L 15

AN APPEAL FOR REFUGEE PHILOSOPHERS

AN organization named 'Council for Assisting Refugee Philosophers' has been formed for the purpose of helping philosophers who are seeking refuge in this country from racial or political persecution. The inaugural meeting on March 11th was attended by representatives of the Aristotelian Society, the British Institute of Philosophy, the Mind Association, the Analysis Society, the Philosophical Society of England, the Scots Philosophical Club, the Senior Division of the Cambridge Moral Science Club, and the Oxford Philosophical Society.

The Officers of the Council are Viscount Samuel, President; Professor John Macmurray, Chairman of Executive Committee; and Dr C. A. Mace, Honorary Secretary.

The Council has already been able to take some effective action on behalf of philosophical refugees. It has under consideration further plans for assisting these philosophers to carry on their teaching and research in this country. In the detailed formulation of proposals to this end, it is working in close collaboration with the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning and with the philosophical societies of this country.

The British Institute of Philosophy is anxious to support to its fullest extent the movement sponsored by the above named Council, and to announce that it is represented on this Body by the President, Lord Samuel, Professor Muirhead, The Dean of St. Paul's, and Dr Hilda Oakeley. In common with other philosophical societies in Great Britain, the British Institute of Philosophy is opening a Fund to which those members who desire to help in this pressing need may contribute. It is hoped that many will respond to this appeal. Those who are able to do so can feel assured that the assistance given will not only alleviate very great distress, but will also enable those receiving it to continue making important contributions to the advancement of learning and to the preservation of cultural values endangered in the present world situation.

Cheques, etc., should be made payable to *The British Institute of Philosophy (Refugee Account)* and sent to The Honorary Secretary of the Institute at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.

IN MEMORY OF FREUDENTHAL

PROFESSOR A. WOLF

THE centenary of the birth of Freudenthal should not be allowed to pass in silence, if only because of his great services to the cause of Spinoza study. He was one of the leading pioneers in exact Spinoza research, and his contributions constitute a turning point in this important and attractive field of investigation.

Jacob Freudenthal was born on June 20, 1839, at Bodenfelde, a village in the province of Hanover. His people were poor, and his early schooling was carried on amid considerable difficulties. At the age of 12 he entered his father's shop, but showed so little interest in it that it was thought best to send him to a school in Hanover with the idea of his becoming a schoolmaster eventually. In 1856 he entered the Jewish Seminary in Breslau, where he continued his studies until 1862. In Breslau he worked under several distinguished Jewish teachers (Frankel, Bernays, and others), and laid the foundations of his sound Hebrew and Classical learning. In 1862 he went to the University of Göttingen, where he studied philosophy under Lotze. His Ph.D. dissertation dealt with some aspects of Aristotle's philosophy. In the course of the 1860's Freudenthal also published some essays on the Greek and Hebrew conceptions of God, and on Alexandrian Religious Philosophy, and he carried on some investigations in medieval philosophy.

When in 1866 Bernays was appointed Hon. Professor and Director of the Library in the University of Bonn, Freudenthal succeeded him in the Breslau Seminary. Nine years later he added the post of lecturer at the Breslau University, where he was promoted to the rank of Honorary Professor in 1879. It was extremely difficult at that time for a professing Jew to be elected to an ordinary salaried Chair at a German University. The University of Breslau nominated him for the ordinary Chair in Philosophy in 1888, but it took them two years to persuade the imperial headquarters to sanction the appointment. Accordingly in 1890 Freudenthal resigned his post at the Breslau Seminary, and entered on his distinguished career as University Professor.

Freudenthal's interest in Spinoza was probably first roused by his teacher Bernays, who, in 1850, published an essay on Spinoza's *Hebrew Grammar*. His own first contribution to Spinoza literature appeared in 1887, in the form of a long paper on "Spinoza and Scholasticism," in a volume of essays published in honour of Zeller. In 1893 his essay on "The History of Spinozism" was published in the *Jewish Quarterly Review* (vol. viii). About that time with the encouragement of the Berlin Academy, Freudenthal undertook a laborious survey of all the original sources of information relating to the life and work of Spinoza. In the course of it, he searched many libraries and archives in Holland and England as well as elsewhere. The results were published in his epoch-making work, *Die Lebensgeschichte Spinozas in Quellschriften und Nichtamtlichen Nachrichten* (Leipzig, 1899). This source book contains nearly all the available material, carefully collected, and duly annotated. Two Dutch scholars, Meinsma and Meyer, had already done some valuable work in this field, but Freudenthal's book is still the only comprehensive collection of documents for an authentic account of the life and work of Spinoza. Earlier biographers were far too slipshod in their methods and quite unreliable in their

results. Five years later Freudenthal produced a *Life of Spinoza*, which is still the best book on the subject. The *Life* was to have been followed by a companion volume on the *Teaching of Spinoza*. Unfortunately he died, in 1907, before completing it. But he left considerable portions of it in manuscript. These were edited by the late Dr. Gebhardt, and published, together with a new edition of the *Life* in 1927 under the original title of *Spinoza: Leben und Lehre* (*Bibliotheca Spinozana*). This is a bulky volume of about 620 quarto pages. Bigger volumes on Spinoza have appeared since then, but nothing more important or as important in spite of its incompleteness.

The secret of Freudenthal's success as a biographer of Spinoza may be indicated in a few words. Two requisites are essential for a good biographer—knowledge and sympathy. Knowledge may be acquired by anybody with sufficient intelligence and industry. Sympathy, however, is of a different order. It depends on one's entire life and character. And Freudenthal, as a Spinoza biographer, had the supreme qualification of having lived a life very like that of his subject. Both were brought up at first in a conservative Jewish home; both were eager students of Hebrew, Classical and Modern Knowledge; both felt it incumbent on them to attempt a conciliation between East and West, between the old and the new; between the religious and the secular outlook; and both suffered in various ways for being what they were. To have lived and suffered in the same kind of way as Spinoza did is not an enviable gift; but it is literally the *sympathy* that is one of the best qualifications of a great Spinoza biographer.

Freudenthal was fully qualified in this respect as well as by his wide knowledge and critical powers; and his name will be remembered and honoured by those who are genuinely interested in the life and thought of one of the deepest thinkers and greatest characters of all times.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR,

In his review of my book Professor Stedman asks me a number of questions to which perhaps I may be allowed to reply

(1) He asks whether I claim only *linguistic consistence* for some statements he quotes. The answer is that I claim that each one is logically valid in so far as they are all consistent with one another and with a great many other statements which, taken together form my philosophical point of view. But I do not claim that they are all true in the proper sense that historical and scientific statements are, or may be.

(2) He asks whether I avoid 'the vaguities and ambiguities' of the metaphysical writers I criticize, implying that I do not. But surely this question is not to be decided by merely quoting two isolated turns of phrase, since I myself expressly reject the mathematical ideal of accuracy and claim only that my main arguments do not depend upon equivocation or other linguistic abuse. None of these arguments is examined or even mentioned in the course of the review.

(3) He asks 'by what right I speak of *'our sensible experience'* etc. The answer in brief is the right to speak since all language postulates the existence of other selves. Professor Stedman seems to hold that the public world of experience is built up by each one of us out of a previous solipsistic stage of consciousness. What 'right' has he to this underlying assumption of the sensationalist epistemology?

(4) The answer to this question is that the mind-body relation is specifically dealt with in chapter iv section n §4 and that my central argument is mainly concerned with the relation of spatial to subjective or existential categories. Professor Stedman disdains this discussion apparently on the ground that any attempt to define and distinguish the terms *'reality'* and *'existence'* is mere schoolboy silliness.

(5) The answer to this question is that I do not deny the far-reaching character of Descartes' scepticism. But that this scepticism was combined with a professed orthodoxy and submission of all his opinions to the authority of the Church is common knowledge.

May I add these two further comments on the review.

(1) Professor Stedman condemns my arguments by denying 'that the reasonable can be pursued once truth is repudiated'. But how do I repudiate truth by trying to define the meaning of the term? And must we believe a course of action to be true if we hold it to be reasonable?

(2) He suggests that I apply the term *metaphysics* to any philosophy I do not agree with. This is quite incorrect. I do not agree with Locke's philosophy, and I do agree with a great deal of Croce's philosophy. But the latter I call a metaphysical writer: the former I do not.

Yours faithfully

ADRIAN COATES

ILMINSTER,

April 17 1939

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The Syllabus of Lectures and Evening Meetings for the Session 1939-40 is now in course of preparation and will be sent to members in the early autumn

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WHY WE ARE AT WAR

WE have once or twice been tempted to address the readers of *Philosophy* on the subject of contemporary events. If ever there was occasion to do so before, there is surely one now.

If not a conflict between philosophers the War on which we are now entering is, as perhaps never before in the whole course of history, one between philosophies which differ fundamentally as to what man is and what he is here for.

To those who have been watching the gathering clouds there were moments of dread lest the issue should be made to appear that of the safety of possessions and of the *status quo* in their distribution. Whatever the horror of the present moment we cannot be too thankful that this danger has been averted (though more perhaps by the logic of events than by any conscious logic of our own) and that the issue that was in reality all along at stake has emerged in its true features and proportions.

How often in older wars have we in Great Britain drunk inspiration from the words put by Shakespeare into the mouth of 'old John of Gaunt' in 'This precious stone set in the silver sea'. To day we are called upon to apply them not to 'this realm this England alone' but to 'this earth' in a wider sense than Shakespeare had in view, set like England an island in the sea of the great spaces of the universe. It is this world whose destinies are in the balance threatened by the excursions and alarms of doctrines that would turn it from the great aim of being the abode of a family of nations fitted by their endowments of heart and mind and an ever increasing power over the elements to live together in co-operative unity, to that of making it the cockpit of irreconcilable warring factions. It is the glimpse that we have caught of this issue in the confusion of the racing clouds that has nerved us and our allies at last to take our courage in our hands and (even in the midst of the falling away of so many who we hoped would have seen it too) to come forward unmistakably as protagonists in the cause of Humanity. How long the present conflict will last and who will be victors in it is hidden from us. What is not hidden is the unspeakable value of the ideas

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for which we have taken up arms, the truth of which all the great philosophies and all the great religions of the world have borne witness. We have learned little from these and from our own untrammelled reflections if we do not believe that, however long-drawn-out the present conflict may be, and however often it may have to be renewed, the final victory of these ideas is secure. To lose faith in them seems to us to be to lose faith in everything that makes life on this planet worth living.

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THE LOGICAL BASIS AND STRUCTURE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF¹

LESLIE J WALKER, S J

BELIEF is the affirmation of reality, but not all affirmations of reality are beliefs, for if we have or have had, perceptual experience of a reality, we do not say, 'I believe,' but 'I see, hear, perceive, or remember.' Similarly, of the realities involved in our inner experience, we say, 'What I had in mind, desired, hoped, or felt was . . . ' or else say, more simply, 'I was much moved, was in pain, felt affection or hatred, longed for, was thinking about, knew.' On the other hand, there are realities of the perceptual order in which we may express belief, as when we say, 'I believe that New Zealand exists, that nitrogen is a gas, that the earth is round, that William the Conqueror crossed the Channel in 1066, that Jesus Christ suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died, was buried, and rose again.' The realities in which we thus express belief are not realities which we ourselves have observed, but are such that they could have been observed by a person appropriately situated in time and in place. Hence in this case it is not the nature of the realities affirmed that differentiates belief from experience of either the perceptual or the inner type. The difference lies elsewhere. When we affirm a reality of which we ourselves have, or have had, perceptual experience, it is the reality itself, present to our perceiving mind, which alike determines the content of our affirmation and justifies us in making it. When we affirm a reality of the perceptual order of which we have *not* had perceptual experience, though it is still this reality,

¹ Written, by request, in reply to an article by Professor C. D. Broad, which appeared in *Philosophy*, April 1939, Vol. XIV, No. 54, pp. 131-154.

present in imagination or thought, that determines the content of our affirmation, it is *not this reality* that justifies our affirmation, but something extrinsic to it, namely *other* realities in which we believe or of which we have had perceptual experience.

Take first a simple case. A wife tells her husband that there is a cat on the garden wall. He believes her. His belief, though apparently simple, in reality has logical structure. It involves two beliefs, one of which depends upon the other. He believes that there is a cat on the garden wall because his wife says so, and of her saying so he has perceptual experience. He believes what his wife says because he believes her to be a competent and reliable witness as to fact. His belief in her competence and reliability is logically prior to and conditions his belief in the truth of her statement, and this prior belief, in conjunction with the *hearing of her statement* constitutes the logical basis of his belief that there is a cat on the garden wall. But whereas a statement is a perceptible reality, the competence and reliability of witnesses are not perceptible realities, though there may of course, within one's own perceptual experience, be grounds for believing in them. Thus in the case in question the husband may have found that his wife's statements were frequently confirmed by his own observations, may never have caught her telling a lie, and in general may have found her to be a reliable person. He infers her competence and reliability in such a case from her perceptible behaviour, but the realities which he infers are not themselves realities of the perceptual type. His belief in the reality she affirms, therefore, depends not only upon his experience of perceptible realities but also on his well grounded belief in realities which transcend perceptual experience.

But suppose now that the wife, instead of announcing that there was a cat on the garden wall, had stated that at a séance she had seen a luminous musical box floating through the air. If her husband himself is a spiritualist, he will be prepared to accept her statement, for it will harmonize (1) with his own perceptual experiences and (2) with his belief that there are non-perceptible realities, called spirits, who bring such events about. But if he be averse to spiritualism, he will probably dismiss her statement as nonsense on the ground that in his own perceptual experience such things do not happen. To which his wife may well retort "But, my dear, your experience is so limited and your outlook so narrowed by stupid prejudices!" Whereupon, if he be scientifically inclined, the husband perchance will rejoine "My experience and that of other level-headed folk is sufficiently wide for me to be able to state with certainty that there are in nature no forces capable of bringing about events such as you describe, and of forces that he outside nature neither you nor I have any experience at all." If we are to accept as fact a

LOGICAL BASIS AND STRUCTURE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

reality to which a person other than ourselves bears witness, it must harmonize with prior beliefs and must fit into the general scheme of reality as we conceive it to be, or alternatively we must so change our prior beliefs and *modify our conception of reality as a whole* as to admit of its possibility, for in what is impossible or self-contradictory no one can believe

It will be found, I think, that the same general principles are applicable to all beliefs which affirm realities of the perceptual type of which we ourselves have not had perceptual experience. First, in all cases our own perceptual experience—the hearing of the evidence or the reading of some record—conditions the belief and determines its content. Secondly, in all cases the acceptance of the statement or record is further conditioned by belief in the competence and reliability of the witness or witnesses in question, i.e. by the belief that they are competent to observe, are competent to narrate, and are truthful. Thirdly, since neither competence nor truthfulness is a perceptible reality, we look around for other realities from which these non-perceptible realities can be inferred. We inquire whether the witnesses were in a position to observe the facts, whether their statements are compatible one with another and, if the witnesses are present, take note of their general behaviour. But a fourth condition also must be fulfilled if we are to believe in the reality which witnesses affirm: it must cohere with the totality of facts which we have already accepted as realities and with the beliefs which have thence arisen. If it fails to do so, as has happened not infrequently alike in history and in science as well as in the experience of individuals, either the evidence must be rejected or our preconceived scheme of things be revised.

In brief, then, belief in a reality of the perceptual order which we have not ourselves observed is conditioned logically by

- (1) The testimony of witnesses—a perceptible reality of which we have perceptual experience,
- (2) belief in the competence and reliability of the witnesses, which are non-perceptible realities, implied by perceptible realities if the belief be valid, and
- (3) the coherence of the reality, affirmed by witnesses, with our conception of reality as a whole, a conception which will be valid only if it comprise facts duly observed and duly attested, and their implications.

There are other imperceptible realities, besides the competence and truthfulness of witnesses, in which belief is commonly expressed. We believe, for instance, that others think and feel and desire much as we ourselves do, that electrons rotate in orbits round a nucleus positively charged, that light is propagated with finite velocity, that

the universe expands, that *God created angels of whom some rebelled against Him*. It will be convenient to class these non-perceptible realities in which people believe under three heads (1) realities pertaining to the inner experience of the individual, (2) realities affirmed by science, and (3) realities affirmed by religious belief.

Belief in the reality of other people's thoughts, emotions, desires, feelings, pleasures and pains, anxieties and ecstasies, is conditioned logically in the same way as is belief in the external realities which they may affirm, except that here there can from the nature of the case be but the one witness. Belief presupposes (1) that we have heard what they have to tell us about their inner experiences, (2) that we believe them to be capable of expressing, and actually to be expressing, these experiences in appropriate words, and (3) what they tell us must be sufficiently compatible with our own experience for us to understand what they are talking about, and must be consistent with the kind of thing that we believe minds to be capable of experiencing. Belief that the witness is actually expressing his mind in what he tells us can to some extent be controlled by his behaviour, provided he be describing something with which we are more or less familiar, but if he describe some mystical experience in terms to which we can assign no intelligible meaning, we can in no wise control the actual statement made, but at most can control other statements made by the same witness. Hence if in such a case belief arise at all, it will be belief in a formula which refers to some reality that thus far we have failed to apprehend. The beliefs of childhood are often of this kind, and are not irrational provided the witness proves reliable in other respects. But as we grow older and the scheme of reality develops in our minds we incline to reject not only statements which conflict with this scheme, but also statements purporting to refer to realities for which within this scheme we can find no place.

There is a school of thought to-day which has devised a scheme in which only realities of the perceptual order are assigned a place. Nothing exists, it is claimed, except observers and the realities which they observe. Forces, masses, charges, stresses, and tensions and strains are, together with atoms, electrons, and quanta, regarded in this view as but convenient symbols introduced into mathematical formulae which denote what in the perceptual order has happened and under similar perceptible circumstances is likely to happen again. There are no causes. Nothing is ever accounted for. To affirm that a thing has power to do this or that is but to say what we expect of it. A housewife who buys a pound of beef, or her husband who purchases a gallon of petrol or a hundredweight of coal, does so in the expectation that the *tasty looking morsel*, the *smelly liquid*, the *dirty black lumps*, will be followed by the growth of the

LOGICAL BASIS AND STRUCTURE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

family, the motion of a car, the warmth of a room, because this is what has been observed to happen on previous occasions. To suppose that in beef resides the power of nourishing bodies, in petrol a force capable of causing compression in coal the potentiality of combustion, is unnecessary and unwarranted. It suffices that, since sequences have been observed to occur, it is reasonable to expect their recurrence.

The expectancy that sequences will recur is a reality of the mental type that *not even logical positivists have thus far called in question*. But is this expectancy reasonable if there be no reason why sequences should recur? In the older view which still prevails alike in the realm of common sense and in the scientific laboratory the recurrence of sequences is accounted for. They imply forces potentialities, powers, resident in the imperceptible structure of nature which differ from atom to atom. From the nature and distribution of these forces and the structures with which they are associated the perceptible behaviour of things in different circumstances can be inferred and it is found that things do behave in fact as the theory of forces and structures has predicted. The recurrence of similar sequences thus fits into the general scheme of things and ceases to be a mystery. The expectancy of future sequences is no longer an irrational hope evoked instinctively when we notice a recurrence. It is based on the belief that the realities which science ascribes to nature, though imperceptible are none the less there, and this belief, in turn is based on the fact that nature behaves as it should behave were these imperceptible forces and structure really there as is supposed. Into the logical basis of such beliefs the testimony of others enters only in so far as the individual has not himself observed all the relevant facts, but since they are there to observe if he chooses to observe them the testimony of others is incidental rather than essential. Belief in the imperceptible realities which science ascribes to nature, therefore, is conditioned logically by

- (1) Their coherence with the observed facts which they purport to explain,
- (2) the continual verification of prophecies based on their supposed existence and
- (3) their coherence one with another in the general scheme of nature, which progressively enlarges its scope as scientific method improves and observation becomes more exact and more extensive

Religious belief is concerned with a way of life, devised with a view to some end, diversely conceived in different religions, but in all cases, with the possible exception of Confucianism in its earlier

form, conceived as something ultimate alike in the real and in the teleological order

The historical conditions which make possible religious belief and the religious practices in which belief expresses itself are the same for all the great religions of the world

(1) All, with the exception of Hinduism, have a person known to history as their founder in the East Lao-tze, Confucius, Buddha, Zoroaster, in the West Moses, Jesus of Nazareth and Mahomet.

(2) All possess ancient documents, commonly called "sacred books," in which are to be found the basic beliefs which determine the specific character of the religion in question, and which usually contain also some account of the life of the founder and of the believing community in its initial stage the Odes and Annals of Confucius, the Tao of Lao-tze, the Vedas and Sutras in Hinduism, the Nikayas in Buddhism, the Avesta in Zoroastrianism, in the West the Old and New Testaments and the Koran

(3) All have a tradition which in the East has remained to a large extent oral and is the privileged possession of a special class, but in the West has been committed to writing—for Jews in the Mishnah and Talmud, for Christians in the works of the Apologists and Fathers, for Mahommedans in the Kadith

(4) All have religious teachers whose function it is to expound and interpret the sacred books, to conserve and explain tradition, to inculcate and exemplify religious practices In the East religious teaching is organized under a central authority only where there exists a State religion, but in each of the three religions of the West a central authority is conspicuous For centuries the Jews recognized in the Sanhedrin the authority of Moses Catholics acknowledge in the See of Rome the authority of Jesus Christ And in the Caliph Mahommedans recognize the successor of the Prophet who in the mosques is represented by Imam, in the law courts by Cadi, in his administrative functions by Diwans

The survival of belief in that reality to which the founder of a religion—or in Hinduism its earliest writings, the Upanishads—bears witness is conditioned by religious teachers whose teaching is controlled by sacred writings and by a tradition which bears witness to the same reality But in this there is nothing peculiar to religion, *except where the witness of the founder, and/or the witness of the believing community led by its religious teachers, enters into the logical structure of belief and forms part of its logical, as distinguished from its historical, basis* In each of the three great religions of the West—Judaism Christianity, and Mahommedanism—this is actually the case What the religious community believes, it believes because in so doing it believes that it is bearing witness to the same reality to which its founder bore witness, and that, in bearing witness to this

reality, its founder was a competent and truthful witness. The founder—Moses, Jesus of Nazareth, Mahomet—in each case purports to be a unique witness to whom was vouchsafed a revelation. It is in this revelation that the community believes, and it believes in it because of his witness.

In Oriental religions the founder does not attain to the knowledge of ultimate reality by means of revelation but by preparing himself for the contemplation of it by an ascetical discipline by a certain way of life. Nor does he claim to be, or is he regarded as unique in this respect. His disciples also may contemplate ultimate reality, provided they adopt the same discipline, and the effect which it produces in their lives, the increased indifference and enhanced powers which they acquire, are the same as those produced in and acquired by the founder. Belief in ultimate reality, in the case of those who follow this discipline is not based on the witness of the founder or on the witness of sacred books, but on the fact that this reality harmonizes with and integrates their whole experience and at the same time conveys to them a power which otherwise they would not have. The multitude who do not follow the discipline of the *elite*, no doubt believe mainly because they have been taught so to believe and because their ancestors so believed before them, and to this extent their belief is mainly irrational. On the other hand, they see the effects produced by belief in the lives of their ascetics, have knowledge in and through sacred writings tradition, and religious teaching of the reality in which they express belief, and so, to some extent at least can judge how far it harmonizes with experience. The grounds of their belief in this case though less adequate are the same in kind as the grounds on which the ascetic believes. It is a philosophical belief based like scientific belief, on experience but on an experience wider in scope, and with the emphasis laid on the characteristics of human life rather than on events and sequences of events in the physical world.

The consequences are what from a study of the history of philosophy we should expect them to be. The conception of ultimate reality not only differs widely in different Oriental religions, but within the same religion has in many cases undergone reversal. In the sacred writings of Hinduism ultimate reality is conceived sometimes as a Trinity sometimes as a supreme God, sometimes as impersonal Force. The impersonal reality in which Buddha believed is in one form of Buddhism transformed into a pantheon in which *Buddha himself finds a throne in place of the personal God* in which Confucius believed, Chu hsi in the twelfth century substituted two impersonal principles—one the principle of diversity, the other the principle of being, life, evolution. The Taoism of Lao tze, who postulated a dual principle, again impersonal, in order to account

for progress and decay, gives place to a Shintoism in which the emperors become gods. Zoroastrianism is the only Oriental religion of which the historical development has been coherent, and its followers have in these days dwindled to comparative insignificance.

If this analysis be correct, then of the four factors which condition historically religious belief, none enter into the logical structure of Oriental belief, and to its logical basis sacred writings, tradition, and religious teachers are relevant only in so far as they provide evidence of the effect produced by religious belief on the lives of those who have faithfully and rigorously observed the prescribed discipline. The founders of Oriental religions are respected as great thinkers who had a profound insight into the nature of things and so were able to devise a way of salvation for man, but they are not regarded as inspired prophets, speaking in the name of God and vouched for by the power of miracle and prophecy which God communicates to them. The community which each founds does not regard itself as a "chosen people" in the sense that Jews, Christians, and Mahomedans regard themselves as a "chosen people," watched over by the Providence of God, who conserves in the mind of the community the revelation once made and furthers in His own way its development. The sacred books of the East are not held to be inspired in the sense that the Old and the New Testaments and the Koran is held to be inspired, nor yet do they contain historical writings which attest the workings of Providence, as do the Old and New Testaments and the Koran. The conception of Providence, in fact, even where there is belief in a personal God, is lacking in Oriental religions, possibly because the Oriental's outlook on life is so profoundly pessimistic, but in any case it is lacking, whereas in the three great religions of the West it is basic, and was one of the main reasons why in the thirteenth century Bonaventure and the early Franciscans entered so vigorous a protest against the introduction of a philosophy which took no account of Providence.

The logical structure of religious belief in the West, therefore, involves three factors, neither of which pertains to the logical structure of Oriental belief. They are (1) belief in the Providence of God, (2) belief that in and through a primary vehicle, a human being—Moses, Jesus of Nazareth, Mahomet—a revelation has been made, and (3) belief that in and through a secondary vehicle, the believing community—Israel, the Christian Church, Islam—the revelation, under Providence, is conserved and evolves. In this logical structure each subsequent belief presupposes the beliefs that precede it, and in the prior belief or beliefs finds in part its logical basis, but each belief has also a factual basis, to be found either in perceptual experience or in historical records.

Belief in Providence, like every other belief that affirms a reality

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transcending perceptual experience, is based on the fact that perceptual experience, in isolation from non perceptible realities, is unintelligible but, granted these non perceptible realities, becomes intelligible. Forces and potentialities are postulated by science in order to account for the recurrence of perceptible coincidences and sequences. They do not, however, account for the element of novelty which in such sequences and in all sequences continually appears, for to say that the novel element was potentially present in its antecedents does not account for its emergence. As a perceptible reality it *was not* but now has *come to be*. Its emergence as a perceptible reality can be accounted for only if we postulate a Cause which transcends alike the realm of perceptual experience and the realm of those imperceptible realities which science ascribes to nature. Upon this Cause, which in the last resort will be uncaused, depend all the existents and all the sequences, perceptible or imperceptible, corporeal or mental, which pertain to that spatio temporal manifold which we call the physical universe.

In so saying I affirm Providence in the primary and basic meaning of that term—the totality of all created existents and sequences considered in relation to that uncaused Cause upon which they depend for their existence. But there is more to it than this. The Cause of this spatio temporal universe must somehow comprise all the realities which it brings into being. Hence in some sense we must ascribe to it the characteristics which pertain to our own minds. In its own way but not in our way, it must be a thinking, loving, volitional being, and so personal and purposive, but we know not quite how. The nature of the transcendent Cause of the universe remains a mystery, *unless and until* it be revealed. But how, unless man be transformed into God, can such a revelation be made and be made known?

In the spatio temporal manifold, which in its dependence upon God we call Providence, there are events and sequences of events which we ascribe to the powers of nature or to powers of the human mind. These powers, fortunately, have assignable limits, for if there were no limits the possibilities would be infinite and even a guess at what is likely to happen would become impossible. Events and sequences of events sometimes transcend the limits assigned, and are called super normal on this account. Thus to display intimate knowledge of the uncaused Cause of the universe would be super-normal since it is plain from the history of philosophy and of Oriental religions that such knowledge does not normally appertain to the human mind. Similarly, to display knowledge of what happens to human minds when the earthly vehicle in which they express themselves has been consigned to the grave or to the crematorium, is super normal. So too is it super-normal for a human being to cure

diseases and still tempests with a word, to raise the dead, to walk on the surface of a lake, or to remain in the air without visible support. All turns upon the question of behaviour, just as the diagnosis of chemical property or of a disease turns upon the question of behaviour. If a person behaves normally, we ascribe his behaviour to powers inherent in nature or in the human mind, if abnormally and a natural explanation cannot be found, we ascribe his super-normal behaviour to a power that transcends nature, and from an examination of the behaviour involved infer the kind of power which is displayed. At super-normal knowledge, if not accompanied by super-normal behaviour, we are inclined to shrug our shoulders and to ascribe it either to hallucination or to a mystical experience which we do not understand. But if in conjunction with super-normal knowledge a man displays also in his behaviour a power akin to that which God displays in creating the universe, we are justified in ascribing alike the knowledge and the power to divine action, and in regarding the person who displays this knowledge and power as "one sent by God," a prophet or a *legatus divinus*. Super-normal events and super-normal sequences, which, like normal events and normal sequences, depend on God, in such a case become significant. They imply that, in and through the human being who thus behaves super-normally and displays super-normal knowledge, God is making a communication that will be beneficial to mankind.

From their experience, both external and internal, conjoined with their study of history, Jews, Mahomedans, and Christians alike infer the action of Providence both in the general and in the special sense which I have endeavoured to explain. Granted the validity of this inference, the possibility of a revelation follows, and also the possibility of its being in its development divinely sustained. Belief in divine revelation and in its divine conservation are thus justified, *provided facts can be adduced which can be accounted for only on the supposition that in and through them God has revealed Himself and is conserving this revelation in a recalcitrant and unbelieving world*.

Belief that a revelation has actually been made has as its logical basis historical facts interpreted in the light of a prior belief in Providence. Historical facts connected with the history of the believing community are relevant here in so far as they verify statements made by the prophet in whom the belief of the community is centred—Moses, Jesus of Nazareth, Mahomet. But what is of primary importance are the facts which induced the believing community in its early stages to accept Moses, Jesus of Nazareth, or Mahomet as a person in and through whom God was revealing Himself. These facts comprise the claims made by the person in question and the events which purport to verify those claims. For its knowledge of the relevant facts the believing community at the

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outset relied upon observation or the evidence of eye witnesses, but later generations have to rely on documents—for the facts concerning Moses and the nascent community of Israel on the Pentateuch, Chronicles, and Kings, for the facts concerning Jesus of Nazareth and the nascent Christian community on the Gospels and Acts, for the facts concerning Mahomet and the nascent Moslem community on the Koran and on an oral tradition which was eventually collected together in the Kadith. That the Old and New Testaments and the Koran are believed to be inspired is irrelevant, for this belief is logically subsequent, and is also (except in the case of the Koran, which itself claims to be inspired) historically subsequent, to the community's acceptance of its founder as a prophet and to its belief in itself as a community divinely guided. It is as historical documents, subject to the norms of historical criticism, that the Old and New Testaments, the Koran, and the Kadith, enter into the logical basis of religious belief.

Thus far the three cases are substantially parallel, yet not quite parallel. For if and in so far as Moses is the author or principal source of the Pentateuch, the Jew is relying in part on his prophet for the facts which verify his claim to be a prophet, except where the facts related by Moses are confirmed by independent evidence. In like manner, since the Koran was written at Mahomet's dictation, the Mahomedan, in relying upon it for his facts, is relying upon his prophet for the facts which verify his claim to be a prophet, except where there is independent historical confirmation of the facts. The documents on which the Christian relies, on the other hand, were not written by Jesus of Nazareth, but by independent witnesses who were either eye witnesses to the facts or had the evidence of eye-witnesses before them.

There is a difference too in the facts, in respect both to the claims made and to the manner of their verification. At the time when Jesus of Nazareth was born the Jews were expecting a Messiah who should at once restore and transform the ancient kingdom of Israel. Their hopes were based on the sayings of prophets whom in their belief God had sent. Jesus of Nazareth claimed to be this Messiah, actually did restore and transform the kingdom of Israel (though not in the way either the Jews or His own disciples anticipated), and in his gospel Matthew points out how in Jesus Old Testament prophecies were fulfilled. Jews, Mahomedans, and Christians all believe in the prophecies of the Old Testament, but only if the Christian position be valid and Jesus be the Messiah, has the Messianic hope raised by the prophets of the Old Testament been fulfilled and their claim to be prophets been validated.

Jesus of Nazareth also made another claim which was made neither by Moses nor Mahomet. He claimed to be divine, and on this account

was put to death at the instigation of Jewish authorities, who repudiated this claim as *blasphemy*. In support of this claim Jesus appeals both to His words and to His works, which were certainly very different in character from the words uttered and deeds done either by Moses or by Mahomet. No one has presented so spiritual a conception of God as did Jesus, nor has anyone conceived his own relation to God in the same way, nor yet has anyone wrought such diverse and astounding miracles with the same ease. What inference should be drawn from this? That Jesus is divine, or merely that He is the Messiah, a divinely attested prophet? Jesus certainly did not expect anyone in His lifetime to infer from these data His divinity. He expected the Jews to reject Him and His own disciples to forsake Him. Nor is it the divinity of Christ that Peter thence infers in his Pentecostal pronouncement. He infers from the miracles, wonders, and signs that God did by Jesus, that Jesus is "a man approved of God among you." He then calls attention to other facts: to the resurrection of which he had been a witness, to a psalm in which David had said that the Lord would not leave His soul in hell or suffer His Holy One to see corruption, to the fact that David died, was buried, and that his grave was well known, to the promise that of the fruit of David's loins one should sit upon his throne; whence he infers that it is not of himself that David is speaking, but of Jesus of Nazareth, who was the fruit of David's loins and whom God in fact had not left in hell to see corruption but had raised from the dead. The resurrection, therefore, was prophesied of old and the prophecy had now been fulfilled. So too had the promise of the Holy Ghost, which Jesus Himself made, been fulfilled, and Jesus, unlike David, had ascended into heaven. Now David envisaged the Messianic king not only as his son but also as his Lord in a passage to which Jesus Himself had called attention. Therefore, says Peter, "let all the house of Israel most certainly know that God hath made both Lord and Christ this same Jesus whom you have crucified."

It is on facts that Peter bases his argument, on facts interpreted in the light of a profound belief in Providence. From the earlier set of facts he infers that Jesus is a man approved of God, from subsequent facts, considered in their relation to Old Testament prophecy, he further infers that God has made Jesus both Lord and Christ. Later on, when the implication of the facts is fully realized, the Church proclaims Jesus to be divine. The claim that Jesus is a man approved of God is logically prior to, and its validity is presupposed by, the claim that He is Messiah and Lord, and this claim in turn is logically prior to, and its validity is presupposed by, the claim that He is divine. In its essentials, therefore, the position of Christianity does not differ logically from that of either Judaism or Mahom-

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medanism All depends upon whether we are prepared to accept the facts and whether we have the requisite belief in Providence whereby to interpret them

Alike in Judaism, in Mahommedanism, and in the Christian Church, ritual, religious practices, and creeds are the outward expression of a revelation which the community in question has embraced, and their development, in part spontaneous, in part controlled by authority, is in each case integral to its life In the belief alike of Jews, Mahommedans, and Christians, it is by the action of Providence that revelation is thus conserved and develops within the mind of the believing community This belief presupposes belief in Providence and belief that a revelation has been made, but it also has, as have these prior beliefs, a factual basis The Jews appeal to the miraculous way in which Jehovah again and again saved His people from external foes and from their own tendency to fall into idolatrous practices, to the raising of their moral standards and spiritual outlook by the preaching of prophets, to the deeds of these prophets and to the curious way in which some of their prophecies were fulfilled, to the conservation both of the Jewish faith and of the Jewish race in spite of its dispersion and the persecutions that ensued and which endure until this day Mahommedans appeal to the rapidity with which their religion spread, to the moral and spiritual uplift which it gave to the peoples who embraced it, to the fidelity with which the basic teaching and precepts of the prophet are observed throughout Islam to this day, to the fact that all this has happened in accordance with the visions vouchsafed to the prophet and in confirmation of his words Christians appeal to the striking manner in which Christ's promises have been verified under Providence in the history of the Church, in spite of difficulties, which were overcome by spiritual weapons, not by force of arms They point to the fulfilment of the promise that the Holy Ghost should descend upon the apostles and should abide with them, giving them power (a) to work miracles, as they did work miracles and as miracles are still worked in the Church to day, and (b) to preach boldly the Gospel, as they and the Church have preached it, and in spite of persecution have preached it, as they were bidden to preach it, to all nations They point also to the way in which under Providence the apostles were guided to a decision on the momentous question of the terms on which Gentiles should be admitted to the Church, and again to the fact that, thanks to other momentous decisions, the development of doctrine in the Church has been coherent and without reversal, thus fulfilling the promise that she should be led into truth and that error should never prevail They appeal too, as do Orientals, to the sanctity which results from following the way of life preached by the Church, and again, if they be Catholics, to the unity of the Church,

which was to be such that it would exemplify the unity of Father and Son

Once again the three great religions of the West run parallel. Just as the prior belief that a revelation has been made, has its logical basis in facts concerning Moses, Mahomet, and Jesus of Nazareth, interpreted in the light of a basic belief in Providence, so belief that by the action of Providence revelation is conserved and develops within the believing community has as its logical basis further facts, connected with the history of the three communities, interpreted in the light of a prior belief in Providence and in the fact that a revelation has been made. The logical structure of belief and the logical basis of belief in each of these three religions are in character the same, whether or not the inferences drawn from the facts be valid.

The great religions of the West, with their appeal to facts, their logical structure, their coherence, their scheme of things envisaging in outline the history of the world and of the human race, indicate, especially in the case of Christianity, a cultural level in religion very different from that which prevails in the East, just as in science the cultural level of the West is very different from that of the East. This should be an advantage, but in an article published in the April number of *Philosophy*, under the title "The Present Relations of Religion and Science," Professor Broad maintains that it is, especially in the case of Christianity, a disadvantage. "There are," he says on p. 132, "certain peculiarities about Christianity which make it vulnerable to attacks which might be harmless to some of the other great religions, such as Buddhism, or to religion in general." These peculiarities are three in number: (1) Christianity is, to an unique degree, a doctrine about its own Founder; (2) It took over without question, so Professor Broad says, the Jewish sacred scriptures, which comprise an elaborate cosmogonical scheme and an account of the origin and propagation of moral and physical evil; (3) It is an essential part of Christian doctrine that Jesus survived the crucifixion and in some sense emerged from the tomb with a transformed body.

The first two peculiarities concern the *content of revelation*, and hence presuppose that Christ's competence and reliability as a witness have been established, and again that the competence and reliability of the believing community as a witness to what Christ taught have been established. But the third peculiarity is concerned with an important fact—the *resurrection*—which pertains to the logical basis of Christianity. And there is a further objection, raised by Professor Broad, which concerns the logical structure of Christian belief and is applicable to "any other religion which grounds its specific doctrines on the authority of its Founder or its prophets."

(p 139), for this, in Professor Broad's opinion, renders "their whole position logically circular" (p 138) I think Professor Broad is mistaken, especially in regard to Christianity, but his argument is worth considering. It runs as follows:

An essential part of the reasons given by Christians "for believing specifically Christian doctrines is that these were directly taught by Jesus or are necessary or probable consequences of other statements which He made." But, argues Professor Broad, Jesus is accepted "as an authority on such matters" on the ground that "He was a being of superhuman wisdom and goodness, who was in a position to know the facts and whose mission on earth was to reveal them to men." Wherefore since "this in itself is the most central and fundamental of Christian doctrines," if "Christians accept it on the ground that Jesus asserted it or other things which imply it, their whole position is logically circular."

Now, as I have already pointed out, Christians do not believe that Jesus was a being of superhuman wisdom and goodness, and that He had a divine mission because He said so, they believe it because the facts, taken in conjunction with His words, attest that He was a being of superhuman wisdom and goodness, and that His mission, like His power was of God. Neither Jesus Himself nor His apostles, nor the evangelists expect people to accept His claims or the claims they make on His behalf merely on His *ipse dixit*; they adduce evidence in support of them. Thus to the disciples of John the Baptist, who come to ask whether He is the Messiah, Jesus does not reply "Yes, I am." He answers "Go and relate to John what you have heard and seen: the blind see, the lame walk, lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead rise again, the poor have the gospel preached to them." To the Jews who come to Him later with the same question and the request that He will give to it a plain answer He says "The works that I do in the name of My Father, they give testimony of Me." Similarly, it is to facts that Peter appeals in support of his claim that Jesus is "a man approved of God," who has made Him both "Christ and Lord." The evangelists also present facts—without comment in the case of Mark and Luke, who leave it to the reader to draw his own conclusions. So too in the Acts. In dealing with those who are not of the faith, nowhere is there an appeal to the *ipse dixit* of Jesus either by the apostles or by the evangelists. Their primary function is to present the relevant facts, of which most of them have been witnesses. As it is on the evidence of fact that their own belief is based, so what they ask of others is that they should study the evidence and try to discern its implications. If it shows Jesus to be a man in and through whom God is operating, then what He says about divine things is credible, and the Christian community is justified in its belief and in asking others to believe as it does. If

the facts show also that Jesus is the Messiah in and through whom God was to renew all things, or if they show further that also He is divine, then *a fortiori* Christians are justified in their belief and in asking others to believe with them, for in the first case God is communicating with man through the Messiah, and in the second is in Person communicating with man. If the facts show neither that Jesus is divine nor that He is the Messiah, nor yet even that He is a being in and through whom God is operating, then the inference which Christians have drawn from the facts is invalid, and they are not justified in asking others to believe with them. But this does not render their position circular, for it is on evidence that their belief is based, not on the mere *ipse dixit* of Jesus, and the evidence is there for all to study, whether or not it justify the conclusion drawn.

That Christians adduce evidence in support of their belief in Christ as a credible witness to divine things Professor Broad is aware, and in this connection mentions the miracles wrought by Jesus, the resurrection, the impression produced on those who knew Him and their consequent heroism, the super-normal experiences of St. Paul and his consequent zeal, the fact, that some people have found Christian doctrines to be in harmony with their deepest convictions, that they have lived and died for them, and have had experiences which seem to confirm them. But, says Professor Broad, at the very utmost this shows "only that Jesus was an extremely remarkable and impressive personality."

Quite so, if this indeed be the evidence and all there is to say about it, for most of it is irrelevant, and what is relevant is summarized in two short sentences: "Jesus wrought miracles in His life time," and "was Himself the subject of the stupendous miracle of the resurrection after His death." The nature and variety of the miracles, the circumstances and manner in which they were worked, and the claims made in connection with them are ignored. Of the prophecies that were fulfilled in Christ we hear not a word, nor yet of His promise to rise again, or of other stupendous promises which He made and carried out. Yet all this is relevant to the question whether Jesus had or had not a divine mission.

Most people who repudiate Christianity do so largely on the ground that they find it impossible to credit the miracles which Christian belief presupposes. Professor Broad does no such thing. On the contrary, he declares the statement that "Science proves miracles to be impossible," to be "just ignorant bluff and bluster." He also asks the readers of *Philosophy*, in weighing the evidence for Christianity, to raise "no questions as to whether there is adequate ground for believing that the alleged miracles really happened." The facts, at least for the sake of argument, are to be admitted. Hence it is a fact that Jesus wrought instantaneous cures on the blind,

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the dumb the lame, the paralytic, the dropsical, the leprous, that He gave instantaneous relief to the obsessed, satisfied the hunger of five thousand people stranded in the desert with a few loaves and fishes, stilled tempests, walked on the sea, and on several occasions raised the dead to life, and that He did all this with the same ease that Professor Broad displays in writing philosophy. From these facts it is legitimate to infer, Professor Broad argues, neither that Jesus is divine, nor that He was imbued with divine power nor that He had a divine mission nor yet that His status is unique, but merely that He was 'an extremely remarkable and impressive personality'. The argument would have had force if Professor Broad had been able to point to another such remarkable and impressive personality. But alas, in the pages of history only one such is to be found. Hence, granting the evidence, I am forced to conclude that alike in His claims and in the works which purport to verify those claims Jesus of Nazareth is unique, in spite of Professor Broad's opinion to the contrary.

For this opinion, however evidence is adduced—to wit, the 'alleged miracles of modern mediumship'—for which in the case of D. D. Home we have the contemporary autobiographic testimony of Sir William Crookes, one of the ablest experimental scientists of the nineteenth century. If the Christian apologist is consistent, says Professor Broad, he will accept these alleged mediumistic miracles, "but, if he does, he must give up the contention that the New Testament miracles testify by their uniqueness to the unique status of Christ and the complete reliability of His metaphysical and ethical teachings."

Why so? Granted that mediums do raise themselves a foot or so from the ground, cause phosphorescent trumpets and musical boxes to float in mid air in a darkened room, and that there are 'educated Englishmen' who actually do see phantasms of the living, the dying, and the recently dead, what of it? Produce for me a medium or an educated Englishman (by preference) who with a word can cure all manner of diseases, control the weather, multiply food, walk across the Serpentine when it isn't frozen, and raise Sir William Crookes's dead body to life, and I will not only admit that the argument from Christ's miracles to his uniqueness is fallacious, but shall be prepared to listen docilely to the words of wisdom that may fall from this second unique miracle-worker's mouth. *He must, however, talk sense*, especially if he is going to expound metaphysical and ethical doctrines. It will not suffice that the "mediumistic communications" he makes be 'strongly suggestive of the post-humous intelligent action of certain definite human beings,' as Professor Broad assures me some mediumistic communications are, for the communications made by Christ suggest something far more

profound and important And I shall be still less happy about things if this mediumistic communication turn out to be "so incoherent and repetitive, and so full of surprising ignorance and error, that one feels driven to seek some other super-normal explanation of it" (as mediumistic communications are wont to do, so Professor Broad tells me on p 147), for in that case the parallelism with Christ's metaphysical and ethical teaching will completely break down, and I shall be but confirmed in the inference I have drawn as to uniqueness from the miracles

But, urges Professor Broad, in that case your argument will again be circular, since in adducing the New Testament miracles as evidence for the divine nature and mission of Jesus, you assume the latter as part of your ground for accepting the former on the evidence available (p 141) But I don't I examine the miracles and find them credible and well attested, I examine the teaching and find it coherent and suggestive I examine the prophecies and find them strangely and oddly confirmed, whence I *infer* the divine mission, and so am prepared to accept what Christ says about the divine nature That is the argument used by the apostles and used by the Church to day, and in such an argument there is no circularity, for before accepting the testimony of Christ, proof of His credibility is adduced, a proof of the same type as that which leads Professor Broad to ascribe mediumistic behaviour to the action of posthumous human beings or other super normal agencies, but based on evidence different in character and much wider in scope

One of the miracles on which Christians rely is the resurrection It is the culminating fact in Christ's life, and to it His apostles bear witness, as also does the Church when in the Creed she expresses her belief in Jesus Christ who "suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died, and was buried, and the third day rose again" It is, therefore, correct to say as Professor Broad says on p 134, that the resurrection is "part of *content* of Christianity", but it is *not* part of the *content* of Christianity in the same sense as the doctrine of original sin or of the atonement is part of the content of Christianity, for these are revealed doctrines, whereas the resurrection, like the crucifixion, death, and burial, which also the Church confesses, is not a revealed doctrine, but a fact which forms part of the *evidence* for Christianity Together, moreover, these facts are a very important part of the *evidence* for Christianity, since it was the fact that the apostles saw Christ suffering, crucified, dead, and buried, then found the tomb empty, saw Christ again in the flesh, talked with Him, ate with Him, and applied tests to make sure that His body was real, that finally convinced them that He was what He claimed to be Not only had the prophecies of the Old Testament been fulfilled in Him, but His own prophecies were now being verified, for He had said that

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He would die and rise again. That is why the resurrection of Christ is, as Professor Broad remarks, much more important than the raising of Lazarus. The *contrast* which he makes between the *content* of, and the *evidence for*, Christianity (p. 134), on the other hand, will not hold good if the resurrection be included under the head of *content*, for it is also *evidence for* Christianity, and it is primarily as witnesses to the fact of the resurrection that the apostles go forth. Hence I do not see quite why the Christian's attitude toward the resurrection should be regarded as a "peculiarity" of Christianity, unless it be that resurrections have thus far been very uncommon.

Another peculiarity of Christianity is that "it took over the Jewish sacred scriptures," which admittedly display a deplorable ignorance not only of the theories of Albert Einstein, but even of those of Darwin and Newton. From the standpoint of science this, in Professor Broad's opinion, is disastrous. For it means (1) that 'Christianity originated and evolved against a background of astronomical theory in which the earth was the centre of the universe' (p. 149), and (2) that it "arose, and Christian theology developed, in a certain context of beliefs about the relation of man to other living beings on earth," which, though they still afford "the best available description of the peculiarities of man as he now is and has been throughout the whole of his written history," ignore the "pre history of the human race" in which "we find it developing by insensible steps from ancestors which were purely animal" (p. 152). Hence the Christian scientist has to close his eyes to the fact that Moses conflicts with Darwin and Newton, if not also with Einstein and Planck, and so must keep his religion and his science in watertight compartments, a position which Professor Broad finds intolerable, if not actually dishonest.

This view, it seems to me, takes no account whatsoever of the sense in which Christianity may be said to have "taken over the Jewish sacred scriptures," a point which St. Paul himself makes perfectly plain. It has not taken them over as a scientific text book or treatise, but as the inspired word of God, 'profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, furnished to every good work' (2 Tim. iii. 16, 17). The function of scripture is to teach religion, not science. Hence I submit that the Christian scientist in keeping the source of his religion distinct from the source of his science, is acting in accordance with the best Christian tradition. If and only if, there is conflict between an accepted Christian doctrine and an accepted scientific theory will his position become untenable.

Now in regard to astronomical theory and the general theory of evolution conflict is impossible, for there is no specifically Christian theory of astronomy, nor yet is there any specifically Christian theory

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of either evolution or of **non evolution** Certainly God created all things, but the order of their appearance in time He has left it for human minds to discern, or rather to **infer** from the perceptual data available to each succeeding generation Only on one point do I see the possibility of conflict The doctrine of original sin implies the descent of the human race, which Christ redeemed, from a single pair of human beings Hence, if we assume that a body must be appropriately disposed before it can become the vehicle of a human mind, *either* only two such bodies evolved, or the races which descended from others have disappeared On the hypothesis which Professor Broad prefers, evolution takes place by "insensible steps" Hence it is probable that many more or less similar pairs emerged at more or less the same time On the alternative hypothesis that evolution takes place by saltations, the emergence of a single pair differing from the rest is more likely Moreover, the hypothesis of a single pair will account readily for the admitted fact that during the whole of his written history man has occupied "a unique status" midway between the angels and the brutes, and will also, granted a "fall," account for the frequency with which he is found to sink below the level of any brute

There is, therefore, not the less need for the Christian scientist to emulate the example of Nelson either in his attitude toward religion or in his attitude toward science The development of Christian doctrine is slow, especially among the more orthodox, who rightly insist on its being coherent and are reluctant to modify even a background merely in order to accommodate it to a scientific theory which in ten years or a hundred years may be as dead as that which went to the making of its original background Yet it does develop, and I see no reason why Christianity in collaboration with science should not some day elaborate a cosmic scheme in which apparent conflicts will be resolved and the two sources of human knowledge, observation and revelation, be reconciled in a truth which in isolation neither is adequate to attain

It remains for me to say a word about "the first and most important peculiarity of Christianity," the fact that "it is, to a unique degree, a doctrine about its own Founder" (p 132) Christianity is the only religion, with the exception of a later form of Buddhism, which believes that its founder is divine, and it is the only religion, with the exception of a later form of Hinduism, which believes in the triune nature of God There is no diversity in God except that which arises from relations, which imply a distinction between the terms thus related The relations are relations of origin, and hence are asymmetrical, as Professor Broad remarks The terms are called "hypostases," a word used by the Greeks to denote different persons in the grammatical sense The first person is

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originans, but not *originatum*, the second, which is the person who became man, is both *originans* and *originatum*, the third is *originatum* but not *originans*. This exhausts the possibilities, for a person who should be neither *originans* nor *originatum* can have no relation either to that which "originates" or to that which is "originated". In nature the three persons are identical, which is a mystery, for there is nothing precisely analogous to it in the world in which we live, though there are things which we share and have in common. I do not, however, find the mystery unintelligible or meaningless, even when stated in this abstract way, but on the contrary find that it gives to the philosophical notion of God a significance which otherwise it lacks. For how can God produce a world in which everywhere there is distinction, number, relation, order, dependence, process, unless in Him there be something analogous to the realities which such terms denote? If God be conceived merely as that "eternal and supernatural existent on which everything else that exists depends onesidedly both for its origin and continuance," this question remains unanswered and unanswerable, for though we point to God we say nothing of His nature. Granted however, that in God the Son "is begotten" of the Father and from the Twain the Holy Ghost proceeds, the possibility of distinction, number, relation, order, dependence, and process appearing in the world which God creates is accounted for.

In order to reveal to mankind that the nature of God is triune, the Son takes to Himself a second nature, a human nature, and so appears in the world. He creates and is able to communicate with man in the same way men communicate with one another. But if He is to convince man that what He says about God and about His own relation to God is the truth, He must provide evidence from which man can infer that He is a competent and reliable witness. The evidence which He provides is threefold. He fulfils in His life, and also in His death and resurrection, prophecies which were recognized by the Jews as Messianic and as of origin divine. During His brief appearance in public He works miracles in such profusion and of such a kind that they convince all who witness them that He is imbued with supernatural power, and convince most that He is imbued with divine power, which at times in working miracles He expressly claims, as when He asks whether it is easier to forgive sin or to cure instantaneously a paralytic. He also Himself makes promises of a super-normal character which, as soon as He disappears from the world, forthwith begin to be fulfilled. From this evidence the apostles at length draw the inference which it was intended they should draw, and henceforth believe in and preach Christ. From this evidence, and from the further fact that Christ's promises continue to be verified, Christians draw the same inference to-day.

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Professor Broad finds this evidence far from convincing. Hence he still repudiates Christianity as he has been wont to do ever since the day when he first began to think for himself. It would seem, however, that he finds his present position less satisfactory than it used to be. He takes no delight in the gloomy picture which he has painted of the prospects of Christianity, admits that the absence of religious belief leaves a vacuum which nature abhors, grants that Christ's parable about the state of the man from whom a demon was cast out is profoundly true of humanity as a whole, and tells us that, when he contemplates the two new religions which have "entered into the clean-swept place and possessed it," he appreciates the significance of Mr. Belloc's remark about the need of keeping hold of nurse. On the other hand, with nurse he has long since learned to dispense, is averse to filling the gap with "some system of emotionally toned and unverifiable apocalyptic beliefs," and is appalled at the thought that, if Christianity is to return, the pillars of science must first be cast down.

Such a solution clearly will satisfy no one who respects human thought and is distressed when it leads to contradiction. But is there no other way out? Professor Broad's difficulties seem to me to be largely of his own creating. If he will re-examine the evidence for belief in Christ as it is presented in the New Testament, he will not find therein any logical fallacy. If he will compare the miracles worked by Christ and the revelation made by Christ with mediumistic miracles and revelations, he will not have much difficulty in recognizing Christ's uniqueness. If he will reflect on the date of the documents comprised within the Jewish Scriptures, he will realize that the scientific views therein expressed could not well have been other than they are, and if he reflect on the purpose for which the sacred scriptures were taken over, will see that their function is illustrative and methodological, and that the adoption of this *particular* background is not essential. He will find, too, that the distinction between what is methodological and what is constitutive was recognized at quite an early age in the history of the Church, e.g. by Clement of Alexandria and by Augustine, just as he himself recognizes it in the case of the restrictive principles which science adopts. If these restrictive principles be generalized, a reconciliation between science and religion is impossible. Professor Broad declares emphatically that it is illegitimate thus to generalize them, and in so doing has prepared the way for a return to religious belief.

But since, philosophically, religious belief, like all belief, is in the last resort an interpretation of observed facts, a principle whereby to interpret the relevant facts is required. I have suggested that in Providence each of the three great religions of the West have found such a principle, and that in using it in order to discern the purposive

action of God they rightly apply it to super normal events and super normal sequences of events. That super-normal events happen and are significant Professor Broad grants, and from such events in the case of mediumistic communications infers the existence of disembodied spirits. But when comparing the survival of Christian belief with that of other important beliefs not necessarily religious, it is to the natural consequences of such beliefs that in the main he appeals, with the result that inevitably he finds nothing distinctive about Christianity. The appeal of apostles and evangelists, on the other hand, is to super normal events, so that it is not the original and traditional form of the argument for Christianity that Professor Broad has examined, but a new form devised by apologists less logical in their thinking than were Christ's own disciples. I agree with Professor Broad in preferring a logical to an emotional nurse, but she must also be an experienced nurse who, in diagnosing the significance of events, will not confuse the normal with the super-normal, since it is only in and through the super normal that a revelation can be made, as Peter and the four evangelists clearly saw.

MEANING AND VERIFIABILITY

W H F BARNES, M.A.

It is a widely held doctrine at the moment that metaphysical propositions are meaningless, are, in fact, not genuine propositions at all. This doctrine is supported by the contention that only propositions which are verifiable are significant and it is held that metaphysical propositions do not fulfil this condition, and are consequently pseudo-propositions. Those who hold this view divide propositions into three classes (1) Tautologies, which are analytic, certain, and are guaranteed by the principle of contradiction (2) Factually significant propositions, which are synthetic, hypothetical, and are capable of empirical verification (3) Pseudo-propositions, which only appear to be propositions and are, in reality, meaningless nonsense.

In this paper I shall say nothing about the propositions of class (1). I wish to consider the contention that, apart from the propositions of class (1), any proposition, to be significant, must be verifiable. This will, in practice, resolve itself into considering rather closely what is to be understood by verifiable in this connection. And this is by no means so easy as it might seem to be at first sight.

I

It is necessary first to make a division among those propositions which we commonly entertain in our ordinary and scientific thinking into (i) experiential, and (ii) factual propositions. This distinction is not one that is very clearly made in ordinary life, but it is familiar enough to philosophers. By an experiential proposition I intend one that merely records an actual or conceivable sense-experience. These propositions make assertions merely about such things as colour, expanses, noises, tastes, etc. By a factual proposition I intend one that makes an assertion about something more than can be the object of an immediate experience. All propositions about physical objects, animals, persons, societies, etc., are, *prima facie* at any rate, of this kind.

It is possible to maintain that all factual propositions are analysable without remainder into experiential propositions, though it is usually admitted by those who hold this view that the task is very complicated. On this view, a proposition which asserts something about a society is analysable into a number of propositions about

the individuals constituting the society. In turn, the propositions making assertions about the individuals constituting the society can be analysed into propositions making assertions only about what is, or could conceivably be, the object of immediate experience. In a similar way, a proposition about a table would be analysable into propositions about what is, or what could conceivably be, the object of immediate experience. This doctrine is usually described, some what misleadingly as the doctrine that all 'things' are "logical constructions" out of sense experiences actual or possible.

Let us make the supposition that all factual propositions are analysable into experiential propositions. Since experiential propositions, by definition contain only what is conceivably the object of an immediate experience, it may seem as though they will all be verifiable in a perfectly simple sense. It is only factual propositions that constitute a difficulty. But this is not so. We shall have to distinguish, among experiential propositions, two classes: (i) directly verifiable, and (ii) indirectly verifiable propositions. Suppose the factual proposition 'There will be an eclipse of the sun in October 1938' can be analysed into a number of experiential propositions. These propositions will assert that such and such experiences will be presented to me if I put myself into a certain position at a certain time. The occurrence of the sense experiences under these conditions will constitute a direct verification of the propositions. Their non-occurrence will constitute a direct falsification. Such a proposition is clearly a directly verifiable one. But the case is different with propositions about the past. Suppose the factual proposition 'Caesar was murdered' can be exhaustively analysed into a number of experiential propositions asserting that, had I been in a certain position at a certain time, I should have had such and such experiences. These propositions would not be directly verifiable since I cannot put myself in that position at that time. Yet in some sense these propositions are verifiable. Though I cannot have the sense-experiences which would directly verify them, I can have some other sense experiences (of manuscripts etc.) which would lead me to think the propositions were rendered more or less probable. Such propositions are, then, only indirectly verifiable.

This simple consideration is sufficient to dispose of the view that only directly verifiable propositions are significant. For, on this view, the propositions of history would be utterly meaningless. It might seem that the obvious procedure at this point is to rewrite the "principle of significance" as follows: A proposition is significant only if it is directly or indirectly verifiable. But, in this revised form, the principle loses its simplicity and, with that simplicity, much of its cogency. For, whereas the notion of "direct verifiability" seems an easily understood one, that of "indirect verifiability" is by no means

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such. The principle would obviously appear more persuasive if we could discover a single meaning of verifiability which was satisfactory. I propose, then, to consider two attempts to uphold such a single meaning in the interpretation of the principle, one made by Mr C I Lewis, and the other by Mr A J Ayer.

Mr C I Lewis seeks to avoid the difficulty by maintaining that propositions about the past are directly verifiable. In his *Mind and the World Order* he says

"The assumption that the past is intrinsically verifiable means that at any date after the happening of an event, there is always something which is at least conceivably possible of experience by means of which it can be known. Let us call these items its 'effects'. The totality of such effects quite obviously constitute all of the object that is knowable. To separate the effects from the object is thus to transform it into some incognizable ding an sich" (p. 151).

The first sentence here is unobjectionable. It asserts merely that, in some sense, the past is verifiable, and with this everyone must agree. But the remainder of the paragraph implies that it is directly verifiable. It is tempting to say that all we can know of Caesar's murder is the effects it has produced, and to go further and assert that to speak of Caesar's murder as something distinct from these effects is to talk about a ding an sich, and so to make non-significant propositions. But a moment's reflection suffices to show that this will not do. What are these effects? Many of them are in the past, as Caesar's murder is. And the very argument which proves that Caesar's murder is incognizable proves also that the effects up to date are also incognizable, with the exception of any particular effects which happen to be immediately present to me at the moment, and, of course, any effects which might be present to me in the future. It follows, then, that the only part of the event known as Caesar's murder which is knowable is constituted by certain effects of it which it is possible for me to experience in the future or which I am experiencing now.

If it is meant that these present and possible future experiences of mine are what is meant by the proposition "Caesar was murdered," it is difficult to see why these particular three words should be chosen. Why should not the experiences be referred to in their own character? It is clear that any future experiences I might have cannot constitute what I am referring to when I say "Caesar was murdered," though they might be evidence for it.

It is worth considering in a little more detail how this curious view has arisen. Mr Lewis seems to have arrived at it in something like this way. Propositions about the past are puzzling, because, even when they are experiential propositions, referring merely to what could have been the object of a possible experience, they do not

refer to what could be a possible experience for me or anybody now living. But let us suppose that an event is something having an infinite duration, beginning in the past, extending through the present, and on into the future. In this case, an event such as Caesar's murder, will then be divisible into two parts, that part of it which occupies past time right up to the present moment, and that part of it which has yet to come. Propositions about the event will now be directly verifiable, since part of the event is yet to come. Though directly verifiable, however, they will only be partially verifiable. We can always get more and more nearly complete verifications of them.

This seems to be the line of argument which has led Mr. Lewis to his conclusion. If so, there are two features of it which merit comment. (i) To say that propositions about the past are partially verifiable is misleading if it suggests that complete verification would require an infinite future and is rendered impossible for this reason. It is not because the future is infinite that historical propositions can never be subjected to a complete direct verification, but because the past is irrevocable. (ii) If past events extend into the future, it seems reasonable to suppose likewise that future events extend back into the past. In this case propositions about future events will also be only verifiable partially. And it will be very difficult to draw a distinction between propositions about the past and propositions about the future.

As a means to understanding Mr. Lewis's view more clearly we may state it in terms of our original distinction between experiential and factual propositions. We there mentioned that it was possible to consider that all factual propositions could be exhaustively analysed into a number of experiential propositions and we assumed that experiential propositions might refer to the past, present, or future, defining them as propositions recording an actual or conceivable experience. By "conceivable" we understood something that could under certain conditions be an experience. Now, if we substitute for 'conceivable' in this definition the word "possible," and interpret 'possible' to include what we might experience in the future but exclude what we might have experienced in the past, then it is clear that all propositions about the past are factual propositions and must be analysable into experiential propositions about the present or the future. This may be expressed by saying that the past is a 'logical construction' out of the present and the future. And this seems to be Mr. Lewis's view.

The ground on which this view must be rejected is that it cannot offer us any criterion by which to distinguish propositions about the past from propositions about the future. Mr. A. J. Ayer, who agrees with Mr. Lewis on this question, thinks that it does. But his argument

on this point is unconvincing. In his *Language, Truth, and Logic*, he says

"So that the fact that propositions referring to the past have the same hypothetical character as those which refer to the present, and those which refer to the future, in no way entails that these three types of propositions are not distinct. For they are verifiable by, and so serve to predict, different experiences" (p. 147)

But what is the special character of those future experiences which verify propositions about the past which distinguishes them from those future experiences which verify propositions about the future? Mr. Ayer says "propositions about the past are rules for the prediction of those 'historical' experiences which are commonly said to verify them" (p. 147). But is the historical character of an experience something which we immediately experience? Is it like the pitch of a note, or the brightness of a colour? This would be a very odd view to maintain, and yet it seems required by the theory. But, in fact, the same experience may suffice to verify a proposition about the past and a proposition about the future. For example, meteorological observations made to-morrow may verify both my prediction about to-morrow's weather (a proposition about the future), and a weather expert's contention that several days ago there was an intense depression off the coast of Iceland (a proposition about the past). The experience cannot itself possess an historical character, though it may be such as to render probable an historical proposition. In this latter sense any experience may be an historical experience.

We shall not have to face these difficulties if we admit that propositions can be significant even though they can be verified only indirectly. For we may then allow that a proposition may refer to something other than the experience that verifies it.

III

Mr. Ayer's views, however, deserve fuller consideration, because he attempts to give a single sense to "verifiable" which is neither that of "directly verifiable" nor that of "indirectly verifiable". He maintains that a proposition is significant if it is capable of what he calls a "weak verification," i.e. if it is capable of being rendered more or less probable by some future experience or experiences. Further, he maintains that no proposition is capable of anything more than a weak verification. It is obviously important to know here what is meant by saying that an experience renders probable a proposition. Mr. Ayer says

'Roughly speaking, all that we mean by saying that an observation increases the probability of a proposition is that it increases our con-

fidence in the proposition, as measured by our willingness to rely on it in practice as a *forecast of our sensation* and to retain it in preference to other hypotheses in face of an unfavourable experience" (pp 143-4)

(The term 'hypothesis' or "empirical hypothesis," as used by Mr Ayer, has the same denotation as 'significant proposition' for, since no significant proposition can ever be conclusively verified, all significant propositions are, and must always remain, hypotheses)

On this view of probability I do not think that we shall have any help from the principle of significance in determining which propositions are significant and which are not Further, we shall be faced with the paradox that many propositions now meaningless were once significant and many propositions now significant to some people are not significant to others For example, any one who maintains the proposition 'There is a benevolent God' and at the same time admits that the occurrence of certain events, e.g the flooding of three continents simultaneously, or the violent death of three million persons in one month would be evidence against his proposition, and is ready when these things do not occur to rely on his proposition as a *forecast of their non occurrence in the future*—such a man is on this view, entertaining a significant proposition If he maintains that no kind of observation whatever would shake his faith in the proposition or increase it, then, and only then is his proposition meaningless Why should it be significant in the one case and not in the other? It might be said that in the first case, the words express an experiential proposition about the future, and in the second case they express no proposition at all But this is obviously not true The real difference is that in the former case the theological proposition is thought to imply an experiential proposition, whereas in the latter case it is not The belief that it does imply an experiential proposition would appear to most people to day a product of superstition From which it appears that, provided we are sufficiently superstitious, any proposition may have significance

Consider another example from a sphere less remote than that of theology Suppose that I am fighting in the trenches, and see opposing me certain khaki clad forms I should be likely to make the hypothesis that these forms had feelings, thoughts, and, more particularly, plans to attack me I should rely on this hypothesis in forecasting what was likely to happen in the near future, i.e I should expect my future experiences to be different from what they would be if the khaki-clad forms were merely dummies Such a hypothesis is a significant one, according to the passage quoted above from Mr Ayer Yet Mr Ayer holds that propositions about the feelings, thoughts, etc., of other people are metaphysical (because such feelings can never be experienced by me) and are only significant if they are capable of being

completely analysed into propositions about the behaviour of other people (which can be experienced by me) That is to say, he believes that a proposition is significant, not in virtue of the fact that it yields predictions, but because it is equivalent to a certain number of predictions To put it another way, he holds that all factual propositions are analysable completely into experiential propositions, and holds, also, like Mr Lewis, that all propositions referring to the past are factual, not experiential That he is not very clear on this point, however, is suggested by a passage in which he hints that factual propositions may have to be analysed into an infinite number of experiential propositions

"Then we may say that it is the mark of a genuine factual proposition, not that it should be equivalent to an experiential proposition, or any finite number of experiential propositions, but simply that some experiential propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises without being deducible from those other premises alone" (*op cit*, p 26)

Supposing Mr Ayer to be suggesting that any factual proposition is equivalent to an infinite number of experiential propositions, it is easy to see that this is not true of propositions about the past As we have seen, they cannot be completely analysed into experiential propositions, even if infinite in number It is obvious that "X murdered Y" is not equivalent to any number of propositions of the type "X confessed to the murder of Y," "the bullet in Y's body resembles the remaining bullet in X's gun," etc What is true, I suggest, is that, wherever there is a factual proposition, there is always a set of experiential propositions, perhaps infinite in number, such that the more of them are verified the more probable it becomes that the factual proposition is true

However, it may be a mistake to suppose that Mr Ayer thinks that a factual proposition is equivalent to an infinite number of experiential propositions Let us consider the assertion in the second part of the passage quoted, which is clearly more important than the first part It asserts that a factual proposition is significant, if from it, in conjunction with certain other premises, an experiential proposition can be deduced, which cannot be deduced from them alone The criterion here suggested to distinguish a significant proposition from one that is non significant is, it is worth remarking, the same as the criterion which has frequently been suggested to distinguish a "good" hypothesis from a "bad" one The older view did not, of course, deny significance to "bad" hypotheses, it denied only utility The new view has certain disadvantages not facing the old view

(i) It is difficult to maintain that the atomic theory was significant to Dalton, but not to Leucippus The older view allows that it was significant to both, while maintaining that it had utility only when

it became capable, in conjunction with certain empirical observations, of yielding predictions. Many hypotheses, once metaphysical, become, at a later stage, scientific. Even if it is said that it is not really the same hypothesis it is, at any rate, two hypotheses sufficiently alike to make one hesitate to allow that one is significant, while maintaining that the other is a meaningless collocation of noises. Yet this is what Mr. Ayer's view requires us to do.

(ii) There is a further difficulty. Suppose that I have been operated upon surgically, and the blood lost has been carefully preserved. The proposition "I lost some blood" is obviously a significant one. So also are the propositions "I lost five ounces of blood" and "I lost five and a half ounces of blood". All are verifiable. Supposing, now, that the instruments available for measuring a liquid such as blood are accurate only within 0.0001 ounce. Is it significant to say "I lost 5.00001 ounces of blood"? It certainly seems to be a significant proposition, though not perhaps a useful one. Yet it is unverifiable. Again, supposing I assert the proposition "Caesar lost five ounces of blood when he was murdered," am I talking nonsense? Surely not, even though such a proposition is unverifiable. Of course, it is conceivable that someone measured the blood which Caesar lost and recorded its amount and the record may be discovered. We might then urge that the proposition is verifiable in principle. (Strictly speaking, what we ought to say is that the proposition may or may not be verifiable, but we do not know which is the case¹.) Let us frame, then, the proposition "Caesar lost 5.0001 ounces of blood." This degree of accuracy is not beyond the power of modern instruments of measuring. It is certain that Roman instruments were less exact than ours. So that no record made would be of any use in verifying this proposition. It is unverifiable, yet surely significant.

We may conclude then, that there are two classes of significant propositions which are unverifiable.

I. Propositions asserting something about the past, which are unverifiable not because of the sort of assertion they make but simply because they are about the past and the past is irrevocable. It is clear that historical works contain many such propositions. It is perhaps the preponderance of such propositions over verifiable propositions that makes history more of an art than a science.

II. Propositions making assertions to a degree of exactitude beyond that verifiable by any available instruments. We ought perhaps also to add

III. Propositions which are verifiable only indirectly, since, as we have seen, to say that a proposition is indirectly verifiable is really to say that it is not itself verifiable though it is connected in a certain way with a proposition that is.

It is worth noting that many of the propositions included in

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class I can also be placed in class III. For example, the murder of Caesar is unverifiable just because it is in the past. But it is indirectly verifiable through documents, inscriptions, etc. Again, just as direct verifiability is precluded by the fact that an event is in the past, so also it may be precluded by the fact that it is going on in an extremely remote and inaccessible region of space. For example, we may say of the proposition "There are mountains on the other side of the moon" that it is verifiable in principle, making the assumption that there is no absolute obstacle in the way of a journey to the other side of the moon. (Incidentally, can we suppose that there is any absolute obstacle in the way of a backward journey in time, which would enable us to see Caesar's murder?) Or we may say that it is indirectly verifiable, i.e. it can be rendered probable by the verification of some other proposition or propositions.

Each of these three classes presents a difficulty for the theory that only verifiable propositions are significant. Even if all the propositions in class I could be brought into class III (which we have seen to be difficult on the general ground that events in the past cannot be verified with the same degree of accuracy as events in the future) there would still be the difficulty about propositions in class II. It might be argued that any significance such propositions possess is a kind of pseudo-significance derived from the significance of some *a priori* proposition in mathematics. Even if this were possible we should still be left with propositions that are verifiable directly and propositions that are verifiable only indirectly. And these are really quite disparate types.

But are they really quite disparate types? Mr. Ayer makes no such distinction between the two types. He maintains a distinction between propositions that are conclusively verifiable, and propositions which are capable only of being rendered more or less probable by experience. And he maintains further that no proposition is conclusively verifiable. All significant propositions are merely such that they can be rendered probable by experience.

There seem to me to be quite conclusive objections against this attempt to formulate the 'principle of significance'.

(1) If by 'rendering probable' is meant "making a man more convinced" then it is difficult to close the door of significance to metaphysical and theological propositions. A man may find that innumerable experiences make him more convinced of the proposition 'God exists' (as mystics of all ages have claimed), or of the proposition "The Absolute is not in time" (as Mr. Bradley would certainly have claimed). And you will not be entitled to point out that the experiences he has do not in fact render such a proposition probable because you have defined probability in terms of degree of conviction. You cannot either say that "God exists" is not significant

because it is not verifiable, since you understand by verifiable merely the fact that a proposition can come to be held with a greater or less degree of conviction under the influence of certain experiences. We may yet live to see this ultra-positivist doctrine used to support a derelict theology. Such is usually the fate of all positivisms.

Mr. Ayer, it seems, might escape by maintaining that the degree of conviction with which the proposition is held is to be measured by the willingness to rely upon it in practice as a forecast of our sensations. But, if this is admitted, then it follows that metaphysical, theological, astrological, and theosophical propositions are significant to any one who is ready to take them as a guide to practice. Astrology, we should have to admit, is compounded of most admirably significant propositions! In fact, the significance of a proposition would be determined by the depth of superstition into which the holder of it had fallen.

(ii) The view involves us in complications which, when explored, prove very unpalatable. To a naive mind the 'principle of significance' means that a significant proposition predicts that under certain conditions, I shall have certain experiences. If I have those experiences under those conditions, the proposition is verified, if not, not. It is implied in this that when I am having certain experiences, I can know that I am having them, and so can also know that my proposition is verified or not. But, on Mr. Ayer's account, it turns out that this is in fact not so. I can never be sure that I am having any experience whatever. So that when I am having experiences which would normally be thought of as verifying a certain proposition all I can do is to frame the hypothesis that I am having those experiences. And so I go on from one hypothesis to another. Now this contains the following difficulty. Suppose a proposition P which would be verified by experiences e and e' . Suppose I am in a situation in which I think I may be having these experiences. Is the proposition verified? No, according to Mr. Ayer, since I do not know that I am having these experiences. Is it then rendered probable? Yes, according to Mr. Ayer, since on the strength of what I experience I can frame the hypothesis "I am having the experiences e and e' " (itself, of course, a proposition to be verified in the future). But how can this hypothesis render probable my original proposition? If the hypothesis is true, then I am having the experiences e and e' , and my original proposition is verified. If it is false, then I am not having the experiences e and e' , and my original proposition is refuted. In neither case is it rendered more or less probable.

On Mr. Ayer's view we are always making hypotheses and never verifying them. We always put off the day of verification by making further hypotheses. This is a curious and paradoxical conclusion. And it seems to me that the only way out of it is to admit that some

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propositions are not directly verifiable and to maintain our distinction between direct and indirect verifiability

IV

The argument has so far proceeded within a somewhat restricted sphere. But it has been shown, I hope, that many propositions not directly verifiable in experience cannot be denied meaning. The criterion of meaning which has been under review would exclude from the realm of significance all propositions about the past as well as all those about other selves as centres of experience fundamentally similar to my own.

To suppose that this difficulty can be overcome by some transparently obvious device such as a behaviouristic view of other selves is the peak of philosophical absurdity. Consider simply the case of historical testimony. What significance can it have, unless we suppose that centres of human experience existed in the past, Herodotus, Thucydides, Tacitus? The evidence is significant only in the light of this assumption. To suppose that this evidence remains what it was, once you have repudiated this assumption, is to deny the assumption verbally and to accept it intellectually.

And yet it will be said. What empirical evidence have you for making this assumption? Even if the answer is "None," we must add that unless we accept this assumption, there is precious little in the field of knowledge for which we have any empirical evidence. Let us grant that certain characteristic facts in our empirical experience compel, though they do not prove, the recognition of other centres of experience. Then, where not all of these are forthcoming, doubt may arise as to whether in this particular case we are compelled to recognize the existence of another centre of experience. We may say. Let us make the hypothesis that we are here confronted with another centre of experience. Given, then, further empirical facts, the hypothesis may be considered verified in the sense that the total of empirical facts now compel the assumption. This is merely to say that the existence of other selves, if not directly verifiable, is at any rate so bound up with empirical facts which are verifiable that they may serve to constitute an indirect verification of it.

V

We have seen that many propositions are verifiable only indirectly. Now the essence of such a type of verification is that the meaning always transcends the verification. We cannot then seek the criterion which determines whether a proposition has meaning or not in its verifiability. We shall have to seek it elsewhere.

First, we should remind ourselves that there is not necessarily one condition only under which a proposition acquires significance. There may well be several. I propose to suggest five conditions. It may be that there are more, and that it is possible for a proposition to conform to all these four conditions and yet be devoid of meaning.

(I) The proposition must contain symbols.

(II) The symbols must possess a propositional structure. "Long night the is" is not a meaningful proposition.

(III) There must be no logical contradiction.

(IV) The symbols of the proposition must fall within one order of reference (e.g. "Pudding is righteous" is nonsense) or, if the symbols belong to more than one order of reference, they must enter into the proposition only by way of distinguishing the different orders of reference (e.g. "A stone is not morally good or bad.")

(V) Each of the symbols must refer to some element in my experience, or if it not something that is an element *simpliciter* of my experience, something which by the aid of elements in my experience can be imaginatively constructed by me. (This is an important, though dangerous, qualification. I do not see how we can do without it. The mystical experiences of some of the Christian Saints are foreign to my temperament, but propositions containing symbols referring to these experiences are not devoid of meaning for me. The more of this imaginative construction needed, however, the more the proposition will tend to lose some of its significance.)

Of these conditions the first three are of little importance, since they would hardly be challenged by any one. (IV) is important because it allows for the possible existence of non-empirical orders of reference within experience, such as the order with which Ethics appears to be concerned. If we are tempted to reject ethical propositions as meaningless, because they cannot find a home within our empirical experience, we must remember that on precisely the same grounds we must reject propositions about other selves. We no more "see" another self than we "see" the rightness of an action or the value of an end. If, however, the existence of another self is bound up with certain empirical experiences, and these experiences serve indirectly to verify propositions asserting its existence then, similarly, it may be possible to verify indirectly ethical propositions by means of the empirical experiences with which they are associated.

IN DEFENCE OF HUME ON MIRACLES

H J MAIDMENT, M A

If, as we are told, Hume's essay on Miracles was an irrelevant insertion in his *Enquiry* to gain it the notoriety which the Treatise had missed, the artifice has certainly been successful. Hume's thesis has been hotly debated from that day to this. Neither side it seems can claim complete victory, for both make important concessions. Green, his mostly adverse critic, agrees with Mill and L. Stephen that the argument against miracles is 'irrefragable' in itself, though not consonant, he thinks, with Hume's own principles. On the other hand, Huxley whilst declaring it on the historical side "irrefragable," demurs at least to the presentation of the formal side.

As Hume's estimate of the historical evidence is accepted by all these critics and not directly impugned by the latest, Professor A. E. Taylor, we need only touch on disputed points and alleged flaws of the argument.

These allegations mostly spring from misconceptions of the purpose and scope of the essay. He is not discussing the *a priori* possibility of miracles, nor to be refuted by argument in its favour. Here, as Professor Taylor says, our attitude depends on our metaphysics. Hume deals with the metaphysical problems in their place, but here only with the question which on any theory requires an answer, on what grounds the actual occurrence of miracles and prodigies in history may be accepted—a matter not for metaphysics but for such common sense as a juryman employs to determine facts within the framework of his common sense world. Common sense projects its "invincible belief in causation as a necessary linkage of the external world. Miracle proper only exists as a breakage of this necessity. It is the supersession of a natural physical necessity of causation by a supernatural psychic cause. Only as a breach of natural necessity can it be a proof of supernatural power. But Hume's metaphysic denies this necessity. He holds that the causal sequence, though a constant, is not a necessary connection. The cause is not an "efficient" cause. It has no inherent power of constraining the effect. Causality is not a "law of nature" in this sense. Consequently there are no laws of nature in this sense. But miracles proper are infractions of laws of nature in this sense, and thus on Hume's own view at once impossible. But opponents, whether theological metaphysicians or unsophisticated men of the world, do not accept this view and must be met on their own ground.

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Hume defines miracles as violations of laws of nature. Huxley objects to this definition because, he says, there are no laws of nature (in the above sense). He seems to forget that Hume is not defending but attacking miracles, that he must define clearly what it is that he is attacking, and that if the definition is in itself untenable, the fault is not his. Obviously miracles are violations of laws of nature or they would not be miracles. That a conjunction hitherto found constant should fail, is not astonishing. There have been many instances. A miracle violates a constant because necessary causal connection, a law of nature. But usually, with the apologists, Hume takes the terms in a looser sense.

Causality to Hume being a constant but empirical law, its failure is conceivably possible and not miraculous. Yet it is the surest of all laws, being found verified alike in the fulfilment or frustration of all special laws. If 'miraculous' is to retain any sense for Hume it must be the violation of this law and those it validates and sanctions as laws of nature. His opponents, however, give it a still laxer sense as the violation of any purely empirical constant law, such as the law of gravitation or of human mortality. These though not causally established, they assume to be necessary. To them the resting of lead in the air or the rising of a dead man would be miraculous. On the latter, indeed, the apologists came to rest the whole of their case.¹ If to raise the dead is a miracle that the dead rise not is a law of nature, empirical but unbroken. Hence when Huxley censures Hume for saying, "It is a miracle that a dead man should come to life, because that has never been observed in any age or country," he again fails to notice that it is in this sense, as violations of empirical laws of nature, that the disputants are concerned, the one to uphold, the other to reject miracles.²

Hume must on his theory and does, in fact, admit that "there may possibly be miracles or violations of the usual course of nature." An eight days' darkness over all the earth in 1600 he would allow on overwhelming evidence as an unusual course of nature, beyond human power to simulate. If there were like evidence that in 1600 Queen Elizabeth was entombed and a month later came forth and reigned for three years, he must admit the fact though he would have no inclination to believe she had really been dead, for in this case the contrary experience is complete, and human interest, fraud, and folly offer an easier explanation. But human passions become so deeply engaged, and so heighten the initial improbability when the marvel is made the foundation of a system of religion, that he

¹ L. Stephen *English Thought in Eighteenth Century* I p. 271.

² Laing, *David Hume*, p. 184 shows that this use of "miracle" was that common in Hume's day.

³ Green and Grose, *Hume's Philosophical Works*, IV, p. 105.

decides after carefully exposing the special weaknesses of such evidence, that in this case and this only¹ it may be rejected without further examination

Mill also appears to make a needless concession by allowing the objection that miracles are not to be ruled out as contrary to uniform experience, since there is some positive evidence that such things have happened.² But there is a prior question what evidence is admissible. There is some evidence that the sun turned back in heaven at sight of the banquet of Thyestes. To credit all evidence without scrutiny is to make an end of all discussion, all laws of nature, and with them miracle itself. The chief purpose of Hume's essay is to assess the value of this evidence to miracle. In testing the veracity of witnesses we do not give them credit for veracity on the very matter to which we find their witness suspicious enough to need testing, but as far as otherwise veracious, that is in statements found concordant with the common course of nature. Against Hume at least the objection cannot lie, for the opposition in affirming miracles affirm uniform experience against them in all but this case, and Hume accepts it, not to brush aside but to weigh against the witness to this case. After careful scrutiny of credentials, his finding and sole contention is that past records of miracles, always of inferior value to present perception, are less credible than the uniformity of nature. "Their falsity would not be more miraculous than the facts they endeavour to establish."³

Indeed, there can be no evidence to miracles as infractions of natural law. The marvels may and would be attributed to the working of laws unknown to us. Until we know them all, miracles as infractions of laws of nature can neither be proved nor disproved.

Ordinarily, however, the term "miracle" is applied to a certain kind of marvel better called "sign" as indicative of superhuman power wielded by human agency. Though mere miracles cannot be proved, since all proof of fact rests on the uniformity of nature, and even the last criterion of Tillotson and Hume, our own senses, could establish no more than the presence of an inexplicability to our own limited knowledge yet signs, not denying but affirming, while extending the range of causality, might conceivably be proved, if that extended range were justified by independent ground of belief in that superhuman power as a *vera causa*, as something more than a postulated unknown cause acting in an unknown way, an "occult" bearer of an "occult" quality. The abstract possibility of such "signs" is not denied. If an ignorant peasant by his word

¹ Green and Grose, *Hume's Philosophical Works*, IV, 105

² On like grounds Laird, *Hume's Philosophy*, p. 122, declares Hume guilty on an outrageous *petitio principis*.

³ *Enquiry*, IV, 94

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arrested a cannon ball in mid flight, or reversed the course of the sun in heaven, results beyond the present powers of science and the known capacities of nature, most of us would listen with much respect to his account of the source of his power. If, however, it were attested not by the faithful witness of the eye but by hearsay or tradition, few of us would take it seriously, and if ascribed to a divine source the philosopher would compare it with the wonders related of the founders of rival faiths.

Thus there are three kinds of wonders to which the term miracle is commonly applied. First marvels which conflict with our own limited experience, like the freezing of water for the Indian prince, or with limited human experience, like a month's total darkness. These are violations of the usual course of nature.¹ Next miracles proper, violations of laws of nature, and therefore ultimately of the uniformity of nature: that constant conjunction of cause and effect to which the exceptions to more special conjunctions conform, and whereby the limits are set within which the special conjunctions are 'laws of nature'. But since miracles flourish in ages unversed in scientific induction, the term is practically confined to breaches of constant empirical laws: "lead unsupported falls", "bodily death is final". Here experience is so nearly complete that the conjunction is believed to be causal, a law of nature: an invincible belief is translated into physical causal necessity, and its breach into miracle. Thirdly, such breaches become 'signs' of the exertion of supernatural power to ages for which such powers are real and active.

Hume discusses miracles in these three senses, defining each in succession. He begins not with a definition but a description of the whole subject to be treated, "miracles and prodigies found in all history," the credibility of recorded events called miracles including prodigies or marvels² and of their usual interpretation as signs.

Allowing the merely marvellous, violations of the usual course of nature, he passes to real miracles which are 'violations of laws of nature: that is, 'contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same,'³ and so contrary to the principle of causality, that the same cause has the same effect, which Hume, like his opponents, accepts⁴ as without exception if not necessary. Violation of laws of nature in this sense neither side is concerned to impugn or vindicate, for the constancy of purely physical law is vital to either case. The admissibility of signs is the real question in debate. These do not infringe the law of causality and are not to be summarily dismissed. We may define them accurately as transgressions of a law of nature by the inter-

¹ *Enquiry*, IV, 102.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, IV, 92 n.

⁴ Cf. Laing, *Hume's Philosophy*, p. 107.

position of some divine or demonic power.¹ That the voice or command of a man should arrest in air a lump of lead, or raise the dead, is at present beyond human power and to that extent a breach of natural law,² and therefore a miracle or sign of a higher power. None now present themselves to stand the ocular test of Tillotson. Evidence to signs in the past must be critically weighed. Here the wise man will proportion his belief to the evidence. After full discussion Hume finds that such testimony is far more improbable, human veracity far less constant than the constancy to be outweighed, and the value of such witness so slight "as to amount to entire annihilation," at least with religious miracles which all men of sense are now warranted 'to reject even without examination."

It seems, therefore, that Hume is not open to the charge of inconsistency for starting with the principle that a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence, and concluding that in a certain field the wise man will ignore the evidence. In that field he will find it once for all to be negligible. He is then charged with only establishing this result by "the illegitimate device of changing a fundamental definition in the course of the argument." He gives three definitions of three different things, marvels, miracles in the strict sense, and miracles in the usual laxer sense, the first admissible, the second undemonstrable, the third abstractly admissible historically undemonstrable. A further inconsistency is said to be that by the last definition Hume must after all allow that a resuscitation of the dead might be proved. He would, on ocular evidence duly controlled, not on hearsay and tradition. And that it would not be a sign to any not already persuaded of the reality of the alleged cause, is common ground.³

The dispute between Hume and his critics is like a battle where each commander is victorious on his own wing. His assailants contending for the abstract possibility of miracles carry an undefended position and offer no resistance to his own attack on the value of the evidence for a certain kind. Hence Professor Taylor, claiming victory on the formal side, declares that Huxley, anxious to maintain Hume's conclusion with some appearance of logic, restates the case against miracles and rests it on the inadequacy of the evidence for their actual occurrence in the past. But Leslie Stephen appears to be right in holding that this was Hume's whole contention, at least in this essay to which the attack is, as usual, confined. Possible or not, they cannot be proved to have happened. Pure miracles of course, being natural impossibilities, cannot be proved possible, for the uniformity of nature is our criterion of possibility. Signs, humanly impossible, supernaturally possible, might but cannot, he holds, in

¹ *Enquiry*, IV, 93 n.

² *Ibid*

³ *Ibid*, IV, 107, Taylor, *David Hume and the Miraculous*, p. 49

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fact be substantiated. The wise will treat them as we all treat the prodigies of Livy.

We are then told that if we translate the argument into the language of Humian scepticism we shall get results either conflicting with fact or else harmless truths "quite acceptable to the vast majority of the orthodox." That since our only evidence of causality is an invincible propensity to believe it, the only conclusion to be drawn is that no one does believe in miracles, which is not true. The answer is that no one does believe in them as violations of causality: such disbelief is the necessary basis of the belief in signs as vindications of causality. Whilst on the other hand, since Hume's only evidence to 'laws of nature' is an inexplicable custom of belief in inexplicable customary conjunctions in a field where all events are loose and separated, it only follows that we believe on balance of customariness or probability, an unsensational result which no one disputes. He could only say that we do not believe in miracles as the most unusual of things, not that miracles cannot happen.¹ His psychological theory affords no rational ground for the uniformity of nature. It explodes science at least as much as theology, and should have shocked Huxley as much as John Wesley.

It is clear that Hume did accept the uniformity of nature. He tells us² how causal connection may be inferred from a single observation, by methods which anticipate the four canons of Mill.³ Such conviction from a single instance cannot be the effect of habit, but we have many millions to convince us that like objects in like circumstances always produce like effects, and this principle, which is habitual, bestows its evidence on the single case.⁴ All adults have acquired this notion of causality and argue thereby from a single instance.⁵ Philosophers make it a universal maxim, referring all events to known or hidden causes.⁶ Theologians and Hume accept it as common ground, for both understand by miraculous "contrary to the uniformity of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same."⁷ Hume accepts it as a formulation of instinctive reason and postulate of a world that can be reasoned about. Hence proofs derived from the causal relation are 'entirely free from doubt and uncertainty'.⁸ A translation into Humian scepticism merely adds that this principle of inference is not inferred.

Hume then accepts the uniformity of nature: it can only be objected that on his theory he had no right to.⁹ He accepted the

¹ Hume admits that there are only degrees of probability. Miracles are the most improbable of things. He does not say that miracles are impossible, but that some are absurd.

² *Treatise*, I, p. 405.

³ *Ibid.* I, p. 405.

⁴ *Ibid.* I, p. 430.

⁵ *Treatise*, I, p. 423.

⁶ *Ibid.* I, p. 466.

⁷ *Ibid.* I, p. 429.

⁸ *Enquiry*, IV, p. 92 n.

⁹ Cf. Lang, *David Hume*, p. 132.

common course of nature, the common-sense world (of coherent perceptions) No philosopher can start without it When he stepped out of his study he forgot about his "fictions," but like the common man got on quite well without them Hume forgot that he was a Berkeleian, and the common man according to Berkeley does not know that he is one A Berkeleian may have his system of nature, and the common man instinctively frames a whole of his experience, as even animals do to less extent, for they, too, share in "the wonderful and unintelligible instinct called Reason, which carries us along trains of ideas and endows them with particular qualities"¹ The trains are linked by association, by resemblance, contiguity, cause and effect, for associative linkage is in the mental what gravitational attraction is in the natural world² The behaviour of men and animals implies awareness of regular sequences and undoubting expectation of their recurrence Hume accepts this common world with its causal network, as the basis and test of true philosophy³ As a philosopher he can only analyse, criticize, and seek to delimit the range of its instinctive subconscious reason In philosophy it merely becomes conscious of itself, detecting and formulating the implication of its instinctive procedure as a law of causality

Both to the man of instinct and of reflection the test of reality is possible inclusion in the causal network of their world, and the ground of their belief in its causality is the same, that any seeming infraction, any failure of special sequences, is outweighed by many millions of contrary experiences, and ascribed to the secret operation of counteracting causes This is the rule both of common sense and of the organized common sense of science and philosophy For Hume as for Mill the belief in the uniformity of nature rests on simple enumeration of instances, on experience not on demonstration Experience gives only uniform sequence causal efficiency is neither observable nor demonstrable "If we reason *a priori*, any thing may appear able to produce anything"⁴ But, in fact, it does not natural events are not incalculable, not really loose and separate⁵ they seem⁶ loose and separate since we can never observe any tie between two events, any reason why one thing is followed

¹ *Treatise* I 471

² *Ibid.*, I, 321

³ *Enquiry* IV, 133 Philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life methodized and corrected Cf *Dialogues*, II, 384, and Laird, *Hume's Philosophy*, p 297, Laing *David Hume*, p 145

⁴ *Enquiry* IV, 135

⁵ *Treatise* I 319 Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone could join them In a letter he protests that he never defended the absurdity that a thing could come into being without a cause only that our certainty of the contrary arises neither from intuition nor demonstration, but from another source

⁶ *Enquiry*, IV, 61

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by one thing more than another ¹ To say we cannot tell why things are conjoined does not deny the conjunction

Hume then founds science on the uniformity of nature as firmly as Mill, and no more undermines it by his denial of causal power or efficiency than Mach and K Pearson and all men of science for whom science is only descriptive But unlike Mill, he does not call the first principle an induction For all induction starts from the facts of an accepted world of coherent uniformities in which their coherence constitutes them facts Hence all attempted proofs of the principle from experience must move in a circle ² It is only through the relation of cause and effect that we are persuaded of any real existence ³ We only know our self or person as a succession of perceptions forming a chain of causes and effects ⁴ Neither reason nor sense can justify our belief in cause and effect, our conviction that the future will resemble the past It is the work, therefore, of imagination Memory senses and understanding are all of them founded on the imagination, ⁵ on fictions which are not idle fancies but working hypotheses, not changeable weak and irregular, but permanent irresistible and universal The latter kind are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions ⁶ They are fictions in the sense of the *Als ob* of Vaihinger Constructing and relating sensible objects in a causal framework, Human fiction does the work of the Kantian category That framework is the field of possible miracle and the common ground of champion and challenger

As L. Stephen says, ⁷ "If all reason is fiction, fiction is reason The process by which belief is generated is not what we call reason It does not imply a reference to general rules But that is because it generates the rules Feeling precedes reason, and is the material out of which reason is evolved We become reasonable as we become conscious of the law by which our feelings have been unconsciously determined

When Hume comes upon a process which underlies reason, instead of being deduced from it, he pronounces it to be fictitious, as the ontologists call it transcendental ⁸ Hume's critique of Human Nature finds the synthetic function which makes knowledge possible to belong more to the sensitive than to the cogitative part of our nature ⁹

It is admitted that the evidence to signs is unconvincing unless we already believe on metaphysical grounds in the possibility and

¹ Kemp Smith *Hume's Dialogues* p. 34 remarks that critics fail to observe that the impressions through which Hume's philosophy is developed, being impressions not of sensation but of reflection instincts, passions propensities, sentiments are not to be called detached

² *Enquiry*, IV 3rd

³ *Ibid.*, I 542

⁴ *Ibid.* I 511

⁵ *Treatise* I, p. 475

⁶ *Treatise*, I, 409

⁷ *Ibid.* I 545

⁸ *Hist. Eng. Thought*, I p. 49

likelihood of signs being given. This conclusion Hume would not quarrel with as not in conflict with his own that the balance of evidence without such metaphysical make weights is overwhelmingly against them. And since a sign must be miraculous to be—as understood in the eighteenth century—a sign to convince the unbeliever, Hume's argument must still be met. It is true that all arguments about miracles must rest upon a general theory of the universe, a theistic to accredit, a deistic to discredit signs and Hume, siding with deists like Voltaire and Thomas Paine, proceeds to argue for an Epicurean deity who does not interfere. "This essay is but a small part of Hume's attack upon the fundamental dogmas of theology

but so exclusively has attention been fixed upon it that few of his assailants take any notice of the immediately succeeding essay¹ which forms with it a complete and connected argument."² It examines the current metaphysical proofs of a deity likely to manifest signs, and urges "that if God be inferred solely from the order of the universe, we cannot logically attribute to him interferences with its order."³ And "according to Hume's profound remark, the savage infers God from the apparent interruptions of order, the philosopher from order itself."⁴

In the *Enquiry* Hume whose interests grew more and more concrete, brings his philosophy to bear upon contemporary thought and its special problem, the evidences of religion. In the *Treatise* he had forged his weapons and tested them upon the metaphysical defences, and now in mature age he descends into the arena to bear his part in the great controversy of the day. The *Enquiry* is the *Treatise* "cleared for action." So far from this section being an excrescence, it would be truer to call it the heart of the *Enquiry*. It was not inserted to gain notoriety,⁵ rather the whole *Enquiry* is directed to this—the object of all authors, as a striking contribution to a debate which occupied the minds of all thinking men. The earlier sections give special prominence to the theory of causation, a necessary preliminary to all discussion of miracle. Causal "power" necessitating effect is dismissed and with it pure miracle as infringement of such causal necessity in nature. But on Hume's view of causality as unbroken uniformity of nature in human experience, infraction becomes abstractly possible. The unbroken need not be unbreakable. The immeasurably improbable may happen. We can only ask, "Has it happened in human experience?" Our essay argues there is no evidence it has, and argues nothing else. To refute "Hume on Miracles" is to refute this. It has only been met indirectly

¹ On a particular Providence

² *Hist Eng Thought*, I, p. 310

³ *Ibid* I, p. 340

⁴ *Ibid*, I, p. 410

⁵ Laird, *Hume's Philosophy* 95, 282. "The original draft probably belonged to the first design of the *Treatise*. It was cancelled not to give offence."

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by urging that an ordainer of natural law may exert a dispensing power as a sign, and that believers in a law giver with power and will to do so, will be convinced by less evidence than unbelievers that he has done so. Yet a miracle so accepted ceases to be a sign, or only to those who do not require one. The admission that no miracle can be proof of a religion to the irreligious destroys the position of Hume's opponents that they could be and were the only proof, in favour of Hume's that no such proof to convince the irreligious had been established. One party had learnt to distrust, the other to discard metaphysics. Finally to his proof that no signs have been given, Hume adds in the next section that metaphysics can show no *a priori* likelihood that they should be, and concludes in the last that all such metaphysical proofs transcending experience are nothing but sophistry and illusion. Hume denies the competence of all metaphysics or metempiric, to cite him at the bar of later systems reminds us of Green's criticism of his theory of knowledge, entangling him in the finer reticulations of a more developed system, and of the comment of W. K. Clifford that we might as well find fault with Newton for not including Maxwell's Electricity in his *Principia*. Thinkers must be judged as they confront with the equipment of their time the special problem of their time, by their historical reaction. So looked at the purpose and scope of this essay is plain. After Tindal had set the God of reason in contrast with the God of the Jews, W. Law had contracted the defence of revealed truth to miracles and prophecies. Woolston and Collins had challenged both. Leshe had given four rules for their acceptance. Waterland had turned from rational to historical grounds holding miracles to be the sole and sufficient support of the orthodox creed. Middleton was delivering his attack on the miracles of the Early Church. Finally the apologists fell back on the central fact of the resurrection. Hume in this essay attempts to carry the last position: no historical testimony can prove a miracle. The *Enquiry* engages the popular theology on its whole front, the attack on the external evidence strikes at the centre.

In his later *Dialogues* he reviews and develops his case, and rejecting the other metaphysical arguments allows a certain force to that from design, to which before Darwin there was no plausible answer, and decides "that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence".¹ Since this view is common to Cleanthes and Philo, the writer would seem to favour it himself in a sense analogous to Kant's,²

¹ This would not exclude the suggested alternative of organization that in nature as in animals or plants there is a great vivifying principle' *Dialogues* II, p. 452. "an original inherent principle of order" (p. 419).

² Kant had read and approved the criticisms of the *Dialogues* and incorporated them in his final revision of the *Critique* (Kemp Smith).

recognizing with Cleanthes the force of the argument from design, and with Philo how far short it falls of demonstration: whilst he might also say he stood nearest to Cleanthes as sharing, in common with Gibbon, Voltaire, and cultivated men of the world like Walpole, his view that current creeds indefensible in themselves were good for the common people, at least so far as they reinforced morality, adding no doubt with Philo that as infected by superstition and enthusiasm, on the whole they actually did more harm than good.

In short, Hume was of "the religion of all sensible men" courting neither martyrdom nor ostracism, he balked and infuriated the enemy by ironical bows in the temple of Rimmon. An Under-Secretary of State was in no danger of the fate of the humble Aikenhead who uttered some profanity, recanted, and was hanged in 1697. Yet in his own day Annet and Woolston had mocked at miracles the first was pilloried, the second died in prison. It was better like Tindal, the Fellow of All Souls, to live unmolested and inspire Voltaire and the French enlightenment.

Can we finally share the doubt "whether Hume was really a great philosopher or only a very clever man"? He was not clever enough to win honour and profit as a champion of popular opinions in place of "the vehement indignation both of the truly devout and of the believers in the extreme value of respectability, nor would he have incurred obloquy without the justification of sincerity".¹ When Hume died, his tomb was guarded eight nights against the mob to refute him became the high road to preferment. Horne was rewarded with a bishopric, Beattie with a pension, others with professorships or headships of colleges. "Toland gives a very sound canon to the effect that when a man maintains the common and authorized opinions his sincerity may be doubtful, but that when he attacks those opinions there is at least a presumption in favour of his sincerity".² The judgment of a contemporary opponent, the eloquent dissenter, Foster, is more generous "Deists are not to be blamed for disguising their assaults, until an open declaration of their opinions involves no danger".³ "The shame ought to lie with those who make plain speaking dangerous".⁴

Shall we say he was no great philosopher for rejecting miracles? So did Spinoza, and on like grounds. For disallowing the documentary evidence? So do all critical historians. For loosely defining

¹ Professor Laund points to the parallel case of Cicero *de natura deorum*. There Cicero an eclectic of the Academy, who held speculatively with the sceptical Carneades and practically with the mitigated scepticism of his teacher Philo leans to the view of Stoics like Cleanthes who pressed the argument from design. Hume is speculatively a Pyrrhonian sceptic practically a mitigated Academic sceptic (*Enquiry*, IV, 132). ² Philo deferring on like grounds to Cleanthes.

³ Stephen, *Hist Eng Thought*, I, p. 342

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, p. 105

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, p. 146

⁶ *Ibid.*, I, p. 105

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miracles? So did his opponents. For slighting school metaphysics and affirming all attainable knowledge to be organized common sense? So do most men of science. May not posterity decide his last appeal¹ by pronouncing one who, with the crude psychology of his day, set himself the problem of Kant, by a critique of human understanding to exhibit its incompetence to transcend experience, to have been the first critical and scientific thinker of the English school, and by the answer he gave, of cardinal importance in the world dialectic of thought?

¹ His tombstone bore only name and dates leaving it to posterity to add the rest."

KANT'S CRITICISM OF METAPHYSICS—II

W H WALSH, M A

So much for the Aesthetic. We can now proceed to the Analytic, the philosophical importance of which is much greater. Kant's main contentions in this part of his work can be summed up in two propositions: (i) human understanding contains certain *a priori* concepts, and on these are based certain non-empirical principles; (ii) these concepts are only general concepts of a phenomenal object, and therefore the principles in question are only prescriptive to sense-experience. As has already been said, interest in the first proposition has distracted attention from the fact that the important thing Kant has to say is contained in the second.

Nevertheless, the first proposition is important in itself, and in any case an examination of it throws light on the second. In its first part it is an assertion of the doctrine of categories. What does this amount to? To answer this question we must go into Kant's view of the nature of physical objects. Kant supposes in the *Critique* that an intelligence like ours can only know when an object is given to it, it cannot create its own object as an archetypal intelligence (such as that of the deity) can. Now the "giving" of an object is not quite so straightforward as it might seem. We might think that there was a world of fully formed objects existing in its own right and that we simply apprehended it in perception. But Kant does not agree with this account any more than Hume does. Both philosophers recognize that if we actually examine perception we see that what is given is never a whole object, but on each occasion merely a facet or an aspect of an object. What is given is a series, or, more accurately, a stream, of sense-data. The physical object we speak of—the chair or table of everyday speech—is a construction out of these sense data. Both Berkeley and Hume put forward theories of perception which in fact maintain that what we perceive is sense data, but both are vague as to what constitutes a physical object. Thus Berkeley begins his *Principles* by saying that "things" are simply "collections of ideas" (§ 1). In § 38 he speaks of "the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called things."

* Or phenomenal objects. Though Kant is thinking mainly of the physical world, physical must not be taken as excluding 'psychical' in what follows so far as by psychical is meant what is known in introspection. Actually the question of the application of the categories by Kant to the phenomenal self is a complicated one: see Ewing, *Kant's Treatment of Causality* Ch. VI.

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In § 99 he says "The objects of sense are nothing but sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted together" In the third *Dialogue* (pp 282-3, Everyman edition) there is a passage giving a more detailed account "Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we feel, neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by the naked eye But in case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind or individual, the endless number or confusion of names would render language impracticable Therefore to avoid this, as well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men combine together several ideas, apprehended by diverse senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, but observed, however, to have some connection in nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession, all which they refer to one name or consider as one thing (This doctrine of the independence of the objects of different senses is of course the consequence of the standpoint of the *New Theory of Vision*) Now in all this there is no explanation of the process of collecting, combining, or "concreting" of ideas All that Berkeley tells us is that the different aspects of an object are held together by being perceived by a spirit (*Principles*, § 91) He gives some indication of *what* ideas go together, viz. those that "are observed to attend one another,"¹ but he has nothing to say about *how* they are combined Hume again, does not seem to have a satisfactory doctrine of the nature of physical objects In his chapter on "Scepticism with Regard to the Senses"² he raises some interesting questions as to why we say that objects persist when we are not perceiving them, but he does not appear to think that there are any difficulties about objects we are actually perceiving These are presumably just 'bundles of perceptions' like the minds which perceive them,³ and no account is offered of how they are collected together Perhaps Hume's view is that just as the idea of continuing physical objects is a fiction imposed on us by the imagination, so is the idea of physical objects in general,⁴ and still more of a stable world of physical objects Yet such a world seems to be presupposed by the natural sciences, and it is difficult to see how there could be any scientific laws unless it were presupposed It is interesting to note that, despite his theory, Hume treats the general law of causality as if it were universally valid, but how could such a law be true of a mere congeries of unrelated sensations?⁵

¹ Third *Dialogue* p 287 (Everyman)

² *Treatise*, I, iv, 2

³ *Ibid*, p 207. Selby Bigge

⁴ This also seems to be the implication of Berkeley's nominalism

⁵ If the general law of causality is really derived from experience it should not extend further than experience has shown it to extend But Hume treats it as if it had universal validity, e.g. in his remarks about miracles

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Kant gives a more detailed account than either of his predecessors of what is meant by a physical object and a world of physical objects, and it is here that the doctrine of categories is introduced. The *Analytic* begins (B 74 = A 50 ff) by remarking on the interdependability of thought and the senses. Besides "receptivity of impressions" there must be "spontaneity of concepts" if we are to have knowledge of objects. That is to say, we cannot grasp formed objects by the senses alone, "intuition without concepts is blind," i.e. disorderly. What the senses present us with is a stream of uncoordinated sense-data, grasped assuredly under the general forms of space and time, and having an individual nature of their own, but not united together so as to form stable objects. Thus, I suppose, we have in perception sensations of roundness, brownness, hardness to touch, etc., together with the spatial and temporal relations of these, but not the knowledge of a penny. If we analyse what is involved in our knowing an object like this, we discover a complicated process, the details of which are given by Kant in the so-called "subjective deduction," but the essence of which can be simply expressed. It is a process of *synthetizing* sense-data. By processes of synthesis we hold together different parts of the given. Every synthesis proceeds in accordance with a certain rule, and the concept of the rule is the concept of the object produced. Now Kant's contention is that processes of synthesis (a) are indispensable in the knowing of objects, (b) cannot be the work of the senses. For synthetizing is an activity and the senses are passive. Hence synthetizing must be ascribed to some other faculty than sense—for the moment let us say to the understanding. Understanding then necessarily co-operates with sense in the knowing of objects.

Now all this may be true, but so far nothing has been said about the categories. To understand their part we must explain more of the detail of Kant's argument than has so far been necessary. Kant supposes that the process of synthesis comes up at two levels. First of all it is "empirical"—it operates upon ordinary sense-data. It unifies sense-data in accordance with rules the nature of which is expressed in empirical concepts—penny, bowler hat, and so forth. But besides this empirical synthesis there is a pure (i.e. non-empirical) synthesis, and this is the crucial point. The pure synthesis is a synthesis of what Kant calls the "*pure manifolds*" of space and

and contrary causes. Certainly Hume says that anything may be the cause of anything but unless we could guarantee some order in the appearance of sense-data, could we form any causal laws? Kant's theory attempts to show that we can expect a degree of stability in the physical world without committing ourselves to any metaphysical remarks about the source of sense-data.

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time.² This doctrine of the uniting of the pure manifolds is not an easy one, but it may perhaps be made clear as follows. If we take any section of the stream of sense data we see that over and above the particular character of the data is the fact that they all stand in temporal and perhaps in spatial relations. If we take spatial or temporal relations in abstraction from the particular character of what they relate, we have what Kant calls a "pure" manifold. Every empirical manifold is accompanied by such a pure manifold, because everything we perceive is characterized by temporal and perhaps also spatial relations. This fact must be taken account of in the synthesizing of sense-data. Besides the empirical synthesis proceeding according to empirical rules there must be another synthesis, and this since it is concerned with something which does not vary from case to case, must be a pure synthesis proceeding according to *a priori* rules. The concepts expressing the nature of these rules are the categories.

I have explained this in Kantian language but the whole thing can perhaps be put in a simpler fashion. A physical object is a construction out of actual and possible sense-data: a construction in which we hold the given together in certain definite ways. These ways of our uniting depend on the nature of the given and are expressed in empirical concepts. But quite apart from the fact that we thus synthesize sense-data according to their *particular* nature, we also, in thinking them into objects, synthesize them in accordance with certain *general* principles, which express what is thought in 'objectness' as such. By this means we think the data as objects forming part of an objective physical world. And the concepts of the processes by which objectivity is thus conferred upon sense-data are *a priori* concepts and are the categories.

To make this possible human beings must be endowed with categories or, again, our understanding must have in it certain *a priori* concepts. What concepts do we possess of this nature? It is here that Kant has recourse to the pure intellectual concepts of the *Dissertation*. The list of the *Dissertation* is amplified into what purports to be a complete list of all possible concepts of this kind, with the help of a curious appeal to the supposedly *a priori* certain table of judgment forms of formal logic. Each of the concepts mentioned in 1770 finds a place in the full list.

From the position that there exist *a priori* concepts of the understanding the proposition that there are synthetic *a priori* principles

² For the sake of simplicity I have followed the apparent indications of the first half of the first edition deduction here. This may result in a distortion since the pure synthesis may not be of space and time themselves but of objects in space and time. But this is not the place to discuss details of Kantian interpretation and dogmatism is unavoidable.

of the understanding is easily deduced. The concept of cause, for instance, is the basis of the general law of causality. Because everything we know is combined in accordance with a rule the nature of which is expressed in the concept of cause, everything is subject to the general law of causality. The body of synthetic *a priori* laws of this kind forms the first principles of what is sometimes called "pure physics", or, again, expresses the fundamental presuppositions of rational science of nature."

Thus is accomplished the first part of Kant's task in the *Analytic*—a demonstration of the existence of *a priori* elements in the understanding. Our understandings are naturally endowed with certain *a priori* concepts. It remains to see what can be concluded from this fact as to the possibility of metaphysics.

In the 1770 *Dissertation* Kant had argued from the existence in us of pure intellectual concepts to the possibility of metaphysics as a science. He had treated the concepts in question as a source of knowledge entirely separate from sense experience, and in fact had looked on them in very much the same light as Cartesian innate ideas. At this time he had been content with the dogmatic affirmation that certain of our concepts were *a priori* concepts. But in the *Critique* he sets himself to show *why* we must say that we have in us concepts of this nature, and in the answering of this question gives an account of them which shows that he now has a very different conception of them. For instead of regarding them as innate ideas giving us insight into the general nature of a supersensible world, he now looks on them as concepts of processes by which we combine *a priori* the data of the senses. Out of relation to sense experience they have no function or significance.

This point should be plain from what has already been said, but it is worth emphasizing, even if that involves a certain amount of repetition. There are in human beings certain pure concepts of the understanding or categories. What is a category? A category is the concept of a process whereby synthetic unity of a very general kind is conferred on a given manifold, or again, a category is a concept of an object in general. What is meant by this technical language? The whole position can be explained very simply. The world we know is a world of fully formed physical objects. But the senses never present us with such a world. All we have in sensible experience is a stream of impressions or sense data. To get out of these physical objects standing in relation to other physical objects and forming with them the sort of physical world presupposed by scientific investigation, our understanding must combine or synthesize the sense-data. This process of synthesis proceeds in accordance with certain rules. First, it combines the given so as to form an object of this kind and not that—a penny and not a bowler hat. But

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secondly, over and above this, it combines the manifold so as to form an object as such—so that it possesses certain characteristics common to all objects.¹ The first type of combination plainly depends on the nature of the sense-data, from pennyish sense-data we construct pennies. But the second is something common to all processes of objective combination, whatever their particular nature, it is through it that an object is an object. It therefore does not depend on what is given, and Kant suggests, plausibly enough, that it must be due to the constitution of the apprehending consciousness. Human intelligence is such that it must combine any matter given to it in certain general ways. Because here the particular nature of what is given makes no difference, the ways in question are *a priori* ways of combination, and the concepts which express or sum up their nature are *a priori*. They are *a priori* concepts of the understanding or categories. And they are concepts of an object in general, because they are concepts of processes whereby objectness or objectivity as such is conferred upon sense-data.

From all this it follows that the categories cannot be the basis of a metaphysics of the traditional type. (i) The categories are concepts of processes, they cannot then assure us of the *existence* of anything non-sensible. (ii) A process of combination is obviously without significance until we are assured that there is something to combine. But "our nature is so constituted that intuition with us cannot be other than sensible, i.e. the only data which can be presented to us for combination are sense-data. Even the pure manifolds of space and time, which are in a sense the peculiar object of the categories, have an essential reference to sense-experience. If the categories were to have a metaphysical use we should have to have access to a manifold of intellectual intuition, i.e. we should have to have direct acquaintance with an intelligible (super-sensible) world. But we have seen that even in the *Dissertation* Kant did not go so far as to maintain that this is so."²

If the categories thus relate essentially to sense-experience, it is not likely that the principles based upon them will have any different reference, and this in fact turns out to be the case. Indeed, as we shall see presently, the principles have an even closer connection with our type of sense-experience than the categories themselves. The principles enable us to anticipate sensible experience in certain

¹ And stands in relation to other objects forming with them an objective world. It must not be thought that 'first' and 'second' here refer to temporal order.

² And in any case Kant says (B 145) that the categories would be of no use to an intelligence possessed of intellectual intuition, presumably because such an intelligence would not need to synthesize a manifold given from without (perhaps, would not need synthesis at all).

general ways. By means of them we can say that anything which falls within our experience will have certain characteristics—will have extensive and intensive quantity, be a substance or a state of a substance, be in causal relation with other substances, and be affected by changes in their states, but we cannot say anything about things in general. We cannot, if we grant the existence of a super-sensible world, say that it will be a world of substances or a world in which causal law obtains. We cannot even say that such a world is the cause of events in the world of sense. For if we do this we extend the validity of the principles of the understanding to things in general, a procedure for which we have no warrant. We can only justify the principles as principles of the possibility of our type of sense-experience, they are principles which prescribe to experience its general form.

This point about the *prescriptive* character of the principles is an important one. We saw above that Kant's account of mathematical propositions led us to say that they, too, were prescriptive in character, and this seems to be true even if everything else that Kant says about mathematics is rejected. Let us try to make clear what a prescriptive proposition is. It must be distinguished from a factual proposition.¹ A factual proposition states a fact about what we know in experience, and all empirical propositions are factual. Thus nearly all the propositions of everyday discourse and all the propositions which make up the raw material of the empirical sciences, together with the scientific laws established by induction, are factual. In contrast, prescriptive propositions do not say anything about particular matters of fact, but express certain general laws which all matters of fact must comply with. To adopt Kant's distinction, they do not concern themselves with the matter of knowledge, but with its form. Because prescriptive propositions (a) have nothing to do with particular facts, (b) express conditions which all matters of fact *must* fulfil, they are all *a priori*. Among prescriptive propositions seem to be (i) the presuppositions, as opposed to the conclusions, of scientific thinking, e.g. the general law of causality, (ii) the laws of logic, (iii) mathematical propositions, though the fact that mathematics and logic can be said to have objects of their own points to there being quasi-factual as well as prescriptive.²

Two general remarks must be made on this distinction of factual from prescriptive propositions before we go on to show its bearing

¹ Yet factual propositions depend on prescriptive propositions, since without the latter there could be no facts.

² In Kant mathematical propositions are clearly quasi-factual since they describe the essential nature of space and time as well as prescribing laws which everything which falls within space and time must obey.

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on the question of the metaphysical value of the principles of the understanding. First, though all empirical propositions are factual, there is no reason in principle why all factual propositions should be empirical, in the sense of based on sense-experience. For it might be the case that we had some other source of information than the senses, and if we thus had insight into an intelligible world we could assert factual propositions about it. But in fact all our information comes from the senses, and thus the proposition 'all empirical propositions are factual' can be converted *simpliciter*. If, therefore, a proposition purports to be both factual and non-empirical, it cannot be true. Secondly, there is clearly a division within the class of prescriptive propositions. Some propositions prescribe to all types of object, others only to a special class of objects. The laws of logic are obviously of the first type whilst Kant, probably mistakenly, regards mathematical propositions as of the second. The first type of proposition may be described as generally, the second as specially prescriptive. Propositions of the first type obviously have some value for metaphysics (though they do not by themselves form an adequate basis for the science), whilst propositions of the second type unless they are specially prescriptive to metaphysical objects, are useless for metaphysical purposes.

From all this there follow conclusions both about the possibility of metaphysics in general and about the metaphysical status of the principles. First, the traditional metaphysics often asserted propositions which purported to be both *a priori* and factual, e.g. 'there is a God'. But such propositions, if the argument outlined above is correct, cannot be valid. And secondly, since the principles of the understanding are specially prescriptive to our type of sense-experience, they have no metaphysical validity. It follows that any employment of them beyond the sphere of sense-experience is unwarranted.

These considerations ought to dispose of any attempt to base a metaphysical system on the categories. Yet it is notorious that many philosophers have tried to use them in a metaphysical way. Even

¹ There are also divisions within the class of specially prescriptive propositions. Kant, e.g. regards arithmetic as more generally prescriptive than geometry.

² This argument as it stands is unduly dogmatic (i) because there seem to be some factual propositions which come very near to being *a priori*, e.g. there are categories—sense and thought co-operate in knowledge (and in fact philosophical propositions generally), (ii) because it rests on a dogmatic denial of the very thing metaphysics claims—that the senses are not the only source of knowledge. Metaphysics does allege a non-empirical source for some of its propositions (e.g. pure apperception for rational psychology) and this allegation ought to be investigated. But all this does not alter what has been said about the principles.

with the warning of the *Critique* before us, Kant thinks, we are liable to fall into this error ourselves, and Kant himself at least seems to fall into it in the passages where he describes things in themselves as the cause of appearances. What happens here is not that we forget that the categories are concepts of processes, but that we imagine that they are concepts of processes by which not only sense data but all objects of thought¹ are combined. This makes us think the principles not specially but generally prescriptive.

Actually there is a certain amount of excuse for this mistake, but not enough to justify it, and here we come to a point of complication which has so far been neglected. The truth is that there are two sorts of categories, of which one has theoretically a validity beyond the sphere of space-time experience. The distinction is best approached through § 24 of the second edition *Transcendental Deduction*, where Kant speaks of two syntheses: an intellectual and a figurative synthesis. The first is a synthesis carried out by the understanding alone, operating with *pure* categories; the second is carried through by the imagination under the understanding's control, and the operative concepts in it are not pure but *schematized* categories. What is the meaning of this?

We must begin the explanation by remarking that Kant believes that the human intelligence is *discursive*, i.e. is such that it cannot originate material, but only operate upon data given to it from without. Now *our* discursive intelligence stands in relation to a sensibility whose forms are space and time, but it would be rash to assume that ours is the only possible sort of discursive intelligence. There is no contradiction in assuming intelligences related to sensibilities whose *a priori* forms are quite different from space and time. This being the case, Kant thinks we must say that what is true of our intelligence is not necessarily true of discursive intelligences as such.

Nevertheless, Kant believes that all discursive intelligences combine the data of the senses,² and that their fundamental *a priori* ways of combination are identical. But every actual discursive intelligence is in relation to a peculiar type of sensibility, and its *a priori* concepts must accommodate themselves to this fact. They do this, in the case of the human intelligence (the only type of

¹ Using 'object' in a non-technical sense (as Kant sometimes does, often with confusing results, cf. e.g. B 122 = A 89).

² Assuming that every discursive intelligence has a sensibility. Every such intelligence has a "receptivity," but it is not clear whether this is the same thing as a sensibility. Kant sometimes appears to mean "sensibility like the human by sensibility" (cf. e.g. B 342-3 = A 286-7). The whole question of the possibility of other types of intelligence than ours is a complicated one, and Kant perhaps contradicts himself (cf. B 155 with B 139 and B 283 = A 230, and again with B 43 = A 27).

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intellect with which we are acquainted), by acquiring a special connection with the pure manifold of time. We saw at the beginning of our account of the categories that there is a sense in which it is on the pure manifolds of time and space that the categories immediately operate, and of the two, time is the more important, since time alone is a truly universal form (only the data of the external senses are situated in space). We now see that this fact is not without significance. It means that the categories as they operate in human experience are not pure but "schematized" categories. That is to say, they are not the abstract combining concepts which lie at the base of every discursive intelligence's combination but are concrete as befits their application to a specific type of material.

When we realize this there should no longer be any special difficulty about the parts Kant assigns respectively to understanding and imagination in knowledge. Combination in general is the work of the understanding.² At the bottom of every synthesis is an operation of the understanding and behind that, I suppose, an act of the unity of apperception. The synthesis of the understanding, taken in abstraction, is described by Kant as an *intellectual synthesis*. But the syntheses human beings in fact carry out are syntheses of a manifold whose forms are space and time, and are carried out in the first place not by the understanding, but by a faculty with a closer relation to sense—the imagination. The imagination, however, though it is described as *the synthetic faculty*, is not capable of executing a synthesis entirely on its own account. The synthesis must be 'brought to concepts' by the understanding, by the aid of which we become capable of knowing the rule on which it proceeds. In truth the concepts of the understanding control the synthesis of the imagination, being operative particularly at its *culminating point*, the holding together of the pure manifolds of time and space. But just because of this fact they are modified, lose their purely intellectual character, and become schematized categories peculiarly suited to a space-time experience.

The synthesis just described is not an intellectual but a *figurative synthesis*. The important point to realize about the two types of synthesis is that the second alone is concrete and actual. The first is only the sort of synthesis which the understanding would perform supposing that it ever did synthesize entirely by itself, a situation for the existence of which we have no evidence. The intellectual synthesis is really an abstraction, and so are the categories which operate in it. Only the schematized categories are real.

Now all this has a bearing on the function of the categories. The pure categories are not in specific relation to a space-time experience, and that makes us think that they have a metaphysical use. And

certainly they are available for the combination of other types of manifold than a space-time manifold. But, unfortunately, we are only actually acquainted with the categories in their schematized form, i.e. as combining concepts of our type of manifold. If we try to characterize them in their abstract form we find we are unable to do so adequately. We cannot find any determinate content for them in this shape, their content as we know them is all along contaminated by the senses. The only clue we have to the content of the pure categories is what is thought in the logical form of judgment which corresponds to them, and this is in every case so vague that it is useless for knowledge of objects.

To restate the whole doctrine shortly: the pure categories express the fundamental ways of combination employed by all discursive intelligences, and because of this there seems to be no reason why their validity should be confined to space-time experience. It thus looks as if the categories carry us beyond the sensible and are capable of a metaphysical use. But in fact we can only understand them as they operate in our experience, and there they are modified and brought into relation to time. Outside an experience like ours we cannot specify determinately the process of combination they express. We know, for example, what is meant by causality or substance in the co-ordination of sense data, but what could be meant by them if applied to an intelligible world, when abstraction would be made from all reference to sense, we cannot say. Thus the promise of the pure categories to transport us beyond the senses turns out to be chimerical, and metaphysics is not helped by them except in having the number of its mistaken devotees increased.

The only use of the categories beyond experience is apparently to *think* objects in general. It may be the case that some other faculty than understanding assures us of the existence of non-sensible objects, and if this is so, the only way in which we can represent these objects to ourselves is through the pure categories. The pure categories are of all our concepts the furthest removed from sense.¹ Nevertheless, we must not make the mistake of thinking that the characterization of objects in this way is *cognition*, we are not knowing the objects by determining them through the categories. All we know, on these terms, is that there are non-sensible objects: their real nature, failing an intellectual intuition, is obscure to us. But since the existence of these objects makes a great difference to our lives we must have some working conception of them, even if it is in fact a merely analogical or indeed totally false one, and that is why we have recourse to the categories.

¹ The ideas of reason are further removed from sense, but it is ideas that we seek to determine in thinking objects in general.

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It only remains to remark that the principles of the understanding, since they are principles of the possibility of human experience, are based not on the pure but on the schematized categories. It follows that they are specifically adapted to our type of experience and are specially prescriptive to it, being meaningless in reference to any other Metaphysics, then has little to hope from them.

' Transcendental Analytic has accordingly this important result that the understanding is competent to effect nothing *a priori* except the anticipation of the form of a possible experience in general. And since that which is not appearance cannot be an object of experience the understanding can never transcend those limits of sensibility, within which alone objects can be given to us. Its principles are merely rules for the exposition of appearances, and the proud name of an Ontology which professes to present syncretical cognitions *a priori* of things in general in a systematic doctrine must give place to the modest title of Analytic of the pure understanding.' Let us sum up Kant's criticism of metaphysics in the Analytic before mentioning the main things we can learn from it. The essential claim of the type of metaphysics which Kant sets out to examine is that it can transport us beyond sense experience and give us knowledge of a super-sensible world. In the *Dissertation* this claim had been accepted, the evidence being that we are in possession of certain pure concepts which give us insight into such a world. In the *Critique* the problem is again discussed, only this time the question is complicated by the introduction of the important distinction between understanding and reason, which means that the potentialities of two lots of pure concepts have to be examined—categories and ideas. It is with the first set only that Kant is concerned in the Analytic. He shows (i) that the categories are concepts of certain processes of combination and thus are without meaning except where data are presented for combination, (ii) that the only data which can be thus presented are sense-data. Thus the categories though *a priori* nevertheless stand in essential relation to sense-experience. If we try to employ them beyond these bounds we find them without meaning. And from this there follow conclusions about the *a priori* principles of the understanding: first, that they are expressed not in factual but in prescriptive propositions, and second, that these propositions do not prescribe to all types of object but simply to whatever falls within sensible experience.

We should not imagine that this is a complete demonstration of the impossibility of metaphysics in the traditional sense. It is only one nail in metaphysics' coffin,¹ and there is a strong possibility

¹ B 303 = A 246-7

² It accounts for Ontology in the Wolffian division.

that the corpse will refuse to lie quiet. For metaphysics still has the ideas of reason to its credit, and these plainly present a more serious difficulty than the categories. And even if the ideas of reason can be dealt with, it remains to be seen whether some other type of experience than the intellectual cannot give us insight into a supersensible world. There are many roads marked as leading to the Absolute, and perhaps not every one will prove to be a *cul-de-sac*. But at least we know that one has failed us: the categories of the understanding will not take us beyond sense-experience. "The concepts of reality, substance, causality, even that of necessity in existence, have no significance out of the sphere of empirical cognition, and cannot, beyond that sphere, determine any object." Thus is the lie direct given to the assertions of the *Dissertation*.

What are the philosophical conclusions to be drawn from all this? The main one seems to be that one part of the human intelligence is a faculty which co-operates with the senses, not a distinct source of knowledge from them. There seems no reason to deny the existence of a faculty of understanding, even if we prefer to call it by another name, and if we grant it, we must also grant the truth of Kant's account of it. The understanding is the human intellect as it operates in most common-sense and scientific thinking, it is the mind, not producing something out of itself, but operating on a given material. There can surely be little doubt that there is such a "discursive" aspect of the human intellect, and if there is, it is plain that apart from sense-experience it is impotent. Even if we say that there are pure concepts in the understanding (if we can continue to use Kant's word), we see upon asking in detail what these pure concepts are that they only express certain very general ways in which we necessarily combine given material, and that the only material available for combination is sense-data. The pure concepts, in fact, though they are not derived from sense-experience, are nevertheless specially adapted to it, so much so that though they express ways of combination which have their seat in the pure understanding, we cannot say with any precision what these ways are except in terms which refer to space-time experience. A metaphysical use of the pure concepts is thus doubly impossible: (a) to give knowledge they must operate on something given, but no metaphysical matter is forthcoming, (b) even if it were, the pure concepts as we know them would not serve for its combination, since they are specially suited to the type of matter with which human beings are acquainted.

It follows from this that if we persist with the argument that thought must be a source of knowledge other than sense experience, we must justify ourselves by reference to some other faculty than

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understanding; in fact, by accepting the metaphysical claims of reason

The Kantian conception of the pure understanding can perhaps be brought out in another way. We draw a distinction between the judgments a science establishes and those it seems to presuppose. The former rest on the basis of experience, but the latter seem to condition experience itself. It is because of their existence that in scientific investigation we can approach nature "not in the character of a pupil but in that of a judge." There seem to be presuppositions of this sort in every science, both presuppositions of scientific thinking as such and presuppositions of the special science in question. These presuppositions are *a priori*; they represent the contribution of the pure understanding to knowledge. But that does not mean that they are a source of metaphysics. They do not give us any insight into a world which passes the bounds of the science they belong to. They are essentially related to the object of that science, and apart from that reference are not valid.

Thus the understanding is a discursive faculty and except in reference to sense experience has no function.¹ Its categories, therefore, cannot be metaphysical. But it is interesting to notice that in any case a metaphysical system cannot be erected solely on the basis of concepts like the categories. All the categories are concepts of combination, and to construct a metaphysics we require concepts of a different nature also. To put the matter in the terminology of the *Dissertation*, we require concepts of things as well as relations, or, to put it in terms of logic, to make up a valid metaphysical system we must know at least some factual propositions, prescriptive propositions alone will not suffice. But unless we have insight into a super-sensible world, how can we know any factual propositions about it—unless, which seems unlikely, there are in us certain ideas whose content carries with it the guarantee of its existence, like the idea of God in Descartes? To put the matter in another way, a valid metaphysics would have to rest on concepts which were absolutely *a priori*, and not all of these concepts could be relational concepts. The fatal thing about the categories is (a) that they are all, in a broad sense, relational concepts, (b) that, despite their non-empirical origin, they are contaminated by sense.

The best hope for anyone who wants to defend the metaphysical value of the categories is to show that we can find some precise meaning for them in their pure form. If that could be done, and we could be assured by reason that there was a non-sensible world, then we might begin to construct a metaphysics. But the task still remains to be accomplished.

¹ Except in formal logic and that is not knowledge in the strict sense.

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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE ON PRESCRIPTIVE PROPOSITIONS

Though a class of propositions of this type is clearly recognized by Kant, he does not bring out the prescriptive character of the principles of the understanding so plainly as he might. He sometimes speaks of the principles as expressing the highest of all the laws of nature, and says that all empirical laws must stand under them. And this suggests that there is no difference of principle between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* laws of nature, except that the former are known independently of experience. But such a conclusion would obviously be seriously wrong. The truth is that Kant was responsible for showing that in Leibnizian terminology, there is a fundamental difference between 'truths of reason' and 'truths of fact,' so that a transition from the first to the second (the kind of transition which all rationalists hoped for) was impossible. But though this was plain enough to Kant himself, it is not always plain from his language.

(What Kant did in fact was show that 'truths of reason' were prescriptive. Of course not all Leibnizian 'truths of reason' purported to be such, e.g. God is. But Kant thinks that the truth of a proposition like this cannot be determined by any intellectual process. All 'truths of reason' which are valid are prescriptive in character—among others the propositions of logic and mathematics and the general law of causality.)

GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY

PROFESSOR JOHN MACDONALD

THE object of the present article is to indicate where and how Gestalt psychology bears on the problems of the ethical philosopher. Unlike the other "schools" of psychology (Behaviourism, Freudianism and Purposivism) Gestaltism has no obvious bearing on these problems, and yet if we accept its fundamental tenet, it appears to carry important implications for ethical philosophy. This tenet concerns the primacy of totalities or wholes. I will begin with it and then proceed to consider certain further principles of Gestalt which are of interest to the moralist.

The apprehension of form or totality is of course an old topic in psychology. That the whole is more than the sum of its parts and cannot psychologically be resolved into a sum of parts is now almost a platitude of psychological literature. Wundt, Stout, Ward, James, and even the atomistically minded Titchener have seen in the apprehension of form or wholes a genuine psychological problem. And these authorities have been especially cited by those who would discredit the Gestaltist claim to novelty of conception.

Clearly however, when the Gestaltists talk of the primacy of form, they *mean* something different from what is implied in the views of those earlier writers. For Gestalt psychology, the whole is primary not merely in the sense that it contributes something towards making the parts what they are but in the more radical sense that the parts derive from it their entire psychical reality. Apprehension is always and necessarily apprehension of totalities. What we call parts means the manner in which the totalities have come to be "figured", "parts" have no status or mode of being in themselves. That the Gestaltists mean something really novel (whatever success they may have had in making their meaning clear) is shown by the fact that they re-raise the whole question of the neurological basis of perception. Their criticisms moreover, of the earlier discussions of form show clearly how far they are from thinking that these discussions anticipated their own position. All such discussions, they argue, are dominated by atomistic tendencies. Their own basic concept of form, totality or figure and ground (however we label it) implies the rejection, as *ipso facto* false, of all ideas of mechanical or additive relation of part to whole. Apprehension of totalities as such is not for them a specific problem, it is the basic fact in all cognition.

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This thesis suggests a new approach to one of the basic problems of ethical philosophy

Consider the issue that divides the utilitarians and the intuitionist, the question as to whether "good" or "right" is the basic category in ethics. According to the utilitarian, right acts are to be regarded essentially as means to good ends, the notion of good being thus made fundamental. According to the intuitionist, there are acts which are in themselves right—*prima facie* right, as Ross puts it in a recent contribution. Thus the utilitarians make "end" and the intuitionists' rule" supreme in the moral life.

From a Gestaltist point of view, the issue here would be seen to turn on a false antithesis. It is only because we artificially isolate the particular act and regard it as having reality in itself that we can talk of it as being either right in itself or a means to some good. In actual experience, the act is part of a totality, and the sense or feeling of this totality is integral to our cognition of the act. The utilitarian is mistaken in finding the ethical value of the act in something outside of itself, something to which it is a means, the agent himself does not apprehend the value in that way. The intuitionist, on the other hand, is mistaken in failing to see that the act, although it carries its rightness in itself, derives its own existence, reality or significance (the words mean the same thing) from a wider totality. The utilitarian is thus right, as against the intuitionist, when he insists that there is *some* wider context the idea of which operates in our ethical judgments. The intuitionist is right, as against the utilitarian, when he insists on the immediacy or directness of these judgments.

In this connection the following passages from Joseph's *Some Problems in Ethics* are of interest.

"It would seem then as if there are some actions which we think we owe to do, or the thought of which obliges us, but in which we apprehend no goodness to make them right, so long as we look only to them, nor can we find it by looking to their effects. . . Can I find it if I look at the alternative actions in a wider context, not furnished by their effects? And if so, what is this context? Were it possible to do this, the defence of my original judgment, that I owe to do this action, would be in the goodness not of it but of the system which it forms with its context, and it would be the thought of the goodness in this system, rather than in the particular action alone, that obliged me. I would submit that in principle this is possible, however difficult it may be to work out in every case."

And again "The goodness of a form of life in which a principle of action works, and which one may say is animated by it, is not an aggregate. It has that unitary character which we have seen that

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goodness must have To act on principle is to live a life with unity of design in which one act is what it is because of what others are or were, or will be and we might as it were read in each act the form of the whole "1

And finally "It would be the consciousness however inadequately realized of this all embracing form of life, rather than of some single rule that must really lie at the base of our unmediated judgments about the rightness of particular acts And this would be what we must make explicit, if we are to defend these judgments to ourselves or others "2

In the first passage Joseph suggests the difficulty of demonstrating the existence of such a form of life In what sense does the form exist in consciousness? Is it perhaps unconscious and therefore not amenable to introspection? It would seem that we are here again in the presence of an old problem in psychology Take the concept of "disposition, for example ' The existence of psychical dispositions," says Ward, ' is without immediate evidence certainly the very nature of subconsciousness implies that But it surely cannot be maintained that the only evidence of existence is that of direct acquaintance or distinct presentation 3 Stout similarly recognizes the need for such a concept The present-day emphasis on "attitudes" does not imply any advance on the psychology of disposition, so far as careful analysis is concerned that emphasis is concerned rather with the attempt to show the variety of phenomena in this field and to some extent with the much more doubtful attempt to apply mathematical methods to its investigation All the psychologists, whether they talk of dispositions attitudes or Gestalten, are at least in the district of the same problem, and they are equally vague about the contours

At the same time, the vagueness of psychology at this point should not blind us to the fact that the problem is a real one Evidence of its reality is forthcoming on every hand A E Houseman, for example, in describing how he comes to write a new poem, says "As I went along thinking of nothing in particular, only looking at things around me and following the progress of the seasons, there would flow into my mind with sudden and unaccountable emotion, sometimes a line or two of verse, sometimes a whole stanza at once,

¹ *Op cit* p 101

² *Ibid* p 103 Joseph it may be noted is not thinking of Gestalt psychology On the contrary, he discounts the Gestalt hypothesis (along with that of Behaviourism) because of what he regards as mechanistic implications incompatible with the ethical viewpoint At the same time if we disregard the question of ultimate presuppositions and try to apply the Gestalt concept of form to the ideational or non perceptual levels we get something at least very like what Joseph is trying to describe

³ *Psychological Principles*, p 100

accompanied, not preceded, *by a vague notion of the poem which they were destined to form a part of.*¹ Some musical composers claim to have had the same kind of experience in the practice of their art

In the moral sphere, a similar phenomenon occurs, although here it usually goes unnoticed. We choose this line of conduct and reject that, and the choice is accompanied by a more or less vague idea of the whole life of which such conduct is rightfully a part. To act in the spirit of "my station and its duties" is to apprehend the totality in one way; to submit to the influence of personal example is to apprehend it in another. The latter form of control—control by personal moral patterns either directly presented in real life or vicariously experienced in history, drama, and fiction—is a case where the usual categories of the moralist are apt to darken counsel. The factory girl in her moral quandary does not think essentially in terms of *prima facie* rightness, and still less perhaps in terms of utilitarian consequences. For her the essence of the matter is apt to lie in the question: what would Greta Garbo do? I suggest that her question implies something which is not adequately or even correctly accounted for either by the principle of "rule" or by that of "end" in morals, or by both together.

It might be objected that such reactions are emotional in character and raise no question as to intellectual content at all. That they are of an emotional character need not be questioned; it is implied in the use of terms such as disposition or attitude. We are still, however, left with the question on our hands as to the nature of the object around which the emotion has grown up. To interpret the "form of life" as an emotion or emotional tendency does not dispose of the problem under consideration. Such an interpretation, of course, might be meant to imply that particular situations have come to evoke an emotional response which, on analysis, turns out to be blind and animal-like. Some behaviourists would adopt such a view. If we accept it, *quaestio cadit*, there is no distinctively human or moral issue at all.

The relationship of part to whole with which we are here concerned suggests, as we have indicated, an analogy with art, and Joseph likewise notes the analogy. I would submit that at this point ethical philosophers have been mistaken either in contenting themselves with noting a vague analogy and leaving the matter there or, more positively, in carrying the analogy to a point where they reduce the ethical to a form of the aesthetic judgment. May it not rather be that we are here dealing with a basic mental process which, when it occurs in one valuational field, produces the aesthetic judgment, and when it occurs in another and essentially different field of values, results in the moral judgment? To illustrate: when we are looking

¹ *The Name and Nature of Poetry*, p. 49 (italics mine)

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at a picture, the totality which determines our judgment of the parts is actually before us. On the other hand, when we are reading a poem, a novel, or a play, it would be admitted, I think, that we are more or less unconsciously judging every phrase, line, action, and scene by reference to some totality which in this case is "in the mind." In the sphere of conduct, we pass judgment on particular actions by essentially the same kind of mental process. We should no more conclude, however, that the ethical is therefore a form of the aesthetic judgment (or vice versa) than we should conclude that imagination and memory are the same because both are manifestations of the same basic process—representative activity. The kind of harmony of part and whole that the dramatic artist is interested in is not the only kind that can occur or fail to occur in conduct. There is another sort of harmony (or lack of harmony) which is neither a matter of aesthetics nor yet (to instance another wrong identification) a matter of logical consistency. It is here that the moralist finds his special province.

So much for the concept of totality in relation to one of the basic problems of ethical philosophy. It would be easy to illustrate the use of the same concept in connection with less fundamental issues. Take, for example, the distinction between act and motive. Here the Gestaltist would remind us that any presentation can function as an element in more than one Gestalt, though not of course at one and the same time. So with an act, such as giving money to a charity. It may be apprehended in a totality which makes it non moral or even immoral, or in a totality which makes it moral. The important question is which totality operated in determining choice? Again, action from "mixed" motives could be readily interpreted on the Gestaltist principle of "figure and ground." Leaving these more detailed applications, let us turn to the second main principle of Gestalt psychology.

According to this principle, response is a matter of the "demand of the situation", the idea of a specific bond of connection between stimulus and response is rejected. As the Gestalt psychologists commonly put it, the connection between stimulus and response is necessary, not contingent. A necessary connection means that the situation 'demands' a certain response, it tends to make the brain act in a certain way in order to restore equilibrium. I am not concerned here with the rather interesting experimental evidence adduced in support of this principle but with its implications for ethical philosophy. These implications are again of a rather fundamental character.

If the connection between stimulus and response is purely contingent, it follows that a particular response can, theoretically speaking, be bound up with any situation whatsoever. This is essentially the

position of the behaviourist. The emotions can be conditioned, unconditioned, and re-conditioned, so as to attach themselves to a great variety of situations. So, too, with the responses implied in the concepts "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong." Pushpin is as good as poetry, provided the amount of conditioning be adequate. Moral values are essentially a matter of time and place. In other words, a contingent connection between stimulus and response implies an out-and-out relativity of moral values.

On the other hand, the idea of a necessary connection, in the Gestaltist sense of the phrase, furnishes psychological justification for belief in the absoluteness of moral values. Particular moral situations demand certain responses and man's moral nature will not be satisfied until the adequate responses are found. Many factors stand in the way of their discovery, but these can all be attributed to immaturity, racial or individual. There is "method" behind what appears at first to be an unmeaning diversity of moral values. The refinements and complications of civilized standards of conduct are contained in the crudities of primitive morality, as the flower is contained in the seed. Moral development from the primitive to the civilized level is a process of discovering values which possess universal validity. If we interpret ethical absolutism in that way, it would be implied in the Gestaltist principle of the "demand of the situation."

In meeting the demand of the situation in any particular case, the mind apprehends a new totality, a new "figure" in its appropriate "ground" or setting. This is what the Gestaltists call "insight." As one of them puts it: "Insight is not an explanatory concept, it is purely descriptive. The perception of a goal in relationships which have not been encountered previously may be taken as a criterion of insight." Mental development itself has two phases. First, there is the achievement of new insights resulting in the apprehension of new totalities. Second, there is development of already existing totalities resulting in the clearer articulation of them. The Gestaltists talk of two laws which have reference to the manner in which totalities develop. One is the "law of completion" or, as Koffka calls it, the "law of closure," according to which incomplete configurations tend to become complete. The other is the "law of precision" (*pragnanz*), according to which configurations tend to become as precise, well-articulated and "impressive" as possible.

In the moral sphere, doctrinarism (devotion to one or two abstract principles without regard to the diversities the concrete situation may present) would imply totalities which are highly comprehensive but very poorly articulated. Narrow mindedness (the viewing and judging of all situations in the light of a rather limited personal

* Wheeler *The Science of Psychology*, p. 126

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experience) would mean that the governing totalities are well-articulated but lacking in comprehensiveness, it would mean that insight had ceased to occur. Furthermore, if we assume in both cases that the totalities have become intensely emotionalized, we have a picture of fanaticism in the two typical forms it may assume.

Insight, again, means that a new situation is coped with in a genuinely new way. As Gestalt psychology has it, the brain is an organ for responding *uniquely* to the particular situation. Psychologists have erred in regarding learning as a quasi-mechanical process by which new habits are acquired and fixed in, a process of which the essence is repetition rather than novelty. The moralists have made essentially the same mistake in describing moral choice as the application of a rule to a new case. Each new case, on the contrary, is unique and unpredictable.¹

This account seems to come nearer to the moral consciousness of the ordinary man, as that consciousness appears, for example, in the faith of the devout Christian that he will be "given light" to guide him in any moral contingency that may arise. Taylor, in *The Faith of a Moralist*, stresses this idea. And yet we know, he says, 'that if we live in the dutiful spirit, when the responsibility of deciding rightly is thrown upon us, we can trust that it will bring with it the light necessary for the decision. The voice of enlightened conscience does not make itself audible until the duty of deciding is laid upon us. There could probably be no worse preparation for right action than careful anticipatory study of systems of casuistry to know with a justified confidence that you can trust your 'conscience' does not mean that you know in advance what the deliverances of 'conscience' will be.'² He also quotes with approval a passage from Mark Rutherford which seems itself an excellent illustration of the working of a conduct-gestalt or 'form of life'. Taylor seems indeed to have the Gestalt psychology in mind, for in another passage (p. 82) he uses the phrase itself 'demand of the situation'. In the light of this principle, the claim of the casuist must be disallowed not so much because the task the casuist proposes to undertake is impossibly complicated as because the very undertaking of such a task implies a false assumption at the outset. Even where very simple situations are concerned, we cannot assume that imaginative anticipation will function exactly like actual presentation. The 'straw vote' is always a precarious indication of what will happen.

¹ One is reminded of Bergson's theory of laughter according to which the comic is the result of an attempt to impose mechanism on life. In the same connection (i.e. living according to rule), Murhead's question is interesting: "Does it fall outside morality we might ask to cultivate the sense of truth and perfection (not to say of humour) that preserves a man from being unguided?" (*Rule and End in Morals*, p. 109, *italics mine*).

² *Series I*, pp. 156-157.

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Finally, insight comes suddenly, the elements in the new totality "snapping into form," as one writer puts it. The learner, whether in the field of moral experience or elsewhere, is held up until suddenly a new totality swims into his ken. For the ethical philosopher, this is a suggestive idea. It may help him to a better understanding of certain phenomena of the moral life—religious conversion, mystical revelation, and the like—which psychologists, rightly unwilling to take them at their face value, have been prone simply to discount, both in respect of their intellectual content and their alleged suddenness of occurrence.

The Gestalt psychologists are no doubt open to criticism both on the score of their claim to novelty of conception and on the score of a lack of clarity in the exposition of their principles where phenomena other than those of sense-perception are concerned. Such criticism is aside from my purpose here. I have also refrained from any attempt at technical refinement in the statement and explanation of the principles I have used. I have aimed rather at a more or less obvious interpretation such as would suggest itself to a student of ethics who approaches the literature of Gestaltism with his own special interest in mind. Such a student, it may be remarked in conclusion, would do well to remind himself of one point on which we have not yet touched: the principles we have been considering are the results of investigations which had no reference whatsoever to any *ethical* problems. These investigations were either minute laboratory studies of perception or experimental studies of the processes of learning as they occur in certain of the higher animals. This means that the principles in question, so far as ethics is concerned, have the status of *independent* psychological evidence, and the ethical philosopher, whose practice has traditionally been either to ignore psychology or to produce his psychological considerations *ad hoc*, has too little of this sort of evidence at his disposal to be in a position to ignore any of it.

THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER MINDS

PROFESSOR H DINGLE

IN the October number of *Philosophy* appears a very interesting article by Professor H H Price, entitled 'Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds,' the main object of which is to formulate the grounds on which we (or I, as one should say at this stage) may claim logical justification for asserting that other minds exist. No attempt is made to 'prove' the existence of other minds—an effort which is regarded as a wild-goose chase. Neither does Prof. Price seek to identify the actual process by which a particular mind accepts the existence of others as a fact, that, presumably, is a matter for the psychologist, and it may well turn out that the phenomena which give the conviction that other minds exist may vary from individual to individual and may often be logically unevidential. The object of the article, in short, is simply to state why it is reasonable to believe that other minds exist.

The purpose of this article is to express certain difficulties which I have found in accepting Prof. Price's thesis. These difficulties are of two kinds. First, even if the legitimacy of his statement of the problem and the assumptions which underlie it be admitted, I am unable to proceed from this starting point to the conclusion. Secondly, and more fundamentally, I am not convinced that from such a starting point one can possibly reach a valuable conclusion, or even a conclusion which is logically coherent with the premises. In the first section I give, for convenience, a brief summary of Prof. Price's argument, and indicate some of its assumptions. The reader should, of course, judge this by Prof. Price's own statements, which, in spite of their clearness and my careful reading, I may have misinterpreted. The second and third sections are respectively devoted to the difficulties I have mentioned. If I write with an appearance of confidence which I do not feel, it is for the sake of clearness. Prof. Price's knowledge of the work of others on this problem, and his facility in a department of thought unfamiliar to the scientist, are doubtless far greater than mine, and some of my objections to his theory may be based on elementary misconceptions which experienced philosophers have long discarded. Nevertheless, I do not think they are wholly of this type, and since, in any case, the final appeal is to reason and not to erudition, it may be of interest to many other readers of *Philosophy* besides myself to make them public.

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1 Prof Price's contention is, briefly, that "one's evidence of the existence of another mind comes from the receiving of *information* by means of intelligible symbols" "It is," he says, "the perceiving and understanding of noises and other symbols which gives one evidence for the existence of other minds" The commonest example, of course, is the experience usually described as hearing someone tell us something, e.g., 'Look! there is the bus,' or 'If 345 is added to 169 the result is 514' Here, mere noises are symbolically interpreted (no matter how or why) as a possibility of a perception or an idea, and I often find this possibility realized—I do see the bus and I verify the calculation Prof Price holds, however, that it is not the truth but the intelligibility and novelty of the communication that makes it evidential, and he does not regard the association of the noises with an organism (the other person's body, as we call it), or even the physical noises themselves, as essential It is worth while to quote an example of evidential communication from which most of the *messentials* are absent

"In the two cases just considered no body was observed to produce the words, but at least the words themselves were perceived by hearing or sight But even this is not essential It might be enough if they presented themselves to me in the form of mental imagery, auditory or visual Suppose that a sentence came into my mind in this way which conveyed information entirely new to me information which I could not have inferred from anything I already knew or believed, suppose further that there was nothing in the preceding train of thought to suggest it by association Then I should be inclined to think that this image-sentence was produced by some unconscious process in myself. The sentence might be 'there is a wrecked motor car round the next corner' Suppose that on turning the corner I did find a wrecked motor car I should be somewhat astonished, especially if the sentence had been a long and circumstantial one (mentioning, say, the colour and make of the car and the number of its number plate), and was verified in all or most of its details Still, I should stick to the hypothesis that it was produced by my own unconscious, and should attribute the verification to coincidence But if such things happened to me several times, it would be reasonable to consider the hypothesis that there was another mind, or several, communicating to me telepathically And if experiences of this sort went on happening, all giving me new information which was subsequently verified, the evidence might become very strong" (pp 435-6)

The only element of this example which is not essential is that already mentioned, that the sentence is verified "False information

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is just as good, so long as it is information. What is required is that the utterance should convey something which goes beyond what is already present to my mind—something which I did not consciously think of for myself, and which could not (so far as I can tell) have been presented to me by some process in my own unconscious."

The way in which this symbolic acquirement of new knowledge becomes evidence for the existence of other minds is explained by Prof. Price as follows. In my own acts of spontaneous thinking, noises or other experiences function as symbolic instruments—for example, if I think of a black cat I may hear, audibly or by imagination, the words, "black cat." "I know by introspection," says Prof. Price, "that just such noises, and just such an arrangement of them, are often produced in the course of acts of spontaneous thinking. (I may remark in passing that my experience is not altogether compatible with this. I am often conscious of a thought without the association of a sentence expressing it, and may have, in fact, some difficulty in finding a sentence which gives it precise expression. Moreover, I have frequently come to know by heart passages of poetry which have forced their way into my mind simply by their sound or rhythm, and only after I have many times in imagination heard them spoken have I realized what they mean as symbols. This suggests that the association between the symbol and its interpretation is not so necessary as Prof. Price's assertion would seem to imply. I do not, however, put this forward as an objection to his theory, for there may be psychological evidence, of which I am ignorant, that all thinking involves symbolic representation of one possibly public kind or another, or, alternatively, it may be sufficient for Prof. Price's argument that symbolic spontaneous thinking should occasionally occur. I mention the point only to show that some elucidation is desirable.) Having thus formed an association between symbols and spontaneous thinking, I am entitled to infer spontaneous thinking whenever I receive new knowledge by symbolical means. But such reception often occurs when I know that "no spontaneous thinking of that particular sort was occurring in myself. Therefore in this case the spontaneous act of thinking must have been a *foreign* act occurring in some other mind. This is the evidence for the existence of a foreign mind, and the hypothesis when once formed draws additional support from the fact that "it provides a simple *explanation* of an otherwise mysterious set of occurrences. It explains the curious fact that certain noises not originated by me nevertheless have for me a symbolic character."

To conclude this statement of Prof. Price's theory it will be useful to indicate one or two tacit assumptions that are involved in it. The fact that evidence for the existence of other minds is sought implies that their non-existence is a possibility, that is to say, if

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the evidence for existence is unsatisfactory, one must conclude that they do not exist, for an appeal to logical evidence must be answered by logical evidence. This is unfortunately obscured by the title of the article, which should read, "My Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds", if "our" is allowed, the question is already answered and all that is left to do is to identify the psychological processes by which we reach a foregone conclusion. That might be a legitimate inquiry, but it is not Prof. Price's inquiry. Again, Prof. Price takes for granted the existence of other *bodies*. He does not, it is true, depend on this assumption for the ultimate form of his argument, but that implies that the existence of other bodies and the existence of other minds can be treated as totally independent problems, and that the dualism of mind and body is therefore logically absolute. I make here no comment on these assumptions, but simply point them out.

2. Let us consider the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to make possible an answer to the question, "What evidence is there for the existence of other minds?" In the first place, I must know what I mean by "mind". The question, "What evidence is there for the existence of other crickets?" is meaningless, because I do not know what a cricket is, and therefore could not know whether any given fact was evidence for its existence or not. This condition, of course, does not require that I shall have a complete knowledge of "mind," but simply that I shall be able to recognize some factor or factors which provide a specific test for mind. Secondly, I must have a similar specific test for "otherness," and the occurrence of the word "other" shows that my criterion for "mind" must be formed out of the characteristics of my own mind, for that is the only one whose existence the statement of the problem allows me to assume. Knowing, then, what I mean by "other" and by "mind," I am required to look for evidence of the existence of the specific factors in question. Since, as Prof. Price points out, proof is out of the question, such evidence cannot be of the nature of logical deduction, but must consist of known facts which seem to require the existence of those factors for their explanation. We will now inquire how Prof. Price's treatment of the problem meets these conditions.

Take first of all the word "mind". The essential argument requires, as a criterion for mind, simply "*spontaneous thinking*". My introspective knowledge of the association in my own mind of spontaneous thinking with symbolic representation leads me to infer foreign spontaneous thinking when I become aware of foreign symbolic representation. In several of Prof. Price's examples, however, it is not spontaneous thinking but *perception* that is thus inferred. I do not know if my own perception, as well as my own thinking,

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is necessarily accompanied by a symbol, but if so then presumably I may infer foreign perception as well as foreign spontaneous thinking when the appropriate symbol occurs, since I know the difference between the two sets of symbols by introspection. We may therefore take thinking and perception to be the specific factors for mind.

But now two difficulties arise. The first is that my own mind has both subjective and objective aspects which are essential to its constitution. This, I think, is implied in Prof. Price's argument, how otherwise can he distinguish between the case of the sentence which "came into my mind" (in his example quoted above) and that of my "spontaneous thinking"? That he recognizes a difference is shown by the fact that he regards only the former as giving evidence for the existence of other minds, but I can see no ground for distinction unless we assume the presence in the latter, and the absence from the former, of a necessary subjective element of my mind which we may call 'thought control'. Now the experiences cited by Prof. Price give no evidence of the existence of this necessary element outside myself, but only of a foreign interweaving of thought and perception with symbolic representation from which the power of discrimination referred to may be absent. It is difficult to see therefore that they give evidence of a 'mind' outside my own.

The same point may be put in another way. When I say I know something 'by introspection' I necessarily imply the existence of two aspects of my mind, and I think this necessity arises not from the peculiarities of language but from the nature of consciousness itself. In introspection the 'subjective mind' looks at the "objective mind," and we cannot save the situation by saying that they are identical without losing the power of dealing with the problem logically. In my own mind I can distinguish between perception and thinking on one hand and introspection on the other, yet I cannot consider that a perceiving and thinking entity with no power of introspection can have any right to be called a "mind." Now introspection is a mental act which is not accompanied by symbolic representation: if we imagine that it is, we immediately call into existence a remoter subjective mind which interprets the symbol, and so on, *ad inf*. Consequently, the kind of evidence on which Prof. Price relies can never point towards the existence of a foreign act of introspection—i.e. of a mind—similar to my own: at the best it can simply assure me that knowledge can be symbolically conveyed to me in at least two ways—by a perception or thought of which I am conscious, and by some means which is not identical with this, it cannot be adduced in favour of the proposition that this second means is a mind like mine.

The second difficulty connected with the word "mind," though distinct from the first, gives more definiteness thereto because it

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suggests an alternative identification of the second means just mentioned at the same time it introduces the question of the criterion for "otherness." What is revealed to me by "introspection" is not the whole of what is usually called my mind: there is an "unconscious" also whose existence I have to arrive at by deduction from evidence. The criterion for mind which Prof. Price's argument implies—namely, perception and thinking—is entirely conscious, but he refers more than once in his article to the unconscious, and includes it in his conception of mind. The question therefore arises: when I acquire knowledge symbolically without the prompting of my own perception or thinking, how do I know that the knowledge has not come from my own unconscious? In other words, even if we grant that the knowledge has come from a mind, what is the criterion for "otherness"?

In the example I have quoted, and elsewhere also, Prof. Price seems to find this criterion in repetition. "If such things happened to me several times, it would be reasonable to consider the hypothesis that there was another mind." This argument, however, seems to me a false one. The effect of repetition is to make the hypothesis of accidental coincidence improbable, and that of direct causation more probable, but it tells us nothing about the nature of the unknown cause. If my own unconscious can give me new information once, there is no assignable reason why it should not do so a hundred times. A criterion of 'otherness,' therefore, seems to be lacking in Prof. Price's argument, and in its absence it is impossible to know what is evidence for the existence of other minds and what is not. Further, it is not easy to see how such a criterion can be supplied unless we either rule out the idea of the unconscious altogether and identify mind with consciousness, or else specify the characteristics of the unconscious so rigorously as to leave no room for ambiguity. I doubt if any responsible philosopher would be bold enough to take the latter course at the present time.

There is another difficulty, which is concerned rather with the definition of symbolism than with that of "mind" or "other." Prof. Price gives by implication a definition of learning symbolically when he says that it requires the ability "to distinguish between observing something and being told about it." He does not, of course, mean the phrase, "being told about it," to be taken in a narrow sense, and I think he would regard as a symbol any perception which conveyed information of a different character from that of its own bare existence. But if so, learning by symbols is certainly not sufficient evidence for the existence of other minds. Suppose that when I wake in the morning I look out of the window and see wet roofs and pools of water on the ground. The thought arises in my mind: "It has been raining during the night," or "England will not

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make many runs to-day" I see one thing, and I immediately, by "imposed thinking," think another which is of the nature of new information, but I do not suppose that Prof Price would regard this as evidence that another mind made the landscape wet for symbolical purposes. He must therefore formulate the distinction between the symbolical nature of the words "Look! there is the bus" and that of the wet ground. It is, of course, easy to see that there is a distinction: common sense would say that it lies in the fact that I can connect the wet ground with previous rain or future difficult batting out of my own experience, whereas I could not form an image of a bus from the sounds uttered unless I had been taught the language used, or, in other words, that the first connection is a natural one and the second an arbitrary one. But that means of discrimination is not open to Prof Price because it is necessary to his argument that I do not ask how or why I interpret symbols, but simply accept the fact that I do, and when in the course of his article, he somewhat relaxes this restriction in order to discuss a possible objection (pp. 439-40), he maintains that the interpretation of sentences is, in the last analysis, a process of rational correlation of phenomena precisely equivalent to the correlation of wet grounds with rain. I think therefore that before Prof Price can clinch his argument, he must define more precisely what he means by a 'symbol' and that opens up such a long vista of inquiry, including an investigation of the process of learning a language without assuming the existence of other minds (an investigation which he has indeed adumbrated, in a manner which I am pleased to find corresponds very closely to an attempt of my own, but in terms which would be equally applicable to the process of correlating wetness with cricket) that the argument, so far as he has yet carried it, is only a negligible part of what is required, and there is at least considerable doubt whether it could be completed at all.

To summarize, then, looking at Prof Price's problem, 'What is the evidence for the existence of other minds?' from the standpoint he has taken up, my difficulties in accepting his solution are that, as I see it, his conception of mind is inadequate: he has no criterion for 'otherness,' and the experience he puts forward is not evidence

3 I do not believe that it would be possible to modify Prof Price's hypothesis to meet these difficulties, because the problem as he has presented it seems to me impossible of solution. The existence of other minds is not to be understood at a level of thought at which my own mind, other people's bodies, and the nature of symbolism are taken as already independently established. To deal with the problem satisfactorily I must go down to fundamentals—the bare facts of consciousness which I cannot doubt—and treat the existence

of my mind, other people's minds, and the rest, in terms thereof as offering a single comprehensive problem, in other words, I must understand first the meaning of the word "existence," and the distinction between the different things that exist will then be a matter of classification. This, after all, is not only the logical procedure, it is also the only procedure that has the slightest importance. For to seek evidence for the existence of other minds is a mere waste of time so far as the direct result of the quest is concerned, no matter whether I find it or not, or even if I find evidence that other minds do not exist, my behaviour and my general philosophy will be unchanged, I shall still have the same experiences as before, and shall merely decide whether to call other people "realities" or "illusions." That is a mere matter of names, but to use the problem as a means of testing the inner consistency and fundamental soundness of one's philosophy is a very different matter. In that aspect it appears as perhaps the most important philosophical problem that can be framed, for no matter from what question one starts, he ultimately comes down, if he is intent on pushing his inquiries to the limit, to the fundamental problem of the meaning of consciousness itself, and the most vital part of his consciousness is that customarily described as his relations with other minds.

An example might help to make the point clear. My own interest in this problem arose from the attempt to understand the recent developments of physics. It is well known that strange ideas have recently emerged in that subject. The act of observing a body is said to make an incalculable change in the body, matter is said to consist of waves, but the medium in which the waves exist appears to be purely subjective, whereas matter, of course, is objective—the term "waves of probability" has been invented to increase the obscurity, an electron is said to be both a particle and a wave, and so on. In the face of these apparently absurd discoveries, the only way of restoring sanity appeared to be to track down the mental processes by which they were reached—in other words, to understand exactly what scientists were actually doing that could lead them from the obviousness of sensations to such impossibilities of thought. I reached, as I hoped, an accurate definition of science in the statement that it consisted of the rational correlation of those experiences which were common to normal people—the criterion of physical existence thus being the possibility of experience by such people. This enabled much to be understood, but it was obviously not a fundamental definition because it assumed the existence of "normal people" who could have "experiences" comparable with mine. However, since such people "obviously" did "exist," I thought it would be possible to treat this as a separate problem—to interpret the existence of such people in terms independent of my experiences.

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which were later to be compared with theirs—and I therefore assumed a foundation for my definition of science which I hoped later to be able to establish

The task proved impossible. The experiences which assured me of the existence of "normal people" were themselves among the experiences "common to normal people," and I came to see that there was no way of disentangling them. I could not establish the existence of normal people independently of the existence of anything else, and am now fully persuaded not only that the problem of existence must be treated as a whole, but also that several more or less plausible philosophies intended to interpret the recent progress of science are unsound because their authors assume, on the ground of its "obviousness," the existence of other minds, and then proceed to reason in terms which would not allow this assumption to be consistently justified. I would have no quarrel with their belief that other minds exist if they did not then tacitly assume a meaning for "existence" which would make that belief invalid. The importance of Prof. Price's problem as a test case, and the necessity of considering it without his prior assumptions, are thus exemplified.

Space does not permit, nor would it be appropriate to attempt, a fundamental treatment of the problem here. I have made such an attempt elsewhere,¹ and I conclude this article with the barest sketch of those aspects of it which relate directly to the difficulties I have found with Prof. Price's hypothesis. The problem should be approached, I think, with the object not of finding evidence for a stated conclusion, but of examining the fundamental data of consciousness and asking what they are evidence for. The fundamental data are my actual experiences, which I cannot doubt. They may be "realities" or "illusions," "true" or "false"—such classifications belong to a subsequent co-ordination—but that I am conscious of, say, seeing a red light yesterday, I cannot question, whether I "actually" saw it or not. I find regularities in certain of these experiences (which I thereupon regard as "real") which lead me to classify them into groups, and I find that I can use these regularities to predict further experiences, by forming concepts which I define so that their relations with one another form a logical expression of the regularities. Prof. Price has described this process, which he attributes to "an extreme empiricist." Without accepting or disowning the title, I quote, as a fair statement so far as it goes, of my view his description of the attitude of this person—

"He may say what I *mean* by asserting that there are other minds is simply this fact, that my own consciousness of the world

¹ *Through Science to Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 1937)

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is constantly being enlarged by the hearing of noises and the seeing of marks which are symbolic to me, and by the consequent acts of imposed thinking which go on in me, so that 'you' is just a label for certain pieces of information which I get in this fashion, and 'Jones' is a label for certain other pieces of information, and so on. In that case he, too, can admit that there are other minds. Indeed, he can say it is a certainty that there are, and not merely (as we have suggested) a hypothesis for which there is strong evidence (pp 447-8)

The only modification of this that I would make (apart from that of the phraseology which is, of course, chosen to conform to Prof Price's hypothesis) is that I would not call "Jones" simply a label for certain pieces of information, but a concept defined in a more precise way, including the property of continued existence in the concepts of space and time, even when I am not observing him, who by processes capable of logical description, makes the noises and marks which lead me to postulate his existence.

Prof Price's objection to this procedure is that one who adopts it gives "a very strange sense to the phrase 'other minds,' a sense utterly different from the one which he gives to the phrase 'my own mind.'" I think, however, that he has overlooked two essential points. The first is this: when he says this meaning of "other minds" is "utterly different" from that of "my own mind," he is, I think, comparing it with his own experience of introspection. But that is precisely the quality for the existence of which in other minds, his own hypothesis, as we have seen, does not give evidence. His comparison is therefore unwarranted. Secondly, and more importantly, he has overlooked the essential part which time plays in the matter. All my experience on which I can reflect is in the past, because the ceaseless passage of time immediately removes it from the present before I can think about it. In speaking above of "experiences," therefore as my fundamental data, I should have referred to "memories." The concept of my own mind, like that of Jones's, is therefore formed to correlate memories, and the two concepts are on precisely the same footing for logical purposes. Time, in fact, is the quality of consciousness which makes the logical treatment of experience possible: for the moment an experience has occurred, time removes it from the possibility of change. I may be mistaken in my idea of Jones's mind, just as I may be mistaken in my idea of my own mind, I may include an "unconscious" in my concept of each of them, and I may detect my mistakes in each case by the same process—by finding that they contain logical inconsistencies. In every respect, therefore, my mind and Jones's are perfectly equivalent, except in what is happening at the present moment.

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As soon as that moment becomes past its happenings go into the field of my consciousness, to contribute to my idea of myself or of Jones. The experiences of the present belong to the subjective part of my mind, and to put that into Jones would be self-contradictory. There must be something left over to characterize me, because I know that I stand in a unique relation to my own mind (our language is not equal to a satisfactory statement of such obvious experiences in brief terms, but the meaning I think will be clear enough), and what is left over is the experience of the present. I can never have experience of Jones's mind at the present moment—my own experiences which reveal his 'mind' to me reach me after that state of his mind is past. I can quite logically attribute to him a subjective experience at that earlier moment but that is equivalent to attributing to myself a subjective experience at an earlier moment which is now past. To say that my own present is the only one I can experience is simply to say that I can only feel my own toothache and not Jones's: it is not to say that there is any difference of character between Jones's toothache yesterday and mine yesterday.

This view of the matter is, I think, free from the difficulties of Prof. Price's hypothesis. I bring my mind into equivalence with Jones's by acknowledging the automatic separation which time makes between my objective self and my subjective self and in everything which I am able to consider logically we are then on the same footing. The "otherness" of Jones's mind is immediately obvious, from the fact that I can distinguish my own memory of a red light from my memory of the sounds which lead me to deduce that Jones has seen a red light: it is, in fact, the *absence* of the necessity of symbolic communication in my own case that tells me that the memory is of my own experience. Whatever of 'unconscious' I find it necessary to ascribe to myself or to Jones I ascribe solely in obedience to the necessity (or desire if you like) of preserving the postulate of an individual mind as a logically useful one, and the possibility of confusing Jones's mind with my own unconscious cannot arise. Finally, this view does not require a distinction between different kinds of symbolism which it may be impossible logically to establish.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

SINCE the philosophies of Croce and Gentile there is nothing to observe in Italy yet in the way of new, well defined tendencies arising, capable of pointing new orientations of thought. To be sure, we find indications and foreshadowings that there are in preparation critical examinations of the two still dominant philosophies. For example, we have on other occasions indicated realistic attempts of remote Anglo American inspiration aroused by the need of confronting idealism with a view which should give a bigger place to the reality of nature and to the results of natural science. Now, at the other extreme—that is to say beginning from an inspiration of Platonic tendency, Guzzo rises up against contemporary idealism with a book¹ rich in suggestive hints though not yet developed in a well defined body of doctrine. Guzzo does not repudiate idealism precisely, only the bias in the direction of immanence inherent in the idealism of Croce and Gentile. He aims to re-establish the concept and function of transcendence not only in the theological meaning of the word but also in the gnostic and moral sphere. For Guzzo the transcendence of forms is that which turns them into efficient powers of development together with values drawn from the flux of becoming, while immanence is in danger of overturning them. Let us take for example the 'form of the truth'. We cannot speak," says Guzzo, "of presence of the act of truth in the act of knowing because on the contrary the act of truth awakens knowing and thence it is not truth in knowing but knowing is awakened by the act of truth, and truth is not *quod cogitatur*, but *quo cogitatur*, as faith is *qua creditur* before being *quae creditur*. Neither can one speak except by a mistaken symbol of a dynamic relation in which the act of truth is the power which operates in knowing. That would reduce knowledge to a mere result of the act of truth—when instead it is itself an act in response to the act of truth, which pointing to itself demands recognition. If knowledge were not an act roused up by the act of truth if knowledge were the simple result of an operating force then again knowledge would be all true, being the result of the same truth whereas knowledge is essentially decision between true and false responsible judgement, discrimination and decision that which signifies contingency in judgement where a force would install knowledge as necessity. According to immanentism, however (as practised by Gentile not by Croce) error would be the truth of yesterday, and criticism of it would be reduced to a simple re-elaboration of the formula of knowing, but in this way objects Guzzo you would take away from this same re-elaboration all seriousness and all scientific usefulness, since it is solely the elimination of errors that makes of a new formula a better formula.

Guzzo regards the forms thus understood as models and paradigms of spiritual becoming. They are neither distinct among themselves, like those of Croce nor opposed like those of Gentile but, like their Platonic progenitors they are meant to be "inclusive of all spiritual experience." This is therefore the most obscure part of the whole book. It might have had some light thrown

¹ AUGUSTO GUZZO, *Sacris non nobis*, Loffredo editore Napoli, 1939, p. 302

upon it if Guzzo had not limited himself to utterances too generic and ambiguous but had deigned to show us how the problems of science art morality, etc. take shape when they are reconsidered according to the principles which he propounds. But since he announces a second volume to follow the one lately published, it may not be long before our curiosity is satisfied.

The work of John Dewey is beginning to rouse wider interest in Italy. At first it attracted pedagogic interest only. Professor G. Lombardo Radice had *School and Society* translated in 1910. In 1927 he himself wrote in the review *L'Educazione nazionale* of which he is the Director two articles entitled *La pedagogia di Giovanni Dewey*. In 1931 I translated *Reconstruction in Philosophy*¹ preceding the translation by an essay on Dewey's philosophy. This subsequently incorporated in my book *Filosofi del Novecento*² rendered the guiding principles of his philosophy accessible to a larger public. And now a studious young authoress M. T. Gillio-Tos devotes an extensive monograph³ to the American thinker illustrating all the phases and aspects of his activity from the first articles of neo-Hegelian inspiration to the latest essays on art and religion. Her book is based on an exhaustive acquaintance not only with the philosopher's own writings but also with all the Anglo-American literature concerning them. This work together with Feldmann's book with whose interpretation however she disagrees is the most complete source of information about Dewey and therefore deserves to be introduced to the English public. The book is mainly expository: it follows Dewey's separate writings in their chronological order and sums them up with clearness although with a certain amount of redundancy on account of the need to repeat themes and arguments which recur frequently in one or other of Dewey's works. It gives a central importance to *Experience and Nature* rightly viewing it as the culmination of Dewey's anti-intellectualism and instrumentalism and the development of the crisis that arose between the two opposing inspirations of the philosopher: his original idealism and superadded pragmatism. Finally it sees in the two writings *Art and Experience*, and *A Common Faith*, the beginning of intuitions contrasting with the body of the system, if we can speak of system in dealing with so fluid a conception as Dewey's. In the last chapter the authoress sets out her conclusions and her reservations. She recognizes the most serious aspect of Dewey's speculative effort in the sincere attempt which he makes to strip himself of any residuum of intellectualistic culture in order to gather quickening in the freshness of living nature the true meaning of the actual existence of man. In truth the attempt to reconstruct rationally the whole course of human experience in order to discover its genuine source and to clear the products of human civilization from the mould and encrustings that hinder their free play and from the superstructures that complicate existence needlessly, was too bold a task for one man and inevitably involved him in numerous errors, and difficulties disproportioned to his solitary powers. However, merely to save real values from the contagious doubts that end in our days by attacking without discrimination everything that has been done already, this attempt deserves to have its reasons understood and to be brought to completion. (p. 334) With regard to the more positive parts of the system, the authoress enumerates the differentiation of the planes of existence on the way to the arousing of emergent consciousness and the doctrine of thought as the overcoming of obstacles (in place of the old contemplative and static view). With regard to the more negative parts the doctrine of

¹ GIOVANNI DEWEY, *Ricostruzione filosofica* Bari Laterza 1931.

² G. DE RILGIERO *Filosofi del Novecento*, Bari Laterza 1934, pp. 63-87.

³ M. T. GILLIO-TOS, *Il pensiero di Giovanni Dewey*, Loesredo editore Napoli 1930 p. 350.

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religion "Not only is it not placed there by God, but not even by something divine, where everything emerges spontaneously from the bosom of nature where man is the voluntary artificer of his own ideals. The logical inference from such a premise can only be the following: not only all religions in their historical determination are false but religiosity itself is an absurdity in human life properly speaking, a symptom of the abdication of the powers which man has by nature" (p. 347). Yet whatever exception one may take to Dewey's philosophy, he cannot be denied the merit, accorded him by Feldman, of being "one of the truly seminal minds in contemporary philosophy."

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO

(Translated from the Italian by Constance M. Allen)

NEW BOOKS

A History of Science Technology and Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century
By Professor A. WOLF (London George Allen & Unwin 1938
Pp 814 Price 25s net)

This volume is a sequel to the author's corresponding book on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries published in 1935. Most of it is concerned with the physical and biological sciences and with technology but towards the end is one chapter on Psychology and two on Philosophy.

Professor Wolf's method is to deal in turn with the various writers who have made the chief contributions to the subjects. Thus in Psychology we have accounts of Berkeley's work as set forth in his *Theory of Vision*. Hume, who tried to follow Berkeley's observational method more rigorously, and Hartley with his attempts at physiological psychology. Then among continental psychologists mention is made of Diderot, Condillac, Bonnet, and Cabanis.

The first of the two chapters on Philosophy deals with the major philosophers—Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant. A clear account is given of Berkeley's fundamental contention that there is no essential difference between the so-called primary and secondary properties and the train of argument by which Berkeley deduced from this his idealist philosophy—that the reality of qualities and apparent material substances consists in their perception by some mind.

The description of Hume's work is based on the text. Hume ended in scepticism by applying Berkeley's mode of criticism more thoroughly than the good bishop had done. Hume saw as little ground for admitting the existence of mind, soul or spirit as of material substances: man was to him but a bundle of different perceptions and associations of ideas.

Reid, holding a Scottish philosophy of common sense realism, felt that Hume had landed in his type of scepticism by not taking enough into account 'natural instinct'. Kant's transcendentalism reached in his attempt to determine the range and limitations of human knowledge in spite of its obscurity makes the *Critique of Pure Reason* according to Professor Wolf, one of the greatest landmarks in the history of philosophy and one of the most potent influences in modern thought generally. This opinion may be contrasted with that of another modern man of science and philosopher, who regards Kant as a mere misfortune.

In the next chapter accounts are given of the work of seventeen minor philosophers of whom the best known are Bayle, chief of the French sceptics, Wolff and Lessing among German rationalists and Priestley in England. Following Bayle were groups of French materialists, Lamettrie, Holbach, Diderot and Cabanis and of pantheists such as Buffon, Robinet and the crusading philosopher, Voltaire.

Professor Wolf's treatment of eighteenth-century philosophy though less thorough and complete than his science and technology gives a useful picture of the philosophic background against which science had then to grow and this is all that the author claims for it.

W. C. D. DAMPIER

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Psychological Methods of Healing By WILLIAM BROWN, D.M. D.Sc., F.R.C.P.
(London University of London Press 1938 Pp vii + 224 Price
7s 6d net)

This book is a general elementary introduction to the study of psychotherapy as a method of treatment of troubles not only of mental origin, but also of those physical diseases the gravity of which is originated, intensified, prolonged, or complicated by mental factors. There is no need to theorize about the connection of mind and body in order to accept the empirical evidence that 'all forms of disease are amenable more or less to psychotherapy', and the growth of explicit recognition of the fact (it seems *always* to have been acted upon implicitly) is made evident by the increase of schools of thought and practice in this branch of medical diagnosis and treatment from the latter end of the nineteenth century onwards. Dr Brown gives brief accounts of the work of the leading schools of psychotherapy, and, what is even more interesting, draws upon his own clinical observations, made during the War as well as in civilian practice extending over a quarter of a century, for his sources of criticism and constructive elaboration.

The author has several advantages over many of his colleagues who teach and write on this subject. To begin with he is a 'pure' and 'experimental' psychologist as well as a physician. He is a philosopher, a statistician, and has a very wide experience of the subject treated in this book. His philosophy gives him a critical background, his psychology a scientific outlook, his statistics a method, and his experience a sure touch.

The topics dealt with in *Psychological Methods of Healing* cover the various forms of psychoneurosis, which are amply illustrated by case descriptions, and indicate in some detail the psychotherapeutical procedures by which they may be treated. Analysis, suggestion, auto-suggestion, hypnoidization, hypnosis all come in for discussion.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter in the volume is that which deals with 'Hypnosis, Suggestibility and Progressive Relaxation', for in it it is possible to bring forward not only clinical, but also experimental evidence that hypnosis is a state other than normal sleep, and that suggestions given when the patient is in a thoroughly relaxed state induced by mild hypnosis are much more potent than others in their effects. An account is given of experiments carried out at the Institute at Oxford to investigate variations in the amplitude of the knee-jerk during sleep, hypnoidization, and hypnosis. Seated in a suitable chair the Subject's leg hangs over a support, and every ten seconds an electrically controlled hammer smartly taps his patellar tendon. The reflex ensues, and is recorded on a kymograph. The excursion of the stylus on the smoked paper of the drum registers its 'normal' amplitude. The Subject is then repeatedly given the suggestion that he shall sleep, and gradually the amplitude diminishes until it becomes minimal. If, then, he is given the suggestion that he is unable to move his arm, or open his eyes (hypnotic suggestion), no matter how hard he tries he cannot do so, but the reflex at once reappears. This experiment and its results are of great interest, suggesting as they do the possibility of much further work along similar lines.

The book is written in a clear and easy style, and appears to be intended for lay rather than medical readers. Its chief fault lies in a certain amount of repetition, but, as several of the chapters originally were given in the form of addresses, or appeared as articles in journals, this could hardly have been avoided unless the whole had been entirely re-written, since, in the circumstances, each had to be complete in itself for adequate presentation and thus the same matter had to be repeated more than once.

NEW BOOKS

There is an excellent bibliography and a list of references, as well as good indices of the authors cited and the subjects dealt with in the book

F. AVELING

Logic, Theoretical and Applied By D. LUTHER EVANS Ph.D., and WALTER S. GAMERTSFELDER Ph.D. (New York: Doubleday Doran & Company Inc. 1937. Pp. xiv + 482. \$2.50)

The authors of this elementary textbook on Logic state that their aim in writing this text is threefold: namely, first, to interest the student in a critical examination and appraisal of his own thinking and that of others; second, to make clear that dependable knowledge has a structure or pattern and that fruitful thinking must be carried on in accordance with certain well-tested principles; and third, to show how the principles of reasoning actually operate in the constructive thought processes of the physical and social sciences and in the other important activities of civilized man (p. v). These are worthy aims, extremely difficult of fulfilment. It can hardly be said that the second and third aims are realized, whether or not the first aim is likely to be fulfilled will depend upon the use made by the teacher of the text. An undue amount of space is given to the traditional treatment of such topics as immediate inference and the categorical syllogism: the authors' discussion of these topics is no better than that contained in many available textbooks. It would have been well had they saved this space to enable them to give detailed and fully worked-out examples of fruitful thinking in order to secure their second aim. Thus for example their treatment of Causation and Mill's Method^s (Chapter XI) is sketchy and old-fashioned whilst the examples given are not especially illuminating. Throughout the book suffers from the attempt to be comprehensive without being sufficiently full. The student who is beginning the study of logic is likely only to be confused by the various rapid surveys of other logicians' views that are just barely presented to him.

This textbook is in fact neither better nor worse than many others. It is difficult to see what useful purpose it can fulfil.

L. SUSAN STEBBING

A Guide to Aesthetics By ARAM TOROSSIAN (California: Stanford University Press, London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford 1937. Pp. vii + 343. Price \$3.25. 17s.)

This popular survey of the whole field of aesthetics by the Assistant Professor of Architecture at California University is intended for the general reader rather than for the specialist, nevertheless as a serious and scholarly contribution to the science of art no specialist can afford to ignore it. Too much attention has been paid hitherto to the psychological and philosophical aspects of aesthetics and not enough as yet to the objective side of the subject. In this respect the work of a man like Professor Torossian whose approach is that of the artist constructing a theory of art is undoubtedly a useful corrective.

The defects of the book are a tendency to prolixity, a certain looseness of definition in dealing with highly general problems and a rather sketchy treatment of the psychological and philosophical aspects of the subject. He rightly regards aesthetics as a form of scientific inquiry but does not delimit altogether satisfactorily its peculiar province. He goes on to describe the

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spectator's experience as emotional and contemplative, but, unfortunately, accepts the James Lange theory of the emotions as a physiological state. Further, in distinguishing aesthetic emotions from ordinary practical emotions, he accepts the act of projection characteristic of the *Einfühlung* hypothesis, but interprets this in the limited motor sense of Vernon Lee, judging from his bibliography, the writer does not read German and is therefore unacquainted with Volkelt and Lipps whose views would I think provide exactly the psychological explanation for which he is vainly groping.

He is on safer ground when he starts to analyse the work of art but I agree with Carritt and the majority of aestheticians that utility or fitness which the writer seems to regard as an aesthetic quality like form or expressiveness cannot in fact add an iota of value to our appreciation from a strictly aesthetic standpoint. The analysis that follows of the formal and expressive qualities common to the fine and applied arts is admirable, and no less interesting is the treatment of the individual arts which according to the writer, are mainly to be distinguished by their technique. He rightly includes the modern art of the 'motion picture' as an art of movement akin to but peculiarly different from the drama and the dance.

These are the best chapters in the book.

LISTOWEL

The Place of Value in a World of Facts By WOLFGANG KÖHLER (New York Liverlight Publishing Corporation 1938 8vo Pp ix + 418 Price \$3.75)

This book is an attempt to find a place for values in the human acceptance of the term among the recognized or recognizable facts of science. It begins with a dialogue dealing with the case against physical science as having stripped the world of all humanism. It next considers some theories of value that have been formulated by philosophers and having thus cleared the ground it proceeds to analyse the general concept of 'requiredness', which is taken to cover all special forms of value on the purely phenomenological level. There are not only actual or potential facts of experience, but also exemplars of requiredness obtaining between some of these facts. Certain of them fit others. Moreover some phenomenological experiences necessitate "required" completion which does not at the moment lie within the phenomenological sphere. Searching for a name on the tip of one's tongue is a case in point. The name hovers, approaches, recedes, all the while being something perfectly definite though to use the term he prefers, 'transphenomenal'. There is a 'vector' extending from the present experience to it though it is beyond the range of presently experienced phenomena. So too in the case of demands from the phenomenological self to other phenomenal objects and persons and contrariwise from them to us, as when a policeman stops our car and thus makes a demand upon us. But to be scientific we must get beyond phenomena and the instance of trying to recall a name shows us how to do so. Here we transcend actual experience and find a paradigm for transcendence in general. Though the analogical argument seems inadequate Köhler does not hesitate to conclude that transcendence is a notion with a definite meaning that the same is true of transphenomenal reality and that in principle we may ascribe existence to transphenomenal entities no less than to percepts and other phenomena. Accordingly the problem arises whether requiredness occurs among the properties of transphenomenal reality. According to Köhler it does. He argues that 'perceptual and physical contexts are isomorphic (the term is now here exactly defined in this book) in essential macroscopic respects', and thus there is a "resem-

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blance between the phenomenal and the physical world' Again "we may formulate it as a rule that segregation of particular macroscopic entities within a larger continuum is a common trait of visual experience and of its cortical counterpart" This is the doctrine of Natural Units Cortical Configurations, and Phenomenological Gestalten already familiar to students of Kohler's work And the point is that 'requiredness' is to be found, not in isolated unitary elements but in dynamic contexts the parts of which are regulated and determined by the whole according to the Gestalt principle Kohler makes much of the Law of Dynamic Direction also particularly in his discussion of Organic Fitness but curiously enough in his chapter on Man and Nature, he criticizes what he conceives to be the Aristotelean concept of teleology, which seems to be a veritable bugbear of the Gestalt school Yet his ideas in many ways appear to be singularly Aristotelean, which should hardly, perhaps be a matter for astonishment They are developments of the theory of Gestaltqualitäten sponsored by von Ehrenfels Meinong and Brentano Brentano's views were derived from his scholastic training and were greatly influenced by the teaching of Aquinas Aquinas largely copied them from the works of Aristotle himself This is by no means an adverse criticism of Kohler's teaching It is a decided encomium of it

F AVELING

History of Mediaeval Philosophy Vol II The Thirteenth Century By MAURICE DE WULF Third English Edition based on the Sixth French Edition Translated by E C Messenger Ph D (London Longmans, Green & Co 1938 Pp xii + 379 Price 17s 6d)

Here is a summary brought up to date of the chief discoveries in this field But the book is more than a reference book and the subject matter more than a matter of mild interest for the *erudits* The enormous increase, still proceeding in our knowledge of mediaeval philosophy, is bound up with a more wide spread acceptance of its general principles Even in this country where scholasticism is comparatively little studied scholastic philosophers gratefully observe an attitude of sympathetic interest and an acknowledgement that the issues raised are living

The body of the book consists of twenty two sections on individuals and groups of masters each followed by a bibliography which consists generally of about a page of close print sometimes of two or more It holds the field as indispensable for the student and is an impressive monument to the labours of M de Wulf and his fellow scholars They would readily allow the remark that in a field of knowledge which is increasing every year judgments upon individuals who have but recently or in small measure emerged from oblivion may need to be revised or reversed indeed a comparison with the previous editions proves this to be the case These sections do not make easy reading This was inevitable if the views of so many thinkers were to be expressed in anything like a moderate compass There is the further drawback to a thorough reading that the same problems persistently recur and are treated in many cases in almost identical fashion on the other hand sections read in isolation will sometimes prove unintelligible This is said not to complain of an arrangement imposed by the purpose of the book but to guard against a misconception of its contents The historical method precludes it from being an exposition of the *philosophia perennis* which can be properly assimilated by those unfamiliar with the subject At the same time it does very much more than indicate the lines of further study Those who have persevered with the central

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sections will have gained a most valuable light upon the general tendencies of scholastic thought and will thus derive great profit from a summing up of some fifty pages which ends the book. And the introductory chapter of thirty pages (also with bibliographies) on the general historical setting should win the admiration of a large class of readers.

The method here employed causes an irritation to Thomists, that is those who consider the main Thomist positions proof against attack. Even if we allow the very doubtful rule that a historian must suspend his judgment and confine himself to facts (a rule which M. de Wulf himself does not always follow) it seems an excess of impartiality to refuse distinctive emphasis to theories which have imposed themselves upon successive centuries. M. de Wulf does indeed admit that Thomism had in the thirteenth century a privileged position and for this he assigns a number of accidental reasons (p. 330). If this success requires explanation it is permissible even for a historian to suggest that the power of objective truth may have had some part to play.

The intending purchaser may be disquieted by nearly four pages solid with *corrigenda* to Volume I, they are all minor slips and largely obvious. In this volume the nuisance has tolerably abated and a good standard of translation is only occasionally marred. Mgr Pelzer's highly technical pages on recently discovered thirteenth century translations have been omitted. There is a most useful (but not exhaustive) index.

ILTYD TRETROWAN

The Philosophy of Law of James Wilson Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court 1789-1798 By WILLIAM F. OBERING, S. J., Ph. D.
(Issued by The American Catholic Philosophical Association Pp. 276)

This study in comparative jurisprudence inaugurates a series of philosophical studies which are to be published by the American Catholic Philosophical Association and is for this reason alone entitled to receive a welcome. A perusal of the work shows also that it is entitled to a welcome on its merits. The purpose of the author is said to be to make 'an humble contribution to a sound and American philosophy of law'. And he chooses to pursue the philosophy of law of James Wilson who before he became Associate Justice of the Supreme Court was one of the six men who signed not only the American Declaration of Independence, but also the Constitution of the United States.

The work of Dr. Obering is a bold and in its way successful attempt to show that the philosophy of James Wilson was in fact "the *philosophia perennis* which gave us our Common Law and presided over its early development and flowered in the Government of the people for the people and by the people". In proving his thesis the author makes no attempt to trace the literary dependence of Justice Wilson on the masters of the *Philosophia perennis* such as Aquinas or (in his day) Suarez. He seeks simply to establish by an accurate confrontation of texts the substantial identity of the legal philosophies of Wilson and Aquinas. In truth and in fact it does not appear that Wilson was himself a direct student of Aquinas. The identity in philosophy which is claimed would seem to result partly from the study of Bracton and Fortescue and of the Common Law and partly from the study of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity* and the writings of Grotius. It is to be observed however, that Bracton was a contemporary of Aquinas and can scarcely have had any opportunity of studying his teaching and there was a gap of some three and a half centuries between Bracton and Hooker. And these were precisely the

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centuries in which the Common Law developed. It is true that Fortescue in his day had a vivacious knowledge of the writings of Aquinas and so had a greater common lawyer, Sir Thomas More. It would have been interesting if Dr Obering had been able to examine the means by which in the period between the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries, the principles of Aquinas' philosophy had invaded the Common Law, but no attempt is made to trace the infiltration and indeed there is no reference in the bibliography (and only one indirect reference in the footnotes) to the writings of Pollock and Matland and of Professor Holdsworth on the History of the English Law. In these writings there are many references to the influence of the Canonists and the moral theologians of the Middle Ages on the development of English Law but with the single exception of Professor Le Bras of the Sorbonne there does not seem to be any writer with a sufficiently extensive knowledge of the texts of the Canonists and theologians to give us what would be a most valuable study in English Law and English Legal History.

The identity of principle which Dr Obering seeks to trace between the philosophy of James Wilson and the *philosophia perennis* fails at one point which is duly noted, namely in the treatment of Criminal Law and justice which we are told Justice Wilson bases on a false principia analogous to that of Locke which leads him into serious error regarding the origin of the power to repress crime and the end and purpose of such repression.

The whole work is within the limits we have sought to indicate one of very real interest and will surely fulfil the practical purpose of the author. The chapters on the moral basis of law, on natural law and natural rights are of living interest and value in a community which has never wholly forgotten these principles and in a world in which they are being challenged with violence and even with brutality. The chapter on the law of nations is in its way admirable and contains citations from Suarez and Taparelli d Azeglio which are now classical. The book is well produced and clearly written though there are a few manifest errors in proof reading.

RICHARD O SULLIVAN

Crooked Personalities in Childhood and After. An Introduction to Psychotherapy. By RAYMOND B CATTELL M A, B Sc Ph D (Lond.)
(London Nisbet & Co Ltd Cambridge At the University Press
1938 Pp xi + 215 Price 7s 6d)

This book is one of a series in The Contemporary Library of Psychology, edited by Dr F Aveling the object of which is to give a comprehensive and accurate perspective of contemporary Psychology. Dr Cattell's purpose has been to give a popular and yet scientifically accurate picture of present-day methods of treating nervous and difficult children. In this he has admirably succeeded but he has done much more for he has produced an extremely fair minded and objective survey of current trends and schools in therapeutic and analytical psychology which will be of value to the well informed general reader and should have a steadying effect on all keen people who are throwing their hearts and endeavours into social work according to the teachings of one or another of the current schools of psychotherapy and are in danger of losing perspective. It is unusual to find such a harmonious blending of the outlooks of the biologist the scientific psychologist the therapist and the philosopher as Dr Cattell has given us. One is grateful to him for his unbiased exposition of the Freudian, Jungian, and Adlerian schools and his well weighed criticism and correlation of them, and still more for his pre-

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sensation of the experimental scientific approach characteristic of Shand, McDougall, Watson, Spearman, and of the author himself, and his demonstration of the contributions it has to offer to the solving of personality problems

The book is clearly and interestingly written, and is readable by any educated layman, it raises no false hopes and is guiltless of any attempt to 'write down to popular taste'. It is well illustrated with abridged case notes, and there is a useful and comprehensive bibliography. I cannot imagine a better guide to current mental hygiene for parents, teachers, social and religious workers, and doctors. Ethical, philosophical, and religious values are fully taken into account, and the book is rendered more complete by a study of genius and a discussion on standards of normality and on the value to society of the eccentric and unadjustable personality. Especially useful to the layman is the reasoned discussion on the Role of Heredity (chapter 9). Correlation of evidence gained from many sources, both intuitional and observational, is the distinctive contribution of the scientific psychologist, and we are left with a feeling of stability and of confidence in the progress of psychology which more purely subjective and intuitive essays do not give us.

B. D. HENDY

The Absolute Collective. A Philosophical Attempt to Overcome Our Broken State. By ERICH GUTKIND (London: The C. W. Daniel Company Ltd. Pp. 119. Price 6s.)

Because the problem of this book is important and genuine while its treatment must necessarily seem strange to an English reader, I think just a few words may be useful. The book will certainly be hampered in its effect through the fact that the author does not realize that the problems in the sphere of English civilization are not identical with those in the German sphere. So strange as it must appear in the English tongue, it would not be at all unusual in German.

It is based on certain presuppositions which it does not mention. After the war, under the influence of the breakdown of German civilization, a movement arose which was a secession from philosophy and a return to theology. It was a feeling of disappointment with philosophy, a feeling that the most fundamental problems of human life could not be solved by philosophy and that a return to theology was therefore necessary. This feeling was one of the reasons for the extraordinary influence of Kierkegaard and the rise of the so-called *Existenzphilosophie*, although Heidegger and Jaspers both rejected the theological implications of Kierkegaard's thought. The same feeling led from liberal protestant theology to Barth's dialectic theology, and in the Jewish sphere from a liberal attitude to a more orthodox point of view. Presupposed is the work of a remarkable man, Franz Rosenzweig, who through years of terrible illness which deprived his body of practically every kind of movement defied death for he preached in his *The Star of Redemption* the return to God and to Theology, and he taught the irreducibility of God, Man, and the World, the thesis which forms the starting point of this book. Presupposed also are the ideas of Martin Buber, who emphasizes the importance of the I-Thou relation for human life and bases on it his theology and philosophy. Thirdly there is presupposed the former Berlin circle of Goldberg-Unger, who connected God with the biological reality of human community and understood the ritual to be the condition of God's presence in it.

Seen against this background the book loses its strangeness and a certain proportion of its originality, but not at all its personal character. Its central

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thesis is that man whose crisis is based on the fact that he has lost God as a source of his being must return back to God but that he can find him only in this world as *Thou*. Reality exists in our meeting with God. This is the well known *Begegnungstheorie* expounded in Germany by Gogarten, Tillich, Buber etc. but the author gives it the interesting variation 'Man opens all things but is himself opened by God.' This opening up of our being is the fundamental thing.

Instead of drawing the conclusion that given this breach between man and God the only way out would be a fundamental change of man namely his rebirth the author sees the way out in the rehabilitation of ritual as the basis of the people or the absolute collective. About this as the Latterday wonder some prophetic words are uttered.

It is very difficult to find a basis for criticism of books which are not founded on proof and demonstration but are the utterances of prophetic rapture. It would be false to condemn them absolutely. Deep insight into real facts may hide in mystical expressions. I think it is fair to say the problem of this book is important though not new but the solution is not satisfactory because ritual and absolute collective are substitutes and no real way out. Yet the book deserves attention as expression of a type of thinking characteristic for our period of transition and unknown in England. And though it is impossible to replace philosophy by theology it remains true that certain problems of our time may better be expressed in theological language and that we have to choose the best possible form of expression according to the merits of the case.

F. H. HEINEMANN

An Essay on Critical Appreciation By R. W. CHURCH (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Pp. 299. Price 10s. 6d.)

It would be a safe bet that nobody could conjecture the nature of this book from its title from its chapter headings or least of all from the list of illustrations (drawings by Michelangelo, Pollaiuolo, Maillol, Picasso and Titian's *Bacchus and Ariadne*). It is in fact a logical essay in defence of Nominalism supported almost entirely by arguments drawn from aesthetic universals and curiously interspersed with discussions of pictorial technique. The relevance of these last consists only in the contention that a kind of aesthetic criticism is still possible though there is no quality common to the objects or experiences which are called beautiful.

The abstract term 'beauty' is not the name of a common nature. Beauty is a word that derives its connotation from its context in every case of its use in discourse. It would follow that if a man says he has seen something beautiful or that beauty is truth we are in the same sort of case as if a man says that he gave Mary a ball on her birthday. According to Mary's age and so on he may be talking about an india-rubber sphere or an expensive social function. Consequently it is very hard to say what the subject of the book is supposed to be. Nothing is said about the critical appreciation of cars or tobaccos only about that of aesthetic situations. But 'Likewise, the phrase 'aesthetic situation' is a term verbal which derives its connotation from its context in every case of its use in discourse.' Yet 'its context will consist of a description of a situation that is more or less deeply satisfying in itself and a felt situation that is satisfactory in and for itself is a beauty in fact. Then have not beauties in fact a common nature? How can we tell what the context will be?'

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It seems quite possible to agree with the author's conviction that when we ascribe "beauty" to diverse things, they may in truth have no common quality without agreeing that we did not think they had one or that our experiences in contemplating them have none. His attempts to show how, on his nominalist views, rational discourse is still possible are obscure, and as far as I understand them, unconvincing.

E. F. CARRITT

On Understanding Physics By W. H. WATSON (Cambridge University Press 1938 Pp. xu + 146 Price 7s. 6d. net.)

This book is an attempt to interest physicists and scientists in general in the recent developments in philosophy known as logical positivism, and in particular the work of Wittgenstein.

The author first stresses the necessity for discipline in philosophy, and concludes that its primary concern is with the logic of ordinary language. In a chapter on "Methods of Representation," Professor Watson points out the danger of using spatial representations of time, resulting in the error of arguing about "time's arrow," and thus neglecting the difference between linguistic possibility and physical (or logical) possibility. (Needless to say, this is the confusion underlying J. W. Dunne's "Serialism.") Similarly the absurdity of calling an electron a "wave" is also dealt with, and there are some salutary remarks on the growing arrogance of mathematicians. It is difficult, however, to accept the view that the Uniformity of Nature is not a hypothesis about the world, but a statement concerning our method of representation. Here the logical positivists would appear to be pressing their views too far and betraying the fact that they are not active scientific researchers themselves.

There are three important chapters on the Nature of Mechanism, the Logic of Substance and Motion, and Some Aspects of the Symbolism of Mechanics and Electricity, but they are difficult reading. The importance of scientists understanding the symbolic processes which they are continually employing cannot be too strongly urged, but one is left with the impression that this book could have been much more clearly written. To give one instance, the author quotes an article from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* in which the word "fact" occurs, as he points out, with many meanings. Nevertheless, he does not define the word himself, and confusion arises in connection with facts and propositions—the latter being said to be "pictures of reality."

G. BURNISTON BROWN

Saint Augustine and French Classical Thought By NIGEL ABERCROMBIE (Oxford Clarendon Press Humphrey Milford 1938 Pp. 123 Price 8s. 6d.)

This book consists of a short introduction, a chapter on the principles of Augustinian Ethics, and three essays on Montaigne, Descartes, and Pascal. For Professor Abercrombie uses the expression "French Classical Thought" of his title to cover the thought of these three thinkers. The essays are put forward modestly as tentative and fragmentary chapters in the history of French thought in order to lead towards a more precise and intimate appreciation of three great men. There can be little doubt that Professor Abercrombie achieves this purpose. He also shows that the Augustinian influence was a

vital factor in the formation of the intellectual and literary, as well as in the theological thought of seventeenth-century France. To the reader who is familiar with the work of Gilson, Boyer, and Romeyer, the essays on Pascal and Descartes may not seem to contain much new or surprising information; but the essay on Montaigne brought new light to the reviewer. It is true that Montaigne seems only to have read—and borrowed extensively from—the *de civitate Dei* and to have ignored the other works of St. Augustine, but the effect of this reading on the *Essais* was considerable.

When dealing with Descartes Professor Abercrombie follows the line of prudence and suggests quite rightly that the obvious analogies between the doctrines of the *De Trinitate* and the *Meditations* are due more to the reaction of Descartes against the current Aristotelian metaphysics than to a direct reading of Augustine by Descartes. I think that the author makes out a good case against Gilson's view. I am surprised that Professor Abercrombie admits (p. 13) that Gilson's essay on *La Doctrine cartésienne de la liberté* presents as clear an account as possible of the confused and often contradictory series of events involved in the story of Descartes' position. It seems to me that the article of Laporte *La Liberté selon Descartes* in the *Etudes sur Descartes* published by the *Revue de Métaphysique et Morale* has seriously weakened the criticisms and even the exposition of Gilson. Nor would I agree with the statement on p. 57 that the metaphysical part of the system of Descartes was not for Descartes the most important. But it would involve too long a discussion to justify my disagreement.

This is a useful book and also a pleasant book. One might add that it contains a number of provocative statements and I should like to quote one of these with which I fully agree. It is from the Introduction: "Augustine's work and spirit moulded the minds and expressions of countless Western Christians and in more recent times that influence has never vanished despite the loose opinion widely held that Catholic philosophy and Thomism are convertible terms. That loose opinion is widely too widely held."

L. J. BECK

The Philosophy of John Dewey. A Critical Study. By FOLKE LEANDER (Göteborg: Elander Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1939. Pp. 155.)

Mr. Leander says that he wrote this book in Swedish and then translated it himself for publication into English. He is to be congratulated upon his mastery of English for his book despite some Americanisms and/or the word *scourwoman* is often idiomatic and eloquent as well as (nearly always) correct. Such proficiency cannot be adequately explained by a year's residence in America as the holder of a scholarship. Indeed, the book does not read like a translation at all or like the work of a man who thinks in one language and writes in another.

The first four chapters are mainly expository and deal with Dewey's opinions about Logic, Thought, and Language. The exposition appears to me to be careful and scholarly. It is adequately documented and (as I think) evinces a prolonged and discriminating acquaintance with all Dewey's important books.

The remaining four chapters are said to be attended 'with critical discussion' and are in fact more critical than expository. In Chapter V, it is maintained that Dewey's account of thought and action omits what it ought to require, viz. the admission of noetic synthesis as a guide to our action and not merely as an attribute of our behaving bodies. In Chapter VI, this noetic guide is said to be moral and to be compact quintessentially of a categorical

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obligatoriness that Dewey's humanitarian sympathetic social behaviourism ignores or despises to its own hurt. In Chapter VII it is held (on the basis of scattered passages in Dewey) that Dewey *malgré lui* hankers after a funny sort of infinitude and would be a better philosopher had he been prepared to include a religious dimension in his too mundane humanitarianism. In the last chapter it is contended that Dewey's new Baconianism or technological socialistic version of the doctrine that "knowledge is power" is not incompatible with a moralistic energetics, and that the middle pragmatism of Dewey has much to learn from the earlier pragmatism of William James (Both may have misconstrued "the classical tradition" in philosophy, thinking it sloth or quietism or escapism, that is, taking it to be something that it seldom was and never need have been, but James's ethical and religious interpretation of the larger energy of the universe, our author says was all to the advantage of his philosophy.)

These opinions may in part reflect something of the influence that Dr Ernst Cassirer has recently brought to Gottingen. Mr Leander conveys them with spirit and dignity.

I doubt if his book can be regarded as an integrated whole. The difference in atmosphere between the first four chapters and the rest of the book is rather too marked. I think. On the other hand, the author's reaction to (pre-positivistic) pragmatism is interesting in its kind and continues other studies he has written on Babbitt and More and upon the interpretation of history (in the *American Review*).

JOHN LAIRD

The Psychology of Art By R. M. OGDEN (New York: Scribner's Sons 1938)
Pp xviii + 291 Price \$2.50

It is somewhat hard to fathom why a book that mentions psychology in one chapter out of thirteen should be called a psychology of art. However, those in whom false expectations have not been aroused by the title will find in the later chapters an interesting study of the formal structure of the arts. Strange as it may be for a contemporary aesthetician to hark back to Leibniz and Baumgarten for his psychological principles, Mr Ogden does not hesitate to borrow from his eighteenth century predecessors the notions of "confused and distinct" perception, and simply gives them new names borrowed from the vocabulary of behaviourism, thus "felt" behaviour is aesthetic, while discerned behaviour is intellectual. He then proceeds to draw a somewhat shadowy line between the aesthetic in this etymological sense and the special "felt" experience of art and beauty.

This is certainly a poor start. But perseverance is rewarded in the second chapter by a plausible classification of the arts as auditory, rhythmical and visual, according as they depend mainly on hearing or sight, and in the subsequent chapters there is a workmanlike analysis of the formal structure of music, poetry, and the visual or plastic arts. It is a pity that so competent a study of spatial and temporal patterns in the fine arts should have consistently ignored their content.

LISTOWEL

Experience and Education By JOHN DEWEY (The Macmillan Co Pp xii + 116)
Price 3s 6d

In this Kappa Delta Pi Lecture, Professor Dewey summarizes and clarifies the chief canons of his educational thought. Starting with the statement that men tend to "formulate their beliefs in terms of extreme opposites" *Either-*

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Ors," he shows that a true theory of education should not emphasize the antithesis between the traditional and the progressive. Each taken separately, falls short: since real education consists (to use Professor Dewey's famous definition) in the reconstruction or reorganization of experience. But the meaning of experience is insufficiently understood, especially by those "progressives" whose principle is no more than a negative reaction to traditional practice. Hence the lecture is largely concerned with working out a philosophy of experience. The two main criteria of experience are continuity and interaction. Continuity signifies not mere growth but such growth as will 'create conditions for further growth', interaction entails, of course, the "objective and interreal conditions" of the learner. Dr Dewey shows how 'progressives' no less than 'traditionalists' have fallen short of the ideal. He has written a wise and very salutary little book.

F. A. CAVENAGH

The Psychology of Social Movements: A Psycho-Analytic View of Society By
FRYNS HOPKINS, M.A. Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
1938. Pp. 284. Price 10s. 6d.)

The author may be thought to have attempted the impossible both in writing a book to such a title and in expecting a public for it. The presentation of psycho-analytical findings to the general public will always meet with resistance, as many since Freud have discovered, and a writer on this subject is more than usually uncertain of fair treatment, even from his reviewers. Psycho-analysis itself is a discipline which most people will avoid unless they are driven to it by suffering. The reading of a psycho-analytical book is still more difficult an enterprise because it must be of necessity fragmentary and lacks the personal appeal of a course of psycho-analysis.

Furthermore the subject is so vast both in its psycho-analytical and in its social content that an author is compelled to limit himself in his scope by some rather difficult selection. Dr Frys Hopkins has been careful to define the limits within which he is working, whether in the psychological or the ethical field. Psychologically he is faithful to the findings and expresses himself in the concepts of the Freudian school of psycho-analysis; ethically he accepts as his yardstick the hedonistic theory of Jeremy Bentham. Having with Bentham's aid, answered the question 'To what goal is man marching?' and having outlined the development and outlook of modern scientific psychology in general and the Freudian theory of psychology in particular, he devotes the remainder of the book to an analysis of six of the prime forms of happiness desired by mankind—the enjoyment of knowledge, of sensibility, of inner peace, of conjugal love, of material means, and of freedom from violence—and shows in reference to each how psychological motives are at work in forming our prejudices, dispositions, and character traits.

He is careful to defend the psychoanalysts against the charge of being on the side of instinct rather than of reason—of being, in Freudian language, in league with the Id, and he justifies his focusing of attention on libidinal components by asserting that ego impulses and reason are obvious both in themselves and in their effect, while repressed libidinal impulses are extremely obscure. With this conclusion not even all Freudians would agree: in recent times analytical progress has been more concerned with understanding the ego and its mechanisms of defence, and it has been realized that ego-resistances and the mechanisms of repression are a still more fruitful field of study than id-components. From this point of view much of the book is unhelpful, except where the author abandons his thesis for a moment and permits himself

ordinary human comment as in his preface where he is content to speak of graciousness good taste, good manners whole hearted submission to discipline and the acceptance of suffering These human virtues, "unscientific" though they be have an intimate connection with ego development, and the complete analysis of ego resistances and repressions must concern itself with questions of value as well as with questions of fact It is sometimes overlooked that the "scientific approach" is in itself an excellent ego-defence against moral ethical and religious challenges, and it is this fact that makes one cautious of accepting such a "scientific" treatment of social problems as Dr Pryns Hopkins presents Mankind needs no inducement to accept an exogenous rather than an endogenous explanation of its difficulties, and there is danger in these days lest we should explain too much and master too little—lest we should *know* all and be nothing In this sense the book may be said to discuss many issues without being very significant

Dr E. Graham Howe in a paper on "The Causal Fallacy" (*The Lancet* March 24, 1934) did much to demonstrate the limitations of the "scientific or objective approach to specifically human problems And Professor Jung has also warned us that the conduct of human life and relations cannot be managed exclusively by reference back to the psychology of childhood immensely important though this is Man will certainly achieve greater rationality in his affairs by insight into and mastery over his emotional fixations but I think Dr Pryns Hopkins exaggerates the scope of psycho-analysis and undervalues the contributions to human well being that can come from already known cultural sources drama art, friendship, education and religion

Nevertheless the analysis of man's beliefs and of some of the component impulses that go to make up (or perhaps more accurately, become aggregated around) his religion (Chap. xii Man and His Knowledge) is a caustic corrective to the tendency to accept uncritically what is proffered under the label 'religious' The chapters on the Science of Psychology and the analysis of the Roots of Social Ethics and of the Needs of Mankind are clearly written and instructive The author is most controversial and perhaps least objective in the chapters on Sensory Enjoyment which are in the main an analysis of tobacco smoking and of addiction to tobacco While the present state of society demands that we should seriously examine our tendencies to addiction whether to alcohol tobacco food or drugs and our insensibility to the normal enjoyment of what he calls sensory naturalism, 'one feels that the invoking of Freudian mechanisms is an insufficient answer to the problem Evils so vast and powerful are more likely to be met by a determined restatement of values than by an individual exploration of mechanisms Assuming with the author the importance of unconscious motives one is aware how indifferent the unconscious mind is to rational considerations and how even at its most childish and unconscious levels it still recognizes the hierarchy of values It is true that he says on page 265 "Psycho-analysis in itself is no cure for man's totality of troubles I have asserted only that until it is used man cannot begin to work out his salvation He also warns us that 'the mature self is evolved only at the price of pain in each one of us, and that' the integration of the self is a task attended by not only the greatest labour but the most lively dangers But he leaves us still wondering what the effective agent in salvation will be when man's secret motives are uncovered and what motivation it is which gives man the courage to face the dangers and sacrifices involved Psycho-analysis can be in itself as he claims an education of an unusually fundamental sort but it is not the only education in fundamentals which the world has yet produced and I cannot help feeling that the

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contribution which analysis has to make to the furtherance of social welfare will best be mediated to mankind through existing educational channels by selected individuals who have had experience of analysis rather than by making analysis universally available in State aided clinics as he suggests

The book is written in popular style and loses a good deal in clarity both by this and by a certain carelessness of phrasing in places. There are too many misprints including one on the back of the dust-cover

While it is informative on the subject of psycho analysis and clears up many popular misunderstandings of it and while it is stimulating to thought both on individual and on social issues it does not fulfil the promise of its title and tends on the whole to confuse rather than to illuminate. A more fundamental understanding of the nature of sadism and of the desire for power over other people is needed by psycho-analysts and by sociologists before they can be in a position to contribute much to social science

B D HENDY

On the Contented Life By EDGAR A SINGER, JR (New York, N Y Henry Holt & Company 1937 271 pp.)

In this book Professor Singer presents his philosophy of 'the practical life' and analyses some of the central concepts of morals art and religion. This analysis is a further development of the principles expounded in his earlier books and gives a completer account of his thought

The best way of understanding the basic ideas of 'the practical life' is through clarifying the theoretical principles involved in conduct. Given life with its activities biological, political, moral, aesthetic, what method of approach would make these intelligible? On the whole there are two types of intelligibility—the ateleological or more specifically the mechanical and the teleological. For example is the meaning of beauty like that of some geometrical concept to be sought among those which for their lack of reference to purpose are generally called ateleological definitions? Or will beauty along with life's implements and gestures owe the unity of its manifold forms to their common teleology? For with beauty as well as with every activity of life there would seem to be no way of defining save one of these two. Professor Singer's answer to this question was already formulated in an earlier work. 'All the categories of life and mind are to my understanding of them teleological.' The class living being as well as the class mental being, 'has nothing but a certain purpose common to its members and only this purpose can be offered as the definition of life.' But though biological and psychological concepts are teleological they are not anti-mechanical. Here Professor Singer parts with the vitalists despite his emphasis on purpose. 'Life however rich in purpose lives in and by means of unbroken world old mechanism.' From the mechanical to the teleological interpretation there is indeed a leap but it is a leap from attitude to attitude of the contemplative mind. It is no leap in nature's exact and reliable order of life. And teleology for Professor Singer is primarily the Aristotelian notion of the function of a type: the purpose of an event is the result which that type of event is calculated to accomplish.

Professor Singer's belief in the teleological explanation of life and mind

¹ *On the Contented Life*, p. 6

² *Mind as Behaviour*, vii

³ *Logic and the Relation of Life to Mechanism* *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. LXIV, No. 2 1925, p. 202

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 202

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 60

⁷ *Mind as Behaviour*, p. 68

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having been made explicit, the central question of 'the practical life' may now be raised 'Whatever the answer, however difficult to find, there can be no more practical question than this, our one chance of living contentedly in an essentially painful world is our chance of finding what we would live for.' What should one live for? What ought to be one's supreme and ultimate end? And if there are more ends than one, what are these ends? Professor Singer critically surveys and rejects the traditional answers. We have outlived obedience to purposeless laws, such as primitive taboos, sacred customs, unwritten laws of heaven, which set practices said to be good "whatever happens." We have found wanting the pursuit of goods only in terms of means or instrumentalities, this leads to the "melancholy of success," and the melancholy is not relieved by any bettering of means. Finally, we have come to reject attainable ends, for these end in satiety. These hopes of the past have ended in but one thing—disillusionment. But there remains one as yet untried experiment—to seek what contentment may lie for us in that most improbable of pursuits, the pursuit of the unattainable, the infinitely remote ideal.¹ This ideal though approachable, is never attainable. Like every limiting conception, this end is no realizable objective but a goal infinitely remote, an end always susceptible of closer approach, never of final attainment.² The ideal is not only unattainable but also completely desirable. And in the pursuit of this ideal contentment is not a condition that follows on work done³ but one that is attendant on work a doing. No objective can yield contentment in the winning, but only in the pursuit.⁴ Such and only such an infinite undertaking fits the modern idea of progress, such and only such an unattainable goal fits the modern sense of the ideal.⁵

As one surveys Professor Singer's major ideas, one is led to ask certain questions to the end of determining the scope and limit of these ideas.

One might ask to begin with whether Professor Singer's basic ideal of conduct, the pursuit of the unattainable, has been adequately analysed. Though Professor Singer's discussion is fruitful and enlightening, it is not altogether free from criticism. In pursuing the unattainable there is not only a gradual approximation to an ideal but there is also the attainment of the ideal as a relatively completed whole. In my conduct, for example, I achieve courage or truthfulness as a unified whole. I become truthful not merely by adding one truthful act to another, but by developing a unified tendency or disposition to tell the truth. Sameness and difference go together. Completed infinite is not necessarily a contradictory concept.

One might also ask whether the pursuit of the unattainable should be considered as the whole means of contentment. That progress, growth development are among the enduring yearnings of the human race there is no doubt yet to regard them as the only yearnings is to put undue emphasis on the future. "No object can yield contentment in winning," Professor Singer writes "but only in the pursuit."⁶ And, again, Contentment lies not in having it lies in the hope of having and its measure is nicely proportioned to hope's measure of assurance.⁷ If every action has value only in relation to the future, no action would have any value of its own in the present. Does not this make contentment rather a paradoxical concept? Of course, to make the immediacy of the present action dominant is equally vicious, yet unless one learns to discern values in the present which are not always instrumental to future values, one will lack the secret of contentment in future. Professor

¹ *On the Contented Life*, p. 58

² *Ibid.*, p. 143

³ *Ibid.*, p. 139 (italics mine)

Ibid., p. 139

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 140

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 143

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 110 (italics mine)

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Singer's persistent claim that contentment lies "in the hope of having" lays too much stress on one aspect of time

And one might ask still further whether Professor Singer's ideal of progress is possible. The conditions for this possibility are summed up by him in his definition of progress "*The measure of man's co-operation with man in the conquest of nature measures progress*". Two beliefs are involved in this definition: first, that nature is conquerable, second, that co-operation of man with man is attainable. The first of these beliefs is a complex notion. Its crucial ideas are expressed in Professor Singer's theory of science as "the understanding of nature as perfect mechanism". Unfortunately Professor Singer does not tell us why this idea should be entertained. We hope he will analyse this idea more in detail in his forthcoming volume on *The Experimentalist*. The second belief, namely, the possibility that co-operation of man with man is attainable is of the utmost importance for our civilization. Professor Singer despite the contemporary bitterness and despair makes a convincing case for it. The co-operation he advocates is not the sentimental and unrealistic one of self sacrifice but one where "without self sacrifice egoism and altruism are one". Yet there are some difficulties. In certain realms this type of co-operation is possible but whether it is possible in all realms is doubtful. But there is nothing that needs more imaginative and sustained effort and more intelligent experimentation, than co-operation of man with man. One should not be dogmatic about the limits of this ideal, its possibilities may be indefinitely increased through rational wills, through new institutions and through socialized goods. We should be grateful to Professor Singer for having stated the problem in the way he has.

Professor Singer's treatise is an impressive philosophic reflection on life. I have referred only to some of his major ideas and omitted the wealth of their detail and emphasized primarily certain difficulties. To get the full force of the arguments and the full beauty of his presentation, one should go to the book itself.

Y. H. KRICKORIAN

What was the Original Gospel in 'Buddhism'? By MRS. RHYNS DAVIDS, D.Litt., M.A. (London: The Epworth Press 1938 Pp. 143 3s. 6d.)

Dr Rhys Davids has been fighting a slowly winning battle for some years past against the orthodox interpretation of the teachings of Gotama Buddha. Most of what she has written has been for the expert. Here she seeks to explain to the general reader who is interested in the subject, and at the same time to carry her research another step forward. It is not easy to say in short space what are the essential contentions of a book that so radically challenges current doctrines but here at least, are a few cardinal points. Dr Rhys Davids denies categorically that the commonly accepted idea that man is a quincunx, the five khandhas and no more, is part of the original teaching. This misses the ego, the essential man, in which Gotama believed. Indeed Dr Rhys Davids challenges the numbered doctrines, so beloved of modern Southern Buddhists as later accretions to the first gospel. She does not deny the possibility that the Buddha's teaching grew even in his own lifetime but insists that its growth so far was rather to a more than to a less, and orthodox Buddhism has since then shrunk, not increased, the implications of its founder's words. The disciples of after years lost the "man in man". They saw a static perfection, where their master saw a becoming perfect. They

* *On the Contented Life*, p. 83

* *Ibid.*, p. 116.

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disparaged man and the world as insignificant and evil. In all these things and more they erred. But it is only one fully at home in Pali who can determine the reasons for holding this. Even Dr Davids admits that in some cases sheer familiarity made her accept for a long while inadequate or misleading translations of certain terms which obscured their originally dynamic significance. But anyone who is familiar with the whole trend of thought in Brahmanism will appreciate the fact that it was wholly unlikely that Gotama, alone amongst all reformers, should break so radically with the universe of thought in which he was reared as to proclaim, and still more marvellously, to succeed in proclaiming, a faith so alien to it. Original Buddhism was a gospel preached in the world to ordinary people. The traditions state that the first to believe were certain laymen. Modern Buddhism is a system that has been wrought in the monasteries amidst all the abnormal features that accompany such a kind of existence. The man 'as Gotama saw him became lost in the monk.

This book presents a challenge which the student of Eastern religions has no excuse for evading. Here in brief and clear form, he can obtain a summary of the contentions which have been more fully expounded by the authoress in her larger works. If it is true that the early teaching has been misrepresented, it is only in line with what has happened to the teaching of Jesus of Zaratrusta, and many another leader of men. Indeed the wonder would be, especially in such a system as Buddhism if the original setting had remained. There is therefore an antecedent probability in favour of Mrs Rhys David's contention of corruption which must be held to be strong. The remaining question of the correctness of her reconstruction of that teaching is one upon which the last word is with the Pali expert. Yet there is a reasonableness in what she says which impresses much. She has no extreme thesis to maintain. Her reconstruction gives what seems to the student of Eastern religions the type of teaching he would have expected from such a man at such a period. One may welcome then this accessible and intelligible statement of the case in the hope that it may serve to convince those interested in the study of religions that Buddhism as originally conceived, was not nearly so much of a mutation in religion as orthodox interpretations make it to be, but that Gotama joined with that fellowship of faith that is wider than all creeds in proclaiming with his own emphasis, the truth for which all religions stand.

E S WATERHOUSE

The 'Truth' of the Bible By STANLEY A. COOK, Litt D., D.D., F.B.A., Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Cambridge (Cambridge, W. Heffer & Sons 1938 Price 9s. net.)

I have found this book, learned, discerning, comprehensive, interesting and important as it is, difficult to read, and more difficult to review. There is more repetition than seems necessary to stress "some of the more important matters of Biblical Criticism and of Comparative Religion" which "are not so well known as they deserve to be" (p. xiv). Several of the chapters consist of articles already published, and not sufficiently revised to fit into a continuous argument. The writer often goes off at a tangent, and although the matter introduced is not irrelevant, it breaks the continuity. Again and again he bends back upon his own steps. These defects make it impossible to give a summary of the argument in an orderly succession, and I must content myself with recording the main impressions left on my mind. With the purpose, content, and spirit of the volume I find myself in cordial agreement, and, apart from the criticism just offered, I can give it sincere commendation.

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The title might suggest that it is not a book to be reviewed in the pages of *Philosophy*, but such a suggestion would in my judgment be an adverse reflection on philosophy itself which, if it is to justify its claim that it thinks things together, should regard nothing as alien to its interest and scrutiny, least of all anything concerned with religion, which does profess to have access to the ultimate reality, which must be the concern of philosophy. But this volume can claim the attention even of those who have a less comprehensive conception of philosophy as the opening sentences of the Preface show "The unusual device of placing the word 'Truth' in inverted commas is to provoke attention to four questions which have constantly been before me. What is the Truth we expect or desire to gain from the Bible? What true things important for us to-day emerge from the modern critical study of the Bible? What is the process whereby we reach a position where we are able to say that so-and-so is true? And finally What is there that just because it is true must be made real and must be manifested in life and thought?" (p. vii). The author recognizes and is concerned about the actual situation of the world to-day, and seeks to discover the corresponding obligation for our thinking and doing. He gives us an ontology and an epistemology, the content and the process of thinking. In dealing with the content he avoids two dangers which beset the Christian theologians: he does not isolate Christianity, i.e. the "truth" the Bible contains, from the 'truth' of other religions, nor 'religious' from 'non religious' thinking (Chap. I). Indeed it is this constant endeavour to be comprehensive which accounts for the difficulty already mentioned. In *Biblical Criticism* (Chap. II) he includes not only criticism in the narrower sense as a scrutiny of the documents, but he compares and correlates the contents of the Bible with the aid of archaeology and the comparative study of religions. He lays an emphasis not hitherto general on the Palestinian contribution to the pre-Mosaic stage of Yahvism and the many religious currents converging there. He lays a proportionately greater stress on the Exile (Chap. VIII) in Babylon than on the Exodus from Egypt as formative epochs in the religious history. He shows the importance of the prophets as teachers of righteousness (Chap. III) in 'the reconstruction of Israel' (Chap. IV). He whole-heartedly accepts the theory of Evolution as a guiding principle in the interpretation of the history of Biblical Religion (Chap. V) which he traces from the pre-Mosaic religion to the Protestant Reformation. He does not maintain that progress is invariable, but even in a reaction he sees the return of an old element in a new setting, and while insisting on continuity, he recognizes creative epochs in which quantitative differences become qualitative (Chap. VI). He has a note on the 'Originality of Christianity,' but as especially an Old Testament scholar he does not seem to me to deal adequately even for his purpose with the New Testament. To the Exilic Age (Chap. VII), especially to the Second Isaiah, he attaches a significance which has often been overlooked. He regrets the paucity of our literary sources for a clear apprehension and full appreciation of its importance. He rightly deprecates the unfavourable comparison in Protestant polemics between the priestly and the prophetic contribution. The Pentateuch while preserving and modifying pre-prophetic ritual provided a popular protective husk for the kernel of the ethical monotheism of the prophets. Chapter VIII gives an exposition of Holiness and Righteousness as the content of the prophetic message and its continuance in Christianity, and Chapter IX presents " 'Ethical Monotheism' in the Light of Comparative Religion." I have found these two chapters among the best the book offers. "The last three chapters (X, XI, XII) carry on and supplement the previous nine" (p. xi). These

chapters may be described as apologetic; they seek to correlate "ethical monotheism" to the knowledge and thought of to day. His thinking is organic, recognizing differences, he yet emphasizes continuity, not identity, of God, universe, man. In religion he asserts a direct contact of man with God as ultimate reality, of which religious thought seeks to give account. "The various religious doctrines, all the world over, present the result of human thought working upon religious experience, and influenced by the social and intellectual environment." Accordingly "the cardinal fact is the intuitive conviction that even the 'revelations' claimed to be of divine origin are to be examined along 'natural (ethical and rational) lines, the 'spirits' are to be tested (1 John iv 1)" (pp 300-301). To some readers the book may seem not to give adequate prominence to what is distinctive in Christianity. These are, however, his closing sentences: "Of all the symbols the Cross stands on a hill apart. It is the crowning symbol of all who testify and bear witness to their ultimate truth, it speaks also of seeming failure, disappointment and disillusion, it tells of daily burdens, not known to others, but not borne alone, and it is the assurance that it is not men alone whose concern is with the history and conditions of men, but that behind and above all is the Divine Love" (p 328).

The volume is furnished with Chronological Notes, an Index of Biblical and other Passages, and a full General Index. Not only Biblical but also philosophical students owe the author their generous gratitude.

A. E. GARVIE

Knowledge of the Individual Riddell Memorial Lectures by W. G. DE BURGH, M.A., F.B.A. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford 1939. Pp. 60. Price 2s. 6d. net.)

In this course of Riddell lectures Professor de Burgh is fighting, as in all his recent publications, on two fronts: on the one hand against the fashionable depreciation of the authority of reason, especially in religion; and on the other against the error, as he takes it to be, of rationalism, to reaction from which that depreciation is due, the error of limiting the sphere of reason to the exact sciences and to such modes of thinking as employ the methods appropriate to these. His purpose is, as he puts it (p. 6), "to vindicate the knowledge of the individual (which what we nowadays commonly call 'science' concerned as that must always be with "universals" and with individuals only as instances of universals, must necessarily fail to achieve), as illustrated in history, art, and religion, and to vindicate it in the name of reason."

In history, so Professor de Burgh holds, we have a kind of knowledge which is indeed, like that embodied in the natural sciences, stated in propositional form, yet which, unlike this, is essentially a knowledge not of universals or of general laws, but of individual persons and their individual actions. It is interesting to note that in the section devoted to history Professor de Burgh pays a tribute (p. 16) to "Newman's great chapters on 'Informal Influence' and 'The Illative Sense' in *The Grammar of Assent*" as anticipating an interest more common at the present time than it was three quarters of a century ago in the methods of historical as distinguished from physical science (Professor de Burgh's reference to Newman's work might seem, by the way, although doubtless unintentionally, to suggest that Newman limited the "range of the Illative Sense" to historical thinking).

With Aesthetic Knowledge—for our author insists that "art is a rational

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activity, revealing truth' (p. 22) and defends this position at length—he deals in his second lecture. He calls Plato—perhaps somewhat unexpectedly—as a witness on his side on the ground that the unfavourable judgment passed upon art in *The Republic* by 'the one great philosopher who was also a consummate artist' (p. 24) was pronounced on the ground that it claims to impart knowledge and that by that claim it must stand or fall. Plato however, erred, according to Professor de Burgh, not in holding that truth is to be looked for in art but in assuming that the truth which it purports to reveal is "scientific truth, the truth of general notions, laws, and uniformities. Professor de Burgh on the other hand refuses to limit truth to the truth of propositions (p. 32). Art reveals 'a reality that is both immanent and transcendent' (p. 41). It is sacramental" and therefore a critique of aesthetic knowledge is the fitting prelude to an inquiry into the truth given in religion."

Religion like art though in a different manner, claims to reveal knowledge (p. 42). Wherever there is intellectual apprehension of reality be it the gift of divine grace or the achievement of natural reason there is knowledge. Religious knowledge is experiential (p. 43) and 'personal' (p. 44) and 'the reality known thereby is individual' (p. 45).

The concluding pages of this interesting discussion distinguished as it is by originality of treatment and by unmistakable depth of conviction are devoted to the consideration of objections which may be brought against the validity of the claim of religion to give knowledge. I cannot help doubting whether a reader while making full allowance for the impossibility of dealing adequately with so large a topic in so restricted a space may not unnaturally complain that certain difficulties which obtrude themselves in the examination of this claim are not faced as they deserve to be. The problem of the place of historical evidence in religious faith is not ignored (see p. 55) but some may feel that it is to some extent evaded. That again which is presented by the mutually contradictory affirmations of different religions which claim to be revelations of the divine reality is barely touched upon while on p. 44 the opinion (in which I should myself agree with Professor de Burgh) that the nature of religious experience is most satisfactorily conceived as a communion of persons is perhaps too lightly assumed considering the wide diffusion of a contrary sentiment which can plausibly appeal to outstanding facts in the history of religion.

But Professor de Burgh has given us so much of value within the narrow compass of these lectures that we are scarcely justified in making a charge against him that he has not given us more.

CLEMENT C. J. WZEE

Studies in the History of Political Philosophy Before and After Rousseau By
C. E. VAUGHAN M.A. Latt D. Edited by A. G. LITTLE M.A., F.B.A.
(Manchester University Press 1939 Two volumes Pp. xxiv + 364
xxvi + 336 Price 25s. net.)

This is a new and cheaper edition of the well known *Studies* by Professor C. E. Vaughan which originally appeared in 1925. Nothing has been changed except the bulk and the price of the volumes. The most that a reviewer can hope to do therefore is to attempt some appreciation of how well or how ill these studies in political philosophy have stood the test of time. Are they still—fourteen years after their first publication and some twenty years after most of them were written—of the same value to the student of political philosophy?

Their value I believe, is limited by three considerations. In the first place, since Vaughan's time, the fashion in writing histories of political theory has changed. It is no longer the fashion to concentrate only on the paladins of politics. It is no longer regarded as adequate to leap from peak to peak, living all the time in the rarefied atmosphere of the greatest philosophical heights. It has become customary to spend more time exploring the intermediate hillocks, and even to descend into the plains and valleys where ordinary mortals live, in the hope that not only may new treasures be discovered, but also that new truths about even the towering giants themselves may be learnt from lower levels. Indeed, the emphasis has changed from Political Theory to Political Thought and even from Political Thought to Political Science. But about Political Theory as handled by Vaughan, there is an air of abstraction, of pure logic and metaphysics, which is alien to the prevalent tendency. Vaughan approached politics as a literary man and a philosopher and so, whilst he exposes admirably the philosophical implications of for example the modifications introduced by Vico, Montesquieu and Hume into the Social contract theories of Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke, he does little to relate these philosophical ideas to the particular circumstances and the historical context out of which they grew.

Secondly, the whole development of Political Philosophy, for Vaughan, revolves about Rousseau—as the very title of this book suggests. Before Rousseau it was based on abstractions—on the abstract individual rights of Locke, or the abstract pleasure of utilitarianism. Rousseau's synthesis of individual rights and social obligation into the concept of a "moral freedom to obey the general will" destroyed these abstractions. Thus political theorists after Rousseau were able to develop the idea of 'right' as it is embodied in communal life—in the family, society, the State, the nation, and, ultimately, humanity itself. Vaughan laid down that 'The conditions to be met by any sound theory of the State may, in the last resort be roughly reduced to two. It must provide for the freedom the spontaneous action of the individual, and it must provide for a general control over the individual by the community at large. Or, to put the same thing in the negative form it must provide against the tyranny of the State on the one hand, and against the tyranny of the individual upon the other.' It is because he believed that Mazzini's conception of nationality and the place it might play in the progress of humanity satisfied these two conditions, that he is able to regard Mazzini's theories as the climax of the modern history of Political Philosophy. Few critics to day would rate the theories of Mazzini as highly as that. Indeed all these Studies are tinged by this preoccupation with the purely theoretical relation between the individual and society. And that relationship may well be one which cannot be adequately defined in the realm of pure theory but must rather be laboriously worked out in practice in the actual context of each particular place and generation.

Finally, considerable research has been conducted into the significance—both theoretical and practical—of these various writers since Vaughan wrote these studies. The work of Dr. Strauss on Hobbes and of Dr. Cobban on Burke and Rousseau—to name only two examples—have further illumined the significance of these great men. But it is surprising how suggestive and adequate these essays still remain. Certainly no student of Political Philosophy for generations to come will be able to ignore the work of Professor Vaughan. And the Manchester University Press has done a service to scholarship by reprinting this work. The volumes include a memoir of Professor Vaughan, by the editor, and a very useful list of Vaughan's writings, compiled by Mr. H. B. Charlton.

DAVID THOMSON

NEW BOOKS

Dictatorship Its History and Theory By ALFRED COBBAN, M A Ph D
(London J Cape 1939 Pp 352 Price 12s 6d net)

Dr Cobban thus describes what he means by Dictatorship 'This is the government of one man, who has not *primarily* obtained his position by inheritance, but by either force or consent and normally by a combination of both. He must possess absolute sovereignty, that is all political power must ultimately emanate from his will and it must be unlimited in scope. It must be exercised more or less frequently, in an arbitrary manner, by decree rather than by law. And finally it must not be limited in duration to any given term of office, nor must the dictator be responsible to any other authority, for such restrictions would be incompatible with absolute rule.

Thus Napoleon is regarded as the first modern Dictator—though the grounds on which Robespierre is rejected from this honour by Dr Cobban are not very convincing.

Accordingly the first chapters of the book trace the development of the idea of sovereignty up to Napoleon. This task is ably and clearly done. The first part of the book is an essay in political thought and as such is admirable. But the brief section which follows and which attempts to describe the rise of dictatorships in the present century is too scrappy and superficial to be of great value. It is an essay in current affairs, and as such is inadequate.

But it is in the last part of the book giving an analysis of the various forces and trends of political thought which have combined to produce modern totalitarianism that the author is at his happiest. I regard this analysis as of considerable value for the understanding of modern politics—both in theory and in practice. As Dr Cobban so concisely expresses it, the association between nationalism and dictatorship has become the determining factor in the development of both. The force of nationalism is the strongest popular enthusiasm in the modern world and therefore a force to which every political movement—Democracy and Stalinism no less than Fascism and Nazism—is wont to appeal. But nationalism is an old man of the sea ready to run away with all who would ride it. The basis of totalitarianism is very complex. In it as the author says the ideas of state, people, nation and sovereignty finally meet to the state now based on the great emotional force of nationalism is attributed the sovereignty of the people and of both these and not merely of the idea of absolute sovereignty is dictatorship in modern times the heir. For a State which is conceived in theory and works in practice in a totalitarian fashion dictatorship has emerged as the appropriate form of government. To reveal the implications of this alliance between nationalism and dictatorship is the most urgent task of the modern political thinker. By stating this task so clearly and by doing so much towards performing it Dr Cobban has produced a real contribution to modern political thought.

DAVID THOMSON

Swords and Symbols By JAMES MARSHALL (New York and London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp 168 Price \$2 8s 6d)

Attractively written in a terse and lucid style this book is an acute analysis of what the author (an American lawyer) calls the technique of sovereignty. The history of all political units cities states nations alliances, and federations has been in his view the story of the battle for the achievement and retention of sovereign power. But this sovereign power is essentially a limited, local, and unstable *superiority* never an absolute supremacy. And

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the reason for this is that the weapons by which sovereign power can be achieved and maintained are never exclusively in the hands of the sovereign power itself. 'Governments are limited by their impotence to absorb all interests in the community, and therefore, to control all political weapons.' These weapons are law (which is essentially based upon force and is of value to the sovereign 'because it serves notice on the subjects upon what occasions and in what circumstances the sovereign will use force'), economic power, propaganda, and education. None of these weapons is exclusively in the hands of the sovereign power and the very use of power by the sovereign is apt to create opposing forces which must be satisfied or destroyed if the sovereign is to survive. The political process, consequently, is this complex and uncertain business of maintaining power, and the "art of sovereignty" lies in the satisfaction of adverse interests without surrendering superiority. Mr. Marshall expounds this thesis with a wealth of varied and apt historical examples, and his publishers without undue exaggeration compare the book to *The Prince* of Machiavelli. But the philosopher will not find in it much to interest him. The analysis is carried out consistently and acutely at a level of thought which precludes any philosophical consideration of the subjects touched upon. Sovereignty is considered solely in terms of power, law is mere force, liberty, popular sovereignty, right and wrong are mere symbols, propaganda weapons in the struggle for sovereignty. It would be absurd to quarrel with so vigorous and acute a book for being what it is and not something else, but it is unavoidable that so narrowly limited an analysis of the political process should, in the end, be unsatisfactory because of its abstractness.

MICHAEL OAKESHOTT

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association Vol. XIV
(Washington D.C. Catholic University of America 1939 Pp. 228
Price \$1.50)

The sub-title given to this collection of papers and discussions held on the occasion of the fourteenth annual meeting of the Association is "Causality in Current Philosophy," and though the subjects treated range over a wide field including "philosophy of religion," physics, biology, psychology, logic and ethics, the unity of the volume is sufficiently preserved, though perhaps at times at the price of a somewhat artificial approach. The result is a useful and interesting compilation, and European students of philosophy will find some instruction from the classification of contemporary European and American philosophers to be found in the different papers, which are all by men who whilst uncompromisingly Scholastic in their standpoint, have, nevertheless, faced the challenge—if it is a challenge—of modern thought frankly and sincerely, and are well versed in its literature. In short papers—the longest of them is a vigorous analysis of 'Mechanism and Teleology in Contemporary Biology' in 25 pages by Dr. Hauber—we do not look for any very permanent contribution to philosophy, especially when the authors are confessedly confining themselves to exposition and criticism of the views of others, but what the volume loses in depth it gains in breadth and variety. It cannot be doubted that this Association includes a number of men not less keenly interested in the different aspects of modern thought than in its repercussions on the traditional forms in which the *philosophia perennis* has been moulded. A paper by Dr. Rudolf Allers on "Cause in Psychology" and

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an excellent statement of modern teachings on "First Cause in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion" are perhaps worthy of special mention

T CORBISHLEY

Vitalism Its History and Validity By L. RICHMOND WHEELER (London, H F and G Witherby, Ltd 1939 Pp xii + 275 Price 15s net)

Dr Wheeler has written a history of the controversy between the Mechanists and the Vitalists. For the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the account is rather sketchy, but the later period to the present day is dealt with at length and much more satisfactorily. The author is an avowed supporter of vitalism. He uses the term in a wide sense to express the view that the biological sciences are autonomous studies with concepts and methods of their own and are not merely branches of physics. Vitalism for him does not necessarily imply a belief in anything like "vital forces." There is no objection in principle to a wide use of the term. It does, however, allow him to include among vitalists all thinkers who deny the all-sufficiency of mechanical explanation without regard for the great differences of opinion among them nor does he consider seriously the possibility of a strictly neutral attitude. The book is an interesting and useful contribution to the history of scientific thought in recent times.

A D RITCHIE

Essays in Philosophical Biology By WILLIAM MORTON WHEELER, selected by Professor G. H. PARKER (Cambridge Mass. Harvard University Press London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp xv + 261 Price \$3.00 12s 6d)

These essays have been reprinted as a memorial to the late Professor W. M. Wheeler, a distinguished American biologist, whose speciality was the study of the social insects. He was besides a man of unusually wide interests and knowledge and a witty writer. The letter from the King of the Termites in the fourth essay is excellent satire and should be read by all students of human sociology. There are also valuable discussions of the theory of Emergent Evolution and of other aspects of modern biological theory. An unusual and stimulating book.

A D RITCHIE

Man or Leviathan? A Twentieth Century Enquiry into War and Peace By EDWARD MOLSLEY (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd 1939 Pp 470 Price 15s net)

This is the mature work of a distinguished lawyer who, in addition to his many legal activities, has meditated and read widely upon the foundations of law and of society. Like Hobbes he finds the vital condition of peaceful society in a justice rooted in supreme power. Unlike Hobbes he feels acutely the danger both to man and to peace inherent in this power as supreme. Hence he finds himself in an *impasse* from which (as I see it) he remains unextricated. The vital contest, be it noted, is not that of Leviathan versus Leviathan or even of an antipathetic supreme power against Leviathan. It is man who must revolt against Leviathan for the issue is between man and Leviathan, as only one can survive (p. 155). True, I think, but if law essentially entails supreme power, if man is such that law cannot even in

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principle be envisaged as making its own direct moral appeal and as such dispensing with power, what escape can there be from Leviathan?

Against Grotius Mr Mousley insists rightly, that there can be no *jus belli*—war being the denial of law. The attainment therefore, of peace requires the genuine establishment of international law, and this in turn entails the modification of the nation and of its sovereignty. His most serious difficulty is to show that the super state to which he looks will be less, and not more, perilous to man's integrity and freedom. The "Commonwealth of Nations" must be 'equipped with the power of exacting compliance from those who obey only because they must.' Here surely, is the essence of Leviathan. A part of man's tragedy would appear to be that, being what he is, he cannot help himself without at the same time hurting himself: his instruments (among which we may number the State) are all double-edged. He turns them against himself.

RALPH E. STEDMAN

The Kantian Philosophy of Space By C. B. GARNETT Jr (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1939. Pp. xi + 287. Price, 17s. 6d.)

Mr Garnett believes that what Kant has to say about the nature of space is instructive if we are interested in the controversy on the subject among contemporary philosophers. Taking the theories of Alexander Whitehead, and Broad as examples of three possible solutions of the spatial problem, he attempts throughout to show how the different views he discovers in Kant are related to these. By this means he hopes to do something to resolve what seems to him to be the grand question about space: whether there can be an account of space over and above that proffered by mathematical physics or whether the last word on the subject must be spoken by the scientist. It is not clear how this procedure does in fact help towards a solution, since we are left at the end with no more than a statement of the alternative positions which can be taken up, but perhaps it can be claimed that it does make it easier to grasp the point at issue.

The central part of the book is taken up with a statement and discussion of Kant's mature theories, and it is to these that I shall confine myself here. I should, however, mention first that this statement is preceded by a fairly full sketch of the historical context in which those theories were developed, embracing the doctrines of space and the object of perception maintained by Newton and Clarke on the one hand and by Leibniz on the other, as well as the pre-critical views of Kant. This section of the work is both interesting in itself and useful for the understanding of the "critical" position. The genesis and nature of this Mr Garnett proceeds to set out in his three main chapters. He attempts first to show that Kant arrived at the theory of space put forward in the 1770 inaugural *Dissertation* (which is substantially identical with that of the *Aesthetic* of the *Critique of Pure Reason*) in three stages. The first consisted in a simple analysis of the concept of space: an analysis inspired by the results reached by Leonhard Euler in his *Réflexions sur l'espace et le temps* (1748). From that work Kant learnt that space was (a) a concrete singular entity; (b) not apprehended in sensation or reflection; and (c) related to spatial objects as form to matter. He took this over when he declared that space was a 'pure intuition' and a 'form of empirical intuition', but by these terms he did not originally mean that space was in any way prior to particular experiences or subjective in character. The doctrines of the priority and subjectivity of space were later accretions to the original theory, as also

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was the point that its contentions were confirmed by a consideration of mathematical truth. Arguments from geometry were only taken account of in the second stage of Kant's thinking and the question of subjectivity only in the third.

This hypothesis is interesting and may very well give a correct account of the development of Kant's thinking but it can surely not be used to estimate the value of the different parts of the view as a whole. Mr. Garnett seems to think that Kant's earliest doctrine was his soundest and in consequence he proceeds in considering the Aesthetic, to lay stress almost entirely on the Metaphysical Exposition. He has very little to say about the Transcendental Exposition and he passes over the arguments for space's subjectivity in silence. Now of course it may be true that by this means a sound estimate is made of the value of the different aspects of Kant's theory but one would have thought that the less valuable parts ought to have been discussed. In his treatment of the subjectivity of space in particular Mr. Garnett seems to be much too hasty. He thinks that Kant believed space to be subjective in 1770 because of the peculiar metaphysical views he held at that time, and that all ground for the doctrine vanished once those views were given up. This leads him not only into a strange account of the metaphysics of the *Dissertation* (he maintains in spite of Kant's explicit statements to the contrary that in 1770 Kant hoped to attain to an intuitive knowledge of the intelligible world) but also into a neglect of the arguments on which Kant continued to base his view of the subjectivity of space in the *Critique* itself.

After elucidating the theory of space developed in the Aesthetic Mr. Garnett goes on to maintain that there is another theory quite incompatible with this in the Analytic. According to him space is regarded in the Aesthetic as an infinite concrete whole which determines its parts (and consequently has a necessary nature) a whole which we are somehow supposed to intuit before all actual sensation, whilst in the Analytic it is the product of a synthesis which begins with given intuitions. As such it cannot be more than logically prior to particular sensations cannot be said to be a whole determining its parts cannot be known to have a necessary or uniform nature and cannot be shown to be intuitive as opposed to conceptual in character. Nor are any of the attempts by Kant or his commentators to reconcile the two views in the least successful. The truth is that the theories of the Aesthetic and Analytic are based on fundamentally diverse conceptions of space a fact which the present work brings out by comparing the one to the theory of Alexander the other to that of Broad.

All this (apart from the last point) is an old story the value of which cannot be estimated in a sentence. It is perhaps fair however to remark that Mr. Garnett starts by thinking not only that the doctrine of the *Critique* is not unitary but further that it is better that it should not be such. He consequently finds no difficulty in considering the Kantian theory of space without reference to the wider context of which it forms part. It seems that this failure to take a synoptic view accounts for his finding so many inconsistencies for after all Kant tells us that in the Aesthetic he is isolating sensibility and that prepares us for a change of doctrine later in the work. It is perhaps worth noting too that Kant says that the synthesis which constructs space is of the homogeneous and it is thus no doubt which enables him to regard space even in the Analytic, as necessarily homological in character.

Mr. Garnett's detailed contentions seems to be open to criticism at a number of points and occasionally he appears to raise difficulties where none are to be found but despite this and what is in my opinion, the fundamental

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mistake of not considering Kant's philosophy as a whole, he has written a book of some interest. He sets out what he takes to be Kant's views with clarity and he seldom forgets that it is their truth or falsehood which is the most important thing about them. And these are merits in a book of this kind.

W. H. WALSH

The Study of Society: Methods and Problems Edited by F. C. BARTLETT, M.A., F.R.S., Hon.D.Ph., M. GINSBERG, M.A., D.Litt., E. J. LINDGREN, M.A., Ph.D., R. H. THOULESS, M.A., Ph.D. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1939. Pp. xii+498. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

This book originated from a meeting at Cambridge in 1935 of three of its contributors "to discuss informally what steps could be taken to direct the application of the more reliable methods of psychology, anthropology, and sociology to a study of the problems of complex societies" (p. vii). To this end they gathered round them the remaining fifteen contributors and, with one exception, all the nineteen contributions have been read and discussed at periodic meetings by all the eighteen contributors. The book falls into four main sections: "Some Problems of Social Psychology," "Social Applications of Psychological Tests and Other Methods," "Some Methods of Social Anthropology," and "Some Methods of Sociology." It is thus, in the words of its editors, "a survey of existing methods, contributions, and problems, which might help prospective laboratory and field workers in complex societies in much the same way as *Notes and Queries in Anthropology*, first published by the British Association in 1874, had assisted the field worker in anthropology" (p. viii). Except in the second section, there is little about the way in which the discoveries of the various sciences can be applied to the solution of the actual problems of society. But there is much valuable emphasis on the caution which must be practised in any attempt to make the application, and the various contributions, all by writers of recognized authority in the subjects with which they deal, suggest very clearly what the sciences with a bearing on social problems can do and have done in their own spheres. The book is "addressed both to research workers in the social sciences and to intelligent and interested members of the general public" and there is no doubt that the former will profit by the compact and concise discussions of these matters which it offers. But it is doubtful if these discussions are not too compact and concise if not perhaps also too technical for the latter, though in several places and especially in Professor Bartlett's contribution, there are useful hints about the work which can be done by students without specialized training.

O. DE SELINCOURT

Problems of Ethics By MORITZ SCHLICK. Authorized translation by DAVID RYAN, Ph.D. (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1939. Pp. xv+217. Price \$2.)

This translation of Schlick's *Fragen der Ethik* is to be welcomed for it renders accessible to English readers a treatment of moral problems on the principles of Logical Positivism by one of the most distinguished leaders of the Viennese school. The author's line of approach is clearly indicated in the preface and the opening chapter. Ethics, he holds, is not strictly a part of philosophy for philosophy is not a science (i.e. a system of propositions),

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but an *activity* to wit of exhibiting directly what scientific propositions mean. In so far as a treatise on ethics stimulates the reader to this activity, it may properly be called philosophical. But its main business is to affirm true propositions i.e. to be a science, and since the propositions in question all concern human behaviour, a scientific ethics falls within the ambit of psychology. Here its function is twofold. It has first to determine the highest i.e. the most general rule or norm ascertainable in men's actual value-judgments, in other words to attain the "merely linguistic result of determining the meanings of the words 'good' and 'evil'" (23). This is, however, a relatively unimportant and uninteresting task. The more serious concern of ethics is explanatory: to show why the rule thus ascertained serves as the standard of conduct. Since in all of the natural sciences every explanation can be conceived as a causal explanation (25) we inquire into the causes that is the regularity and order, of all human actions with the aim of discovering the motives of moral actions (27). Were there no psychological laws of motivation ethics as a branch of psychological science would be impossible. Schlick claims to have discovered such a law viz. that the decision of the will proceeds in the direction of the most pleasant end in view in the following manner: of the ideas which function as motives that one gains the upper hand which finally possesses the highest degree of pleasant emotional tone or the least unpleasant tone and thus the act in question is unambiguously determined (38-39).

It is all very simple far too simple indeed for the complexity of the object. Assume the methods of the physical sciences and you are led inexorably by way of Naturalism to a Hedonistic theory of conduct. Ethics is a science of facts which can brook no severance of 'ought' from is (21). The remaining chapters of the book are occupied partly with a refutation of rival theories of objective and absolute values partly with the attempt to reconcile the author's doctrine with the facts of man's moral experience. His criticisms especially of Kant to whose ethics he finds it necessary to bestow a moment's attention (110) are singularly unconvincing. On the other hand he faces frankly many of the difficulties ignored by prior Hedonistic thinkers. This is most evident in the discussion in Chapter III of the distinction between egoism and hedonistic morality. The pleasure that determines the mechanism of human action is not the anticipated pleasure of the attainment of the end desired but the present pleasure-tone of the idea of the end. Pleasure and pain can only be felt never thought or imagined (71). In Alexander's phrase they are objects not of contemplation but of enjoyment. Egoism therefore cannot be the impulse directed towards pleasure.

Selfishness is neither an impulse nor a collective name for a group of impulses. It designates—and here Dr. Schlick appeals to Butler—the existence of a certain relative strength between the inclinations, i.e. the subordination in conduct of social to other impulses. The essence of egoism in fact, is inconsiderateness (74-75). Moral valuations on the other hand are nothing but the emotional reactions with which human society responds to the pleasant and sorrowful consequences that according to the average experience, proceed from the modes of behaviour and character thus valued (78). Any end, even martyrdom may excite pleasure in the man who entertains it: the moral man is he who feels pleasure in conformity with the normal preferences of his social environment. Like Alexander, Schlick refers us, as the last word in ethical analysis to the sentiments of the standardized man.

To criticize such a theory in detail would be like flogging a dead horse. We have allowed that the author avoids many of the fallacies of his predecessors, he even goes out of his way to repeat some of the familiar criticisms on

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J. S. Mill's *Utilitarianism*. But there is little in the substance of his book that is original when compared with other naturalistic systems of ethics. In truth the writer's personality, of which we catch glimpses between the lines of his treatises is more attractive than his explicit teaching. There is something in his outlook upon life, especially in his handling of the problems of human sorrow and suffering (Ch. VI) and in his insistence on the worth of kindness and charity, that engages our sympathy, making us realize that in his case as in so many others, the Hedonistic philosopher is far more interesting and attractive than his Hedonism. But this emotional reaction can hardly be allowed on the principles of Logical Positivism, to lure us to allegiance to his doctrines.

Dr. Rymyn's translation, which is admirably clear, had been read and partially revised by the author before his tragic death. We note only two trifling lapses: on the last line of page 65 where "all of the acts of will" should read "all the acts of will" and on page 130, where the sentence on lines 11-13 from the foot seems hard to construe. There is a good index.

W. G. DE BURGH

Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology. By EMIL BRUNNER. Translated by Olive Wyon. (London: RTS-Lutterworth Press, 1939. Pp. 564. Price 13s. net.)

This is an interesting and important, but difficult and provoking book. It shows wide learning and keen insight; it is intensely serious in purpose, and passionately fervent in spirit; yet it irritates by its confident dogmatism and intolerant criticism. The translator, whose work can be very warmly commended, informs us that the English title, *Man in Revolt*, has been chosen by Dr. Brunner himself (p. 13). As it not only does not literally translate the German title *Der Mensch im Widerspruch* but observes the distinctive content and method of the whole volume, that change of terms is to be regretted. Throughout the volume the word *contradiction* is consistently used. Man as sinner against God is the *contradiction* of man as creature of God—this is the theme. The argument also advances by *contradictions* for to each question there is the Yes and the No, sometimes a loud Yes and a low No, at others *vice versa*. This *dialectical* method the author takes from Karl Barth, of whom he began as a disciple and an exponent more lucid than his master, but now has become a severe critic and at whose pen he has suffered theological excommunication. To put briefly the contradiction between them: Barth asserts an absolute contradiction of the creature by the sinner, man is altogether impotent for good and has lost his receptivity for and responsiveness to grace; unless grace restores it. Brunner asserts that the sinner is impotent to save himself, but he has still the capacity, however impaired, to receive and to respond to grace. Common to both is the assertion of the necessity of the divine revelation: the Word of God in Christ and the insufficiency of the human reason. Accordingly in this volume Brunner opposes the *Christian Anthropology* or doctrine of man as creature and as sinner to any scientific or philosophical conception resting on the autonomy of man's mind.

On the one hand he uses the terms of Christian dogma: Adam, the Serpent, the Fall, original sin; and gives the impression that his theology disregards modern thinking; but on the other he accepts the current criticism of the Bible, makes no claim for the story of Genesis as authentic history, rejects Augustinianism and even the doctrine of the Reformers in regard to man and sin, and offers an original restatement, consistent with modern know-

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ledge, but challenging throughout all modern thinking which does not take the Biblical doctrine as he expounds it for guide into those regions which reason cannot explore and revelation alone discloses. The frequent references show his indebtedness to Luther more than Calvin but his main dependence seems to be in the Danish thinker Kierkegaard whose circumstances, character and career, however marked his genius would make me distrustful of the balance of his judgments.

The first main section *Foundations* is an exposition of the Biblical data for this Christian anthropology and deals with the Word of God as Source of Being as well as Knowledge, the Origin of Man as the Image of God, the destruction of that Image by sin and the conflict between the origin of man as God's creature and the actuality of man as sinner. The interest of this exposition in its details might probably be confined to theological experts and might seem out of place in the pages of *Philosophy* and therefore I content myself with a brief summary. Man is being created for creation is not a past event but a present process and the Word a constant activity in the *image of God* as personal that is ever deciding his own activity but responsible to God who makes him in love and for love to respond to God's love in love for God and man with whom he is created for community. In sinning disowning this responsibility to God and claiming to be master of his fate and captain of his soul man destroys that image not wholly but so far that he cannot himself restore it and yet can decide to submit to the grace of God which alone can recover his loss. As sinner his whole personality is tainted with sin and even his pursuit of truth effort for goodness desire toward God show this perversion of the image.

His relation to God as having his origin in God and having contradicted his origin in his sin is supra temporal and supra spacial and yet man—this contradiction—lives and acts in time and space. Of the themes of the origin of the soul the author seems to reject *traducianism* inheritance from parents he asserts *creationism* God is creating every soul in and by the Word and his rather obscure teaching about the relation of man to God is supra temporal or supra spacial his perversion of his origin in the destruction of God's image, shows affinities to Origen's theory of pre-existence. Not going as far as Barth in asserting the destruction of the image by sin Brunner nevertheless seems to me to apply the Christian standard universally and to condemn as sin what should be described as ignorance and imperfection. Not rejecting the theory of evolution in nature he does not adequately in history recognize the inevitableness of gradualness. Although he does try to be appreciative of what is good and true in man his judgment is less just because less kindly than would be Christ's or even Paul's by whose theology he seems to be most influenced. I trust I have not misinterpreted him but that is as accurate a statement of his doctrine as I understand it that I am competent to give after careful study.

The second main section *Development of the Theme* should perhaps be of greater interest to students of philosophy as he applies this doctrine to human personality as created by God in His image but in decay because of sin. He charges the human reason in its claim to autonomy with the ambition to deify man. To man in bondage to sin he leaves a narrower liberty than moral theory has often claimed. Human individuality given by God is overdone by sin and so its complement—community—is not fully realized. His treatment of character—what a man makes by his decisions of his individuality—seems to be unsatisfactory as he finds in it only sin and asserts that it must be overcome by faith for surely the saint has and keeps character as well as the sinner. More congruous with my judgment is his treatment of the

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relation of individuality in the wider sense of the differences among man to humanity, the common possession. A special chapter is reserved for what seems to be a sane discussion of the differences of sex. I have found the discussion of soul and body confusing as the biblical terms are used without adequate recognition of what psychology can contribute to the elucidation of human personality. I have already referred to his treatment of evolution. Under the title "Man in the Cosmos," he seeks to vindicate man's unique significance despite the vastness of space and the duration of time modern knowledge discloses. Dealing with man in history, he challenges the assumption of inevitable progress, and finds its significance in redemption. The closing chapter of this section is rather gloomy in its emphasis on death and on man's eternal destiny as doom rather than as boon.

The *Epilogue* does give glimpses of glory to relieve the gloom in showing how in the Christian Redemption there is the Removal of the Contradiction between man as he actually is, and man as he is intended to be. He does not rise to the larger hope as in his last sentence he still affirms that if man acts against his divine destiny, it becomes his curse, as well as that now in faith and then in sight the divine image may be restored (p. 559). To me that larger hope is a necessity and rests on the assurance that He who took the responsibility to create man as free to sin must have the resources to redeem man from his bondage to sin. With the author's main contention that man can be saved from sin only by divine grace through human faith I am in agreement although he seems to me to condemn as sin what does not deserve that judgment. I agree with him also that no philosophy is adequate which does not take due account of man's moral conscience and religious consciousness as well as his pure reason, including the witness of what Christians believe to be the divine revelation in Christ, but he seems to me to depreciate unduly the value of human knowledge and thought, which, even if not professedly Christian, is sincere and reverent, for he sees more of the contradiction of sin and less of the creation of God in human history than I can and do. This book is a contradiction of many a philosophy serious and competent enough to claim the attention of the readers of *Philosophy*.

ALFRED E. GARVE

Friedrich Paulsen: An Autobiography Translated and edited by THEODOR LORENZ, with a Foreword by Nicholas Murray Butler (New York: Columbia University Press; London: 1938, Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford 1939. Pp. x + 514. Price \$3.75, 18s. 6d.)

This substantial volume has two parts. Part I, "Recollections of my Youth," appeared in German in 1909, a year after Paulsen's death. It is out of print in Germany, and certain omissions in its final chapter (concerning persons then living) are now restored. It is a lively continuous narrative composed very largely to tell Paulsen's first wife what sort of environment, forebears, and training her husband had had. The second part is very different. It begins indeed with a narrative chapter "The first years of my marriage," but the editor has had to piece the narrative together from sundry drafts. Thereafter there is a series of shortish "annals" from 1883 to 1908. Nothing in the second part has been published before and it will probably never appear in its original German.

Paulsen was a liberal Berlin professor when Berlin was very great among the universities of the world. He was proud of his profession: "To minister to a selected number of the youth of our nation," he says (p. 463), "nay, of the

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youth of all nations as we now see it gathering at our larger German universities—by assisting them during their most receptive years in forming definite ideas about the world and human life and in attaining durable convictions concerning the things that are really worth while, is it not a task which in importance and dignity outranks all other tasks that human life has to offer?" Officially a teacher of pedagogics as much as of philosophy, Paulsen was also very well known as a writer on the latter subject *tests* his much translated *Ethics* and his *Introduction to Philosophy*. He was an eager speaker, an inveterate publicist, a great friend especially to the young. All this is faithfully reflected in the book, and very skilfully too, but the book has further claims on one's attention. Impressed by the rapidity of social changes in Germany in the Bismarckian and post-Bismarckian era, Paulsen made a special effort to recall the conditions of life in the Frisia of his boyhood and to describe his schooling faithfully from the inside. Thus occupies the first hundred pages of the book, and there is a further seventy pages before he became a matriculated student at the University of Erlangen—his first choice in what was to be a series of universities.

In short, the book abounds with significant detail about schools, about *Burschenschaften*, about the advice of the military authorities to postpone his *Dienst* when the Franco-German war had broken out (he became an unusually efficient artilleryman). It also contains vivid short portraits of Trendelenburg, Erdmann, and other philosophers, as well as a good deal of candid comment about the backstairs of university appointments and about the sovereign insolence of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Speaking generally, however, readers whose interests lie in philosophy rather than in the administration of education will not find very much in the book to stretch their intellectual muscles. It is in history, social theory, and education that the book is really informative. The keenness and the candour of the author's vision of the life around him, admirably expressed by a vivid and skilful pen, make the work.

Mr. Lorenz's translation is fluent and satisfying. The affectionate pains he has taken in interpreting his author leaves nothing to be mended, and he supplies an adequate working bibliography.

JOHN LAIRD

The Meaning of the Humanities: Five Essays by Ralph Barton Perry and others
 Edited with an introduction by Theodore Meyer Greene (Princeton University Press, London: Humphrey Milford, 1938)
 Pp. vii + 178. Price \$2.50 (13s.)

The humanities have been regarded as a group of cultural subjects in the educational curriculum differentiated from technical and scientific subjects, or more narrowly they have been limited to Greek and Roman studies. The distinguished contributors to this symposium are concerned to establish and exemplify another definition in terms of human freedom and individuality. Professor Perry (whose participation were other grounds absent, would justify this review) gives *A Definition of the Humanities*. Professor Krey adds a very able chapter on 'History and the Humanities' while Professors Panofsky, Calhoun, and Chuard write respectively on Art, Theology, and Literature.

According to Perry, the humanities 'embrace whatever influences conduce to freedom. By 'freedom' he means 'enlightened choice' but choice depends primarily upon available alternatives. Learning is, therefore, the first condition of human freedom. To this he adds imagination, sympathy, and civility. As occasions and incentives to such human freedom virtually any subjects of

study, rightly pursued may be regarded as humanities. A merely retrospective humanism—a cult of the past—is not liberating but enslaving. Nevertheless, Greek and Roman studies, which were accidentally humanizing to the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries *may* be humanizing to day. These are no more *essentially* humanizing than any other study. The sciences and social studies also *may* be humanizing or may not. Under present conditions of extreme specialization a peculiar responsibility as humanities rests upon history and philosophy. This last point is also emphasized by the Editor in his introduction.

RALPH E. STEDMAN

Readings in Jurisprudence By JEROME HALL, Professor of Law, Louisiana State University (Indianapolis: The Bobbs Merrill Co. 1938 Pp. xix + 1183 Price £2)

This collection of readings (we are told) was designed to be used primarily in schools as a source book and to facilitate analysis of problems of jurisprudence.

The book is divided into three parts which deal respectively with the philosophy of law, analytical jurisprudence, and law and social science.

The first part opens with a statement of the classical sources of natural law theory and proceeds in a series of chapters, to deal with such topics as historical jurisprudence, transcendental idealism, utilitarianism, pragmatism, and so forth.

The second part, after a short introduction, presents a series of useful chapters on logic and law and the nature of law and, after an examination of the terminology of certain basic concepts of the law, proceeds to expound the theory of the syllogism and the logic of analogy, and ends with chapters on classification and on formal science.

In the third part, which deals with law and social science, there are chapters on science and scientific method and on the nature of social science, on the general theory of an empirical science of law, on primitive law and law and custom, on social and legal institutions and (to name no others) on legislation and social problems.

It will be manifest that the book is one of considerable value and one which exhibits much of the best thought of all times concerning jurisprudence, and which integrates the thinking of jurists with the whole field of philosophy and of social science. As the book is primarily designed for use in American schools and colleges, it is perhaps natural that it should put a certain emphasis upon English and American contributions to the science of law. One imagines that certain Anglo-American writers now living will be honoured, perhaps above their degree, by finding their names in juxtaposition with the great names of Plato and Aristotle and Aquinas and Grotius and Hobbes and Kant and Jhering. And not only are some names included which one scarcely expects to find, but other names are missing which might surely have deserved a mention.

In the chapter on natural law, which runs to more than 80 pages, one looks in vain for any reference to such names as that of Franciscus de Vittoria, Taparelli d'Azeglio and (in our own time) Louis le Fur, whose lectures on *La Théorie de Droit Naturel* are to be found in the *Recueil* of the *Académie de Droit International* for the year 1927. The omission of the name of Professor le Fur here and elsewhere is all the more notable since he is one of the two persons who inspired the work on *The Revival of Natural Law Concepts* by

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Charles Grove Haines of Harvard some ten years ago. And the second of those persons Professor del Vecchio is given his proper place in the chapter on empiricism and realism.

One misses also the names of Geny and Hauriou which might have found a place by way of supplement to the transient theories of Duguit.

We have nothing but praise for the second part, which relates law to logic but venture to suggest that if a new edition is contemplated a place should be found here or elsewhere for a chapter relating law to psychology and also to metaphysics. We imagine that some useful comments on this relation of law to psychology and metaphysics are to be found in the notes written by the French Dominican fathers to their new translation of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas Aquinas.

But these criticisms are not intended and must not be taken to detract from the value of this book as a source book of jurisprudence. It is of high value. There is nothing (so far as we are aware) like it in the English tongue and one is delighted to know that there are students in American schools and colleges who are capable of assimilating the learning it contains.

RICHARD O SULLIVAN

Philosopher's Holiday By IRWIN EDMAN (London Constable & Co. 1939)
Pp. xx+284. Price 10s. net.)

The gods have been very kind to Professor Irwin Edman. They have allowed him to become as good a man of letters as of ideas and he is by trade a philosopher of note. In the present book he has drawn upon most not quite all of his many talents and in his rôle of itinerant humanist both geographically and intellectually has produced a fascinating medley of autobiography, fantasy and grave perpendings. From the moment when he met a philosopher doctor without benefit of academic philosophy and bearing the unbelievably appropriate name of M. Platon Mr. Edman's liberal sage and gently ironical spirit finds ample scope. Some of the things he says, I suppose, are too good to be new but nearly all of them seem fresh to me. It is an advantage, I think, that Mr. Edman's prose is less jewelled and his outlook rather less disillusioned than his master's Santayana's. Indeed I am glad that he has some prejudices. But he gives us just enough and not too much of his office in Philosophy Hall and almost enough (as a sample) of his contacts with real or nearly real men and places and ideas.

In an impersonal and unofficial sort of way the book is very largely autobiography. It tells us desultorily about the author's boyhood in little older New York, about his adolescent intimations concerning the puzzles and pathos of time about his teachers at school as well as at Columbia University, about his pupils, about the identity of the sophomore type in Beirut as well as in America, about his non-academic *confidés* of the spirit as well as about the inn-keeper's daughter and why she hadn't received a proposal from M. Felsen, and about the way in which his most efficient housekeeper prepared a lunch for Father Ford.

But I can't describe the substance of the book (if it has a substance and not something better than substance) any more than I can adequately indicate its charm. Even if I had the knack of doing that sort of thing I could not ask for the space. I think Mr. Edman would like to think that he has the sort of sanity that he thinks Englishmen like to think that they have—with a little more pep to improve it, for at all costs he would avoid being genteel.

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But I may very well be wrong—or unfortunate in the way in which I have expressed my impression

Among the few misprints one is rather amusing It is "dielectric materialism" in p 252 I think Mr Edman holds that dialectical materialism is rather dielectric i.e non conducting

JOHN LAIRD

Books received also —

- J LINDSAY *A Short History of Culture* London V Gollancz, Ltd 1939 Pp 408 15s
- L WESTERMARCK *Christianity and Morals* London Kegan Paul Trench Trubner & Co 1939 Pp xiii + 427 21s
- R OTTO (Translated and edited by J E Turner) *The Original Gita The Song of the Supreme Exalted One* London G Allen & Unwin Ltd 1939 Pp 309 15s
- THE SIRDAR INBAL ALI SHAH *The Spirit of the East An Anthology of the Scriptures of the East* With explanatory Introduction London T Nelson & Sons Ltd 1939 Pp 277 5s
- M M DESAI *Surprise (British Journal of Psychology Monograph Supplement XXII)* London Cambridge University Press 1939 Pp vii + 124 12s 6d
- H D J WHITE *Goals of Life For Students of Psychology and Ethics* London C W Daniel Co 1939 Pp 102 3s 6d
- D D KANGA *Where Theosophy and Science Meet A Stimulus to Modern Thought Part III God From Humanity to Divinity* Adyar, Madras Adyar Library Association 1939 Pp xx + 260 Rs 2 4
- P HARLOW *The Shortest Way with the Jews* London G Allen & Unwin Ltd 1939 Pp 256 6s
- E C PARSONS *Pueblo Indian Religion* Chicago University of Chicago Press 1939 Vol I Pp xviii + 549 Vol II Pp 551-1275 35s the set
- A H KAMMAT *Social Forces in Personality Stunting* Cambridge Mass Sci Art Publishers 1939 Pp 256 \$2 50
- Plato and Parmenides Parmenides "Way of Truth" and Plato's "Parmenides"* Translated with a Running Commentary, by F M Cornford London Kegan Paul Trench Trubner & Co 1939 Pp xvii + 251 12s 6d
- G CATLIN *The Anglo Saxon Tradition* London Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co Ltd 1939 Pp xiii + 286 10s 6d
- J A NICHOLSON *An Introductory Course in Philosophy* New York and London The Macmillan Co 1939 Pp xii + 508 12s
- H W B JOSEPH *Harold Henry Joachim 1868-1938 (From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol XXIV)* London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp 29 2s 6d
- J B BURGESS *Introduction to the History of Philosophy* London McGraw-Hill Publishing Co 1939 Pp xi + 631 18s
- J FEIBLEMAN *In Praise of Comedy A Study in its Theory and Practice* London G Allen & Unwin, Ltd 1939 Pp 284 10s 6d
- W M URBAN *Language and Reality The Philosophy of Language and the Principles of Symbolism* London G Allen & Unwin, Ltd 1939 Pp 755 21s
- W STEKEL (Translated by E and C Paul) *Technique of Analytical Psychotherapy* London John Lane the Bodley Head 1939 Pp xvii + 408 21s

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- VARIOUS AUTHORS (Individual Psychology Medical Pamphlets No 21)
The Significance of Dreams Escape into Invalidism The Infectious Quality of Neurosis, The Sexual Demand London C W Daniel Co 1939 Pp 57 2s 6d
- P R ANDERSON and M H FISCH *Philosophy in America from the Puritans to James* With Representative Selections New York and London D Appleton Century Co 1939 Pp xiii + 570 18s
- R G COLLINGWOOD *An Autobiography* London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp 167 7s 6d
- G R MALKANI *Philosophy of the Self of a System of Idealism based upon "Advait Vedanta"* Amalner Indian Institute of Philosophy 1939 Pp vii + 218
- J BAILLIE *Our Knowledge of God* London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp ix + 263 8s 6d
- A A BOWMAN *A Sacramental Universe Being a Study in the Metaphysics of Experience* Princeton Princeton University Press, London Oxford University Press Humphrey Milford 1939 Pp xxviii + 428 \$5 00 22s 6d
- S C CHATTERJEE and D M DATTA *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* University of Calcutta 1939 Pp xviii + 464
- B STEVENS *The Psychology of Physics* Manchester Sherratt & Hughes Pp xvi + 278 7s 6d
- J BUCHLER (Foreword by E Nagel) *Charles Peirce's Empiricism* London Kegan Paul Trench Trubner & Co 1939 Pp xvii + 275 12s 6d
- J DEWEY *Theory of Valuation* (International Encyclopedia of Unified Science Vol II No 4) University of Chicago Press London Cambridge University Press 1939 Pp vii + 67 5s
- J DELVOLVÉ *De la Matière en Général et plus particulièrement de la Matière Nodique* Paris Boivin et Cie Pp 272 Fr 30
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- J BELIN *Les Démarches de la Pensée Sociale D'après des textes inédits de la période révolutionnaire (1789-1792)* Paris Hermann et Cie 1939 Pp 98 Fr 20
- J BELIN *La Logique d'une Idée Force L Idée d'Utilité Sociale et la Révolution Française (1789-1792)* Paris Hermann et Cie 1939 Pp 635 Fr 120
- M CAMPO *Cristiano Wolffe e il Razionalismo Precritico* Milano Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero" 1939 Tomo primo Pp xix + 389 Tomo secondo Pp xii + 684 Due tomi Lire cinquanta
- S V ROVIGHI *La Filosofia di Edmund Husserl* Milano Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero" 1939 Pp ix + 173 Lire Quattordici
- J B VICO (Traducción por J J Cuccaro) *Sabiduría Primitiva de los Italianos Desentendiada de los Orígenes de la Lengua Latina* 1710 Instituto de Filosofía Buenos Aires 1939 Pp 142
- J C LANTIER *Cursos Filosóficos Dictados en Buenos Aires en 1819 Con las Polemicas Referentes a la Introduccion de la Ideologia en la Argentina* Buenos Aires Instituto de Filosofía 1938 Pp 200 + vii
- "ILUHANIDADES Tomo XXVI Filosofía y Educacion Homenaje a Domingo Faustino Sarmiento en el Cincuentenario de su Muerte (Director A D Calcagno) La Plata, Argentina Universidad Nacional de La Plata 1938 Pp 546

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

SIR

May I acknowledge Mr Coates's reply to the questions which I put in the course of my brief review of his book *A Basis of Opinion*?

Perhaps my questions and his answers will serve without further discussion to draw attention to a work which—as I am glad to repeat—certainly emerges above the ruck and is certainly worth reading

Yours faithfully,

R. E. STEDMAN

ST ANDREW'S UNIVERSITY

July 22 1939

THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

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INSTITUTE NOTES

ANNUAL MEETING

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT

THE fourteenth Annual General Meeting was held at the House of Lords on Wednesday June 28th. After the meeting Viscount and Viscountess Samuel received the members of the Institute and their friends on the Terrace, where tea was served.

The Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the year were unanimously adopted. The President Lord Samuel, in the course of his observations said:

The Institute now has close upon 1300 members. With the inevitable losses year by year through death or resignation the efforts that are constantly made to increase the membership hardly suffice to maintain it. Could our numbers be increased our influence would be the greater, and the difficulties of finance would speedily disappear. That there is need for an Institute such as this and for the strengthening of it, the present condition of the world abundantly shows. Are there any means by which our activities could be expanded and by making the Institute even more useful than it now is increase its attraction to a wider circle?

"Mr Hooper our Director of Studies and Editor of the excellent Quarterly, wrote to me recently on this matter and it occurred to me that our members might be invited to make suggestions to that end. If any of those present

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would be good enough to communicate with him or with me, I can assure them that any practical proposal would receive the careful consideration of the Officers and Executive Committee

' It is proposed to print in *Philosophy* a report of these observations and thereby to extend this invitation to all its readers "

Special Notice

Since at the time of going to press, the country is already in a state of war we are compelled to inform members of the Institute and the general public that no Lectures will be given or Public Meetings held until further notice

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[Suggested]

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